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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
Ziel der vorliegenden Studie ist die Analyse der Verwaltungspolitik und der Institutionen 
in Entwicklungsprojekten am Beispiel von zwei Projekten zur Entwicklung von 
Wassereinzugsgebieten
1
: 1) dem Indo-German Watershed Development Programm in 
Maharashtra (Westindien) und 2) dem Integrated Watershed Development Projekt, 
Shiwalik Hills-II in Uttarakhand (Nordindien). Anliegen dieser Arbeit ist es, die 
Entwicklung des Verwaltungsdiskurses in zwei Fällen zu beobachten und sein Verhältnis 
zu Politik, Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie zu analysieren. Diese Untersuchung kommt zu 
dem Schluss, dass sich die Sphäre der Öffentlichkeit durch die Institutionen und den 
Diskurs in Entwicklungsprojekten verändert hat, was sich am deutlichsten im Phänomen 
der Entpolitisierung ausdrückt. Entpolitisierung ist eine Form der Staatskunst und eine 
Strategie des Regierens, die ihrerseits als Sammelbegriff für eine Vielzahl von 
Symptomen zu verstehen ist. In den Fallstudien wird veranschaulicht, wie das Treffen 
von politischen Entscheidungen im Sinne einer informierten, kritischen Diskussion der 
Bürgerinnen und Bürger über 'watershed policies', durch das Überreden zu bestimmten 
Interventionen und Schlussfolgerungen von ‚experten‟2 ersetzt wurde. 
 
I. Prolog 
 
Projekte zur Entwicklung von Wassereinzugsgebieten finden innerhalb der Grenzen von 
hydrologischen Einzugsgebieten statt und setzen sich zusammen aus physischen 
Interventionen wie Boden- und Wasserschutzmaßnahmen (z.B. Bau von 
Rückhaltedämmen und Sickergräben,  Aufforstung) sowie institutionellen Interventionen 
(z.B. Organisation von Komitees
3
 oder Selbsthilfegruppen für das Management von 
Wassereinzugsgebieten oder Etablierung von Kleinkreditgesellschaften und 
Waldschutzgruppen).  
                                                 
1
 Watershed Development Projects: Feststehender englischer Begriff, der die Entwicklung von 
Wassereinzugsgebieten bezeichnet. 
2
 Vgl. Evers (2005) 
3
 Village Watershed Committee - VWC: (Dorf-) Wasserkomitee, welches eigens für die Umsetzung eines 
Watershed Programms ins Leben gerufen wird und für die Durchführung verantwortlich ist.  
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Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht die Umsetzung von lokalen Governance-
Praktiken, politischen Präferenzen und Institutionen in zwei von Geberorganisationen 
geförderten Projekten in Indien, und zwar IGWDP in Maharashtra und Shiwalik Hills-II 
in Uttarakhand. 
Insbesondere seit dem Weltwasserforum in Den Haag im Jahr 2000 ist ‚Governance‟ ein 
zentraler Bestandteil internationaler Wasserdiskurse: nicht nur wegen der Einführung 
neuer Ideen wie Verantwortlichkeit und Transparenz in die internationale Diskussion, 
sondern auch weil nun der Mainstream-Entwicklungsdiskurs zum Thema 
Wasserressourcen – bis dato beherrscht von Ingenieuren und Hydrologen – erstmals mit 
politischen Prozessen und mit Politik in Verbindung gebracht wurde. Das Zitat “Die 
Weltwasserkrise ist eine Krise von Governance, nicht eine Krise von Knappheit“ aus der 
No Water No Future Rede des niederländischen Kronprinzen wird seitdem oft 
wiedergegeben und ist zum Wahlspruch der globalen Wasserressourcenstudien 
geworden.
4
 
In der Literatur zur Entwicklungszusammenarbeit werden dem Begriff ‚Governance‟ 
zwei Bedeutungen zugrunde gelegt: Erstens ein Verwaltungs- und Managementgedanke, 
der primär mit der offiziellen Position der Weltbank zusammenhängt. Dieser Gedanke 
betont unter dem Label 'good order', Verwaltungs- und Managementprobleme. Die zweite 
Perspektive geht einen Schritt weiter, indem die demokratische Gestaltung von 
politischen Prozessen für nachhaltige Entwicklung integriert wird. Im Feld hingegen 
existiert in der Form eines komplizierten Netzwerks aus Menschen und Institutionen eine 
dritte Art von Governance, die sich aus Management und aggregierter 
Entscheidungsfindung
5
  zusammensetzt.  
 
II. Hintergrund  
 
Der folgende Abschnitt beschreibt das Konzept der ‚selbstverwalteten 
Wassereinzugsgebiete‟, die geographische Lage der beiden Projekte und die zunehmend 
wichtige Rolle der Geberorganisationen in der Entwicklung von Wassereinzugsgebieten 
nach der Liberalisierung der indischen Wirtschaft in den 1990er Jahren. 
                                                 
4
 Vgl. Mollinga (2007)  
5
 Vgl. Young (2000: 19) 
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Der englische Begriff ‚Watershed‟ entwickelte sich aus dem deutschen Wort 
Wasserscheide (vgl. Reimold, 1998:1) und bezeichnete ursprünglich die schmale, erhöhte 
Landfläche, die zwei Abflussbecken teilt; es ist die Grenzlinie eines Ablaufbeckens (vgl. 
Heathcote, 1998: 4). Der Begriff ‚Watershed‟ bezieht sich auf einen ‚Wendepunkt‟ oder 
eine ‚Änderung‟ im alltäglichen englischen Sprachgebrauch. Er dient als Trennlinie; z. B. 
wird auch ein Wendepunkt in der Geschichte als ‚watershed‟ bezeichnet.  
Im Zusammenhang mit ‚Watershed Management‟ hat sich die Bedeutung des Begriffes 
verschoben und er bezeichnet hier das Abflussbecken selbst (vgl. Heathcote, 1998: 4).  
Dieses Becken ist das Einzugsgebiet eines Wasserlaufes oder Flusses, d.h. der 
Niederschlag, der in diesem Gebiet fällt, speist einen bestimmten Fluss (vgl. Farrington, 
1999: 1). Ein Watershed ist also ein natürlich abgegrenztes Gebiet, und die 
hydrologischen Prozesse in diesem Gebiet sind voneinander abhängig, wie auch alle 
natürlichen Ressourcen in einem Watershed voneinander beeinflusst werden. Das 
Watershed beinhaltet sowohl die Böden, die Vegetation, das Oberflächen- und 
Grundwasser, als auch die dort lebenden Tiere und die Menschen, die Einfluss auf die 
Natur ausüben (vgl. Reimold, 1998: 1).  
Die Teilnahme der internationalen Geberorganisationen an Wassereinzugs-
gebietsentwicklungsprojekten in Indien hat seit 1992 – nach der Liberalisierung – stark 
zugenommen. Im Jahr 2005 umfassten von internationalen Gebern unterstützte Projekte 
eine Fläche von 2,72 Millionen Hektar mit Investitionen von 4968,93 INR crores
6
. 
Geberorganisationen arbeiten vor allem auf nationaler und bundesstaatlicher Ebene mit 
den Ministerien der indischen Regierung zusammen. Dabei beziehen sie internationale, 
nationale und lokale Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NROs) sowie die Menschen vor Ort 
ein. In diesem Zusammenhang wurden für die vorliegende Arbeit zwei gebergeförderte 
Watershed-Projekte, die darin vorhandenden Institutionen und ihre Governancepraktiken 
analysiert.  
 
Fall-I: Indo-German Watershed Development Programm (IGWDP) Maharashtra  
Das ‚Indo-German Watershed Development Programm‟ (IGWDP) ist ein laufendes 
Projekt, das vom Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und 
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 GoI/ MoRD (2006). Crore ist eine indische Einheit; ein Crore entspricht 10 000 000 Rupien.  
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Entwicklung (BMZ) gefördert wird. Es wurde im Jahr 1992 eingeführt und läuft weiter 
bis 2009. Dabei hat ‚Watershed Organisation Trust‟ (WOTR), eine indische NRO, die 
Durchführung übernommen. Das Projekt befindet sich in Ahmednagar Bezirk im 
Bundesstaat Maharashtra im Westen Indiens (siehe Karte 1).  
Ahmednagar wird von der indischen Regierung als ein dürreanfälliges Gebiet mit 
geringen und erratischen Niederschlägen bezeichnet. Acht von den 13 talukas 
(Teilbereiche eines Landkreises) in Ahmednagar sind ständig von Wasserknappheit aus 
Gründen unregelmäßiger und geringer Niederschläge betroffen.  
Die Regierung von Maharashtra schreibt dem Programm von Boden- und Wasserschutz 
in ihrem Bundesstaat eine besondere Bedeutung zu. Dieses Programm wurde zum ersten 
Mal in 1958/59 eingeführt. Seit diesen ersten Bemühungen hat sich das Programm 
mehrfach weiterentwickelt. Derzeit führt das IGWDP allein 104 Entwicklungsprojekte in 
und um Ahmednagar durch und umfasst  204 Dörfer. Dabei sind u.a. mehr als 1200 
Mikro-Kredit-Gesellschaften für Frauen eingerichtet worden. Das Projekt befasst sich 
weiter mit Themen zu Gesundheit und Emanzipation. 
 
Fall-II: Shiwalik Hills-II Projekt, Uttarakhand 
Das zweite Projekt, Shiwalik Hills-II, befindet sich im Yamkeshwar Block von Pauri 
Garhwal Bezirk im Bundesstaat Uttarakhand in Nordindien (siehe Karte 2). Das hügelige 
Gelände mit seinen bewaldeten Hängen erhält ausreichende Niederschläge von Mitte Juni 
bis Mitte September. Gelegentliche Niederschläge sind auch im Winter zu verzeichnen. 
Die Region erhält durchschnittlich 2180 mm Regen pro Jahr, ungefähr 90 Prozent davon 
ergeben sich aus dem Monsun. 
Trotz reichlichem Regen leidet dieses Gebiet unter Wassermangel und 
Trinkwasserknappheit in den Sommermonaten. Dies begründet sich darin, dass das 
meiste Regenwasser wegen des hügeligen Geländes aus dem Gebiet abfließt. Die 
Beschaffenheit der steinigen Böden erhöht die Wassererosion. Dieses Wasser kann durch 
Waldentwicklung, Aufforstungsmaßnahmen, und den Bau von Staudämmen am 
Abfließen gehindert und in bestimmten Bereichen ‚geerntet‟ werden.  
Watershedentwicklungsprojekte in dieser Region zielen daher auf diese Aufgabe ab. Die 
größte Herausforderung ist dabei das Speichern von Wasser über einen längeren Zeitraum 
bis zu neun Monaten. Das so genannte ‚Integrated Watershed Development Project 
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(Shiwalik) Hills-II‟ wurde in den Jahren 1999 mit diesem Ziel eingeführt. Es wurde von 
der Weltbank gefördert und dauerte bis September 2005.  
 
Das Hills-II-Projekt und das IGWDP errichten lokale dörfliche Institutionen für die 
Durchführung der Projekte.  
Die Beteiligung von Nichtregierungsorganisationen und die Bildung von Ausschüssen 
(ohne die gewählte lokale Regierung,  Gram Panchayat in Indien
7
) scheint überraschend 
angesichts der Tatsache, dass die 73. Verfassungsänderung 1993 die lokale Regierung zur 
Aufnahme und Durchführung von Watershed-Entwicklungsprogrammen im Dorf 
ermächtigt
8
. Im breiteren Rahmen der Politik der "guten/verantwortungsbewussten 
Regierungsführung" scheinen die neuen Institutionen allerdings an der richtigen Stelle 
angesiedelt zu sein. Die Regierung zieht sich in den Hintergrund und die Projekte werden 
durch NROs oder ähnlich bevollmächtigte Gremien implementiert. Dabei wird 
Watershedentwicklung als ein technisches Thema behandelt, welches von der lokalen 
Gram Panchayat -Politik und den Änderungen in Ministerien wegen Wahlen und 
politischen Ereignissen abgegrenzt bleiben soll. 
"Good Governance" oder verantwortungsbewusste Regierungsführung in der Planung 
und Umsetzung ist ein wichtiger, wenn auch nicht der einzige wichtige Aspekt der 
gebergestützten Watershedentwicklungsprojekte. Die Restrukturierung und 
Neugestaltung des Diskurses und der Institutionen für die Umsetzung von 
Watershedprogrammen findet auf verschiedenen Ebenen (Geberorganisationen, nationale 
NROs, quasi-staatliche Organisationen, Dorfgemeinschaft) statt und berührt dabei 
technische / physische, organisatorische, sozioökonomische und politische Dimensionen.  
Diese Arbeit zielt darauf ab, diese verschiedenen Aspekte der Watershedentwicklung 
sowie die politischen Präferenzen und Einrichtungen zur Durchführung der beiden Fälle 
unter dem Konzept der Entpolitisierung zu integrieren. Auf diese Weise gewinnt die 
Öffentlichkeitsforschung einen empirischen Zugang zur Meinungs- und Willensbildung 
                                                 
7
 Dorfkomitee; traditionell bestand das Gram Panchayat aus fünf (panch) Mitgliedern.  
8
 Dadurch sollte Entscheidungsgewalt sowie soziale und ökonomische Gerechtigkeit in die Häuser der 
Menschen gebracht werden. Im Laufe der Zeit zeigte sich jedoch die Schwerigkeit bzw. die Unfähigkeit der 
Administration, die neue Getsetzeslage indienweit umzusetzen.  
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der Akteure im Bereich des Watershed Developments, die sich mit den Begriffen 
deliberative Politik und Entpolitisierung verbinden lassen.  
 
III. Problemstellung und die zentrale Forschungsfrage 
 
Diese Studie befasst sich mit zwei grundlegenden Aufgaben. Die erste, praktische und 
zielgerichtete, Aufgabe ist die Betrachtung von politischen Dimensionen der 
Watershedentwicklungsprojekte, d.h. den Praktiken und Institutionen in den beiden 
ausgewählten Projekten. Die zweite, akademische und allgemeine, Aufgabe ist, einen 
Beitrag zur weiteren Entwicklung der politischen Analyse der Watershedverwaltung im 
konzeptionellen Rahmen der Entpolitisierung zu leisten. Das Ziel hier ist die Entwicklung 
eines analytischen Werkzeugs zur Untersuchung der Auswirkungen der verschiedenen 
Governance-Strategien in den Watershedentwicklungsprojekten, vor allem ihre 
diskursive Konstruktion und institutionelle Formen. Dieses Werkzeug wird dann bei der 
Analyse der zwei Fallstudien eingesetzt.   
Der Zweck dieser Arbeit ist darüber hinaus, nach Lösungen auf dem Weg zu einer 
demokratischen Verwaltung der Watershedentwicklung in Indien zu suchen. Diese Studie 
liefert nicht nur die Belege für eine kritische Bewertung der derzeitigen politischen 
Präferenzen und Institutionen, sondern behandelt auch weitergehende Auswirkungen, 
welche eine Demokratisierung von Entwicklung schaffen. Die Studie belegt, dass trotz 
des jüngsten Einzugs der ‚Politik‟ in den internationalen Diskurs Wasser, die meisten 
Studien und Praktiken der Watershedentwicklung innerhalb ihrer technischen oder 
wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen bleiben.  
Bei der Literaturstudie finden sich zahlreiche Vorträge und Artikel über Projekte, die sich 
mit verschiedenen Themen befassen, z.B. dazu, welche Institutionen am besten zu guter 
Regierungsführung passen, zur Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Regierung und NROs, zur 
Beteiligung der einheimischen Bevölkerung u.ä.. Eine Menge von Literatur befasst sich 
auch mit Wassereinzugsgebieten und Nachhaltigkeit, mit dem Fehlen von "Good 
Governance", mit Macht und Korruption, damit, wie Projekte von der Elite dominiert 
werden und den Armen nicht nutzen und wie das Thema zusammen mit 
Frauenemanzipation ein bevorzugter Bereich von Entwicklungsinterventionen sein soll.  
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Jedoch gibt es wesentlich weniger Studien, welche die Verwaltung eines 
Watershedprojektes, seine Vorgehensweise und seine Durchführung sowie die breiteren 
Auswirkung des Projekts auf Demokratisierung studieren und damit die politischen 
Dimensionen der Watershedentwicklung als eine Darstellung einer umfassenden 
Regierungsstrategie analysieren. Die aktuelle Vorgehensweise der Watershedentwicklung 
in ihrem diskursiven Aufbau und ihrer Durchführung gibt sich als Teil des Problems zu 
erkennen, das die öffentliche Debatte über praktische Themen wie Wasser weithin 
beschränkt. 
Um dieses Phänomen in den Diskursen und Institutionen von 
Watershedentwicklungsprojekten zu betrachten, wird im dritten Kapitel dieser Arbeit 
eine Vorgehensweise entwickelt und zur Analyse der Fallstudien angewendet. Der Fokus 
dieser Vorgehensweise ist die Entfernung der Watershedentwicklung aus der 
‚deliberativen Öffentlichkeit.‟  
„Öffentlichkeit ist einerseits eine Soziale Sphäre, in der öffentliche Diskurse (aber auch 
all die anderen genannten Kommunikationsformen) zirkulieren, andererseits zugleich ein 
Kollektiv, das nicht nur die Zuhörer (Publika), sondern auch die Sprecher der 
Öffentlichkeit umfasst. Dieser Doppelcharakter von Öffentlichkeit wird am deutlichsten 
in den beiden Bedeutungsvarianten, die Öffentlichkeit im Englischen annehmen kann: 
‚public sphere‟ als soziale Sphäre und ‚public‟ als Kollektiv von Sprechern und 
Zuhörern“ (Peters, 2007: 21). 
 
Die Darstellung der Watershed Entwicklung nur als technische Maßnahme zum Boden- 
und Wasserschutz wird in Frage gestellt. Stattdessen wird Watershed als einen Ort der 
politischen Anfechtungen und Verhandlungen gefordert. 
Der Fokus dieser Vorgehensweise auf den konzeptionellen Rahmen der Entpolitisierung 
und das Arbeitsgebiet der zwei Fälle werden in der Hauptfrage dieser Studie 
folgendermaßen zusammengefasst: 
Welche Diskurse, Strategien und Institutionen haben Weltbank und BMZ verwendet, um 
die Formulierung und Umsetzung von Watershedentwicklungsprojekten in Uttarakhand 
und Maharashtra zu beeinflussen? Haben diese Einflüsse zu der Entpolitisierung der 
Watershed-Governance in den zwei Fällen beigetragen? 
 
In einer Zeit, in der das Publikum den Politikern und den politischen Institutionen seines 
Landes anscheinend wenig Vertrauen gegenüber bringt, wird die Übertragung von 
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Aufgaben entweder auf Organisationen, welche in bestimmtem Maße politischer 
Kontrolle entzogen sind, oder auf auf Regeln beruhenden Systemen außerhalb des 
staatlichen Gemeinwesens als positiv betrachtet werden. „Doch die demokratischen 
Auswirkungen dieses Prozesses sind selten geprüft ", meinen Flinders und Buller (2005).  
Diese Studie erstrebt einen Beitrag zur Überbrückung dieser Kluft, wobei sie sich auf 
Mechanismen konzentriert, durch welche die demokratischen Prozesse im Governance 
von Watershedprojekten und die Projektgebiete beeinträchtigt werden. Hier gelingt es, 
ausgehend von Einsichten der normativen politischen Theorie tragfähige Brücken zu den 
empirischen Forschungen in Politik und Wasserwissenschaft zu schlagen.  
 
IV. Theoretischer Rahmen und Methode 
 
Diese Studie beschäftigt sich mit dem Begriff und der empirischen Erforschung von 
öffentlichen Diskursen in Watershedentwicklungsprojekten unter der Anwendung des 
Konzepts der Entpolitisierung.  
Entpolitisierung ist ein Prozess, in dem vormals politische Themen und Institutionen 
weniger politisch oder unpolitisch werden. In der jüngeren englischsprachigen Literatur 
wird Entpolitisierung oft als eine Form der „Staatskunst“ und eine „Strategie des 
Regierens“ (Burnham 2001; Buller/Flinders 2005) verstanden, die zugunsten eines 
verbesserten policy outputs darum bemüht ist, politische Entscheidungen in Arenen zu 
verlagern, die auf der Grundlage von nicht-politischen bzw. weniger offensichtlich 
politischen Prinzipien operieren. 
Habermas (1990) beschreibt eine Verwandlung, in der die Rolle der „citoyens‟ (Bürger) 
zu der von Konsumenten wird und die Öffentlichkeit zu reinen Beobachtern wird. Dies 
impliziert die Verschiebung solcher Themen oder Institutionen aus dem Raum von 
demokratischen, politischen Verhandlungen und Entscheidungen in Räume, die von 
apolitischen Fachgremien beherrscht werden, sodass Regeln und Regulierungen von 
nicht-verhandelbaren wissenschaftlichen “Fakten” vorgeschrieben werden9. 
Das Konzept der Entpolitisierung stammt ursprünglich aus den Politikwissenschaften, die 
die Transformationen von demokratischer Governance in den “entwickelten” Ländern, 
speziell  USA, Deutschland und Großbritannien, analysieren. Entpolitisierung und 
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 Vgl. Hirsch (2007)   
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Delegierung sind konstitutive Kernelemente der 'postdemokratischen Revolution' (vgl. 
Blühdorn, 2007) seit den 1990er Jahren und sie sind elementare Strategien, um in 
spätmodernen Gesellschaften das effiziente Management einer nie dagewesenen 
Komplexität zu ermöglichen. Das Management natürlicher Ressourcen ist ein gutes 
Beispiel für diese Komplexität, und Entpolitisierung und Delegierung scheinen populäre 
Ansätze für ein effizientes Bearbeiten dieser Komplexität zu sein. 
Harriss (2001) und Fergusson (1990) haben neben anderen das Konzept der 
Entpolitisierung in den Bereich der Entwicklungsstudien eingeführt, um darauf 
hinzuweisen, dass die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit von Weltbank und anderen 
internationalen Organisationen auf einem Diskurs basiert, der politische Themen wie 
Armut und Wasserknappheit als rein technische Probleme behandelt, um demokratischer 
und politischer Diskussion/Anfechtung aus dem Weg zu gehen. Sie argumentieren, dass 
Regierungen und andere Akteure ein Interesse daran haben, Debatten zur Entwicklung zu 
entpolitisieren, da dies die Legitimität des Staates und die Durchführung von 
Entwicklungsprojekten unterstützt.  
Flinders und Buller (2005) versuchen, verschiedene Formen der Entpolitisierung 
(institutionelle, Regel- und Präferenzformende) zu analysieren und zu untersuchen, wie 
die verschiedenen Formen durch unterschiedliche Mechanismen und Prozesse 
operationalisiert werden. 
In dieser Studie wird Entpolitisierung in zwei Kategorien disaggregiert: 
I) Präferenzformende Entpolitisierung (preference-shaping depoliticization) 
II) Entpolitisierung von Institutionen und sozialen Organisationen. 
Diese Aspekte werden für die zwei Fallstudien detalliert betrachtet, um die Governance 
Strategien der Entwicklungsprojekte zu analysieren.  
Präferenzformende Entpolitisierung hat seine konkreten und sichtbaren Auswirkungen in 
Form von Institutionen, die zur Umsetzung des Watershed-Programms gebildet werden.  
Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit den Präferenzen des Spenders und den Institutionen der 
Wasserbewirtschaftung in den ausgewählten Fällen, die im Rahmen der Analyse erwähnt 
wurden. 
Der nächste Abschnitt beschreibt die Art und Weise der Durchführung dieser Studie. 
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Methode   
Die Grundlage der Methode ist die Fallstudie von zwei Watershed 
Entwicklungsprojekten, IGWDP und Shiwalik Hills-II. Fallstudie ist eine ideale 
Methode, wenn eine ganzheitliche, eingehende Untersuchung notwendig ist (Feagin, 
Orum & Sjöberg, 1991; Yin, 1994).  
Dies trifft ebenso zu in Konfliktfällen wie Wasser und in Fällen wie denen, wo ich 
argumentiere, dass das derzeitige Konzept der Regierungsführung in der Tat eher Teil des 
Problems als der Lösung ist.   
Die Daten für diese Untersuchung wurden in formellen und informellen Interviews sowie 
durch Haushaltsumfragen gewonnen. Des Weiteren wurden Sekundärdaten in gedruckter 
und übers Internet veröffentlichter Form einbezogen. Die Fragen für die Interviews 
wurden ausgehend von den Forschungsfragen formuliert. Im Feld wurden sie dann nach 
zahlreichen Probeinterviews modifiziert und erweitert, um die Qualität der Fragen zu 
verbessern, bevor die eigentlichen Interviews geführt wurden. 
 
V. Aufbau der Arbeit  
 
Nach der Einführung in die Analyse beschreibt Kapitel 2 das empirische Milieu der 
Fallstudien und die in der Arbeit untersuchten Gebiete. Es beschreibt die 
Herangehensweise der aktuellen Studien zu Watershedmanagement und postuliert, dass 
ein bestimmtes Genre der Studien, welche ihre Legitimität von ökonomischen Theorien 
und technologischer Entwicklung ableiten, auch Watershedentwicklung als 
Forschungsbereich beherrscht. 
Studien zur Verwaltung dieser Projekte sind auf den ‚vorgeschriebenen‟ Bereich 
beschränkt, indem sie bestimmen, was für ‚Good Governance‟ geleistet werden soll. 
Dieses Kapitel bildet die Basis für die Analyse, wie Watershedprojekte tatsächlich 
verwaltet werden und die damit verbundenen Auswirkungen. Bei dieser Analyse tritt der 
Prozess der Entpolitisierung als besonders bedeutsam hervor. 
Kapitel 3 beginnt mit einer Diskussion über den konzeptionellen Rahmen, der in dieser 
Analyse verwendet wird. Es verfolgt die historischen und kontextabhängigen Wurzeln 
der Entpolitisierung, um ihre Angemessenheit zur Analyse von Aspekten der 
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Regierungsführung von Entwicklungsprojekten zu bestimmen. Der dritte Abschnitt dieses 
Kapitels taucht tiefer in die Verwendung des Konzepts in der empirischen Forschung ein. 
Kapitel 4 beschreibt die Methode der Fallstudien sowie die Werkzeuge zur 
Datensammlung und Datenverarbeitung.  
Kapitel 5 und 6 bilden zusammen den analytischen Teil dieser Arbeit. Kapitel 5 
beschreibt die Präferenzen der Entscheidungsträger der Geber- und Empfängerländer. 
Dieses Kapitel kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die diskursive Darstellung der relevanten 
Themen in einer wirksamen Weise die Basis für institutionelle Interventionen bildet, 
welche dann als Mechanismen der Entpolitisierung der Entwicklung auftauchen. 
Kapitel 6 isoliert die Institutionen der Watershedverwaltung zur Analyse und zeigt, dass 
diese Institutionen praktische, im Sinne von lebenswichtige, Themen aus der 
Öffentlichkeit entfernen und sie aus einer ‚gewählten‟ politischen Bühne in eine ‚nicht-
gewählte‟ politische Bühne platzieren. Bei diesem Verfahren entstehen strategische 
Koalitionen/Bündnisse, welche sich die Ressourcen der Projekte in einer ungerechten 
Weise aneignen. 
Die Arbeit schließt mit der Betrachtung von möglichen Auswirkungen der Mechanismen 
der Entpolitisierung der Entwicklung in Kapitel 7 und schlägt Themen vor, welche als 
Basis für zukünftige Studien in dieser Richtung dienen können.  
 
VI. Forschungsergebnisse  
 
Die beiden Fallstudien ‚weiten sich aus‟, indem sie politische Beziehungen auf der 
höchsten Ebene betonen, welche dann die Mechanismen zur Regierungsführung eines 
Watershedentwicklungprojekts bestimmen. Anhand des in Kapitel 3 entwickelten 
theoretischen Rahmens zeigen sich Beweise zur Bevorzugung apolitischen Handelns in 
der Watershedentwicklung in den beiden Fällen. Diese Überzeugung vom apolitischen 
Handeln wird sowohl von den Entscheidungsträgern als auch von den Geber- und 
Empfängerländern geteilt und hängt auch von den organisatorischen Neigungen der 
Entscheidungsträger ab. Kapitel 5 betont diese Präferenzen, um zu zeigen, dass 
Watershedentwicklungsprojekte als technische Interventionen zum Boden- und 
Wasserschutz entwickelt wurden, welche dann von den NROs und den Dorfausschüssen 
durchgeführt werden. 
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Der diskursive Aufbau von Entwicklung und Präferenzen äußert sich in der Entstehung 
von Institutionen, welche dann die Watershedentwicklungsprojekte durchführen. 
Quasistaatliche Agenturen und NROs werden bevorzugt und gegründet, um damit die 
politische Eigenschaft der Entwicklung abzugrenzen. Die dazu benannten Dorfausschüsse 
neue Aneignungschancen schaffen, die zur Bildung strategischer Gruppen führen10 und 
liegen im Streit mit der gewählten Dorfverwaltung vor Ort.  
In dieser Situation dient die Politik der Entpolitisierung den Interessen der 
durchführenden Agenturen, wobei die Dorfbewohner von der Projektarbeit verfremdet 
bleiben. Diese Strategien zur Regierungsführung verwandeln nicht nur die Natur der 
Entwicklungspolitik und die Legitimationsquelle einer Demokratie, sondern auch die der 
dörflichen Gemeinschaft insgesamt und damit sogar die Vorstellung von 
Watershedentwicklung. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Vgl. Evers (2005) 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis studies the governance aspects (institutions and discourses) of donor-aided 
development programs in two integrated watershed development projects: 1) the Indo-
German Watershed Development Program in Maharashtra (west India), and 2) the 
Integrated Watershed Development Project, Shiwalik Hills-II in Uttarakhand (north 
India). A watershed development project entails physical interventions for soil and water 
conservation measures (like building check dams, water absorption trenches, forestation, 
among others) and institutional interventions (like formation of village watershed 
committees, micro-credit societies, and forest protection committees, among others) in a 
specified location demarcated by the catchment area of a river or stream.  
Governance is an important component of the international water discourse, especially 
after the events following the World Water Forum in The Hague in 2000. It brought 
associated ideas like accountability and transparency into consideration along with 
politics into the mainstream water resources development discourse that so far was a field 
for engineers and hydrologists. Much quoted is the phrase „The world water crisis is a 
crisis of governance- not one of scarcity‟ from the No Water No Future speech at the 
summit by the Prince of Orange of the Netherlands that has become a slogan in the global 
water resource studies since then (Mollinga, 2007).  
There are two fundamental meanings associated with the notion of governance in 
development literature. First, an administrative or managerial notion associated primarily 
with the official position of the World Bank. It is concerned with promoting „good order‟ 
by focusing mainly on technical, administrative, and managerial issues of governance. 
The other perspective on governance includes democratic politics as an integral 
component for sustainable development governance. In the villages studied, a 
complicated network of people and institutions practiced a third type of governance that 
derives both from managerial and aggregative-democratic decision-making.  
This thesis presents economic and socio-political data from the above-mentioned case 
studies to illustrate that the present governance strategies of the watershed development 
projects can be usefully analyzed from a „depoliticization‟ perspective.  
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Depoliticization can be described as a process in which previously political issues, people 
and institutions are becoming less political or nonpolitical. Habermas describes this 
process as the „decline of the public realm as a political institution‟ that reduces the role 
of „citoyens‟ to consumers, the public realm gets confined to spectacles and acclamations 
(Outhwaite, 1996). This implies that such issues, people and institutions are relocated 
from the arenas of democratic contestation and decision into the arenas which are 
governed by apolitical expert bodies, rules and regulations prescribed by non-negotiable 
scientific „facts‟. 
The discourse of depoliticization has been strategically employed by the implementing 
agencies and professionals to mystify the inequities in watershed development. The 
mystification of inequities through discourse, in particular the way in which „political 
decisions have been transformed into technical ones‟ has been the focus of some studies 
(Ferguson, 1990; Barry et al., 1996; Jenkins, 1999). This concept originates in the 
political science literature that explores the transformations in democratic governance in 
the advanced industrial countries in the globalization era, especially USA, Germany and 
Britain. In development studies, the concept has been used among others by Harriss 
(2002) and Ferguson (1990) to suggest that the developmental enterprise in the third 
world is based on a discourse propounded by international development agencies like 
World Bank, that relocates political issues of poverty and water scarcity in the list of 
technical problems to bypass the issues of contestation in democratic politics. Political 
decision-making in the sense of citizens critically discussing watershed policies, has been 
replaced by dominant groups persuading the public towards certain interventions and 
conclusions as observed in the cases.  
They argue that governments and other actors have an interest in „depoliticizing‟ debates 
on development because exclusion of politics assists in reproducing state power and its 
legitimacy, as well as the reproduction of development projects.  
In this study, depoliticization has been further disaggregated under two categories: (i) 
preference-shaping depoliticization, and (ii) depoliticization of institutions and social 
organizations. These aspects are explored in detail with the help of empirical data from 
each case to locate the governance tactics of watershed development projects. Issues and 
institutions in this sense became the focal locations where the processes of governance 
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were observed to be following certain techniques that could be problematized under the 
umbrella concept of depoliticization.  
This thesis concludes that watershed governance in India is at the crossroads where it is 
undergoing a paradigm shift in the light of parallel transformations in the world 
democracy. This „shift‟ has been characterized in the title of this thesis as „a watershed‟ 
in Indian watershed governance. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis studies the governance practices
11
 and institutions of donor-aided 
development programs in two integrated watershed development projects: 1) the Indo-
German Watershed Development Program (IGWDP) in Maharashtra (west India), and 2) 
the Integrated Watershed Development Project, Shiwalik Hills-II in Uttarakhand (north 
India). A watershed development project entails physical interventions for soil and water 
conservation (like building check dams, water absorption trenches, forestation, among 
others) and institutional interventions (like formation of village watershed committees, 
micro-credit societies, and forest protection committees, among others) in a specified 
location demarcated by the catchment area of a river or stream.  
Governance became a core theme and category of the global water discourse after 2000. 
This was manifested in the three major events that took place
12
 in that period at which the 
global water resources community debated the nature of the „water crisis‟, namely the 2nd 
World Water Forum in the Hague in 2000, the Bonn Freshwater Conference in 2001 and 
the Johannesburg Summit of Sustainable Development in 2002 (Mollinga, 2008: 9). 
Inclusion of governance in the international discourse was a step forward from the 
understanding of water under the central concept of „management‟ in its recognition of 
the embeddedness of water in broader sociopolitical structures. This brought politics into 
the mainstream water resources development discourse and challenged the dominant 
inclination of water professionals to treat water management as a technical issue and 
hence an exclusive domain of the civil engineers and hydrologists. Much quoted is the 
phrase „The world water crisis is a crisis of governance- not one of scarcity‟ and that 
„there is enough water to provide water security for all- but only if we change the way we 
                                                 
11
 Practices being understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons 
given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect. See (Baynes et al. 1987: 103) for a 
detailed discussion on analysis of practices.  
12
 See (Petrella, 2001: 24-25) for other main global conferences and international declarations concerning 
water after 1990, beginning with the „Montreal Charter‟ on Water and Sanitation in June 1990 and First 
World Water Forum in Marrakesh in March, 1997.  
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manage and develop it‟ from the No Water No Future speech13 at the summit by the 
Prince of Orange of the Netherlands that has become a slogan in the global water 
resource studies since then
14
.    
The concept of „governance‟ has various meanings and manifestations in many contexts, 
reflecting a combination of descriptive and normative usages. Governance is generally 
understood as „the prevailing patterns by which public power is exercised in a given 
social context‟ (Jenkins, 2002: 485)15. It is associated with ideas like accountability, 
transparency, and legitimacy; this implies that such processes and relations are not only 
technical or organizational but have political dimensions also, even if it is not directly 
acknowledged (Mollinga, 2007). In this sense, governance of the international 
development projects is a process contested and negotiated by the different „strategic 
groups‟ including development „experts‟ and local stakeholder coalitions (Evers and 
Gerke, 2009). However, the mainstream international development discourse, notably 
World Bank, treats „governance‟ as a „technical‟ issue (Jenkins, 2001; Randeria, 2003). It 
focuses on administrative, managerial, and objective oriented problem solving approach 
to achieve „good governance‟. Since there is no clear definition of „good‟, different 
strategic groups
16
 and development agencies draw „promiscuously‟ on ideas that have 
sometimes emanated from the West‟s largest consultancy firms (Jenkins, 2002: 486). The 
prescribed goal of „good governance‟ entails restructuring of the state17 to ensure the 
„reliability of its institutional framework‟ and the „predictability of its rules and policies 
and the consistency with which they are applied‟ (World Bank, 1997: 4-5). The Bank‟s 
General Council in 1991 affirmed that „technical considerations of economy and 
efficiency, rather than ideological and political preferences should guide the Bank‟s work 
at all time‟ (Abrahamsen, 2000: 12). The above statement by the General Council 
                                                 
13
 This speech called ‚No Water No Future: A Water focus for Johannesburg‟ by HRH the Prince of Orange 
to the panel of the UN Secretary General in preparation for the Johannesburg Summit 2002  is  available at 
the UN website at (http://www.un.org/jsummit/html/documents/nowater_nofuture_eng.pdf) 
14
 See Mollinga (2007), Blumenthal (2006).   
15
 See Kooiman (1993) for the concept of „heterarchical governance‟ that involves various non-state actors, 
whose cooperation is instrumental in managing transnational problems, as opposed to the „hierarchical 
governance‟ based on the nation-state and its subordinated institutions.  
16
 On the definition and scope of „strategic groups‟, see Evers and Gerke (2009: 2). The authors define 
„strategic groups‟ as cutting across hierarchies and social classes but united in their common goal of 
securing present and future chances to gain access to resources provided by the international development 
projects.     
17
 See Hirst (2000: 13).  
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presented the official position of the World Bank and a discursive construction of itself as 
an „apolitical‟ actor in development, involved in the „apolitical‟ act of poverty alleviation.   
The years before 2000 were a period of denial and exclusion of politics from the popular 
discourse on development that seems to be giving way to a new form of understanding 
that accepts the presence of politics as inevitable.
18
 At the same time, different 
stakeholder coalitions seek to „depoliticize‟ the governance practices for the sake of 
efficiency because the democratic decision-making is apparently a complex process that 
delays the project and is inefficient in its outcome. However, the two schools of thought, 
namely, governance as inclusive of politics, popular among the academic researchers, and 
governance as managerial problem solving, popular among the international development 
organizations and non-governmental agencies, coexist in the developmental literature and 
practice.  
1.1 Subject of the Thesis 
This dissertation studies the policy preferences of the donor agencies, institutions of 
implementation and local governance practices in two donor-aided watershed 
development projects in India, namely, IGWDP in Maharashtra and Shiwalik Hills-II in 
Uttarakhand, and analyzes them using the lens of depoliticization. This section describes 
the concept of watershed development followed by the location of two cases and the 
increasingly important role of the donor agencies in watershed development after the 
liberalization of Indian economy in the 1990s.  
The word „watershed‟ refers to „a turning point‟ or to a „change of course‟ in its everyday 
linguistic usage
19
. It is also understood as an important period or factor that serves as a 
dividing line: for e.g. a watershed in history. Technically, watershed development refers 
to a systemic conservation, regeneration and judicious utilization of the natural resources, 
especially land, water and vegetation within a particular geographical location that is 
demarcated by circumscribing the catchment area of a particular stream or river. A 
watershed then is a technical unit based on geographical requirements and thus can 
extend to more than one village community (Iyer, 2003: 72).  
                                                 
s
18
 See Foreword by Mario Soares on „The Primacy of Politics‟ in Petrella (2001: xiii).  
19
 It is a translation of the German word „Wasserscheide‟ syntactically water+ divide. This meaning 
corresponds to the linguistic usage of the term while the technical usage of the concept of „watershed‟ 
would be closer to the word „Wassereinzugsgebiet‟.   
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Any watershed development project undertakes physical activities for soil and water 
conservation starting from the highest point in the drainage basin and follows the 
rainwater to the collection stream. This is referred to as the „ridge to valley‟ approach. 
These activities include building of water absorption trenches, contour bunding, check 
dams, loose boulder dams, appropriate plantations, and ban on tree felling among others.  
At the same time, the watershed project forms community-based, consensually nominated 
organizations in the village called Village Watershed Committees (VWC) for the 
implementation of these activities. It also forms micro-credit societies for women, forest 
protection committees and some times, youth credit groups in the project village. These 
non-elected local bodies work independently of the elected village parliaments (Gram 
Panchayat), with the elected village headman (Sarpanch) as the ex-officio patron of the 
program as recommended in the „Common Guidelines for Watershed Development‟20 
issued by the Ministry of Rural Development in 1994. Both watershed projects selected 
for the case study, one implemented by the government agency and the other by a donor 
supported national NGOs follow these guidelines.  
After the liberalization of Indian economy in 1992, donor agencies began to participate in 
the watershed development projects in a big way. By 2005, the donor assisted projects 
covered an area of 2.72 million hectares and a huge investment of INR 4968.93 crores
21
. 
Donor agencies work primarily with the ministries of the Indian government at the 
Central and State
22
 level, international, national and local NGOs, government 
bureaucracies and local people. This thesis studies two such donor funded watershed 
development projects, their institutions and practices of governance.  
The first case is an ongoing project funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ), called the Indo-German WatershedDevelopment 
Program (IGWDP). It was started in 1992 and would continue to run until 2009. A 
national NGO called Watershed Organization Trust (WOTR) is the implementing agency. 
This project is located in Ahmednagar District, Maharashtra State, in western India (see 
                                                 
20
 MoRD / Government of India (1994)  
21
 Parthasarathy Committeee Report on watershed development projects in India, published in (2006) 
comments that this amount was found to be „little on the high side‟ for the technical committee but when it 
questioned the Ministry of Rural Development, it vouched for its accuracy (GoI/ MoRD, 2006: 39).  
22
 The federal government in India is known as Central government, and the Nation as Union of India. 
Throughout this thesis, the terms Union and Centre mean the federal government and State means the 
federal states. State with a small„s‟ refers to term as used in the political science.    
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map 1). Ahmednagar is classified by the government of India as a drought prone area 
with low and erratic rainfall
23
 that has suffered recurrent famines since 1396
24
. Out of the 
13 talukas (sub-divisions of a district) in Ahmednangar, eight are constantly affected by 
water scarcity due to erratic and low rainfall. 
Map 1. Location of the IGWDP in Ahmednagar district, Maharashtra, 
India 
 
The Government of Maharashtra, therefore, laid specific emphasis upon the scheme of 
soil and water conservation in the State. This scheme was undertaken in the district in 
1958-59 for the first time. It undertook the physical activities of contour bunding and 
nala bunding throughout the district. Watershed development has come a long way from 
these modest efforts in the late 1960s. At present, IGWDP alone covers 104 watershed 
development projects in and around Ahmednagar spread over 204 villages. It has formed 
more than 1200 micro-credit societies for women in this area and continues to work on 
the issues of health and empowerment.   
                                                 
23
 The recorded average rainfall was 303 mm in 2003 and 589.21 mm in 2004, Gazetteer of Ahmednagar.  
24
Gazetteer of Ahmednagar district, Government of Maharashtra (2003); Available at 
<http://www.maharashtra.gov.in/english/gazetteer/Ahmadnagar/agri_famines.html > 
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The second project is located in the Yamkeshwar block of Pauri Garhwal district, 
Uttarakhand State in north India (see map 2).  
Pauri region has a sub-temperate to temperate climate, which remains pleasant 
throughout the year. The hilly terrain with its forested slopes receives adequate rainfall 
from mid-June till mid-September. Occasional rainfall is also recorded in winters. 
Average annual rainfall in the district is 2180 mm, about 90 percent of which is generally 
concentrated over the monsoon. Regardless of the excess rain, this area suffers from 
irrigation and drinking water scarcity during the summer months. This is due to the hilly 
terrain due to which most of the rain water goes as waste in the form of run-off. The 
stony texture of soil further increases the rate of water erosion. The run-off rain water can 
be harvested by constructing water irrigation tanks, appropriate plantations, and 
constructing check dams in feasible areas. The watershed programs were started in this 
district to address this problem. The main challenge was to store the water for an 
extended period of 9 months.  
 
 
Map 2. Location Map of Hills II Project in Pauri, Uttarakhand, India 
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One such project, called the Integrated Watershed Development Project (Shiwalik) Hills- 
II was started in 1999 and „covered‟ 493 villages spread over 24 micro-watersheds. It was 
funded by the World Bank and was operational until September 2005. My fieldwork was 
done in the ten villages of Aamkatal micro-watershed in the Yamkeshwar block 
developed under this project.  
Hills-II project as well as IGWDP created village level institutions, consensually 
nominated by the Gram Sabha (village general body) to plan and implement the project. 
These institutions are created by the project implementing NGO in case of IGWDP and 
by the semi-governmental organization called Watershed Management Directorate 
(WMD) in the Hills-II project. The involvement of NGOs (and not the government) and 
formation of nominated committees (and not involving the elected local government 
called Gram Panchayat in India) appears surprising in the light of the fact that the 73
rd
 
Constitutional Amendment passed in 1993 empowers the local government to undertake 
watershed development programs in the village
25
. In addition, there exist fully functional 
governmental departments for watershed development both at the State and Central 
levels. However, seen in the broader framework of the politics of „good governance‟ the 
new institutional setup does not seem to be out of place. The projects are routed through 
the non-governmental agencies or delegated bodies in sync with the „rolling back of the 
state‟ and treatment of watershed development as a „technical‟ issue that should not be 
mixed with local Gram Panchayat politics or be subject to the changing political 
ministries but with the help of a „strong civil society independent of the state‟ (Hirst, 
2000).    
„Good Governance‟ in planning and implementation, is a, if not the, key aspect of 
watershed development projects supported by the donor agencies. The discursive 
construction of watershed development and the institutions formed to undertake the 
implementation of these projects within the framework of this concept forms the core of 
this thesis. The reconceptualization and reorganization of the institutional setup to 
implement watershed development program takes place at different levels (donor 
agencies, national NGOs, quasi-governmental organizations, village based community 
                                                 
25
 The Constitution (Seventy-Third Amendment) Act, 1992-93. See 11
th
 Schedule (Article 243G). Available 
at: <http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend73.htm> 
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organizations)
26
 and has technical/ biophysical, organizational, socio-economic and 
political dimensions. This thesis attempts to integrate and analyze these different aspects 
of watershed development governance by closely studying the policy preferences and 
implementing institutions of the two cases under the umbrella concept of depoliticization.  
1.2 Main Concerns of the Study 
This study has -thus- two fundamental concerns. The first, practical and specific concern 
is to explore the political dimensions of watershed governance practices and institutions 
in the two selected projects.  
The second academic and general concern is to contribute to the further development of 
political analysis of watershed governance within the conceptual framework of 
depoliticization. The aim here is to provide an analytical tool to study the democratic 
implications of different governance strategies employed in watershed development 
projects, especially their discursive construction and institutional setup. This tool is then 
applied to the two case studies.  
In the final analysis, the purpose of this thesis is to seek solutions and contribute towards 
a democratic governance of watershed development in India This study provides not only 
the „grounded‟ evidence for a more critical appraisal of the present policy preferences and 
institutions but also the wider effects that they have on the democratization of 
development governance. It is the contention of this thesis that despite the recent 
recognition of the importance of politics in international water discourse, most studies 
and practices in watershed development remain confined within a technical or economic 
framework
27
. The participation of the local people and a decentralized form of natural 
resource governance as prerequisites of success for the project dominates the socio-
political literature on watershed development.
28
 Reviewing the available literature we 
find numerous papers and articles on how the watershed projects should be governed, 
                                                 
26
 See Kooiman (ed.) (1983) for the conceptualization of governance as „all those activities of social, 
political and administrative actors that can be seen as purposeful efforts to guide, steer, control or manage 
sectors (or facets of sectors). Governance takes place in interactions between actors on micro, meso and 
macro levels of social-political organization‟.  
27
 See Iyer (2003: 73) on the adherence to technological and engineering based approach to „basin 
planning‟ in the water sector of India.  
28
 See Section 2.8 and 2.9 for a comprehensive review of the existing literature on watershed development 
in India.  
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what are the institutions that we need for good governance, collaboration between the 
government and NGOs, participation of the locals and an equal amount of literature 
outlining the problems associated with watershed development like the issue of 
sustainability, lack of „good governance‟, power dynamics and corruption, elite capture 
of the projects and empowerment of the women being the favorite spots for attack and 
prescriptive advice
29
.  There has been an evident focus on counting the benefits or 
highlighting the shortcomings but very few studies on how the watershed projects are 
actually governed, understood and maintained in practice and what the wider effects of 
these practices are. There are limited attempts in this area of study to conceptually link 
the discursive, technical, economic and political dimensions of watershed development as 
manifestations of a broader governance strategy.  
Within the conceptual framework of depoliticization, the present approach to watershed 
development in its discursive construction and practice is revealed as in fact part of the 
problem that limits public debate on practical issues like water. An approach to observe 
this phenomenon in discourses and institutions of watershed development projects is 
developed in the third chapter and applied to the case studies. The conceptual focus of 
this approach is „the place of watershed development in the public sphere of deliberation 
and contestation‟. Public sphere refers to the realm of deliberation and decision-making 
by discussion on the collective issues
30
. The presentation of watershed development as a 
technical intervention only to conserve soil and water is questioned and watershed as a 
site of political contestations and negotiations is advocated instead.  
The focus of analysis within the conceptual framework of depoliticization and the given 
domain of the two cases is summarized in the main research question of the study as 
follows:  
Through what kinds of discourses and institutions have the World Bank and BMZ been 
influencing the formulation and implementation of the watershed development projects in 
Uttarakhand and Maharashtra respectively? Do these influences contribute towards the 
depoliticisation of watershed governance in the two selected projects? 
 
                                                 
29
 This can also be seen in the formation of working groups around these topics during the Exposure 
program organized for the donor‟s delegation in India in 2006. See section 2.3.2.  
30
 See (Peters, 2007: 55)  
10 
 
„There is an implicit but rarely explicit normative assumption about depoliticization 
tactics in that that they are commonly presented and interpreted as a „good‟ thing. The 
transfer of functions to either organisations that are insulated to some extent from 
political control or rule-based systems operating outside the national polity is commonly 
thought to be a positive development during a period when public trust in politicians and 
political institutions is perceived to be low. However, the democratic implications of this 
process are rarely examined‟, argue Flinders and Buller (2005). This study seeks to 
contribute towards bridging this gap by focusing on the mechanisms through which 
democratic decision making processes are circumvented (or not) in the governance of 
watershed development projects and its implications in the project areas.  
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
To study the political dimensions of watershed governance, this thesis is rooted in the 
„rationality of theory‟-„cognitive maps through which we apprehend the world‟ (Polanyi, 
1958)
31. It „dwells in‟ the theory of depoliticization that provides a cognitive map to 
understand the changes in the governance strategies of watershed development projects.  
This section briefly describes the concept of depoliticization and its mechanisms as 
applied in this study.  
Depoliticization is the process of relocating certain issues, people and institutions from 
the political arena of debate and deliberation into arenas that are governed by apolitical 
bodies. This concept originates in the political science literature that explores the 
transformations in democratic governance in the advanced industrial countries (especially 
Germany and Britain) after the 1990s
32
.  
In development studies, the concept has been used among others by Harriss (2002) and 
Ferguson (1990) to suggest that the developmental enterprise in the third world is based 
on a discourse propounded by international development agencies like World Bank, that 
relocates political issues of poverty and water scarcity in the list of technical problems to 
bypass the issues of contestation in democratic politics. They argue that governments and 
other actors have an interest in „depoliticizing‟ debates on development because 
                                                 
31
 See Kuhn, 1962; Popper, 1963; Lakatos, 1978.  
32
 See Chapter-3 for a detailed discussion on the concept and operationalization of depoliticization.  
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exclusion of politics based on instrumental reasoning assists in reproducing state power 
and its legitimacy, as well as the reproduction of development projects.   
Flinders and Buller (2005) argue that „the wider literature on depoliticization has largely 
failed to distinguish between different types of depoliticization tactics. Nor has it sought 
to explore the inter-play between depoliticization and established frameworks of 
representative democracy. They attempt to specify different forms of depoliticization 
(institutional, rule-based and preference shaping) and analyse how different forms are 
operationalized through different mechanisms and processes.  
Flinders‟ “preference-shaping” depoliticization involves the invocation of preferences 
through recourse to ideological or rhetorical claims in order to justify a political position 
that a certain issue or function does, or should, lie beyond the scope of politics or the 
capacity for state control. In essence a stance is adopted in which a preference-shaping 
position is employed to justify a refusal to intervene or regulate a certain issue, e.g. 
watershed development that should preferably be governed through „self-help‟, NGOs or 
delegated agencies.   
Preference-shaping has its concrete and visible effects in the form of institutions that are 
created to implement the watershed development program. These institutions rely on 
sources of legitimacy other than the democratic mandate and remain theoretically 
insulated from the „politcs‟ of development and promise greater efficiency in project 
implementation:  
“The depoliticization of institutions and social organizations implies that bodies ranging 
from environmental organizations and alternative self-help groups to building societies 
and retail cooperatives shed their ideological commitments and political agendas and 
focus on their core business. Deideologization, professionalization, pragmatism, 
managerial best practice, and the pursuit of efficiency gains are the principles that guide 
this transformation of social institutions” (Blühdorn, 2007).  
 
This thesis subjects the preferences of the donor agencies and the institutions of 
watershed development in the selected cases for an indepth anaylsis within the theoretical 
framework briefly mentioned above. The next section describes the method of conducting 
this study.   
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1.4 Method of Study 
The broad method chosen to address the concerns stated above is the case study of two 
watershed development projects, IGWDP and Shiwalik Hills-II. Case study is an ideal 
methodology when a holistic, in-depth investigation is needed (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg, 
1991; Yin, 1994). Whether the study is experimental or quasi-experimental, the data 
collection and analysis methods are known to hide some details (Stake, 1995). Case 
studies, on the other hand, are designed to bring out the details from the viewpoint of the 
participants by using multiple sources of data. 
Specifically, this research adopted the „extended case study‟ method, „which deploys 
participant observation to locate everyday life in its extralocal and historical context‟ 
(Burawoy, 1998). It is an ethnographic research strategy developed in the 1940s to 1960s 
by members of the so-called Manchester School of anthropology led by Gluckman 
(Mitchell, 1983). It is characterized by a painstaking ethnographic attention to socio-
political processes as they unfold across varied contexts over time, with a focus on 
situations of conflict, or „trouble cases‟ as Gluckman called them. The idea behind 
studying the strategies of watershed governance in their everyday working is to explore 
the methodology of research that in order to get a better understanding of what is 
good/bad governance begins by asking how these divisions (good/bad governance) are 
operated and the purpose that they serve in the two cases. 
Extended case study is a research design that allows impartial and reflexive analysis. This 
is immensely important in conflict cases like water management and in cases such as 
these, where I argue that the present approach to governance is in fact part of the problem 
rather than the solution.  
Another reason to select the extended case study method was its facilitation of 
multidimensional perspective to deal with complex issues. This means that the researcher 
considers not just the voice and perspective of the actors, but also of the relevant groups 
of actors and the interaction between them. The complexity of a watershed development 
program is inbuilt in its integrated approach towards soil and water conservation. Besides 
the complexity in performing a series of simultaneous physical activities, the „community 
based‟ governance approach and formation of village level watershed development 
committees complicate the nature of contestation and negotiation that takes place at 
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different levels of the watershed project, from the field to the funding agencies, and has 
economic, managerial/ organizational as well as socio-political dimensions.  
To maximize the number of possible actors, also beyond the national boundaries, and 
hence discursive regimes in a project, I selected two cases that were funded by donor 
agencies and were implemented both by state and by non-state organizations. 
Both projects undertake watershed development within the participatory governance 
framework, form working committees for project management and address the women's 
development by micro-credit group formation. Both projects have donor funding. 
IGWDP is funded by BMZ via its developmental agencies (KfW and GTZ)
33
 while the 
Hills II project is supported by the World Bank. IGWDP was implemented by the NGO 
called WOTR, and the Watershed Management Directorate (WMD) in Dehradun, a semi-
state agency, undertook Hills II. This selection of cases further helped to maximize the 
number of actors and discursive practices for a comprehensive view of watershed 
governance in India.   
Data collection began in the donor country with the interviewing of policy makers and 
functionaries of development organizations in Germany responsible for development 
cooperation in the IGWDP. This also included a ten-day exposure and dialogue program 
with the important decision-makers from Germany (including German parliamentarians, 
NGO representatives, officials from KfW and GTZ) and other countries who observed 
and presented their findings from the Indo-German development project villages in India. 
After gaining a basic insight into the donor‟s perspective of the project, the researcher 
moved to the field sites in Ahmednagar for the developee‟s perspective. I located the 
activities that were undertaken in the village, both physical and institutional. Staying in 
the village and interviews with the local people brought out the issues under discussion in 
the context of watershed development program. I followed the issues, activities and 
institutions of watershed development to the people who were beneficiaries, the women 
who became members of the self-help group, the office-bearers of village watershed 
committee (VWC), local NGO staff, field workers, local politicians and bureaucrats 
among many others for a holistic understanding of the project.   
                                                 
33
 KfW- Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (German Bank for Reconstruction and Development) 
 GTZ- Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical 
Cooperation) 
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In Garhwal, the same procedure was repeated with a change in order of the informants. 
Here, I reached the village and began my data collection first with the village residents. 
Once the drinking water issue was identified for deeper study, I followed the actors, 
offices, contractors, villagers and women who had some role in the drinking water system 
of Hills-II. The idea was to map as comprehensively as possible the set of practices, 
issues, relations and institutions that play some role in the multi-level project governance. 
The first case in Ahmednagar observes these processes from the „top‟ and the second case 
of Hills-II explores the governance strategies from „below‟. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
After this introduction to the study, chapter 2 opens with a discussion of the empirical 
setting of the cases and the areas that were studied for the thesis. It discusses the status of 
present studies in watershed management and argues that a particular genre of studies that 
derive their legitimacy in economic theories and technological advancement have come 
to dominate the research in watershed development. The studies on governance of these 
projects have been confined to „prescriptive‟ domain, arguing what ought to be done for 
„good governance‟. This chapter concludes with building up a case for studying how 
actually the watershed projects are governed and their wider implications. This can be 
effectively done by using the concept of depoliticization. 
Chapter 3 begins with a discussion of the conceptual framework that the study employs 
for its analysis.  It traces the historical and contextual roots of depoliticization to establish 
its suitability for studying the governance aspects of development projects. The third 
section would delve deeper into the issues of operationalizing this concept for practical 
research.  
Chapter 4 describes the case study method and tools employed for data collection and 
analysis.  
Chapter 5 and 6 together present the analytical part of this thesis. Chapter 5 describes the 
preferences of the decision makers from the donor and the recipient countries. This 
chapter argues that the discursive presentation of relevant issues (people and institutions) 
in a suitable way forms the basis of institutional interventions that act as the mechanisms 
of depoliticizing development.   
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Chapter 6 isolates the institutions of watershed governance for analysis and contends that 
these institutions act as the instruments that remove issues of practical concern from the 
public sphere by shifting them from an elected political arena to a non-elected political 
arena. Strategic coalitions are formed in the process that appropriate the resources 
provided by the project in an inequitable manner.  
The thesis concludes with a contemplation of the possible effects of the mechanisms of 
depoliticizing development in Chapter 7 and proposes themes that could form the basis of 
future research in this area. 
1.6 Main Findings 
The cases „extend out‟ from their locations to highlight the broader political relations that 
determine the mechanisms of governing a watershed development project. Using the 
theoretical framework developed in Chapter-3, the two cases and their governance show 
evidences of a preference for an apolitical treatment of watershed development. These 
preferences are shared by the policy makers from both the donor and recipient countries 
based on the organizational affiliation of the decision-makers. Chapter 5 higlights these 
preferences to show that watershed development projects were presented as technical 
interventions for soil and water conservation, to be routed through the non-governmental 
agencies and nominated committees at the village level. It shows how the governance 
preferences are subject to politicization and depoliticization in different contexts and by 
different strategic groups. The discursive construction of policy and preferences has its 
most visible manifestation in the formation of institutions that are assigned the task of 
implementing the watershed development projects. Semi-governmental agencies and 
NGOs are preferred and formed to circumvent the political nature of development and the 
nominated village committees become a site of resource appropriation and come into 
conflict with the locally elected village government. This chapter shows that removal of 
political institutions from the scene proves beneficial for the strategic groups that are 
formed with the sanction of the development project and fade away with its completion.  
In this situation, the politics of depoliticization serves the interests of the implementing 
agencies while the common villagers remain alienated from the project activities. These 
strategies of governance are transforming not only the nature of development politics and 
the sources of legitimacy in a democracy, but the rural society as a whole and indeed the 
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notion of watershed development itself. As the name of the thesis suggests, these 
transformations in the strategies of project governance represent „a watershed‟ in Indian 
watershed governance.   
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2 SETTING OF THE STUDY 
This chapter has two main objectives. The first is to explain the concept and definition of 
a watershed by briefly describing the activities that are undertaken within an integrated 
watershed development program (section 2.1). The second is to give an account of 
watershed programs in India from the 1960s till 2008 (section 2.2) followed by a 
background of the IGWDP in Maharashtra and Hills-II project in Uttarakhand to locate 
the dominant discourses and institutions of governance in the two watershed development 
projects (section 2.3.and 2.4). 
 This chapter also reviews the literatrure on watershed management in India to show that 
a particular genre of studies that derive their legitimacy in economic efficiency and 
reduction of complexity in evaluation and management have come to dominate the 
research in Indian watershed development (section 2.5). The literature review tells us not 
only what we already know about watersheds but also attracts our attention to those 
aspects that are passed over in silence or remain less researched for the want of 
appropriate conceptual tools and motives. It highlights the perceived gap in our 
understanding of the new forms of democratic transformations and their appropriation in 
development projects. This chapter concludes, in section 2.6, with a summary of the main 
points of the previous sections, and a discussion of some theoretical problems in the 
analysis of the policy and practices of watershed governance, building up a case for the 
employment of depoliticization as a suitable theoretical framework for research in this 
area.  
2.1 Watershed: Concept and Definition 
 
The word „watershed‟ refers to „a turning point‟ or to a „change of course‟ in its everyday  
linguistic usage
34
, understood as an important period or factor that serves as a dividing 
line: for e.g. „a watershed in history‟. Deriving from this sense, a watershed is the neatest 
division between two landscapes without any scope of overlap.   
                                                 
34
 It is a translation of the German word „Wasserscheide‟: Wasserscheide scheidet das abfließende Wasser 
zwischen zwei zusammenhängenden Einzugsgebieten. Das Wasser fließt in zwei unterschiedlichen 
Richtungen ab. This definiton is provided by the Lexicon Wasser. Available at 
<http://lexikon.wasser.de/index.pl?begriff=Wasserscheide&job=te> 
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In technical usage, it can be understood as the drainage basin of a particular stream or 
river. Once raindrops hit the ground, they drift towards a stream or river or a lake 
depending on the topography of the landscape. Each stream has its 'catchment area' that 
collects and feeds the rainwater into it. This catchment area or the drainage basin is called 
the watershed (Wassereinzugsgebiet) of that particular river or stream. Watersheds 
contain a number of biophysical elements and resources: soil and water, along with 
vegetation in the form of trees, grasses and crops, and provide the sustenance for a 
number of further enterprises such as livestock production (Farrington et. al., 1999: 1).  
This rainwater can be managed efficiently only if we take the watershed as one unit, 
unlike soil or forest management that can be addressed sectorally based on soil or 
vegetation types, forest sub-types, and grasslands and such classifications. Besides the 
management of rainwater, watershed also provides an ideal unit for soil and vegetation 
management. A small watershed of a few hectares (500-1000ha) that drains into a small 
stream forms part of a still larger watershed, until the combined watersheds may become 
a major river basin draining millions of square kilometers of land. A watershed is thus the 
smallest possible ecological unit of the world. The fundamental principle of watershed 
development is harvesting and efficient management of rainwater by slowing down its 
velocity and controlling the volume as it descends from the ridge to the valley.  
Tideman (1996) compiled one of the most comprehensive accounts of watershed 
management suitable for Indian conditions. This book provides detailed information 
about the technical aspects of constructing physical structures for water harvesting in a 
watershed. It also refers to the idea of community management and popular participation 
as the prerequisites for a watershed program to be successful. Here, Tideman outlines the 
overall objectives of all watershed development projects (Tideman, 1996: 9) as follows:     
 to increase infiltration into the soil; 
 to control excess damaging run-off; 
 to manage and utilize runoff for useful purposes; 
He further adds:  
‘Watershed development essentially relates to soil and water conservation in a given area 
by proper land use, protecting land against all forms of deterioration, building and 
maintaining soil fertility, conserving water for farm use, proper management of local  
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water for drainage, flood protection and sediment reduction and increasing productivity 
from all land uses‟ (ibid.: 348).  
 
Different structures, like check-dams, loose rock boulders, earthen plugs, grass beds, 
water absorption trenches among other constructions are made to achieve this goal. These 
structures help to conserve rainwater in situ, cause a rise in the water table and provide 
increased production capacity to the land, thereby enhancing the food security and soil 
conservation in rural areas. Watershed development aims to bring about an optimum 
balance between the demand and use of natural resources so that they remain sustainable 
over a longer period.  
2.1.1  Physical Treatments in a Watershed Development Project  
 
This section of the chapter describes the physical measures that are undertaken in a 
watershed development project. It shows how the interdependence of soil and water 
conservation on the socio-political factors requires consent from different stakeholders 
for undertaking these activities.  
A typical watershed project undertakes physical activities for soil and land management, 
water harvesting, crop management, forestation, pasture/ fodder development, livestock 
management and other farm activities. These objectives are addressed by building 
appropriate structures using simple instruments, locally available material and labor. 
Depending upon the topography of the watershed area, the project undertakes all or a 
combination of treatments as outlined below:  
 Continuous Contour Trenches (CCT): Continuous contour trenches are small pits 
with calculated vertical and horizontal intervals in the top portion of the 
catchment made to break the velocity of runoff water. The rainwater percolates 
through the soil slowly and travels down, benefiting the lower lands. Interrupted 
trenches are adopted in high rainfall areas. 
 Water absorption trenches (WAT): This structure is preferred when the slope of 
land is more than 25%. These are rectangular pits and trenches dug with the 
purpose of arresting rainwater.  
 Contour Bunding: „Bunding‟ is an embankment of earth. It plays an important 
role in soil and water conservation in the field with medium slope. 
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 Gully plug: Gullies are formed due to erosion of top soil by the flow of rain water. 
In course of time, a gully assumes a big shape and erosion goes on increasing. To 
prevent erosion, barriers or plugs of different types of material are put across the 
gully, at certain intervals.  
 Gabion structure: Beginning in the 16th century, engineers in Europe used wicker 
baskets filled with soil - dubbed by their Italian colleagues as gabbioni, or „big 
cages‟- to fortify military emplacements and reinforce river banks. The same 
technology is used in „gabion‟ structures. It uses steel wire mesh and stones to 
slow down water velocity and soil erosion.  
 Check-dams: These are concrete structures built at appropriate points in the 
village along the course of the river to store rainwater. It is possible to build them 
out of easily available materials at a very little cost. The most important decision 
to be taken when building such a dam is its location. This decision is crucial, as 
the effectiveness of the dam depends on this. 
 Forestation: The village areas that have been deforested are selected for plantation 
and villagers are provided with saplings and fruit trees to plant in their farms that 
are otherwise barren.  
The above mentioned structures at different places in the village makes the watershed 
program unique in its conceptualization of the interdependence of soil, water, crops, 
forests and cattle development that demands a holistic approach. It contradicts the 
dominant framework of sectoral treatment of water, forests, and agriculture that are 
undertaken by different line departments under different ministries in India. The physical 
interdependence of land, water and forests requires the different line departments, 
community-based organizations, facilitating NGO and local villagers to cooperate with 
each other as the land or forest area, or the drainage lines of the watershed that requires 
treatment may be owned either by the state or the villagers. This could prevent the NGO 
or the village panchayat from undertaking any watershed activity on government owned 
land without prior permission, or the government from working on privately owned land 
without the consent and cooperation of the village people.   
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2.1.2 Institutional ‘Treatments’ in a Watershed Development Project 
 
Managing watersheds for rural development is a relatively new concept, much more 
complex than its original version. It is now concerned not merely with stabilizing soil, 
water and vegetation, but with enhancing the productivity of resources in ways that are 
ecologically and institutionally sustainable. This implies that the interaction between 
different resources and the impact of one over the other becomes the focal issue. Another 
implication of this integrated approach is the need for coordination between different 
owners of the land like the government departments of forest or revenue, private 
landowners and common pool resources with universal access of common villagers.  
To achieve the above objectives in a watershed, a series of institutional activities are also 
undertaken with a fundamental commitment to the involvement of local community in 
the implementation and management of the project. On these lines, a watershed project 
undertakes socio-political activities like formation of consensually nominated and 
apolitical institutions separate from the Gram Panchayat such as Village Watershed 
Committee (VWC), Self-Help Groups (SHG), and formation of different forest protection 
committees to conduct the project work. This section focuses on these „institutional 
treatments‟ undertaken in a watershed program and outlines the agencies that are 
entrusted with the responsibility of project implementation.  
 
With a growth in the prominence of the „good governance‟ agenda in the international 
water discourse, water scarcity was re-cognized as a „crisis of management‟ threatened 
with bad institutions, bad governance, bad incentives, and bad allocations of resources
35
.  
Hence a focus on the institutional setup became an integral part of international and 
bilateral development projects that addressed the issues of water resource management in 
the developing world. Spearheaded by the international funding agencies like the World 
Bank and similar organizations, a reconfiguration of the institutions and mechanisms of 
governance was deemed necessary that formed the building blocks of „good governance‟ 
agenda in the international development discourse. Jenkins (2001) argues that 
„governance‟ as used in the mainstream discourse of the international funding agencies 
tends to become a „technical‟ issue that overlooks the inherent political character of 
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natural resource management. This „technical‟ approach is revealed to some extent in the 
prescriptive suggestions towards forming a set of „apolitical‟ institutions that should now 
undertake the task of providing development. The next section explores the coming into 
being of such institutions in the field of watershed development.  
With a continued focus on „good governance‟ and „rolling back of the state‟ in the 
development discourse, decentralized and participatory forms of governance have gained 
considerable support from all sectors. Good governance was initially used in the field of 
economic development where it referred to institutions‟ role in functional democracy, 
recognizing that establishing free markets and encouraging investments were not enough 
in promoting economic development. The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) has utilized good governance as a key concept in its development policies, 
defining good governance as comprising: accountability, transparency, participation, and 
the rule of law as mandatory administrative functions. These elements, together with 
consensus orientation, equity building, effectiveness and efficiency, are vital pre-
requisites for sustainable change
36
. This has brought new actors to occupy the space 
vacated by the state in its rolling back, in the form of civil society organizations 
commonly understood under the label of NGO and community based organizations at the 
village level. Devolution of management responsibilities to the NGOs, governmental 
directorates, and community-based, consensually nominated bodies forms a major plank 
of the global (good) governance agenda.  
A watershed project initiated by the government or a national NGO, funded by the 
international development banks or bilateral donors, works by forming a consensually 
nominated village watershed committee that acts as the nodal agency in the village 
through which the project is implemented. The project also forms micro-credit societies 
for the women and sometimes separate forest protection committees. In this setup, the 
elected village headman (gram pradhan) acts as the patron of the program but does not 
have any executive or administrative powers with respect to the watershed project.  
The project also requires an agency that would act as a mediator between the donor 
agencies and the target villagers. A preference for routing of watershed development 
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projects through the NGOs and semi-governmental institutions is seen among the donor 
as well as state agencies. This derives largely from the negative contemporary 
connotations of „politics‟ and „political‟ associated with duplicity, corruption, lethargy 
and undue interference that rationalizes the need for „apolitical‟ NGOs. The rise of public 
choice theory and its natural affinities with neoliberalism is one of the reasons that 
idealized depiction of politics as an arena of deliberation, public scrutiny, accountability 
and responsiveness in the academic discourse acquires an interventionist and inefficient 
image in the neoliberal discourse.  
“Neoliberalism, informed by public choice theoretical assumptions, suggests the value of 
a tightly delimited political sphere which does not encroach upon the essentially private 
realms of economic and social exchange, encouraging a profoundly suspicious, skeptical, 
and anti-political culture” (Hay, 2007: 5).  
 
The implementing agencies selected from among the „technical‟ departments and 
„apolitical‟ NGOs are the preferred mode of routing the watershed development projects 
by the donor agencies. The specific institutions formed in the selected case studies would 
be discussed in section 2.3 and section 2.4. An analytical discussion on their 
instrumentalization as tools of depoliticization will be discussed in Chapter 5 and 6. The 
next section discusses the development of watershed development programs in India at 
the national level before taking up the individual cases in Maharashtra and Uttarakhand.  
 
2.2 Watershed Development in India: 1960-2008 
 
This section outlines the growth of watershed development project as a solution for the 
development of rainfed areas from the early years of the first five year plan in India. It 
also outlines the management structure of the watershed development projects now 
falling under three different Indian ministries. It shows that watershed development has 
currently become the premier state and donor intervention for the development of rainfed 
rural areas. This section partially informs the literature review of watershed development 
projects that is undertaken later in the chapter. 
 
Soil and water conservation to increase crop yields and arrest soil degradation was high 
on the Indian agenda since the first five-year plan in 1951(Tideman, 1996: 349). 
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Government established Central Soil and Water Conservation Research and Training 
Institute (CSWCRTI) in 1956 that started watershed activities in 42 locations, mainly on 
a small scale to understand the technical processes of soil degradation and the options for 
soil conservation (Samra, 1997). Watershed development started concretely in India in 
1960s with modest efforts by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) to conserve soil and 
water in rainfed areas
37
. After independence, India relied on multi-purpose reservoirs for 
providing irrigation and generating hydro-electricity. To stabilize the catchments of 
reservoirs and to control siltation, a centrally sponsored scheme of „Soil Conservation 
Work in the Catchments of River Valley Projects‟ was launched in 1962-63. Another step 
in this direction was taken with the launching of Drought Prone Areas Program (DPAP) 
by the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) in 1972-73. The objective of this 
program was to tackle the special problems of areas constantly affected by severe drought 
conditions. In 1977-78, the MoRD started a special program for hot desert areas of 
Rajasthan, Gujarat and Haryana and cold desert areas of Jammu & Kashmir and 
Himachal Pradesh (which were earlier under DPAP) called Desert Development Program 
(DDP)
38
. Together these projects covered an area of 96.1 million hectares spread over 20 
States (Government of India, 2001).  
The Ministry of Agriculture started a scheme of Integrated Watershed Management in the 
Catchments of Flood Prone Rivers (FPR) in 1980-81. During the 1980s, several 
successful experiences of fully treated watersheds, such as Sukhomajri in Haryana and 
Ralegaon Siddhi in Western Maharashtra, came to be reported. The Ministry of 
Agriculture then launched a scheme for propagation of water harvesting/conservation 
technology in rainfed areas in 19 identified locations in 1982-83. In October 1984, the 
Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) adopted this approach in 22 other locations in 
rainfed areas. With experience gained from all these, the concept of integrated watershed 
development was first institutionalized with the launching of the „National Watershed 
Development Program of Rainfed Areas‟ (NWDPRA) in 1986-87, covering 99 districts 
in 16 states (Government of India/ MoRD, 2006).  
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“The severe drought of 1987 forced the Government of India to give more thrust to 
rainfed areas. During the eighth five-year plan, an area of 4.23 million hectares was 
treated and developed with an expenditure of Rs. 9,679 million. In the 9
th
 five year plan, 
an outlay was raised to Rs. 10,200 million to treat 2.25 million hectares, which was 
slightly more than half of the area treated in the 8
th
 plan” (Joshi et al. 2004).   
 
The watershed development programs that were implemented solely by the ministries 
also allowed for the participation of NGOs as implementing agencies with a new 
initiative launched by the MoRD called the Watershed Areas for Rainfed Agricultural 
Systems Approach (WARASA). On these lines, the Government of India issued 
„Common Guidelines for Watershed Development Projects‟ in 1994. However, in 2003, 
these guidelines were revised and NGOs were excluded as implementing agencies that 
was now entrusted to the constitutionally mandated and elected local governance bodies 
called the Gram Panchayat. In 2006, the guidelines issued by the Government of India 
underwent revision and included NGOs and non-elected village committees for project 
implementation as a „practical solution‟39 contrary to the Gandhian dream of gram swaraj 
(village self-rule) and empowerment of the elected village government.   
At present, watershed development program covers all the 25 States and two union 
territories in India. It has so far treated 7.95 million hectares of land with an expense of 
Rs. 2398.76 crores. By the end of the March 2005, a total land area of 45.48 million 
hectares was covered under different watershed based development programs with a total 
investment of Rs. 17037.42 crores (Government of India/ MoRD, 2006: 38)
40
.  
Watershed projects in India are managed by three central ministries: the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA), the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) and the Ministry of 
Environment and Forest (MoEF) with the help of their respective line departments. The 
Planning Commission of India, which is in charge of the development of Five-year Plans 
for the country, co-ordinates long-term policy development in this area. The Commission 
is separated into divisions, which establish sector-wise working groups to make 
recommendations on policy matters for the formulation of the Five-Year Plans. The 
watershed development working group is in the agriculture division of the Planning 
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Commission. There is also a water resources division and an environment and forestry 
division (Amezaga et al. 2003: 6). The Ministry of Science and Technology provides 
technical inputs for the other ministries involved in land and water management through 
its Natural Resource Data Management Systems (NRDMS) program.  
2.2.1 Ministry of Agriculture 
The MoA has worked in the field of watershed development since the 1960s and deals 
with issues like erosion prone agricultural lands, optimizing production in rainfed areas 
and reclaiming degraded lands. The Department of Agriculture and Cooperation (DAC) 
and the Department of Agricultural Research and Education (DARE) of this ministry are 
involved in all aspects of watershed development. They are supported by two 
autonomous bodies: the Indian Council for Agricultural Research and National Institute 
for Agricultural Extension and Management. The MoA is currently implementing several 
schemes/programs including the National Watershed Development Project for Rainfed 
Areas (NWDPRA), Soil and Water Conservation in the Catchments of River Valley 
Projects (RVP) and Flood Prone Rivers (FRP), Reclamation of Alkali Soils, Watershed 
Development Project in Shifting Cultivation Areas (WDPSCA) and Externally Aided 
Projects (EAP) funded by the donor agencies
41
. 
2.2.2 Ministry of Rural Development  
The MoRD has been implementing watershed projects only since the late 1980s. It deals 
with non-forest wastelands and poverty alleviation programs with important components 
of soil and water conservation. The key department in MoRD is the Department of Land 
Resources (DoLR) particularly the Wastelands Development Division. There are 
however two other departments, the Department of Drinking Water Supply and 
Department of Rural Development also involved in watershed development. 
Two organizations support the MoRD, namely, the National Institute of Rural 
Development (NIRD) and the Council for Advancement of People‟s Action and Rural 
Technology (CAPART). The former provides advice on policy matters about watersheds, 
through the Centre for Natural Resources Management, whilst CAPART deals with the 
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voluntary sector. CAPART also has a division which sanctions watershed projects to 
NGOs and voluntary organizations. Programs implemented by MoRD include the 
Drought Prone Areas Program (DPAP), Desert Development Program (DDP), and 
Integrated Wastelands Development Program. Its other projects include on-going 
watershed programs under the employment assurance scheme, support to NGOs, and 
some Externally Aided Projects (EAPs)
42
. 
2.2.3 Ministry of Environment and Forests  
This ministry deals with forest and wasteland issues. Since 1989 the ministry 
implemented the Integrated Afforestation and Eco-development Projects Scheme 
(IAEPS) with the intention of promoting forestation and the development of degraded 
forests within an integrated watershed approach. The smallest player among the three 
ministries, MoEF and its area of work remains confined to the forested areas working 
under many guidelines as illustrated below. Two projects under this ministry are also 
shown in the figure.   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Projects under Ministry of Environment and Forests 
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2.3 Indo-German Watershed Development Project: Maharashtra 
This section of the chapter outlines the location, formation, and growth of the IGWDP in 
Maharashtra. It briefly describes the funding process of the project, involved agencies 
and different institutions that are formed in the process of watershed development 
program. This section also discusses the exposure and dialogue program of the donor 
community that has been taken up for identifying the „preferences‟ of different actors in 
the watershed development program in the 5
th
 Chapter.  
 
Indo-German Watershed Development Project was initiated by Hermann Bacher, a Jesuit 
priest who began the first watershed work in Pimpalgaon Wagha (1988) in Ahmednagar 
district. Fr. Bacher came to Maharashtra in the 1960s, founded the NGO called ' Social 
Center' in 1968 and worked for tribal development in this area. This long association with 
the area and an austere lifestyle has helped Fr. Bacher in winning the trust of the local 
people.  
In 1990, a project proposal was submitted to the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (Bacher et. al. 1990) requesting a loan to start 
Watershed development in Maharashtra with the NGOs as governance agencies. This 
later became formalized as the IGWDP, a bilateral watershed development project. This 
is an ongoing project funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ) started in 1992 and would continue to run until 2009. A 
national NGO called Watershed Organization Trust (WOTR) is the implementing agency.   
This project is located in Ahmednagar District, Maharashtra State, in western India (see 
map 1). Ahmednagar town lies in central Maharashtra, 285 kilometers and seven hours 
bus journey away from Mumbai. It has no airport facility but is well connected by trains 
and buses. It is the largest district of Maharashtra with an area of 17035 square kilometers 
and grows mostly sugarcane, jowar and bajara. It has the largest number of sugar 
factories in the State and is dominated by the National Congress Party of Sharad Pawar. 
The local Member of the Parliament Tukaram Gangadhar also hails from the same party. 
Ahmednagar is classified by the government of India as a drought prone area with low 
and erratic rainfall
43
. Out of the 13 talukas (sub-divisions of a district) in Ahmednangar, 
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eight are constantly affected by water scarcity due to erratic and low rainfall. The 
Government of Maharashtra, therefore, laid specific emphasis upon the scheme of soil 
and water conservation in this area to address the issue of drought and recurrent water 
scarcity. This scheme was undertaken in the district in 1958-59 for the first time. It 
undertook the physical activities of contour bunding and nala bunding throughout the 
district.  
It is also the largest district in Maharashtra occupying 5.66% of the land area. The official 
website of the district presents Ahmednagar as the „most advanced district having 
maximum number of sugar factories in the State. The first cooperative sugar factory in 
Asia was established at Pravara Nagar in this district. Role Model of water conservation 
work can be seen at Ralegan-Siddhi and Hivare Bazar, which are also called ideal 
villages‟44. This account presents three important aspects of the district in the form its 
sugarcane production and processing, a history of cooperative movements and a focus on 
rural development with the help of watershed programs.   
Watershed development has certainly come a long way from the modest efforts by the 
government in the late 1960s. At present, IGWDP alone covers 104 watershed 
development projects in and around Ahmednagar spread over 204 villages. It has formed 
more than 1200 micro-credit societies for women in this area and continues to work on 
these issues.  
The project site in Ahmednagar lies in the watershed of Mula River in the south and 
Pravara River on the north. This river system later meets Godavari River at a place called 
Pravara Sangam towards the northeastern part of the district, and forms the part of larger 
Godavari watershed. Some of the project area in the Ahmednagar block lies in the Sina 
River watershed also.  
IGWDP was inspired by the successful examples of watershed development in this region 
of Maharashtra (notably Ralegan Siddhi village that lies in the same district) that have 
helped in rehabilitating the environment in the drought prone villages of Ahmednagar. 
The main objective of this project „is to alleviate poverty through regenerating the 
environment with the active participation of the watershed community. This objective is 
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achieved through different mechanical and vegetative measures, both on land and along 
the drainage lines‟ (WOTR, 2004).  
IGWDP is a bilaterally funded program with two distinct phases both of which have 
separate funding sources and two separate organizations to route the funds to the 
implementing NGO called WOTR. The first phase is called the Capacity Building Phase 
(CBP), funded by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). In this phase, 
the „mother NGO‟ equips the community-based organizations, villagers and their 
institutions to undertake the watershed project. The responsible organization for this 
phase is WOTR, a resource and support organization for local NGOs and village self-help 
groups that intend to undertake a watershed development project. In the CBP, an amount 
of 60,000 INR is allocated for the programs that deal specifically with the women‟s 
problems (WOTR, 2004).  
The CBP is followed by a Full Implementation Phase (FIP) funded by the German Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (KfW) with NABARD as their local partners. In 
this phase all major drainage line treatments are undertaken. FIP also has a component for 
women‟s promotion activities amounting to 5% of the total project cost or 250,000 INR, 
whichever is more. 
The operational manual issued by WOTR (2004) identifies the important actors in 
IGWDP at three different levels of management. The highest strata at the program level 
consists of the implementing NGO called WOTR, NABARD, program coordination unit 
with two members each from WOTR and NABARD, project steering committee of the 
CBP and the project sanctioning and steering committee with the executive director of 
NABARD as the chairperson. Main actors at the village level are the local NGOs (other 
than WOTR) working at the grassroots and their employees, like the community 
organizer, lady social worker, and the technical officer. According to the manual, there 
are 6 main actors at the watershed level. This includes the watershed community or the 
general body of the project village, the village watershed committee (VWC) nominated 
by the general body, forest protection committee (FPC), women‟s self-help groups, 
samyukt mahila samiti (SMS) and watershed workers/supervisors selected from the 
literate villagers.  
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2.3.1 Exposure and Dialogue Program in Maharashtra 
 
This section describes the donor‟s perspective on the Indo-German Watershed 
Development Project (IGWDP) based on an exposure program of the important decision 
makers from Germany among other international organizations, in which the participants 
visited the villages under this watershed project and discussed it with responsible Indian 
watershed development agencies.  
Policy makers from the German government and other development agencies are 
regularly taken to such project villages in developing countries where Germany is the 
funding agency. This program is organized by a Bonn based NGO called „Exposure-und 
Dialogprogramme e.V‟. Initially these programmes were carried out by the „German 
Commission for Justice and Peace‟ and later by the „Association for the Promotion of 
North-South Dialogue‟, which was founded in 1992. Karl Osner worked as the founding 
managing director until the end of 2001. In 2003, the „Association for the Promotion of 
North-South Dialogue‟ was transformed into the „Exposure and Dialogue Programme 
Association‟45. Since 1985, more than 60 such programs have been organized involving 
more than 900 participants.  
This NGO coordinates with other NGOs in the recipient countries and arranges for the 
participants to stay in project villages, reflect on their findings and meet the decision 
makers from the recipient country.  
IGWDP in Ahmednagar, India has been the host to three such exposure tours since 1991. 
Such exposure tours bring up issues that are considered important by the observers from 
the donor countries and they have an opportunity to directly ask the Indian policy makers 
about their stand and perspectives. This section is based on one such exposure tour 
conducted from October 27
th
- November 5
th, 2006 called „Poverty reduction and self-
governing watersheds in Maharashtra‟, an exposure and dialogue program organized in 
cooperation with Watershed Organization Trust (WOTR), India.  
This section first introduces the four-phase structure of the „Exposure and Dialogue 
Program‟ (EDP) and then describes each phase of the EDP in detail.  
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The Participants 
 
From 27
th
 October to 5
th
 November 2006, a team of 19 participants (including 5 members 
of the German Parliament, 1 member of the European Parliament, 3 officials of KfW and 
one member each from BMZ and GTZ among others
46
) was arranged to live with the 
villagers of the project areas in rural Maharashtra. This was the 4
th
 EDP in the IGWDP 
villages in the last 17 years of association between the German government and the local 
NGO in India. Three before it were conducted in the years 1994, 1997, and 2000. 
The idea behind this was to present an opportunity to the members of the donor 
community to make first-hand observations about the development projects that Germany 
was funding, and later prepare recommendations to be shared with the Indian 
counterparts as the concluding part of the program. 
“The name „Exposure and Dialogue Program‟ (EDP) derives from its methodical 
„exposure‟ of the donors (sich aussetzen) to the project villages followed by a „dialogue‟ 
and discussion phase with the policy makers of the recipient country. The core of an 
exposure and dialogue program is the face-to-face encounter with poor and socially 
marginalized people, who are striving to actively improve their living conditions. For 
about 3 days, the participants visit families in groups of two (usually one woman and one 
man). They live and sleep in the family home, sharing and experiencing their daily 
lives”47. 
 
A schematic diagram represents the exposure program as a four step process of exposure 
to the village life, reflection within the group, dialogue with the implementing agencies 
like the government and NGO staff, and making recommendations for the future 
improvement of the project based on the exposure, reflection and dialogue.  
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Figure 2. Schematic Representation of the Exposure and Dialogue 
Programme 
 
Before Exposure: First meeting of the Participants in Germany 
 
Two months before the actual visit to India, a pre-EDP meeting was organized in Berlin 
to explain this program to the potential participants. In this meeting, the participants were 
given a brief introduction to the project work in India.  
The presentation made at the Berlin meeting
48
, attended by the potential participants, 
remarked that the starting conditions of economic cooperation between Germany and 
India were changing in the light of the following facts:  
 Growing economic performance and influence in world politics- the continuing 
rate of 8% annual economic growth showed that India was using the opportunity 
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offered by globalization. At the same time, India‟s emergence as the local 
superpower in the region have been acknowledged by the nuclear agreement with 
USA and the meeting of the German Chancellor with the Indian prime minister in 
on her visit to India. The cooperation between the two countries is growing in 
many different fields. UN and WTO have also recognized the important role that 
India would play in the future world politics.  
 Widespread poverty and growing social disparity: At the same time, 240-390 
million Indians live in the conditions of extreme poverty, housing the largest 
number of poor in the world. India ranked 127
th
 in the HDI out of 177 countries. 
(China was ranked 94
th
.) 
 Growing energy requirements, environmental problems and protection against 
climate change: As a transition economy, India is in a growing need of raw 
materials and energy for its constantly growing economy. This makes India the 5
th
 
largest emitter of Carbon Dioxide in the environment. This has serious 
consequences for the environment and climate change.  
 An active civil society in the biggest democracy of the world: Inspite of the 
infrastructural weaknesses, Indian democracy has proved its capacity to continue 
working. An active civil society shapes a lively social discourse and actively 
forms political and public opinion.  
 Interests in the deepening of development cooperation between the two countries: 
This includes among other things, intensification of relations, in the areas of trade 
and scientific -technical cooperation.  
 
„Within the environment sector, the objective would be the promotion of local resources 
for the gentle growth and sustainable management of natural resources‟49. The areas of 
activity would be both within the government and industrial sector for environment 
protection and management of natural resources. The integral part of this work would be 
to provide environmental consultancy, Watershed Management, Adivasi development 
projects, PPP (Public Private Partnership) bio-diesel, „zukünftig auch Maßnahmen zu 
städtischer Entwicklung, Anpassung an den Klimawandel‟50.  
 
                                                 
49
 „Förderung von Ressourcen schonendem Wachstum und nachhaltiger Bewirtschaftung natürlicher 
Ressourcen‟. 
50
 Hahn ( 2006). 
35 
 
The next part of the presentation argued in favor of a watershed development project by 
pointing to the fact that more than 50% of the area in India (175 million hectares) is 
affected by land-degradation. Around 70% of the Indian population derives its livelihood 
from subsistence farming and lives in extremely poor conditions. Watershed development 
that improves agricultural production in the rainfed areas has been a strategy of the 
government to fight poverty in these areas. The Indian government started with the 
watershed development projects in the early 80s but made little headway as the guidelines 
provided for the development of watersheds „were purely technical in nature- to combat 
land degradation, without any acknowledgement, participation or role of the affected 
populations‟51. 
“In this scenario, IGWDP was launched and with the main objective of bringing together 
the government and non-government organizations along with the self-help groups 
towards a self-governed and sustainable management of watershed areas. It was an 
integrated multidisciplinary approach to watershed development at different levels like 
concrete technical and socio-economic measures at the micro-level;  local policy planning 
and governing, networking at the policy and decision making level and effective 
coordination between the involved State, central government, „mother‟ NGO, local NGO 
and the community based organizations. IGWDP has impacted the life of poor adivasis in 
Maharashtra as well as the Indian policy makers. In 1999 when GoI set up the watershed 
development fund, the approach followed by IGWDP was taken up as the guiding 
principle for the development of other watersheds”52.  
 
This meeting also described the role of the NGO that has been active in implementing the 
capacity-building phase of the project:  
“Watershed Organization Trust (WOTR) is an Ahmednagar based NGO that was formed 
in 1993 with the aim of alleviating poverty through „self-help initiatives‟. It was started 
by a Swiss Jesuit priest, Hermann Bacher and was coordinated by Fr. Crispino Lobo. 
Presently, Marcella D‟Souza is the director of this program. WOTR plays the role of 
„mother‟ NGO that supports the village level activities, both financially and technically. 
It provides training and consultation to the community based organizations and local 
NGOs in watershed work. It follows a participatory and self-help oriented approach in 
watershed development and undertakes following concrete measures: human resource 
development, land and water management, forestation, plantation activities, fodder 
plantation, rural energy needs and income generating measures”.  
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The German contribution to the project and to WOTR was also outlined briefly. The 
project is still under the support of BMZ and would run out in November 2008. The data 
given below gives us an overview of the FZ and TZ invested in this time period: 
„1992 – 2008:  
TZ: 7, 5 Mio €; FZ: 38,8 Mio €;  
Letzte Förderphase für WOTR 12/2005 bis 11/2008 mit 1,8 Mio €, davon ein 
Finanzierungsbeitrag von 900 T€ „ (Hahn, 2006).  
 
The future challenges for watershed development in India were outlined under two 
subtopics: decentralization and development of „sustainable financial models‟ for 
watersheds with a goal of moving from pure subsidy to financial independence.  
After the Berlin meeting, the participants gathered in India after 2 months for the actual 
program. This time we met in Darewadi village of Ahmednagar district. 
 
Before the exposure: meeting in India 
 
This section describes the first impressions of the EDP participants that were formed on 
the basis of their interaction with the NGO staff and their presentation of the watershed 
development work under IGWDP.  
The participants were first welcomed by Father Bacher who spoke about the idea of 
watershed development and shared his experiences collected over the last fifty years in 
India, especially in the Ahmednagar District of Maharashtra. Due to its location in the 
rain-shadow area, it receives a rainfall between 508-635 mm and is thus a semi-arid 
region prone to recurrent droughts. It was in this semi-arid, drought-prone and 
industrially backward region that Fr. Hermann Bacher decided to establish the Social 
Centre in 1966 with the objective of alleviating poverty and hardships of the small and 
marginal farmers through development of water resources and increased agricultural 
productivity. 
This was followed by a presentation by the director of WOTR, Marcella D‟Souza. This 
presentation was on the sister concern of WOTR, a new NGO called „Sampada Trust‟ 
which has started the work of establishing micro credit societies for women‟s 
empowerment in Maharashtra.   
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The presentation by the director was followed by a briefing by another staff of WOTR 
who explained in concrete terms, the questions and issues that the participants could ask 
once they reach the villages. These could be ascertaining the resource basket of the 
family, the cultural norms, and social relations of the family with the village folks and 
outside world. The participants could also look for the working of elected village 
governance bodies (gram panchayat), the number of self-help groups formed and their 
working, the actual sites with land treatments in the process of watershed development. 
After a brief break, the EDP delegation was taken for a survey of the Darewadi village to 
observe the change brought about by the watershed program.  
 
Exposure and Living in the Project Villages  
 
Nine out of the 204 project villages were selected to host the delegation on their three-day 
visit. On the morning of October, 29th the participants left for their respective villages, 
shortly stopping on their way to look at an untreated area which allowed for a comparison 
to the treated project villages yet to be seen. All nineteen participants were distributed 
into villages within a radius of around 30 km in the Sangamner taluka of Ahmednagar 
district where they would spend the next three nights (See Map 3). For the next 3 days, all 
delegation members were part of a village community, „participating‟ in their daily 
activities, eating the way they eat and sleeping the same way. 
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Map 3.  Location of the Exposure Villages in Ahmednagar, 
Maharashtra 
 
The participants would also meet the different functionaries in the watershed 
development project, the apex body of women‟s self-help groups, which is called 
Sanyukta Mahila Samiti (SMS) and other village level governance bodies. The 
participants were to remain in close communication with the WOTR facilitators working 
in the field, who were also available for conducting the village situation in its different 
cultural setting and language. The delegation represented the power base of fund 
suppliers, yet in a philosophical mood of cooperation and a stance of partnership.  
The participants were received with great fanfare and celebration on their arrival in the 
village. All villagers assembled near the place of arrival to have a glimpse of the people 
from so far away. A „white‟ man/ woman in the middle of an Indian village is not a 
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common sight and hence no villager would miss this opportunity to be a part of the 
welcome ceremony. Everyone, at least it seemed, was there. Adler from KfW and a 
participant of the EDP, records his arrival in the village in the following words:  
 
„Bei unserer Ankunft schien das ganze Dorf auf den Beinen zu sein. Jedenfalls kam uns 
eine Traube von Kindern und Frauen entgegen, dahinter eine Gruppe junger Männer, die 
uns mit Pauken und Trommeln willkommen hießen. Es musste ein Großteil der knapp 500 
Einwohner gewesen sein‟53. 
 
I was located in the village called Pimpri in the Sahyadri ranges of western Maharashtra 
of Akole block. Dilapidated condition of the roads leading to the village makes it 
inaccessible and remote. The terrain is partially hilly and receives an annual average 
rainfall of 957 mm. Pimpri is a small village of around 390.37 hectares out of which 6.02 
come under the forest department. 35.58 hectares is the revenue land, 317.81 hectares is 
cultivable and 31 hectares of wasteland. Agriculture is the primary occupation of the 
people, who often work as labourers in the nearby cities during non-cultivation periods. A 
total of 81 families with around 500 people inhabit the village. The whole community 
belongs to scheduled caste and scheduled tribes
54
.  
Once in the village, the „ice breaking‟ was initiated by the village people in their warm 
and friendly welcome ceremony. In their traditional way of greeting with garlands and 
„tilak‟ on the forehead, the visitors were made a part of the village community. 
 
„Frauen hielten einen Aluminiumteller in den Händen. Darauf stand ein kleines, 
brennendes Öllämpchen, daneben befand sich je ein kleines Häufchen Henna und 
Gelbwurzpulver sowie eine halbe, auffallend kleine Kokosnuss, an der ein Bändchen 
befestigt war. Wir bekamen von den Dorfbewohnern selbst kunstvoll 
zusammengebundene Blütenkränze um den Hals gehängt, und je einen Tupfen Henna und 
Gelbwurz in zwei übereinander liegenden Punkten auf die Stirn gedrückt. Damit waren 
wir Teil des Dorfes – eine schöne Geste der Gastfreundschaft“.55 
 
                                                 
53
 „Lebensgeschichte‟ submitted by Matthias Adler to the EDP e.V. (2006) Bonn, titled „Von verlorenen 
Ziegen und drohenden Hochzeitsfeiern - drei Tage zu Gast in einer indischen Familie‟, 
54
 Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) are Indian population groupings that are explicitly 
recognized by the Constitution of India, previously called the "depressed classes" by the British, and 
otherwise known as untouchables. SCs/STs together comprise over 24% of India's population, with SC at 
over 16% and ST over 8% as per the 2001 Census. Some Scheduled Castes in India are also known as 
Dalits Some Scheduled Tribe people are also referred to as Adivasis. 
55
 „Lebensgeschichte‟ submitted by Matthias Adler to the EDP e.V. (2006) Bonn.  
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We were taken on a visit to the village where the watershed work was in progress. We 
came across the continuous contour trenches, plantations and water absorption trenches in 
the village.  
WOTR provided each participant with a brief document that gave information about the 
project in the visited villages. The management of the project in Pimpri village was 
described in the following words:  
 
“At the village level, the project is managed by Village Development Committee (VDC) 
called the Kaloba VDC with the help of WOTR‟s team working in Akole cluster. The 
members of the VDC were consensually nominated by the village gram sabha. The VDC 
has 9 members including 4 women. They regularly meet to plan, implement and monitor 
the project. Besides, other local level institutions like the women‟s self-help groups and 
sanyukta mahila samiti have also been set up at the village level and these too have 
undergone regular trainings in promotion and management of their groups, financial 
management etc. There are 10 members in the SMS”.  
 
 
Photograph 1. Continuous Contour trenches in Pimpri Village 
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The village social worker and the facilitators explained that this village was still on a pilot 
basis and the project was yet to move into the full implementation phase. The village 
would soon be taken up by NABARD for funding in this phase.  
After a transactional walk of the village, we interviewed the women‟s micro-credit group 
and met with the interviewee family in the evening. This family consisted of a small land-
owning couple with three children. The couple worked as farmers in their small piece of 
land and as daily wage laborers in the nearby town.Chandrabhaga Bai took us to her 2.5 
hectares land plot that was slightly away from the village. The land was tilled but had no 
plantations at that time. She explained that there were no irrigation facilities and the only 
way to get water for her fields was the monsoon rains.  
 
Reflection and Sharing of Village Experiences 
 
After the village exposure, the EDP delegation reassembled to share their experiences 
made in the project villages over the last three days. They brought out a range of issues in 
the reflection phase that took place among the participants. They outlined the 
discrepancies in the project, status of women, education, role of the NGO, and political 
nature of the village society, among other things
56
.  
 
Dialogue with Indian Delegation  
 
Dialogue phase in Poona gave the EDP participants an opportunity to meet with Indian 
governmental and non-governmental decision-makers in the field of watershed 
development. In this phase of the program, the donor representatives shared their 
preferences in watershed development based on their village exposure with the decision 
makers from India. The Indian delegation also used the opportunity to voice its 
preferences and position on watershed development programs. The Minister of 
Agriculture and Watershed Development of Maharashtra, B.S. Thorat also addressed the 
dialogue phase. The presentations on different aspects of the watershed development 
program by the joint delegation were followed by a discussion among the donor and 
recipient delegations. This phase concluded with a list of three final recommendations 
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 See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on the reflection and dialogue phase.  
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made by the EDP delegation for the improvement of watershed development projects in 
India.  
2.3.2 Final Recommendations by EDP 
 
The participants were divided into three working groups to discuss the key issues that 
were identified during the exposure program. 
 
Working group I: Sustainability of the Watershed Development Projects 
 
The first working group took up the issue of ensuring sustainability of the watershed 
development projects. The group debated the need to ascertain measurable indicators that 
could be used to identify the successful activities and institutions created in the watershed 
program. It felt the need for a wider governmental support to the „civil society‟ and such 
NGOs that have worked in this area. Donor policy and funding coordination and the need 
for India to join OECD donors in regional markets was also considered important aspects 
that determined the sustainable implementation of watershed projects.  
The group worked with the help of a set of guiding questions provided by the NGO that 
was useful in providing the flow and direction to the discussion.  
Guiding questions for the Working Group-I: Ensuring sustainability in watershed work.  
 How can we establish best practice indicators, which can be adopted by other 
watershed development programs? 
 How can access to energy in watershed areas be ensured in such a way that a 
deforestation of the rehabitated areas is avoided?  
 What role can renewable energy play in this process? How can this be designed, 
organized and financed?  
 What framework conditions are necessary to strengthen ownership at the political 
level in order to ensure sustainability of watershed development programs?  
 How can this successful watershed development approach (approach of IGWDP/ 
WOTR) be used in national and international development programs? Who could 
be the responsible actors?  
Table 1. Guiding Questions for the Sustainability Working Group  
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With the above set of guiding questions, the EDP group made the following suggestions: 
Indicators to measure successful performance of activities such as empowerment of the 
gram panchayat, SHGs and their resources, training, credit, etc. are needed by NGOs, 
governments, and villagers. 
Indicators to monitor and assess outcomes such as: physical (water flows, water levels, 
water withdrawals), social (years of school, health status), economic (change in incomes 
and wages, number of jobs, land values) and environmental (vegetative cover, 
biodiversity) are needed by NGOs, governments, and villagers. 
The formation of an NGO network should be supported by governments. Through the 
network „centers of excellence‟ or lead NGOs can be identified for capacity building, 
operations, and the establishment of Mother NGOs. Establishment of a separate fund 
managed by a joint NGO and a government commission, which can fund NGOs and 
private sector firms to engage in social marketing. The goal is to initiate farmers clubs, 
identify village problems, begin to set priorities, and most importantly, create bottom up 
demand for watershed activities by villagers. 
Renewable energy can be instrumental in watershed development through a number of 
approaches. Combine energy efficient techniques for cooking, sanitation, house heating 
and others. 
Afforestation and reforestation should be linked with watershed management. A dialogue 
with governments is necessary to create a more reliable energy mix especially for the 
rural sector. In this context it was recommended to participate in the „Germany-India 
Renewable Energy Conference‟ in December 2006. 
To explore donor coordination and investment opportunities through the OECD
57
 would 
be one approach to promote successful watershed development at national and 
international levels. 
Initiate international market places (trade fairs, conferences, expos) where best practices 
are presented, displayed and promoted. Create opportunities for India and Africa to join 
with OECD donors in regional markets. 
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 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
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Working Group-II: Empowerment of villagers through watershed development programs 
 
The second working group was assigned the topic of empowerment of the local 
community and various problems that needed to be addressed.  
 
The guiding questions for this group: 
 What skills do we need today to safeguard the future of the next generations with 
respect to 1) education; 2) social insurance; 3) social and cultural change process; 
4) gender issues?  
 How can watershed programs move beyond technical aspects to contribute to or 
initiate the process of empowerment?  
 
Table 2. Guiding Questions for the Empowerment Working Group 
The working group on empowerment made following suggestions based on its group 
discussion and debate among the participants:  
Empowerment should be politically enabling in the sense that village people must be able 
to organize the village life democratically. Democratic virtues should be developed in this 
given cultural background. 
Creating awareness among the villagers through the WDPs was felt to be necessary. The 
watershed programs can link the villagers to banks and provide credit. Non-farm 
activities for increasing the income of the people (by providing them with vocational 
training- especially for the landless and the poorest of the poor) are to be recommended. 
The so-called „Watershed-plus Program‟ was suggested which would use the watershed 
activities as a platform to address the entire social fabric of the village and bring about 
positive change. 
Policies should be readjusted to make sure that no one is excluded from the program, 
including the landless and the women. The decision-making body should be constituted 
in a way that all classes of the village population are included. Reservations must be 
made in these bodies in accordance with the percentage of population of each class. 
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Working Group-III: Enhancing „good governance‟ in watershed development programs 
 
The next working group was assigned the topic of „good governance‟ and its role in the 
watershed development projects.  
 
Working group-III was provided the following set of guiding questions:  
 How can watershed programs contribute to the promotion of good governance 
through:  
1. Participation of all villagers including landless and women?  
2. Ensuring more transparency of public service delivery?  
3. Dealing with land rights and land tenure issues?  
4. Other issues of good governance?  
 How can governmental programs and schemes reach the poor?  
 
Table 3. Guiding Questions for the Governance Working Group 
Based on its set of guiding questions, the working group came to the following 
conclusions:  
The main key to good governance is transparency. Resulting from that all records should 
be accessible to the public. In the villages visited, for example, all relevant numbers 
regarding the watershed development status were displayed publicly. 
At the same time, the role of literacy needs to be emphasized, because transparency does 
not function in an illiterate environment. So education should be considered as crucial 
factor. 
Transparency also requires clear purposes and clear plans. Therefore, operation and 
maintenance funds should not be used for other purposes. Specific guidelines have to be 
defined for the usage of these funds. 
The decision-makers should have a clear idea about their duties, roles and 
responsibilities. This knowledge should enable them to take better decisions. Every 
villager should have the right to know about the decisions made and the roles played by 
each decision-maker. This is a vital instrument in fighting corruption. 
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Good Governance efforts should also include the NGO and the state level and not only 
the grass-root level. 
 
2.4 Integrated Watershed Development Program, Shiwalik Hills-II: Uttarakhand  
 
The project Hills-II was undertaken in the state of Uttarakhand, which came into 
existence in the year 2000, carved out of the hilly regions of Uttar Pradesh. It comprises 
of the eight hill districts
58
 with its administrative headquarters at Dehradun, 235 km from 
New Delhi.  
Travelling north from Delhi, crossing the plains, the transition (from plains to the hills) to 
the Himalayas is achieved via the Shiwaliks, a line of hills 15-50 km in breadth, with an 
average elevation of 1500- 2000 meters that run along the southern edge of the Himalaya. 
They are the first range of Hills encountered en-route from the plains and are geologically 
separate from the Himalayas. The Shiwaliks form the „southern gateway‟ into the 
Himalayan range. In Uttarakhand, they extend from Dehradun to Almora before heading 
across the southern border of Nepal.  
These Shiwalik hills are separated from the fertile Indo-Gangetic Plains by a band of 
swamp and forest called the Terai. Inhabited only by a few hunting and gathering 
communities, and highly malarial, the Terai formed an effective barrier to the penetration 
of large armies from the plains into these hills. 
59
   
A few kilometers north of the Shiwaliks, the proper Himalayan Ranges begin, ascending 
quickly to an average elevation of 7000 feet. It is the socio-ecological region between the 
Great Himalayan Range and the Indo-Gangetic Plains, which is the project site of IWDP, 
Hills-II and the focus area for my study. 
 Except for the remote valleys north of the Himalayan Range, the Uttarakhand region is 
subject to the annual monsoons and hence, rain-fed irrigation for agriculture. The pre-
monsoon summer months begin in the late April and last till the month of June with the 
first showers of the monsoons coming in early-mid July. July, August and September 
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The 8 hill districts are: i) Pauri, ii) Tehri, iii) Uttarkashi, iv) Dehradun and v) Chamoli – which 
collectively constitute „Garhwal; vi) Almora, vii) Pithoragarh and viii) Nainital- which collectively 
constitute „Kumaon‟.  
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bring heavy rains to this region, average rainfall being anywhere from 1400-2000 mm. 
Winter begins to set in by late October, also marking the end of the pilgrimage season 
with most of the important religious shrines closing down for the cold winter. Heavy 
snowfalls on the Himalayan Range preclude any thoughts of motion in this area. 
However, the Shiwalik ranges receive milder snowfall and the trekking routes between 
the villages are passable even during winters. 
Garhwal was an area constituted by many small principalities and chiefdoms when 
Ajaypal Panwar subjugated them in the early 16
th
 Century. In 1517, it established its 
capital at Srinagar (in Pauri Garhwal) where it administered an impressive area including 
much of the terrain from the Yamuna River to Nanda Devi Peak in the east.  
Bounded on the north by the Greater Himalaya and separated from the Indo-Gangetic 
Plains in the south by the Shiwalik hills, Garhwal remained pretty safe and isolated. Thus 
they neither came under the sway of the Mughals nor were they subject to the invasions 
from the north
60
. This has kept Garhwal in a relative isolation and retains a cultural 
heritage from the „brahminical‟ social order of the past.  
 
Integrated Watershed development work started in the Uttar Pradesh Hills under the Hill 
Development Department in 1983 by launching two simultaneous projects: 1) World 
Bank funded Nayar-Panar project till 1991 and 2) the EU funded South-Bhagirathi 
project till 1993. In the same year, EU funded another program called the Doon Valley 
Project (DVP) till 2001. Hills project funded by the Bank was started in 1999 then 
extended to Hills-II project and now continues in the form of UDWDP
61
 until 2009.  
 
GoI together with the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab 
and Uttar Pradesh signed an agreement with IDA and IBRD in September, 1999 to grant 
a loan of 148 crore INR to improve the productive potential of Shiwalik ranges using 
evolving watershed treatment technologies and community participatory approaches.
62
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 Uttaranchal Decentralized Watershed Development Program. For a complete list of programs 
implemented by WMD, see Appendix A.  
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WMD (2001) 
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The studied project area is located in the Yamkeshwar block of Garhwal District, 
Uttarakhand State in north India (see map 2). This region has a sub-temperate to 
temperate climate, which remains pleasant throughout the year. The hilly terrain with its 
forested slopes receives adequate rainfall from mid-June till mid-September. Occasional 
rainfall is also recorded in winters. Average annual rainfall in the district is 2180 mm, 
about 90 percent of which is generally concentrated over the monsoon. Regardless of the 
excess rain, this area suffers from irrigation and drinking water scarcity during the 
summer months. This is due to the hilly terrain that most of rainwater goes as waste in the 
form of run-off. The stony texture of soil further increases the rate of water erosion. The 
run-off rainwater can be harvested by constructing water irrigation tanks, appropriate 
plantations, and constructing check dams in feasible areas.  The watershed programs were 
started in this district to address this problem. The main challenge was to store the water 
for an extended period of 9 months. One such project, called the Integrated Watershed 
Development Project (Shiwalik) Hills-II was started in 1999 and „covered‟ 493 villages 
spread over 24 micro-watersheds. It was funded by the World Bank and lasted till 
September 2005. My field work was done in the ten villages of Aamkatal micro-
watershed in Pauri District developed under this project.  
 
The World Bank appraisal document identifies the project as follows:  
“Hills-II project is a poverty targeted intervention‟ in the rural development sector, within 
the responsibility of MoA. The implementing agencies would be the respective state 
governments and the Village Development Committees. The project would last for 5 
years and was expected to close down in April 2005. The main objective of the project 
was „to improve the productive potential of the project area in the five states (Punjab, 
Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and Uttar Pradesh), using evolving 
watershed treatment technologies and community participatory approaches. The project 
would contribute significantly to decreasing soil erosion, increasing water availability, 
and alleviating poverty in the contiguous areas of the Shiwalik hills in the five project 
states. Sustainability of project interventions would be ensured through the participatory 
involvement of project stakeholders/ beneficiaries.” (World Bank, 1999)  
 
2.4.1 Shiwalik Hills-II Project in Kimsar Village  
 
This section introduces the institutions and activities of the Hills-II project in the Kimsar 
village of Aamkatal microwatershed. It first shows that the villagers of this block have 
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presented the need for motorable roads but end up with watershed development projects 
that do not fulfill the developmental aspirations of the people.  
  
Kimsar is a small village in the Rishikesh division, Yamkeshwar block of Pauri-Garhwal 
district in Uttarakhand, north India.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 4. Location of Kimsar Village in Hills-II Project, Pauri, 
Uttarakhand 
 
Small but centrally located Kimsar is a useful destination for the villagers in the Taal 
Valley as this village has the only bank in this area. The location of the bank in this 
village makes it the most visited place in the block as almost every villager is required to 
go there at least once in a month or even more times depending on the need. The only 
mode of transportation is the jeep run by the private locals and no buses ply here as the 
roads are not suitable for a bus journey. 
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„On the road‟ of Kimsar 
 
This village lies in the Gauhari Range of Shiwalik hills that became a part of the Rajaji 
National Park in 1983. There was little development in this area due to its forested 
surroundings and isolated location even before the national park was announced. But 
after 1983, all villages in the Kimsar nayaya panchayat
63
 were subject to the jurisdiction 
of Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 and the Forest Act of 1980 (no construction other than 
those directly linked to the preservation of wildlife could be undertaken in the park area) 
that imposed further restrictions on any kind of construction in this area.  
It was plainly unfortunate for the residents of this village that the entire Gauhari Range 
was declared to become a national park in the same year when the government of Uttar 
Pradesh sanctioned Rs. 38 lakhs for constructing the road between Kaudiya and Kimsar 
village in the financial year 1982-83
64
. However, this amount was not released for the 
road construction to Kimsar as noted in the letter to the chief conservator of forests, 
Uttarakhand from the Government of Uttar Pradesh:  
 
“With reference to your letter number P-1682/ 8-1, dated 14-11-1990, I have been 
directed to convey to you that in the development block of Yamkeshwar in Pauri district, 
an amount of Rs. 38.80 lakhs was sanctioned in the financial year 1982-83 for the 
construction of Kaudiya-Kimsar motor road. But due to the 5
th
 km milestone to the 22
nd
 
km milestone stretch lying in the Rajaji National Park (RNP), the road construction was 
withheld due to the provisions of Forest Conservation Act of 1980. Due to this issue, the 
honorable governor has consented to the construction of the above motorable road as 
„forest motor road‟/ jeepable tracks and is pleased to announce a sum of Rs. 22 lakhs for 
this purpose. As the above mentioned work has no provisions in the current financial year 
of 1991-92, and since the work to be done is very important and indispensible, the 
honorable governor has agreed to provide a sum of Rs. 22 lakhs from the State 
emergency fund in advance, till the work is approved by the legislative assembly, to be 
deposited under your authority. Kindly make this amount available to the concerned 
construction agencies.”  
 
This was in response to a letter sent by the chief conservator of forests, Uttarakhand in 
November 1990. The response that came from the government was in 1992 informing 
                                                 
63
 Nayaya Panchayat refers to the cluster of villages or the elected body of village representatives at the 
block level constituted by the elected village sarpanchs of the given block.  
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 Letter to the Chief Conservator of Forests- Uttaranchal from MM Singh,  Government of Uttar Pradesh 
on 30
th
 March, 1992; Number: 1111/28-3-71591/ 88 
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about the money sanctioned for the village road in 1982-83. The amount sanctioned after 
10 years in 1992 was reduced by almost half of the earlier amount as now the roads were 
to remain as „forest tracks‟ between the 5th km to 22nd km milestone.  
 
The sanction of this amount for the road did not translate into any concrete action as it 
could be seen in the „Open Letter‟ sent by the elected local representatives of this area to 
the chief conservator of forests in March 2005 to „exclude the Gauhari range from Rajaji 
National Park area‟. It outlined the problems of individual villages in this range that had 
stopped the construction of roads due to the inclusion of this area into a national park:  
 
“This is to bring to your notice that the existence of all the boundary villages of the Rajaji 
National Park (RNP), Gauhari Range forest area has come under sever crisis. All villages 
under the Nyaya Panchayat Kimsar (Ganga Bhogpur Talla, Ganga Bhogpur Malla, Talla 
Banaas, Kasan, Bhumiyakisar, Kandakhaal, Malla Banaas, Jogiyana, Taal Shahzada, 
Kimsaar, Khairana, Ramjiwala, Diwogi, Marora, Dharkot, Garhakot, Amola, Kachunda, 
Debrana etc) are affected by the Gauhari Range. The main road of access to these villages 
is the Kaudiya-Kimsaar motor road that passes through the RNP forested area and due to 
the enforcement of Forest Act of 1980, the roads have remained unmetalled.  
Kaudiya- Bindwasani-Kandra motor road is also within the Gauhari Range due to which 
the villages under the Naugaon Nayay Panchayat- Like Bukundi, Taal ,Baunsali, Silsari, 
Gundi, Gundi Talli and Chamkotkhaal and many such villages are affected negatively by 
the Forest Act and remain in need for basic facilities for the lack of proper roads to 
approach these villages.  
The developmental work is also facing great obstacles in the boundary villages of RNP in 
the Neelkanth Nayay Panchayat. The main villages affected in the Neelkanth panchayat 
are- Jaunk, Ghotiya, Patna, Haldogi, Phoolchatti, Rattapani, Ghattugad, Khairkhaal, 
Gudangaon, Pundrasu, Mauwan, Bhaun, Kothar, Khargosha, Dhamanda and Chamanpur. 
Due to the Forest Act of 1980, the trekking route from Swargashram (Rishikesh) to 
Neelkanth Mahadev pilgrimage has also come under serious trouble.  
Other villages in the Gauhari range affected by the Forest act of 1980 are under the 
Gaindakhaal nayaya panchayat namely- Kota, Sirasu, Palelgaon, Bijni, Mohanchatti, and 
Nodkhaal.The roads between Lakshmanjhoola and Kandi have also been marked to be 
inside the Gauhari range resulting into frequent problems in road construction and 
transportation. Silogi-Gaindakhaal connecting road, development block Yamkeshwar and 
Dwarikhaal are also part of this range due to which the roads have not been metalled.  
The age old funeral ground of the villagers has also been acquired by the park authorities 
and construction of the cremation house at the Phoolchatti funeral ground, which was 
already passed by the zila panchayat (elected district government), has now been stopped 
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by the park. The cremation houses in Neelkanth and Kimsar nayaya panchayat are also 
stalled due to the park and its provisions of The Wildlife Protection Act (of 1972)
65
. In 
the light of above presented facts, we request you to kindly take suitable action to exclude 
the Gauhari Range from the Park premises.”66  
In another letter from the MLA
67
 of Yamkeshwar block to the chief minister of 
Uttarakhand, the roads issue was again brought up for consideration in October 2005: 
“This letter comes to you as a request for the metalling of Kaudiya-Kimsar motor road on 
behalf of the people of Yamkeshwar legislative assembly, Pauri district. It has become 
impossible for the people of this area to travel on these jeepable tracks. The reason for its 
delay is always that the area lies within the RNP and thus no such activities could be 
undertaken here. I would like to bring your attention to the fact that there are other 
concrete roads within the RNP and some are being continuously metalled. May I ask you 
the reason for this differential treatment of this particular stretch? It is my sincere request 
to you to kindly initiate proper action for the improvement of the road on this 12 km 
stretch on the Kaudiya-Kimsaar road respecting the opinion of the people living in this 
area.”68  
Form the above letters, it can be seen that this area is in a desperate need of a concrete 
connecting roads but has met with little success. It is a well-known issue in this area, 
which has dominated the political sphere of discussions for a long time. Each election 
campaign promises the road but it somehow is shelved. The closest that this area came to 
a good road was in 1983 when the government of UP sanctioned 38 lakhs for this purpose 
but had to hold the work and release of funds because around the same time, the Rajaji 
National Park was announced and this area attracted the provisions of Forest 
Conservation Act (1980). This decision had proved historical for this village as it 
changed the socio-political life of this area forever, where the national park became an 
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Grameenon ke varshon purane shamshaan ghat ko bhi park prashashan ne apne adheen kar liya hai aur 
phoolchatti shamshaanghat par zila panchayat se swikrit shawdaah griha ke nirmaan par rok laga di gayi 
hai. Nayaya panchayat Neelkanth aur Kimsaar ke shawdaahgriha ka bhi nirmaan Park Adhiniyam ke 
karan nahin ho paye hain. The desperation of villagers for the exclusion from the park premises can be 
inferred from the letter that describes not only the difficulties faced by the villagers in their everyday life 
but also the ones faced in case of a death in the village.  
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 Open Letter to the Chief Consevator of Forests: (Dated: 11.03.2005). Village records of the Kimsar gram 
panchayat, Pauri. 
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 Member of the Legislative Assembly 
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 Letter from the MLA- Yamkeshwar to the Ministry of Forests requesting for the concrete roads from 
Kaudiya to Kimsaar:  (Dated: 10.10.2005). It was made available by the village records of Kimsar gram 
panchayat, Pauri.  
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important point of reference and consideration. The roads cannot be built because it was 
partly in the park area, thus bulk goods cannot be transported because there are no roads. 
No roads mean an imposed isolation that result into lack of basic amenities like school, 
hospital, electricity and water supply. The villagers cannot travel out of the village after 
sunset nor can anyone come into the village after it is dark. This confinement is because 
there are no proper roads and the entrance of the access track is closed every evening by 
the forest department, as this is also one of the entrances to the Rajaji National Park.  
It can be observed here that the people of Kimsar had used all democratic means to 
highlight the issue of connecting roads to the village. The village representatives of this 
area sent an „open letter‟ to the forest conservator. A journalist from the local news 
channel and the local MLA had also brought this to the notice of the chief minister of 
Uttarakhand. In response to their demands, the Forest and Environment department of 
Uttarakhand government responded with the following letter:  
“With reference to your letter addressed to the chief-minister on the above subject, dated 
28-10-2005, I have been directed to notify that under the Project-Wan margon ki sudrih-i-
karan yojna (improvement of the forest tracks) the mentioned stretch from Kaudiya to 
Kimsaar has been selected and the concerned offices have been directed to conduct the 
DPR (Detailed Project Report)/ survey for this region.” 69 
The work on road construction was yet to commence when I left Kimsar village after my 
fieldwork in June, 2007. During my period of stay and usage of the same access road, I 
found out that the lack of proper access roads presented numerous difficulties for the 
local residents. Landslides frequently stopped all vehicles from plying on the narrow 
tracks and development activities suffered because the heavy motor vehicles could not 
transport bulk goods and resources. This problem was also highlighted in a letter sent to 
the chief engineer of the Public Works Department (PWD) from the gram panchayat of 
Kimsar requesting action for restoring the access road to the village that was closed since 
last 10 months following a landslide:  
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 Letter to the Sahara Samay News channel from .P Gupta, Principal Secretary of Forests and 
Environment, Section-2, Uttarakhand government; dated: 6-12-2005, Number: 276/ X-2 2005-21(60) 2004 
(820/ Gu. S/ 25-10-2005).  
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“It has to be brought to your kind notice that heavy rains on the 9th of July last year 
caused a landslide between the 17
th
 and the 18
th
 milestone, 300 meters from the 
Shobhasthali of Talla Banaas. This landslide brought a huge stone piece in the middle of 
the road which has not been removed yet, although the information was relayed to you on 
the phone from the advisory staff of the chief-minister on the 10
th
 July. The stone piece 
on the road has totally curtailed the movement of heavier vehicles and the light ones are 
traveling in the face of great risk.     
In between 18
th
 and 19
th
 milestone, about 200 meters from the Patwari‟s office, another 
landslide has blocked the road for heavy vehicles, which can be restored at very low cost 
by minor cutting on the upper part. At the same time, utility vehicles could be used for 
transporting the construction material like 20 feet pipes, iron, cement etc. These two 
restoration activities would cost not more than 8-10,000 INR. Due to the above 
mentioned reasons, heavy vehicles are not plying on this route since last 9 months. 
Frequent requests have been made to resolve the issue but no positive action has been 
taken so far.  As a result, the goods are being transported by the smaller vehicles causing 
extra economic burden to the different communities of the village. The costs of the 
construction work undertaken by different panchayats is also rising due to the shrunken 
transportation facilities.  
The construction of the health center in Kimsaar has also come to a stand-still due to this 
reason as the costs of construction have become unbearable for the contractors and the 
PWD Pauri, which finally would be a burden on the state treasury. The delay in the 
construction of the Health Center in Kimsaar has a direct negative outcome, that the 
people of this area are unable to access proper health facilities.  
Thus, I request you to kindly look into the details of the above mentioned issues and take 
immediate action to resolve the problems and avoid the confrontation with angry 
residents of the area. It would also save the department officers from the charges of 
corruption in spending the budget meant for upkeep of the roads like it happened in the 
past when such charges of corruption were leveled against the PWD officers.”70 
It can be noted in the last paragraph of the letter that the village residents threaten an 
„angry confrontation‟ like the „political society‟ as outlined by Chatterjee. It consists 
mainly of the poorer members of social groups „that transgress the strict lines of legality 
in struggling to live and work. They inhabit, that is to say, the rough and tumble worlds 
of political society, where governmental agencies are met by wit and stealth, and not 
uncommonly by violence‟ (Chatterjee, 2004). The letter was also sent to the local 
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 Letter from the Gram Panchayat of Kimsar to Public Works Department of Duggada block, Uttarakhand 
and copies were sent to the Minsiter for Public Development (Lok Nirman Mantri) - Uttarakhand, Chief 
Medical Officer- Pauri and Dainik Jagran (a Hindi newspaper published from Rishikesh). Dated: 03-04-
2006; accessed from the records of Kimsar gram panchayat, Pauri.   
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newspaper to politicize the problem and to pressurize the PWD by threatening to disclose 
the corrupt activities of the department in the public sphere.  
In November 2006, the chief conservator of forests, Uttarakhand wrote to the secretary of 
forest and environment department acknowledging the completed detailed project report 
and specific changes in the road plan that was within the Rajaji National Park:  
 
“With reference to the Engineering Projects (India) Limited, Lodhi Road, New Delhi and 
their letter number- NRO/ PMD/525/ Dehradun, this office presented the Kaudiya-
Kimsaar Van Motor-Marg sudrihikaran
71
/ DP (detailed project) Report to the 
government for its approval. The letter from the government dated 15
th
 September 2006 
(No- 4270/10-02-2006-12(11)/ 2005 TC) sanctioned an amount of Rs. 489.60 lakhs for 
the construction of the mentioned road. The 12.2 km stretch of the road lies within RNP 
and hence partial changes have been brought into the construction plan, as a sensitive 
response to the park area.”72 
 
Six months later, when I finished my field work in June 2007, there was still no activity 
on the road front, and the issue remained a ubiquitous topic of discussion in the village 
public sphere. After the establishment of the national park, many other changes came in 
the livelihood pattern of the villagers who depended heavily on the forest for meeting 
their different needs, which was now a part of the park and hence unavailable for grazing 
cattle or fuel-wood collection. It was under these circumstances that the watershed 
development project called Hills-II was initiated in the village to be implemented with 
community participation. It can be seen here that decentralization of decision-making 
would imply that the needs of the people as identified by them, like the road here, would 
be a developmental priority. However, the village is treated and re-treated with watershed 
development projects that fails to convince the villagers to participate as it does not 
respond to the local requirements but must be implemented as the „experts‟ have 
concluded that watershed development for the rainfed areas is the only option to alleviate 
poverty and provide food security to the country in the future
73
.  
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 Development of motorable roads in forested areas  
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 Letter from the Chief Conservator of Forests, Uttarakhand to the Secretary of Forests and Environment 
Department, Government of Uttarakhand, Dated 03-11-2006; No number.  
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 See the report issued by the Government of India (2006) in which Parthasarathy concludes that watershed 
development is the only answer to meet the „nutritional emergency‟ that India would face in the coming 
years. The point is not to argue whether watershed development would rescue the country from this crisis 
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Watershed Development Project in Kimsar 
 This section seeks to present a sense of the „texture of relations‟ between state officials 
and the local people. It describes the arrival and evolution of the watershed program in 
this village. It presents evidence to show that the national park around the village plays an 
important role in the local and regional politics of the area. The villagers have repeatedly 
emphasized the need for better roads as the primary developmental concern. The chapter 
has isolated one of the many activities undertaken in the watershed program, namely the 
drinking water supply scheme for a detailed analysis. It provides evidence to show that 
the management of water supply was delegated to the agencies at different levels and 
finally ended up as being disowned by all involved actors. 
The village of Kimsar was not new to the idea of watershed when IWDP, Hills-II project 
came to the village. The earlier watershed development project by the government called 
the Drought Prone Area Program (DPAP) was also implemented in this village from the 
year 1994-1998. The president of the village watershed committee (VWC) now renamed 
as „GAREMA74‟ in the Hills-II project, Bist was also the President of the DPAP project 
in the village. The village was not new to the idea of nomination of the office bearers and 
formation of VDC either.  
 
 Formation of the Village Development Committee 
 
The first GBM in the village of Kimsar was held on the 17
th
 December 2002 to inform 
the villagers about the project. The minutes of the meeting recorded by the village 
panchayat refer to an exposure tour and training session held in Rishikesh earlier where 
the project was introduced to the villagers but none in the village later recalled about such 
a tour except the office bearers of VDC. This meeting was called to elect the members 
who would form the GAREMA (Gaon/Village Resource Management Association), the 
                                                                                                                                                 
but to say that „expert‟ agreed measures for village development find priority and fundings while the 
measures emerging from the village public sphere are disregarded and allowed to languish without any 
funds or support. In this case, giving priority to watershed development as decided by the experts and not 
the road construction as demanded by the villagers (but disapproved by the experts because the road passes 
through a national park) is an example of how decentralization of power is effective only to fulfill the 
dominant agenda.  
74
 Gaon/ Village Resource Management Association, henceforth referred to as VDC (Village Development 
Committee)  
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apex body that would coordinate the activities of the project and formulate the rules for 
money management.  
The meeting was conducted in the presence of Keshar Singh Aire, the Unit Officer and 
the representative of the implementing agency called the Watershed Management 
Directorate (WMD) in this meeting. The village „motivators‟ appointed on a salaried 
basis by the government, were also present.  
“It was agreed in this meeting that the gram pradhan would be the honorary guardian of 
GAREMA and a resolution was passed.  
GAREMA was proposed to be formed of the following office bearers and members:  
 
Post Name  Proposed By  Seconded By 
President  Rajpal Singh Bist Ummed Singh 
 
Anusuya Prasad 
Vice President  Khushhal Singh 
Azad 
Viren Singh Bhopal Singh 
Secretary Vinod Kandwal MadanMohan 
 
Darshanlal Kandwal 
Treasurer Smt.Chandrakala 
Devi 
SS Negi Bhubneshwar 
Kandwal 
Member Jaswant Singh Prema Singh Negi  Om Prakash 
Kandwal 
Member Chait Singh Bist Balam Singh Ved Prakash 
Kandwal 
Member Bansi dhar Kandwal Satya Prasad 
 
Vishambhar Dutt 
Member Sachidanand 
Kandwal 
Purushottam 
Kandwal 
Rajendra Prasad 
Kandwal 
Member Smt.Guddi Devi Narendra Singh 
 
Smt.Urmila Devi 
Member Smt. Sangeeta Devi Smt Pushpa Devi 
 
Smt.Seema Devi 
Member Smt. Krishna Devi Smt.Prema Devi  Smt. Vijaya 
Kandwal 
Table 4. Village Watershed Committee in Kimsar 
 
A resolution was passed that the amount of money received for the project would be 
saved in a national or grameen bank, with the signatures of the President and the 
Secretary. The funds would be withdrawn and managed by the joint signatures of the 
President and the secretary.”75 
 
                                                 
75
 Minutes of the village meeting on 17-12-2002; Records of the Kimsar gram panchayat, Pauri.  
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Once the consensually nominated committee for project governance was formed in the 
village meeting, different activities to conserve soil, water, and forests were undertaken 
by it in Kimsar. The next meeting outlined some of these:  
 
“Today on the 24th of December 2002 an unopposed decision was taken to select Salani 
Tok and Nighra Tok for forestation and plantations. GAREMA was asked to get the area 
surveyed and take necessary steps to start the work of forestation.”76 
 
Along with forestation, other activities like tin shed for animals, water tanks, fencing of 
the forested area, construction of fodder tanks among others were reported. In our 
interview with a retired person from the Railway Protection Force (RPF) in the village 
Talla Banas, the nature of working along with the nature of work was enumerated:  
 
“There was a provision of tin sheds for the poor people. The other thing was the water 
tank. If this is our house and if the rain water falls from the roof, they made a small tank 
where the water falls. Now if it rains, the tank fills up and of course then it would 
certainly work for a few days, as long as the water lasts or as long as the rains last.  
They also made fodder tanks for the animals. They are still there. When we go for the 
village visit, you could see them. What I mean to say is that it‟s not possible to simply 
gulp down cent percent budget. (So there are some structures on the ground.) If you don‟t 
show anything at all, in no time the authorities will take you to jail. What I mean is that 
50% work they have done and 50% was eaten up and that is I think quite normal in 
today‟s world. I have told you the basic thing in very few words. If the top official is 
corrupt, the followers certainly cannot be checked. I know about the world outside. But 
when I see these projects and its management, it makes me really sad. I don‟t stop petty 
corruption or small time rent-seeking. But it should be limited to only as much as the salt 
in the pulses. If we put more salt in the pulse, it would become useless. This is what is 
happening here
77.” 
 
The VDC meeting in February introduced for the first time, a proposal for a pumping 
scheme to supply drinking water in the village. The minute of the meeting reads as 
follows:  
„Today on the 10th of February 2003, in the VDC meeting following resolutions were 
passed unopposed:  
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 Minutes of the village meeting on  22-12-2002; Records of the Kimsar gram panchayat, Pauri. 
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 Mae nahee rokta kisi ko khane se…theek hae khao..lekin utna hi jitna daal mae 
namak..(2) namak jayada gir jaayega to daal bekaar ho jaayegi..nahee kha paaoge...bus 
aajkal  yehi ho raha hae yahan…  (Interview in Talla Banas on 25-01-2006; Field notes) 
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The drinking water problem of the village must be addressed by installing a pumping-
scheme to bring the water from Jugyapani source to the village. In this regard, an 
unopposed resolution was passed to send this project to the IWDP for its consideration 
and seek their help in installing the pumping scheme.‟ 
 
The meeting held on the last day of April 2003 passed 9 resolutions that included a 
demand for more openness in the working of GAREMA committee and other activities 
planned for the protection of forests and water conservation in the village:  
“Today a meeting of the gram-sabha was called in which the newly elected gram 
pradhaan presided over the meeting. Following resolutions were made:  
 
1. A decision was taken that the meeting of IWDP and GAREMA must be held at 
least once every month. (As the last meeting was in the end of February, no 
meetings in March, and the next one is being held on the last day of April. It was 
possible that all the actors in the IWDP are also active in the political field in the 
village. The meetings could not happen because the members and the office 
bearers were busy with the gram pradhan elections.) 
2. The pumping machine should be installed in the village for bringing the water 
from Jugyapaani to the village.  
3. It was agreed that both community forests and private gardens need to be 
protected from the animals by strong fencing of the forested area. It was decided 
that around 2 hectare land of the village would be used for community foresting 
and should be properly fenced.  
4. In the village, there is a need for CC Marg and Kharanja at different places. 
About 3 km of the roads must be made into CC Marg.  
5. The village tok should be repaired by laying around 300 meters of gul and 500 
meters of pipelines, within the minor irrigation arrangement.  
6. As soil conservation measure, small weirs and stone check dams would be made 
at the following locations- dadran tok, rigwadi tok, dandi tok and viradi tok.  
7. It was proposed by the villagers that an animal shade must be made at the 
gudakhani tok. 
8. The unit officer explained about the plans of constructing the water tanks and 
fodder tanks in the village and the rationale behind it. This year about 25 water 
tanks and 50 fodder tanks would be constructed in the village.”  
 
This meeting was attended by 19 people, no women members among them.  
The next meeting in December on the 23
rd
 2003 put the drinking water agenda back in 
picture. The recordings of the meeting read as follows:  
„For the drinking water, the pumping project to bring the water from Jugyapani was 
felt necessary. The house decided to remind the Deputy Project Director once more 
about the pumping project to be installed‟. 
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It was in this meeting that the issue of corruption on the part of the implementing team 
was mentioned:  
“The village motivator, Anuradha, has been accused of manipulating the number of 
plantations in the monsoons distributed to the villagers. Some members of the gram 
sabha expressed displeasure at the so called manipulation of the plantations and wanted 
an enquiry into the matter to resolve the issue.” 
 
The meeting on the 23
rd
 of December was an important event as it was an overview of the 
things done in the last year in the village and the things that needed to be done in the 
coming year. A copy of the minutes of this meeting was also sent to the Deputy Project 
Director (DPD) of the Hills-II project for his information.  
The next meeting held only 6 months later on the 2
nd
 of June 2004, Attended by 27 
people, 12 women among them, addressed the issue of drinking water once again. But 
this was not related to the pumping scheme and demanded the following measures for the 
other sources of water and irrigation in the village: 
 The need for walking tracks till the Jugyapani water source, total length- 500 
meters, was demanded and also the need for tracks from the village to the 
Jamni-Pani water source was stressed. The construction of these two must 
start immediately.  
 In the judbhadar tok, there is a need for water tank and pipelines for the 
purpose of community gardening. To encourage the community gardening and 
irrigate the plantations, these things must be done immediately.  
 With regards to the construction of 1100 meters gul in the tandi tok for 
irrigation, the house passed an unopposed resolution for the gul construction 
without any delay.  
 
This meeting also identified the list of beneficiaries in the project for different facilities 
like fodder tanks, water harvesting tanks, chaff cutters, cattle sheds and for the formation 
of „krishi‟ terraces. The list reveals a localization of beneficiaries within a certain group 
and appropriation of benefits by the strategic groups:  
 
Sche
mes 
Fodder Tanks RWH Tanks Cattlesheds  Chaff-
Cutterrs 
Krishi 
Terraces/Nurseries 
 
1. 
Sulochna Devi Vishwambhar 
Dutt 
Mr. Lalit 
Mohan 
Kandwal 
SS Negi Madan Mohan 
Kandwal 
2. Ranjit Singh 
Rana 
Balaam 
Singh Rawat 
. SS Negi Rajpal 
Singh 
Satya Prasad 
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Bist 
3.  
Sateyndra 
singh Bist 
Kamla Devi , 
wife 
Vishwambhar 
Dutt 
Madan 
Mohan 
Kandwal 
Vinod 
Kandwal 
Vishwambhar Dutt 
4.  Bhopal Singh  Mr. Ranjit 
Singh Negi 
Baalam 
Singh Rawat 
 Sulochna Devi 
5. Dheeraj Singh  Mr. Lalit 
mohan 
kandwal 
Sateyendra 
Singh 
 Sateshwari Devi 
6. Daulat Singh  
Daulat Singh 
Smt. Manju 
Devi 
 Ramlal 
7. Rajpal Singh  
Bhopal Singh 
Bhopal Singh  Ranjit Singh Rana 
 
 
8.  Surendra 
Singh 
.Daulat Singh   
9.  Uma Shankar 
Bhatt 
Vishwambhar 
Dutt 
Kandwal 
  
10.  Prem singh 
Negi 
Bansi dhar 
Kandwal 
  
11.  Virendra 
Singh Negi 
   
Table 5. List of Beneficiaries in Hills-II Project, Kimsar 
 
A close review of the above table indicates that in a village of 600 odd people, the 
resources from watershed program were distributed to 23 people in total. Among these 23 
beneficiaries, eight people secured two and three people secured three benefits.    
It must be noted that the beneficiaries chosen in the village meeting and mentioned under 
the particular scheme does not always exclude all others who are not mentioned. The 
influential people stay out of the village records when it comes to small benefits of the 
project. This serves two purposes. Firstly, it strengthens their claim for one big benefit 
and secondly, they appear to be democratic in not monopolizing the entire scheme.  
If we look at the above table, it is evident that the three most important people in the 
village, namely the VDC president, secretary and the village sarpanch shared the three 
chaff cutters provided in the project. This was probably the most expensive among the 
provided benefits and was shared by the village elite. It must be added that even though 
the village meeting records did not register the name of sarpanch or the president for 
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rainwater harvesting tank, it was found to be present in both the houses. It shows that the 
records maintained by the VDC were only indicative and a half-hearted attempt towards 
presenting an illusion of accountability and transparency. In my 4-month stay in the 
village and repeated visits to all households, I never came across any chaff cutter, neither 
in the president‟s house, nor in that of the secretary or the sarpanch. 
This table also reflects upon the distribution of drinking water in the village according to 
the power and political influence. This meant that the powerful group had secured the 
water-tank with cover, fodder tanks, tin shed, fencing wires and the water pipes were 
drawn till their kitchens while another group would be deprived of all of them or got a 
water tank made without cover in some houses including that of the village pradhan 
(which would anyway count as another tank on paper at the same time save the money 
from most expensive part of tank making), or fodder tanks or tin-shed for animals. This 
group could for e.g. never figure in the list of chaff-cutter beneficiaries or would never 
have the pipelines drawn even close to their locality. The people living in the removed 
hamlet called the Nagri area of the village belonged to this group. The marginalization of 
this group is so complete and part of the discourse that it shows up in almost everything, 
for e.g. in the distribution of project benefits, and at the same time its ubiquity makes it 
totally imperceptible to the village elite and planners alike.   
This meeting also raises the issue of walking tracks from the village to the water sources. 
The other two small sources of water- are jugbhadar tok and tandi tok. The need for 
development of these two was also discussed. The traditional system of gul irrigation 
needed repairing too. 
 
Selection of a Hills-II project activity- Drinking Water Supply System in Kimsar 
 
As mentioned in the meeting records, the need for proper drinking water facility in the 
villages was felt and a proposal was passed for requesting the WMD officers to provide 
resources for installing a diesel run motor to pump water from the source in the valley to 
the village surface level and subsequently to the houses. This scheme involved 
comparatively larger sums of money and manpower. The pumping scheme for drinking 
water was to provide water to each house and would be run by the VDC. It would be 
responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the water supply system.  
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After the first meeting in February which introduced the drinking water supply scheme 
(DWSS), the next meeting held on the 30
th
 of April noted that „the pumping machine 
should be installed for bringing the water from Jugyapaani to the village.‟  
Jugyapani is the name of to the exact location of the water source in the village. 
Jugyapaani source was chosen to pump the water to the supply tank as it had a stronger 
water flow and later the diesel motor was also fixed here. Pipelines were drawn from here 
to the supply site and then from the supply tank water was pumped to a tank made on the 
highest point of the village, from there it was supplied to the distribution lines going to 
the households.  
The minutes of the VDC meeting in January 2005 read as follows:  
“A meeting of the gram sabha was organized today in the Baraat Ghar (village 
community hall) to discuss the issue of drinking water problem and the pumping scheme. 
The issue of laying the pipelines was also discussed in the meeting. Following important 
points were raised:  
 It has been decided by the house that only those villagers who have paid the security 
money for water supply will be provided with a connection nearest possible to their 
house. However, the beneficiary has to make his/ her own arrangements to take it inside 
the house.  
All interested villagers must deposit the security amount of 150INR with the president 
today so that their connections could be planned accordingly.  
It has been decided by the house that Mr. SuryaMohan Singh, son of Pushkar Singh Negi 
would be appointed to operate the pump. He would be paid a sum of 500 INR per month 
for this job. No fiddling with the pipelines would be tolerated once the system has been 
laid out. Any kind of misuse of the pipelines would be seen as a punishable offence.”  
 
It appears that in the meantime, when no mention of the pipelines or pumping set finds 
entry in the meeting records, it was already installed and the issues relating to its 
management were now being discussed.  
This was the last record that existed in the village on the DWSS or any other aspect of the 
Hills-II project. The president of VDC was of the opinion that since villagers did not take 
any active interest in the project work, he stopped calling any more meetings.  
Lack of records or absence of minutes does not amount to saying that nothing concrete 
was happening on the project site. In the meantime, a pumpset was installed, one storage 
tank and one collection tank was made, pipelines were laid out in the village but the 
meetings of VDC (do not have any mention or recording of the discussions on these 
issues) did not bring up these matters for the public discussion. Later, security money was 
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collected, a pump-operator was employed and the stage seemed set for the water supply 
to begin. It never did.  
To understand why it never did, would require that we further break up the DWSS into its 
component elements and observe them one by one to locate the interactions between 
technology, decentralized governance and inhehrent contestations in the project that 
manifested itself in the form an idle machine, a committee without legitimacy or funds to 
operate the water supply and the labrynthine arrangement of pipes across the village 
without any water to supply.  
One of the most important components of this scheme was the diesel motor of 20 bhp, 
which would pump the water to the delivery tank. A storage tank was built and pipelines 
were laid out across the village streets. The diesel motor was ready and the pipes were 
connected to the respective tanks. A trial run was conducted and parts of the village 
received some water. After two days from the trial run, the motor failed to start and the 
villagers were back to their old ways of collecting drinking water, employing women and 
girl children to carry it on their heads from the valley to the houses.  
It was worth considering why the motor failed to work beyond two days. Did the sellers 
not guarantee it? Why is it left without any maintenance and repair until this date?  
 
Diesel Motor Pump in Kimsar 
 
The water-pumping machine was bought in Dehradun on 26
th
 April 2004. The receipt 
(Nr-57) made available from the president shows a payment of 90,000 INR made by 
„Gram Sansadhan Prabandhan Samiti, Kimsar‟ vide Draft Number 569421, dated 16-04-
04 in favor of Pratap Machine Tools, on the Haridwar Road in Dehradun.  
The village pradhan recalled the events of that day when the village committee and the 
government staff were going to Dehradun to buy the motor pump. They traveled to the 
shop that was suggested by the Junior Engineer (JE) in Dehradun. They wanted to buy a 
20 bhp pump for lifting the water by around 300ft before it was supplied to the houses. 
The specifications and requirements were assessed by the JE and „Pratap Machine Tools‟ 
was suggested to be the right shop.  
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Photograph 2. Diesel Motor Pump in Kimsar Village 
To me the machine looked much older than the three years and I shared it with the gram 
pradhan. He confessed that he shared similar doubts on the very first day and recalled 
that when the machine was being bought, he noticed that the machine looked used and 
not brand new. There were patches of oil and seemed that he motor has been used before:  
“I asked the manager of the shop that the motor looks like it has been used before and it is 
not new. The manager told me that I was both right and wrong. He said, just like your 
village, there was another village in the hills which wanted to install the pumping system 
and they ordered this pump and we made a trial run for them. In this sense you are right 
that the motor is old. But their scheme did not work out finally, so they never bought the 
motor and it remained in our shop. Hence it is new and you are wrong.‟78 
 
There are 14 authorized dealers for USHA Inc. (pumpsets and engines) in Dehradun, the 
same brand of motor as that bought by the villagers, but the shop selected was not one of 
                                                 
78
Interview with SS Negi- gram pradhan of Kimsar village; Field Notes, Dated: 4
th
 March 2007.  
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them.
79
 An instructions manual came with this pump to the village and was given to the 
president. It was for a motor of similar make but from a different brand called 
Kirloskar
80
. The shop where the motor was bought has been listed on the Indiamart 
website with the following description: „Pratap Machine Tools- Manufacturers of all 
kinds of stone crushers and Excavators. Address: 8, Haridwar Road, Dehradun, 
Uttaranchal - 248 001, India
81
.  
It remains an open question to understand why one would avoid all the 14 authorized 
dealers to buy the same pumpset from a company that makes stone-crushers, why a new 
machine should have oil patches and come with a manual that is from a different 
company. The reasons why the motor stopped working after two days could also be 
discovered if one explored the above outlined discrepencies in detail, which lies beyond 
the scope of this study. My interest is to explicate the interaction of technology with the 
human agency to show that the visible manifestations in the form of idle pumps or dry 
pipelines are only a symptom of a deeper interactive relationship between the two.  
Finally, the same motor was bought and brought to the village. The next task was to carry 
it to the designated spot at Jugyapaani water source. The secretary of the village 
explained that the pump was unmanageably heavy and 15 people were needed to 
transport it to the right place. He recalled that the „gurkha‟82 laborers were the only ones 
who could have done it. He cynically remarked that the village people would never be 
able to bring that pump to the right place. It also implied the preference of Nepali migrant 
laborers over the locally available labor force. There exists a large Nepali community 
within the labour class and could be seen in all the 13 districts, mostly on the road 
construction sites which is a permanent activity in Uttrarnchal due to land slides and 
mountainous rough terrain.The pump was set up with the help of gurkhas and the 
pipelines were laid out in the village. Storage tank and taps were put. What happened 
now that blocked the water from flowing into the taps? 
                                                 
79
See a complete list of  authorized dealers in Uttarakhand of  the motor making company called „Usha  
International: Available at: 
(http://ushainternational.com/address/dealers.php?product=engines%20motors%20and%20pumps) 
80
Field Notes, 4
th
 March 2007, Kimsar.  
81
Available at (http://dir.indiamart.com/impcat/stone-crusher.html) 
82
Migrant workers from Nepal are, in local discourse, considered strong and hard working. In comparison, 
hill people are considered lazy and laid back.  
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2.4.2 Contested Narratives of Hills-II Project in Kimsar   
 
The issue of water supply and distribution was elaborated in an argument between the 
gram pradhan and the secretary of VDC. The pradhan was trying to put forth the popular 
perspective on the issue while the secretary was trying to explain his puppetry role in 
control of the government staff and that this was the best that could be done. The pradhan 
continued to highlight the shortcomings of the project, held the GAREMA committee 
responsible, and asserted that as the responsible agency for the project, it was their duty 
to demand the right papers and receipts for all the transactions. The following 
conversation between the pradhan and the VDC secretary captures the main arguments 
surrounding the issue in this debate. It started when the pradhan deduced that the DWSS 
was useless because finally it was not delivering anything to the village people.  
Gram pradhan: When the resolution was passed in the gram sabha about the construction 
of these tanks, it was said that the water from the rooftop would be harvested and 
collected in the tank with the help of a channel. Provide me with the channel today and I 
would show you some water in this tank tomorrow. (Even the tanks were not built as 
directed for rain harvesting-no channels were provided). I am just saying that start the 
water supply and if it reaches my house, I would accept your argument.  
 
VDC Secretary: But you cannot say that the scheme is a failure just because your house 
does not get water. I would say that my house is at the end of the hamlet but I still got 
water each time the supply lines were released. Therefore, I would say that it is a 
successful scheme.   
GP: As you rightly said, your house is at the end and therefore at a much lower elevation 
than the others. So obviously, you would have water in your tap but mine on a higher 
elevation would get nothing.  
 
VS: But that is a technical „fault‟ and the engineer is responsible for it. We have no role 
to play in that.  
GP:  It is your responsibility to understand the technical aspects also and even get a better 
quality work done.  
VS: The flow mechanics of water are best understood and handled by the engineers and 
we have no part to play here. 
GP: But I still think that if there were certain technical aspects that affected the social 
distribution of water, you should have inquired about it.  
 
From the brief conversation above, the „texture of relationship‟ between the elected 
village government and the nominated VDC is observable.  
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IN brief, the two positions could be summarized as follows: the VDC claims the project 
to be successfully completed while the gram pradhan considers it to be a complete failure 
due to irresponsible management on the part of VDC. The reasons that each assigned to 
support their claim has been discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.  
 
Present condition of the water pump 
 
  
We paid another visit to the Jugyapaani source and looked around the motor and checked 
the pipes. The pipes connecting the storage tank to the motor looked worn out, the two-
way valve connecting the motor delivery pipe to the supply pipe had slipped threads, and 
the engine oil was missing. We soon realized that just getting the diesel would not help.  
Rajpal, the president of VDC informed me that he had some burnt engine oil from the 
previous days and he could sieve it with a piece of cloth and try to run the motor. The 
jeep driver brought two 5-liter cans of diesel in the evening and we approached the motor 
with oil and caution.  
Rajpal sieved the burnt engine oil with a piece of cloth, his plumber friend (Chote 
Plumber) checked the connecting pipe and tried to seal the cracks on this thick green 
plastic pipe by tying polythene bags around it. The two-way valve with slipped threads 
connecting the motor to the supply tank, could throw the pipe out once the water was 
pushed through it. Rajpal tried to put some cotton strings on the threads of the valve and 
re-wrenched it together with the motor.  
Chote plumber began to rotate the handle on the pump slowly first, like a warm up for the 
engine before he pushed the handle with all his strength and the motor began to ignite 
reluctantly. It started full throttle on the second trial. We were surprised that it had 
worked with used engine oil. Just a minute later, the connecting valve gave up and threw 
the pipe, with all the strength of water on its way 300ft up, a few meters away with this 
break. The water continued to flow out of the motor but the connecting supply pipe was 
already on the ground. The noisy disbanding of the pipes took our attention away from 
the motor itself, which the plumber observed was abnormally thick in its exhaust. It was 
not going to move, I thought. However, the problems were becoming more apparent. I 
could understand the reluctance of the president to work with this motor. I was doubtful 
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that this was a new motor of two years. But the new problem (immediate) that the DWSS 
faced now was the requirement of a new brass two-way valve. We could not even try the 
motor before the valve was fixed. There is no possibility of going to the market and 
bringing a new valve immediately as the first hardware shops that sell these spares are in 
Rishikesh and it would be a daylong journey to go and get it. The president assured me 
that tomorrow we will get the valve and restart the motor.  
The next morning we made our way back to the Jugyapaani source and observed the 
motor in sunlight. The president was also with us and he tried to restart the engine. The 
thick black exhaust of the motor with the start seemed like it would be totaled if allowed 
to run for two more minutes. He observed that maybe because of the burnt engine oil it is 
producing such smoke. Nevertheless, to me it looked like the symptom of a greater 
disease that we were unable to diagnose.  
We went to the water source the next day, fixed the valve one more time and ignited the 
motor. The water began to flow to the supply tank. Three minutes later, the thick black 
smoke appeared again from the exhaust, thick green plastic pipe- 2 inches in diameter and 
a common sight in the Indian villages using tube well irrigation- connecting the storage 
tank to the motor started leaking from all sides like a sprinkler and seconds later blew off 
from the middle. The motor was quickly brought to a halt. A lot more needed to be done 
before the waters would reach the houses.  
We came back to the village and shared our experience with the gram pradhan and other 
village elders. It was clear to us that the motor demanded a thorough examination and 
extra costs than anticipated. It needed technical instruments and supervision about the 
layout of the pipes as well as about the motor. More funds were needed to extend the 
pipelines into other hamlets and extra accessories like plugs and bends. The burying of 
pipes would need attention too. Briefly, no village level solutions would help here as both 
the funds and the technical expertise required did not exist there required funds and 
complete the Jugyapaani drinking water pumping scheme. The village pradhan agreed to 
send an official request to the WMD office informing them about the incomplete status of 
the drinking water scheme and demand funds for its completion. After a week, he sent 
this letter to the Director, WMD demanding 40,000 INR for this purpose:  
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Letter No: 3309/ Kimsaar/ DPAP/ Jalagam- 2003/ 042 
Dated: 02 April, 2007 
To,  
 
The Director  
Water Conservation Department 
WMD,  
Indira Nagar; Forest Colony 
Dehradun- 248006 
 
Subject: Requesting a grant of 40,000 INR to complete the Jugyapaani Pumping 
drinking water scheme started by WMD in Kimsar village 
 
Sir,  
In connection with the above mentioned subject, I would like to bring to your notice that 
in the year 2003-4, the drinking water pumping scheme was installed in Kimsaar through 
the GAREMA committee, which is till date incomplete and therefore the villagers are not 
benefiting from project. The project has not been handed over to the gram panchayat so 
far. When I asked the President and the Secretary of the GAREMA committee about the 
relevant papers of the project, they replied that they had no such papers and no 
documents to give and hence the gram panchayat could not take over the charge of the 
pumping set.  
Added to this, the pipelines that have been laid in the village are not only inadequate but 
also a cause of minor problem on the streets as they have been left above the ground. At 
many points, the pipes have not been properly covered under the ground, as it should 
have been. 
The following reasons account for the non-functional status of the pumping project : 
In the village, the pipelines have not been laid till the household in many cases. The BPL 
groups are unable to buy these pipes and are deprived of any potential benefits that this 
project could bring. To address this problem, we need : 
 60 pipes (20 feet each) with 0.5 inches diameter for a complete layout.  
 accessories for fixing and laying the pipes like reducers, elbows, sockets, fire-
valves,  
 Pipes which have already been laid-out need to be buried under the soil, which 
was to be done in the first place by the GAREMA but the pipes were left above 
the ground arguing that once all the villagers have taken the connection, we can 
think about burying the pipes. It remains in this state till date, half the pipes 
71 
 
buried and half of it outside the soil.  
 The pumping set for this scheme has not been working since the last two years 
and it would need a mechanic to start it after such a long period of inactivity.  
 
Obviously, we need to address these four issues before the pumping project could be 
useful for the people. This would certainly cost money. Hence, as the representative of 
the village community, I request you to grant an amount of 40,000 INR to help us run this 
project for drinking water needs of the village.  
At the same time, the handing over of and taking charge of the project between 
GAREMA and the gram panchayat would require other papers related to the IWDP 
project. I therefore, request you to kindly grant the 40,000 INR for the completion and 
successful running of the project and the relevant papers for the taking over of the charge 
of the pumping set by the gram sabha from GAREMA.  
Thank you, 
Mr.Sohan Singh Negi.   
Gram Pradhan, 
Kimsaar.  
Table 6. Letter to WMD Dehradun from the Gram Panchayat Kimsar 
 
 
Meeting the Implementing agency 
 
I was by now a familiar face in the WMD office, the implementing agency for Hills-II 
project, but that did not make the access to information any easier. At best, I began to be 
seen as an unwelcome outsider who cannot be legally stopped from asking for project 
related information. After the second visit, the officers would try to send me to the next 
person or avoid a meeting.  
I presented my request and purpose of visit to Sharma‟s office and waited outside. The 
peon came out to say that I should visit Mr. Longwa, the administrative director for any 
kind of information. Mr. Longwa was a friendly man and tried to accommodate my 
questions largely. However, he had declined any data or reports from his office until the 
Secretariat consented to my request. About the Kimsar drinking water project, Mr. 
Longwa suggested that I contact the regional office of WMD in Rishikesh for information 
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on this area. In brief, there was not much information provided at the headquarters of the 
implementing agency in Dehradun.  
In the absence of any concrete support from the directorate, I decided to approach the 
local MLA of the area in the hope of politicizing the issue and bring it to the notice of 
politicians who could indirectly pressurize the department to finish the drinking water 
project in Kimsar village.  
 
Meeting the elected block representative (MLA) of Yamkeshwar 
 
Ms. Badthwal is the elected MLA from the Yamkeshwar block and now lives in 
Dehradun. Ms Badthwal is a middle-aged woman and this is her first term in the 
Legislative Assembly. She won the state elections in February 2007 from the 
Yamkeshwar block. She had made a visit to Kimsar village during her election campaign 
recently and knew the gram pradhan of Kimsar and nearby villages very well. She was 
aware about the project but the details were not so well known to her. She heard the issue 
patiently and asked how she could be of any help.  
I requested her to call Mr. Sharma at WMD and ask them to either release the funds as 
required by the gram panchayat or send the team from WMD to finish the incomplete 
work. Ms. Badthwal called the WMD office and had a brief conversation with Mr. 
Sharma.  
Later, she told us that he has asked her to call the Rishikesh office of WMD and talk to 
Mr. Pandey. He was the DPD for this program. Ms. Badthwal called his office and talked 
to him about the project. She stressed the fact that Kimsar village has a serious water 
problem and he should do something from whatever funds are left. She wanted WMD to 
complete the project and then hand it over to the gram sabha. It seemed the project was 
over and the file was closed.  
Ms. Badthwal did not feel very optimistic about WMD after her phone calls and felt that 
they are just shirking responsibility. As the VDC was the responsible implementing 
agency in theory, they were also responsible for anything that went wrong, which gave 
the WMD staff its most important source of security. This time she called the site office 
of WMD in Rishikesh and talked to another government officer, the deputy project 
director of Hills-II, Mr. Pandey:   
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“I wanted to attract your attention to a drinking water scheme in my block 
(Yamkeshwar). As you may remember, it was a part of the IWDP Hills-II but the 
pumping system is still not in a working condition. There is a severe problem of water in 
this village and if you could get it repaired and restore the water supply, I would be very 
obliged. It wouldn‟t cost much either, maybe around 40-50,000 INR because the 
infrastructure is already there. Then I request you to officially hand it over to the gram 
sabha… The project was never completed in the first place. Your department left without 
finishing it, now it‟s your responsibility to complete it and hand it over to the gram 
sabha. I know not much work has been done on the ground during this project. It has just 
been an exercise in making log-book entries”.83  
 
The other way to solve this drinking water problem was to transfer this scheme 
immediately under the jurisdiction of the gram sabha in its present state of incompletion. 
Then the gram sabha could use other development funds to restore the water supply. Ms. 
Badthwal knew the gram pradhan of Kimsar from her election campaigns when she went 
to the village with the now chief minister BC Khanduri. This visit was highly attended by 
the villagers from all the nearby areas. My landlady was also a part of this election 
meeting. She later remarked that most people went there to see the Helicopter (that 
brought BC Khanduri) rather than listen to the speeches. The gram pradhan and the MLA 
belong to the same political party, BJP
84
.  
The point is, Ms. Badthwal is quite familiar with the village and could empathize more 
than the WMD and could help in devising a local solution to the problem. For obvious 
reasons, politicians are closer to the people than the bureaucracy in India. The MLA 
called the gram pradhan on his phone and took a first-hand report directly from the 
village. The pradhan told her about the missing paperwork regarding the project that 
prevented him from taking charge of the water scheme. He repeated that there was no 
fund at present that he could use to revive the water supply.   
 
In the above description of the two cases, it was my attempt to show that watershed 
development is a field occupied by different actors and discourses operating with each 
other in a complex developmental ensemble. The first case highlights the donor‟s 
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Ground pe kuch kaam to hua nahin hai, sirf khanapoorti hui hai... (Interview with the MLA of 
Yamkeshwar, Field Notes on 26-05-2007, Dehradun, Uttarakhand) 
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 Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) is an important right of the centre nationalist political party in India.  
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perspective and preferences for institutions and programs to alleviate poverty in the 
developing countries. This case also shows how a strategic group formation between the 
NGO, delegated government agencies, donors and politicians gives a chosen direction to 
the project and proposes its recommendations to undertake watershed development with a 
given set of institutional apparatus.  
The second case in Uttarakhand reveals the presence of competeing discourses of 
development from the government and the local population. It shows that the Central 
government‟s priority of forming a national park in the inhabited areas prevails over the 
people‟s general will for the construction of access roads. Further, since these areas now 
form the periphery of the Rajaji National Park, watershed development project is the 
government‟s strategy to bring the nearby areas under forestation and subsequent 
protection. It shows that the project forms different institutions in the village that come in 
direct conflict with the local elected governments. In the case study, the consensually 
nominated VDC competed with the gram panchayat for undertaking village development 
activities. The VDC was also instrumentalized by the implementing agency to undertake 
the watershed work and its „consensually nominated‟ status provided enough space for 
controlling its activites outside the public sphere. This resulted in a lack of critical public 
engagement with the work done by VDC that made it possible for the VDC to leave the 
drinking water scheme in Kimsar village incomplete without any accountability to 
anyone. This has led to the present dysfunctional status of the drinking water scheme that 
no agency wishes to claim as its own. VDC does not owe the responsibility because it 
was not registered nor had any other legal status, WMD does not take any responsibility 
because the project was implemented within a decentralized, participatory governance 
model where all funds are routed through the VDC. Moreover, after the project came to a 
close in 2005, all appointments and committees formed during the project period ceased 
to exist. The VDC was no more a valid institution, if it ever was one, and the units 
formed by WMD for this project were re-formed and sent to different projects. The gram 
panchayat of Kimsar could not take it under its jurisdiction because it was incomplete 
and there were no records of any sort about the water supply scheme. It did not come 
under the gram panchayat also because it was implemented by the VDC and funds were 
provided to them.  
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Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 discuss the preferences of the different agencies and the 
institutions formed in these cases in detail to explore the extra-local conncetions of the 
local governance strategies. The next section reviews the nature of studies that form the 
bulk of literature around watershed development projects in India.  
2.5 Literature Review of Watershed Projects in India 
This section explores the studies conducted on the different aspects of watershed 
development programs in India to show that three main groups of writings could be 
identified: civil engineering and GIS based technical studies for watershed development; 
economics based impact studies; and socio-political studies on community participation, 
decentralized governance, gender relations, and institutional framework. This literature 
would fit into, what Burawoy (1998) calls, the „instrumental knowledge‟. A limited 
amount of postdevelopment studies on democratization and governmentality have also 
focused on the watershed development projects as appropriate sites of investigation. A 
general conclusion that is drawn from this review is that there seem to be very few 
studies that address the everyday interactions between the technical, institutional and the 
political aspects of watershed development that works in synchronicity with each other.  
 
Reviews by the Government of India  
 
A periodic review by the government of its watershed programs brought out the gaps in 
policy making and institutional vacuum that was felt from the field experiences as the 
years of involvement in watershed development increased. Watershed projects were first 
reviewed in 1973 by a task force headed by Dr. B.S. Minhas, in 1982 by another task 
force headed by Dr. M.S. Swaminathan and by an inter-departmental group in 1984.  
In 1993, a technical committee headed by Dr. C.H. Hanumantha Rao was formed by the 
MoRD to appraise the work done under DPAP/DDP to identify the weakness of the 
programme and to suggest changes. This committee submitted its recommendations 
towards improvement of the watershed programs in 1994. Based on these 
recommendations, a new set of guidelines were formulated by the MoRD, now called 
'Common Guidelines for Watershed Development- 1994'. The Hanumantha Rao 
Committee felt that:  
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“The programs have been implemented in a fragmented manner by different departments 
through rigid guidelines „without any well-designed plans prepared on watershed basis by 
involving the inhabitants‟. Except in a few places, in most of the program areas the 
achievements had been dismal. Ecological degradation has been proceeding unabated in 
these areas with reduced forest cover, reducing water table and a shortage of drinking 
water, fuel and fodder.”85  
 
The guidelines recommended the formation of local institutions and involvement of 
NGOs to regenerate rural livelihoods through soil and water conservation using 
„community based‟ participation.   
Farrington et al (1999) argue that the 'Common Guidelines' mark the beginning of a new 
era in public sector rural development programs. „The guidelines envisage a bottom-up 
planning approach, working where possible through NGOs and with community 
participation as a central principle‟ (Farrington et. al.: 8). In the eighth five year plan, the 
Indian government explicitly stated that attempts would be made to involve NGOs as 
collaboration partners in various development programs.  
Watershed development projects implemented by MoRD from 1994-2001 followed these 
'Common Guidelines of 1994'. In 2000, the Ministry of Agriculture revised its guidelines 
for National Watershed Development Project for Rainfed Areas (NWDPRA), making 
them “more participatory, sustainable and equitable”. These were called Warasa 
Jansahabhagita Guidelines
86
. These guidelines were revised by MoRD in 2001, modified 
and reissued as 'Guidelines for Hariyali' in April 2003.  
The next major milestone in India‟s watershed development program was the publication 
of the „Report of the Technical Committee‟ in 2006, under the leadership of 
Parthasarathy. Following his suggestions, the Government of India (GoI) has issued the 
new „common guidelines for watershed development‟ in February 2008. The report by 
the Parthasarathy Committee argues that India is on the verge of a „nutritional 
emergency‟ that could be fought only by focusing on the rainfed areas that have immense 
potential to develop within a watershed framework. The discursive construction of 
watershed development as a solution to the looming food crisis is an effort to present the 
soil and water conservation requirements as an emergency so that the political will and 
motivation for the program could be generated (see section 5.4 also).  
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 GoI, 1994. inthe Hanumantha Rao Committee Report on Watershed development , 1994, Preface.  
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 Government of India (2001)  
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As the 1994 guidelines introduced the concept of VDC as the chief implementing agency 
at the village level, the 2003 guidelines totally did away with the VDC and NGOs. It 
notes:  
“The Ministry of Rural Development is committed to empower Panchyati Raj Institutions 
(PRIs) and has been impressing upon the State Governments to devolve necessary 
financial and administrative powers to the PRIs for self-governance particularly in 
planning, implementation and management of economic development activities in rural 
areas. Watershed Development has been included in the list of subjects to be devolved to 
the PRIs. Gram Panchayat and Gram Sabha are equipped with statutory rights and 
mandate for natural resource planning, potentially equipped with the powers to impose 
local taxes or user charges and are committed to „reservations‟ for representation of 
women and weaker sections as per the Constitutional provision.”87 
 
It recommended the gram panchayat, which is constitutionally recognized and formed in 
a democratic election, to be the village implementing institution. The role of the NGOs 
was to given back to the government departments. The gram pradhan was made the co-
signatory with the gram sevak (employee of the government, MoRD) to withdraw funds 
from the project account instead of the nominated committee. This institutional ensemble 
was opposed mostly by the NGO sector that saw it as a plot of the government to gain 
exclusive control and monopoly over the implementation of watershed development 
projects (Lobo, 2005).  
Report published by the Government of India in 2006 has recommended the re-inclusion 
of NGOs and formation of consensually nominated VDCs alongside the gram panchayat 
to implement watershed development projects. It criticized the 2003 guidelines on the 
grounds of its „impracticality‟:  
“The experience of the working of watershed programme all over the country since the 
Hariyali Guidelines provides overwhelming evidence that the institutional arrangement 
as devised is not working well. The Gram Panchayat members are not able to discharge 
their responsibilities towards the watershed programme. We fully share and endorse the 
spirit and will expressed in the Hariyali Guidelines towards empowerment of PRIs. We 
believe this holds the key to the future of democratic governance in India and to realizing 
Gandhiji‟s dream of Gram Swaraj. But as the Mahatma would have advised in such a 
situation we must look for a practical solution.” 
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Hariyali Guidelines, Government of India/ MoRD (2003) 
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A National Rainfed Area Authority (NRAA) was set up by the Government of India in 
2006. Guidelines released in the February of 2008
88
 delegate considerable powers to the 
NRAA and State governments to sanction and oversee the implementation of watershed 
programs. It further envisions the creation of multidisciplinary professional teams at 
national, state and district levels for managing the watershed programs. Providing it with 
„professional‟ experts is a major thrust area of 2008 guidelines. NRAA emerges as the 
highest authority on watershed projects for overseeing and interpretation of any of the 
provisions of common guidelines.  
These guidelines are important for defining the official position and discourse of the state 
with regards to watershed development. It also helps to identify the issues that have 
emerged from the past learning, the actors who are/should be involved and the 
institutions that the state finds suitable for implementing watershed programs. It presents 
the government‟s normative position on the program. It can be seen from the above 
section that watershed development program has undergone periodic depoliticization and 
re-politicization in the governmental discourse based on which the institutional apparatus 
for project implementation is determined, oscillating between the elected, governmental, 
and non-elected, non-governmental, „civil-society‟ actors.  
 
Watershed development program in academic studies  
 
This section shows that the areas of enquiry in watershed development remains confined 
to the study of technical and economic progress documented from the successful projects. 
As an extension, such studies contemplate the possibility of large scale replication of 
successful projects and consider the possibility of sustainability. Other quantitative 
studies tend to be based on a small number of heavily supervised projects with no 
information about the long term effects. This section first outlines the technical and 
economic impact studies on watershed development followed by the studies done on 
institutional aspects. It then presents the limited number of critical studies on watershed 
development. This section concludes by pointing out the areas of research that the present 
studies do not discuss or discuss only rarely. It argues the case for a critical evaluation of 
the present approach as a part of the problem in its discursive construction of policy, 
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practices and institutions that together remove the direct democratic control over 
watershed governance.  
 
Studies focused on biophysical and economic indicators 
 
Most studies in this area focus on the biophysical gains from watershed program or 
economic returns attributable to watershed development and with the methodology of 
assessing returns (Chopra, 1999; Landell-Mills, 1999).  
A study of 6 watersheds (Sharda et. al. 2005)
89
 showed that the watershed program 
reduced soil loses by 52% and surface runoff by 58%. The overall productivity of the 
watershed measured through a Crop Productivity Index rose by 12 to 45% in treated 
watersheds. A review of 120 selected households in four watershed projects in Gujarat 
(Shah, 2000) found that after 4 years of implementation, irrigated area almost doubled in 
all the projects, reaching about 18% of the land held by the beneficiary households. 
Cropping intensity also showed a rise. Around 87% of the households reported that their 
drinking water availability increased. About 71% of the landless reported better 
availability of employment opportunities in the post-project period. The value of the 
stream of benefits from the project over a 15-year period is estimated at Rs. 10.48 lakhs 
with an initial investment of Rs. 2.57 lakhs, with an overall benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of 
4.07 (Government of India/ MoRD, 2006: 43). Other studies conducted to assess the 
impact of watershed programs provides mixed conclusions on the performance of 
watershed development projects in achieving their economic and environmental 
outcomes (see Chopra et al. 1990; Farrington and Lobo, 1997; Kerr and Chung 2001; 
Reddy et al. 2004; Rao, 2000; Farrington et al. 1999).  
An impact study of five watersheds in Andhra Pradesh (Reddy and Ravindra, 2004) 
found that the overall BCR of watershed investment in 4 watersheds varied between 1.10 
and 3.78. On this basis, they worked out that the investment payback period of a 
watershed project is 2 to 3 years. Another study by Chaturvedi (2005) notes that benefits 
occur because of an increase in cropped area, shifts in cropping pattern and 
improvements in crop productivity to due increased water availability. Lobo (1996) notes 
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an average rise of nearly 300% in the irrigated area and 50% in cropped area from his 
study on three watershed villages in Ahmednagar under the IGWDP.   
A comparative study of 16 villages in the drought-affected districts of Gujarat showed 
that the watershed villages were better placed compared to non-watershed villages in 
terms of water and biomass availability, employment opportunities and out-migration 
(Shah, 2000). MoRD conducted a comprehensive evaluation of watershed programs in 16 
states covering 221 districts in 2001. A compilation of the results of this study (TERI, 
2004) reports overall improvement in land use, increase in net sown and gross cropped 
area, expansion in irrigated area, greater fuel-wood and fodder availability, higher 
incomes and employment opportunities from the majority of states. Perhaps the most 
comprehensive summary of the benefits of watershed programs in India is provided by 
ICRISAT‟s (International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics) „meta-
analysis‟ of the impact of watershed programs (Joshi et al, 2005). It is based on an 
exhaustive review of 311 case studies. 
The study found that in treated watersheds: 
 soil loss (51 studies) reduced by 0.82 tonnes/ha/year; 
 rate of runoff (36 studies) reduced by 13%; 
 irrigated area (97 studies) increased by 34%; 
 cropping intensity (115 studies) went up by 64%; and 
 Additional employment (39 studies) of 182 person-days/ha/year has been created and 
in some cases, it went up to 900 person-days/ha/year. 
 
The above-mentioned techno-economic approach is built on a fundamental belief referred 
to as the „nirvana‟ approach (Molle, 2008). It presumes that 1) all water resources flow 
along the physical river basins/ watersheds and are therefore apt for management, 2) 
livelihoods of the poor people depend on natural resources and therefore by managing 
these resources poverty can be alleviated, and 3) by creating institutional structures we 
can sustainably manage natural resources and banish poverty (Saravanan, 2008).  Each of 
the presumptions above is questionable and would require further substantiation based on 
field evidence. The problems of these linear approaches are not about the possibility of 
facilitating and guiding social change, but in over-simple prescriptions. A reductionist 
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approach to the problems of poverty and water scarcity is maintained in discourse that 
thrives on the denial of local level contestations inherent in water management for the 
sake of making sense of this complex situation even if only in the form of 
economic/numerical data, and achieving consensus for the efficient management of the 
project.    
 
Studies focused on institutions, community participation and governance 
 
Along with the studies on economic and biophysical gains resulting from a successful 
watershed program, a relatively smaller number of studies focus on the institutional 
apparatus that is trusted with the task of planning and implementation of these projects. 
Within this genre of studies, a critical eye is raised on the role of NGOs and community-
based organizations, issues of inclusion and exclusion of the poor in the project activities, 
state presence within the participatory discourse and the role assigned to the women with 
special funds earmarked for them.   
The role of national and international NGOs in watershed development is debated 
vehemently from two opposing perspectives. While the one sees it as the creation of a 
new public sphere that is not only apolitical but also supports the mainstream 
development apparatus „from inside‟ and fulfills an important instrumental role in the 
global governance of development, the other perceives NGOs as representatives of the 
„civil society‟ and in a position to provide faster and efficient development compared to 
the governmental bureaucracy. It provides for needs that are not being met by either the 
market-place or the public sector.  
NGOs figure predominantly as one of the important partners in watershed projects in the 
common guidelines issued by the Indian government.  Expanding the role of NGOs in 
socio-economic development requires that we rethink our notion of politics. The public 
sphere occupied by the NGOs is considered a realm of apolitical association, one that „if 
politicized, could help reshape the national agenda in every country‟ (Rifkin, 1998)90.  In 
her study of the NGOs, Fisher (1998) suggests that the „civil society‟ in this form of 
organization should form the central tenet of political discussion in a tripartite model with 
market and the government as other two tenets. To what extent do the NGOs represent 
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the civil society
91
 is a matter of further research but in the Indian case, a distinction has 
been made within the non-governmental public sphere that recognizes the parallel 
existence of a „political society‟ alongside the „civil society‟.92 This consists mainly of 
the poorer members of social groups „that transgress the strict lines of legality in 
struggling to live and work. They inhabit, that is to say, the rough and tumble worlds of 
political society, where governmental agencies are met by wit and stealth, and not 
uncommonly by violence‟ (Chatterjee, 2004)93. If we understand politics as not confined 
to the designated institutions but pervading every aspect of life (Foucault, 1991), NGOs 
as a civil-society organization also cannot remain immune from the political processes, 
especially in the light of the fact that they are involved in the issues of collective concern, 
res publica like land, water and forests.  
The government in India has clearly shown its inclination towards employing NGOs to 
delegate a considerable amount of developmental work in watershed development 
following from the guidelines of 1994, 2005 and 2006. The National Advisory Council in 
its report (NAC, 2005) criticizes the watershed guidelines issued in 2003 that restricted 
the role of NGOs and proposes its reversal: 
“The NGOs are, in general, better equipped to undertake the task of creation of 
awareness, social mobilization and capacity building. However, the revised Guidelines 
for Hariyali have severely restricted the role of NGOs as primary implementing agencies 
in Watershed Development, notwithstanding the mounting evidence that the performance 
of watersheds, in the implementation of which NGOs have been involved, has been 
distinctly better than those which have been executed by the Government Agencies alone. 
. . . This process may be reversed at the earliest and mechanisms evolved at the national 
and regional levels, to involve bonafide and competent NGOs and empower Watershed 
Associations in the task of social mobilization and implementation at the watershed 
level” (NAC, 2005).  
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The report issued by the GoI (2006) takes note of the positive impact that some NGOs 
have created in rural Maharashtra and Karnataka. At the same time it casts a suspicious 
eye on their legitimacy and efficiency:  
 
“Currently, the voluntary sector is seeing a proliferation of agencies, many of which are 
of a dubious nature. It is not clear that a commitment to serve the poorest has brought 
them to this field. It appears that the larger cloud of corruption enveloping society in 
India has made its entry into the voluntary sector as well. Many NGOs are simply fly-by-
night operators who obtain government grants and disappear without a trace. There are 
others who play a contractor-type role, thriving on huge government grants and resultant 
commissions” (GoI, 2006: 89).  
 
Hence, it would be too simplistic to presume that the development projects routed 
through the NGOs represent an involvement of the „civil society‟ and thus are more 
accountable and transparent compared to the government. The issues of corruption and 
sloppy implementation that characterize the Indian bureaucracy are also to be observed in 
the voluntary sector. The final situation comprises of watershed development delegated to 
the NGO without any significant increase in efficiency, but removed from the 
governmental sphere to the non-governmental public sphere.  
“While NGOs carry out their own monitoring and evaluation, rare is the effort from the 
government (or any independent authority) to open the „black box‟ of NGO-led 
watershed projects. The black box contains information on how NGOs negotiated 
watershed and administrative boundaries. How they ensured participation? How they 
integrated diverse interest groups to promote environmental management and alleviate 
poverty? What happened after they withdrew formally? And more important how much 
money do they actually spend compared to funding received, for meeting the needs of the 
poor? While Vaidyanathan (2006) might argue that government bureaucrats are „corrupt 
rut‟, corruption is part of everyday life around the world across multilateral agencies, 
governmental agencies, NGOs and village institutions too, though the intensity varies, 
some of which reduce the transaction cost to a great extent, while some increase the 
transaction cost and impact on the poor. Nevertheless, it is important that we take 
corruption seriously to facilitate those forms of corruption that are beneficial and 
constrain those that seriously hamper the development process” (Saravanan, 2008). 
 
In 1993 the Indian parliament passed the 73
rd
 constitutional amendment that granted 
constitutional status to three-tier locally elected bodies called the panchayats. The 
Common Guidelines of 1994 suggested the formation of nominated village watershed 
committees for implementing the projects. These „community based watershed 
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committees‟, were separate from the panchayat though in theory it worked in cooperation 
with it.  
As per the Common Guidelines of 1994, creation of non-elected and consensually 
nominated VDCs for watershed governance has come under attack from different 
perspectives. Chhotray (2007) investigates the rational of creating non-elected 
community based bodies for India‟s watershed program and argues that a discourse of 
depoliticization is in use to propogate the creation of 'apolitical' watershed committees in 
contrast to  political panchayats, 'ostensibly unsuitable for participatory development for 
their embodiment of political contestation and vested interests'.  
VDCs are seen to be free from the forms of political contestations that commonly 
characterize panchayats and are considered more appropriate for participatory 
development on this basis. This sort of rationalization represents a new form of 
depoliticization, the theorization of development as a wholly economic activity that has 
been highly conducive to the emergence of planning discourses and the attendant 
technocratic rationality of the state' (ibid.: 1038). This perspective on development 
governance has acquired significance after the pioneering work by Ferguson on Lesotho 
(1990) followed by other related studies (Harriss 2002, Kamat 2002, Tordella 2003, 
Chhotray 2007).  
It can be observed from the above review that techno-economic indicators form the 
dominant framework in watershed studies. NGOs have come under critical appraisal with 
adherents both for and against their deployment. The issues of sustainability, good 
governance and empowerment of the poor through watershed projects are discussed 
under various subtopics. While the NGOs are seen to be in a position of providing 
development without the complexities of local politics, their politics of an apolitical 
participation in development projects and its long term impacts on democratization 
remains an issue for further research. It would however be difficult to comprehend that 
the governance of common goods like natural resource could be achieved apolitically.  
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2.6 Problematizing Discourses and Institutions of Watershed Governance 
 
This section of the chapter elaborates the issues that remain under researched and 
neglected in the watershed development literature. This forms the basis of the present 
study that seeks to fulfill this gap and account for the missing link by employing a 
theoretical framework under the umbrella concept of „depoliticization‟ as explained in the 
next chapter.  
 
Watershed Policy making in India as well as internationally, has rhetorically moved 
towards finding new approaches and political legitimacy in the international goal of 
reducing global poverty and sustainable development, in the language of partnership and 
participation, citizen‟s rights and democracy. But the actual practice in the field is not 
informed/inspired by this „new discourse‟. The National Water Policy 2002 and the report 
of the technical committee on Watershed programs in India of 2006 emphasize the need 
of participation of the local NGOs, village community, especially women and the poor in 
watershed development planning and implementation.  
National NGOs supported by the „global civil society‟ and the community-based 
governance have largely spearheaded this movement to „include‟ the local people and 
ascertain „participation‟ in development projects. While NGOs carry out their own 
monitoring and evaluation, rare is the effort from the government (or any independent 
authority) to open the „black box‟ of NGO-led watershed projects, as noted by Saravanan 
(2008) earlier.  
The arguments for micro-watershed rehabilitation as a means of strengthening rural 
people‟s livelihoods through integrated, productive and sustainable use of natural 
resources are compelling. Equally compelling is the evidence from many small-scale 
projects, often run by NGOs that a rehabilitated watershed will quickly degrade again 
unless local institutions capable of managing the resource are strengthened.  
Of particular importance is the evidence that the interests of the poorer sectors-often in 
common forest or grazing lands- will be overridden unless their voice in these institutions 
is strengthened (Farrington et. al. 1999: Preface). In general, watershed technologies are 
likely to fail if they divide benefits unevenly but require near universal cooperation to 
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make them work. In this case, equity becomes a prerequisite to efficiency (Kerr and 
Sanghi 1992).  
Benefits after the first year or two were typically assumed
94
, and, not surprisingly, cost-
benefit findings were usually favorable. At the same time, the vast majority of projects 
were never evaluated, and there were good reasons to suspect that most of them had little 
impact (Kerr and Sanghi 1992). A study conducted by IFPRI notes that „the improved 
condition of common lands on the projects appears to have been at the expense of access 
to products such as fuel and fodder from the commons. Respondents in the IGWDP 
villages indicated that they had suffered from reduced access to fuel and fodder from 
common lands more than respondents under other projects. At the same time, none of the 
projects seem to have done much to assist farmers without irrigation or to help landless 
people gain access to the additional water generated through project efforts.‟95 
 
Well-intentioned efforts to „build local organization‟ – never mind anything as ambitious 
as „civil society‟ - can so easily go wrong, as Corbridge et al. (2003) show, about the East 
Indian Rainfed Farming Project. Their independent evaluations of this project show that it 
had a fair degree of success as a farming systems program. But the logic of the project is 
that sustainable livelihoods are to be achieved through collective action in local 
organizations. Consequently, the project had devoted much effort to forming local 
development organizations. Considering the extent of inequality and social hierarchy in 
India, and  the misleading stereotype of the „egalitarian tribal society‟ in the rural areas, 
we can observe that development organizations are very substantially dominated by the 
more affluent and powerful members of the society, argues Corbridge. The NGO sector is 
no exception to this rule. This means, even the NGOs in most of the cases are dominated 
by people belonging to the higher castes/class and work in rural areas for tribal 
development. With this background, one has to check if at all and how much participation 
at the grassroots level is actually achieved and how far does „documented‟ policy actually 
reflect the field reality.  
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Mosse (2005) presents an analysis of how the „policy-practice dynamic‟ played out in the 
DFID-funded Indo-British Rainfed Farming Project (IBRFP) amongst the Bhil 'tribal' 
communities in rural western India. He describes how a development project finds ways 
of working itself out and how these ways are rarely based on policy in the way it is 
usually documented - but that they can nevertheless be turned into policy after the events. 
'What if,' as Mosse formulates it, 'development practice is not driven by policy? What if 
the things that make for good policy are quite different from those that make it 
implementable? What if, instead of policy producing practice, practice produces policy, 
in the sense that actors in development devote their energies to maintaining coherent 
representations regardless of events?' (Mosse, 2005: 2). It becomes evident that the 
dynamic between policy and practice is deeply important in the project - but not for the 
reasons one would think. Evidences from the WB project showed that policy merely 
remained a convenient hanger for many agendas while the actual practices were distorted 
by class politics and power.  
All important decision-making positions (President, Secretary) were held by the village 
elite in the consensually formed VDC. It was never registered under the Societies Act, as 
required by the participatory policy and decision making. In contrast to this, the 
implementing agency namely WMD presented the formation/ registration of the the 
village committee as the first step in implementing the project in the village
96
. This is just 
one example of development projects working to maintain themselves as coherent policy 
ideas (as systems of representations) as well as operational systems. Here policy 
primarily functions to mobilize and maintain the status quo of local political support i.e. 
to legitimize rather than to orientate practice. The discursive construction of the project 
by WMD presents it as a „participatory development‟ project. This serves the political 
purpose of maintaining a policy coherency with the WB, at the same time legitimizing the 
continuation of such practices. The incoherency between policy discourse and field 
practices appears to be strange in the wake of popular slogans of participation and 
decentralization. Its focus, borrowing a phrase from Johan Pottier, is thus not on what the 
project achieved (or didn‟t) but how this achievement was represented.   
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This thesis argues that a democracy of „simulation‟ is at work here to claim that „success‟ 
and „failure‟ are policy-oriented judgments that obscure actual project effects and the 
political dynamics of its everyday working. Simulated democracy helps to conceal the 
flailing nature of the Indian state that maintains a coherent documentation of the 
development projects at the policy level to gain approval from the funding agencies, 
irrespective of the local mismanagement and partial action. This representation of the 
reality is biased in the favor of economic indicators, technical treatments and number of 
„institutions‟ formed during the project. It does not communicate the actual qualitative 
status of the newly formed institutions and the political contestations that are inherent in 
the governance of water resource management to the effect of denying their presence.  
This corresponds to an emerging strategy of governance that treats water issues as a 
„technical‟ matter devoid of politics that can be efficiently provided by the apolitical 
NGOs and nominated expert committees. This apolitical treatment of water governance 
can be problematized as a brand of politics that takes up „depoliticization‟ as its political 
ideology and employs discursive and institutional tools to pursue it. Rather than 
empowering the local communities or enhancing their capacities for self-development, 
these tools lead to the formation of strategic groups from among the international and 
national civil society, NGOs and delegated government departments, which is catalyzing, 
as this thesis argues, „a watershed‟ in watershed governance.  
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter explains the theoretical framework of this study by defining the concept of 
depoliticization and its operationalization for the case studies. It outlines this concept 
with reference to the concepts of politicization and politics and identifies its different 
tactics. In the next section it provides a review of the authors who have worked with this 
framework, specifically in the field of development studies and highlights the importance 
of this concept in facilitating our understanding of watershed governance, especially in 
the multilateral projects. 
 
3.1 Politics, Politicization and Depoliticization 
 
This section describes the concept of „politics‟ and the different dimensions of its usage 
in the development literature. It contrasts the traditional meaning assigned to the term 
with its negative modern connotation. On this basis, it approaches the concept of 
depoliticization and outlines its relevance for this study.  
 
Meaning of „Politics‟ 
 
Since the notion of politics plays such a central role in this thesis, it would be worthwhile 
to briefly describe what I mean by this term.  
Stated most simply, politics responds to the need in complex and differentiated societies 
for collective and ultimately binding decision making. In the language of rational choice 
theory, contemporary socieities are characterized by proliferation of so called collective 
action problems (environmental degradation, global warming) to which politics is, in 
some sense, a response (Hay, 2007: 2). In a broad sense, politics is about the mediation of 
social power, and the strategic action related to that mediation, that is, the process 
through which the social relations of power are constituted, negotiated, reproduced, 
transformed or otherwise shaped (Mollinga and Bolding, 2004: 6).  Leftwich describes 
human socieities to be characterized by a diversity of interests and preferences that need 
to be sorted out and resolved by a set of conscious processes that he calls „politics‟, 
defined as “all the activities of conflict, cooperation and negotiation involved in the use, 
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production and distribution of resources, whether material or ideal, whether at local, 
national or international levels, or whether in private or public domains” (Leftwich, 
1983).  Such a basic conception facilitates ways of integrating both conventional ideas 
about politics (power, authority and collective decision-making) and economics 
(allocation of scarce resources) into a broader understanding of the relations between 
them (Leftwich, 2007).  In this sense politics acquires a broader context specific meaning. 
Kerkvliet defines politics as „the debates, conflicts, decisions, and cooperation among 
individuals, groups and organizations regarding the control, allocation and use of 
resources and the values and ideas underlying these activities‟ (Kerkvliet, 1990: 11). Hay 
identifies twelve different senses of the term „politics‟ (Hay, 2007: 61)97 that shows us the 
different ways in which an action or issue could be defined as „political‟ oscillating 
between the ideal form of critical public scrutiny and accountability of governmental 
policies, an arena of deliberation and realization of the collective good, to the association 
of politics with pursuit of material self interest of politicians, undue interference, 
corruption, inefficiency and lack of accountability.  
From the definitions given above and the different connotations of the term as identified 
by Hay, it is clear why all development projects in the water sector are therefore 
inescapably political, not managerial or administrative in the current technicist sense. 
„For at any point in any developmental sequence what is crucially at stake is how 
resources are to be used and distributed in new ways and the inevitable disputes arising 
from calculations by individuals and groups as to who will win and who will lose as a 
result‟ (Leftwich, 1996: 6). Evers and Gerke (2009) argue that strategic groups are 
formed when new resources become available as a result of social change or 
globalization, and that such groups try to acquire these resources in the long term. In this 
scenario, some groups stand to win at the cost of the others. Watershed development 
project brings a basket of resources to be used and allocated in the village public sphere 
that involves conflict, cooperation and negotiations among the different actors and leads 
to the formation of „strategic groups‟: 
“The theory of strategic groups assumes that resources, in this case development funds, 
will be appropriated by a group that then implements a strategy of securing resources in 
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the long term and attempts to build social, political and economic environment towards 
this goal. Development experts can thus be considered as globally operating strategic 
groups. Within the context of development projects experts, as Bierschenk (1988: 158) 
has found out, are considered to in a „process of continuous negotiations‟ with other 
strategic groups.  Risse (1998: 1) has, in this connection drawn attention to the tendency 
for transnational networks and their actors to be decoupled from national and local 
issues” (Evers and Gerke, 2009: 6).  
 
In the above paragraph, the authors highlight the strategies that groups, formed as a result 
of proliferation of development projects, employ towards securing the resources made 
available by the project. One of the popular strategies employed towards this end in 
watershed development projects, as this thesis would empirically show, is that of 
depoliticization.  
 
 Politicization and Depoliticization  
 
This section describes the concept of politicization and develops the concept of 
depoliticization in contrast to it. It describes the different models that are used to identify, 
map and explore the processes of politicization and depoliticization that forms the basis 
of operationalizing the concept in the next section for examining the case studies.  
 
Simply stated, issues and institutions are politicized when they become the subject of 
public deliberation and decision-making where previously they were not. Hay (2007: 79) 
describes politics as the „realm of contingency and deliberation‟ to distinguish it from the 
realm of necessity in which, „in the absence of the capacity for human agency, it is fate 
and nature that fight it out for supremacy‟. In this definition, political sphere includes 
both the governmental sphere and the public sphere. He further seeks to „departmentalize‟ 
the political realm in order to discriminate between the different spheres of the political 
by differentiating between three arenas: 1) the governmental arena; 2) the public but non-
governmental arena; and 3) the private sphere. Beyond this sphere, there exists a „realm 
of necessity‟ where fate and nature/ necessity rule in the absence of any capacity of 
human control. Each of these spheres is seen to be politicized to a lesser extent than the 
preceding one. Consequently, issues and instiutions can be politicized in one of the three 
ways (Hay, 2007: 79): 
92 
 
Politicization 1: promotion from the realm of necessity to the private sphere. 
Politicization 2: promotion from the private sphere to the public sphere. 
Politicization 3: promotion from public sphere to the governmental sphere.  
 
 In this model, the most basic form of politicization is (type 1) involves the extension of 
the realm of contingency and deliberation on the issues or institutions that were earlier 
assigned to the realm of fate and necessity. The examples of this type of politicization 
could be seen in the questioning of the religious prejudices and taboos or in the 
recognition of the capacity of human influence in the matters that were earlier the 
preserve of natural processes like global warming and climate change. Science and 
technology provides means to observe these natural processes in greater depth so that we 
no longer see such changes to be in the realm of fate but consider them as important 
issues for public deliberation and decision-making. In this sense, development of science 
had a politicizing effect.  
An issue or institution is further politicized when they become subject to the deliberation 
by the masses (the public) when previously such deliberation was confined to the private 
sphere. In Hay‟s model, this is politicization of type-2. Growth of the feminist movement 
in India that challenged the traditional power relations in the domestic space and raised 
the issue for wider public debate is an example. It was clearly expressed in its slogan: 
„personal is political‟.  
 A further process of politicization, according to Hay, might be seen to promote issues 
from the public (but non-governmental) sphere into the arena of direct governmental 
deliberation. The issue which already enjoys a certain degree of popularity in the non-
governmental public discourse (like the roads issue as explained in the Hills-II case) is 
taken up and incorporated in the governmental policies and become part of the formal 
political agenda. This is type-3 politicization.   
While Hay‟s model clearly shows the process of successive politicization of an issue, 
another study by Blühdorn (2007: 313) identifies three locations or sites of politicization 
as follows:  
1. Politicization of issues: This implies that previously non-negotiable issues become 
negotiable and decidable. This means, these issues are dragged from nonpolitical 
spheres such as religion, tradition, nature, or intangible political authorities into 
the arena of public contestation and scrutiny, where value pluralism gives rise to 
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alternative scenarios, where decisions have to be justified and democratically 
legitimated.  
2. Politicization of people: This implies that citizens or groups of citizens who have 
previously been uninterested in politics and excluded from it become engaged in 
political debates and turn into political actors. The inclusion of women, lower 
castes and dalits into the mainstream Indian politics is an example of 
politicization of the people.  
3. Politicization of social organizations and institutions:  This is the process in which 
previously nonpolitical organizations such as nature conservation societies, 
religious associations, sports clubs, universities, or even courts of justice embrace 
and more or less openly promote specific political agendas.  
 
In the most general sense, politicization is the realization that established social norms, 
social practices, and social relations are contingent rather than sacrosanct, that citizens, 
individually and collectively have political agency by means of which alternatives can be 
explored and implemented. This recognition of contingency in social practices and 
relations and the power of collective political agency have been the igniting spark of 
emancipatory-progressive movements (visible in the form of „participatory discourse‟ in 
development) and politicization has been their key strategy (Blühdorn, 2007: 313).  
 
Depoliticization 
 
With this background, depoliticization can be described as a process in which previously 
political issues, people and institutions are becoming less political or nonpolitical. In the 
context of location, depoliticization of issues implies that they are relocated from the 
arenas of democratic contestation and decision into the arenas which are governed by- at 
least supposedly- unambiguous and nonnegotiable scientific „facts‟ and codes rather than 
contestable social values. Scientific laboratories, economic markets, expert committees or 
international regimes are the prominent examples of such supposedly apolitical arenas. 
Interest rates, education standards, environmental quality, poverty or water scarcity are 
just a few examples of issues that have recently been relocated in this arena.  
The depoliticization of people implies that citizens that had previously been interested 
and engaged in public affairs withdraw from political arenas and retreat into the 
nonpolitical pursuit of their personal affairs and wellbeing. Emergence of individualism, 
mistrust of political organizations and activities, consumerist social order and 
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disappearance of community life due to personalized sources of entertainment may be 
seen as evidence for the depoliticization of citizens.  
In brief, the depoliticization of institutions and social organizations implies that bodies 
ranging from environmental organizations, micro-credit societies, water-user 
associations, retail cooperatives to youth volunteers shed their ideological commitments 
and political agendas and focus on their „core business‟ or the „task at hand‟. As in the 
case of watershed development, professionalization, managerial best practice and the 
pursuit of economic efficiency were the principles that guided this transformation of 
social institutions.  
Returning to Hay‟s model, depoliticization could be understood as operating in the 
reverse order to politicization as shown in the figure below.    
Depoliticization 1: demotion from governmental to the public sphere.  
Depoliticization 2: demotion from the public to the private sphere 
Depoliticization 3: demotion from the private sphere to the realm of necessity.  
 
Source: (Hay, 2007: 80) 
 
 
The first type of depoliticization (type-1), as shown in the diagram, is:  
“the effective demotion of issues (institutions) previously subject to formal political 
scrutiny, deliberation and accountability to the public yet non-governmental sphere.This 
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may take one of two general forms: the displacement of responsibility from governmental 
to public or quasi-public authorities and the off-loading of areas of formal political 
responsibility to the market (through privatization). The potential advantages of this to 
government are considerable- in that responsibility for contentious issues can now 
effectively be passed to public or quasi-public bodies and to official who can present 
them as purely technical matters. Politicians are thus insulated from having to answer for 
the consequences of policies that may continue unchanged and for which they would 
previously have both claimed and borne responsibility” (Hay, 2007: 82).  
 
This strategy results in an apparent loss of the policy-making capacity of the politicians 
due to which they demote the responsibility only to a quasi-public body such as a newly 
formed central bank and retain the power of appointment to such bodies. As outlined in 
the case of IGWDP where funds are routed through the bank called NABARD, the 
Ministry of Finance is not directly answerable or responsible for the project but retains 
the power to appoint (or remove) the managing director of the bank. At the same time, 
the delegated agency does not interfere in the autonomy of the government at all. Hay 
argues that type-1 depoliticization is also manifest in the attempt by the government to 
present environmental degradation as an issue of corporate or collective societal 
responsibility. In this way, the government moves to a „facilitating‟ role and displaces the 
issue from the core political realm to the non-governmental public sphere.  
Type-2 depoliticization occurs „when issues previously politicized within the public 
sphere but not currently the subject of formal political deliberation are displaced to the 
private realm- becoming matters for domestic deliberation and consumer choice. For 
example, the representation of the issue of environmental degradation in such a way that 
responsibility is seen to lie neither with government, nor with business, but with 
consumers is, if successful, a form of depoliticization of type-2‟ (Hay, 2007: 85).  
Depoliticization of type-3 involves the transfer of responsibility from the realm of 
deliberation (political realm) to that of necessity and fate. It involves a disavowal of the 
capacity for deliberation, decision making and human agency and entails a non-
negotiable fatalism. The politicians often use globalization as a non-negotiable external 
economic constraint that limits the national governments to frame policies outside this 
structure.  
The framework outlined above has clear resemblances to the Russian Doll Model of 
Flinders (2007: 108) where he characterizes the British state as a series of nested layers 
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with relatively small government departments at the core and a series of distinct layers 
working outwards. It resembles the solar system model where the public bodies are 
elliptically revolving around departments at various distances like planets around a sun. If 
departmental boundary lines provide theoretically significant categories for analysis, my 
contention is that the delegation of authority at each step involves a redistribution of 
power and sometimes involves the inclusion of new actors that are significant in locating 
the mechanisms of depoliticization.  
From a public policy point of view, then, depoliticization means the reduction of direct 
influence of politicians, either through institutional delegation or the minimization of 
discretion, considering that politicians have the impression of being vote-maximisers tied 
to short-term electoral cycle.  
Burnham defines depoliticization as a form of „statecraft‟ and a „governance strategy‟:   
 
“Depoliticization as a governing strategy is „the process of placing at one remove the 
political character of decision-making‟. State managers retain arm‟s-length control over 
crucial economic and social processes whilst simultaneously benefiting from the 
distancing effects of depoliticization. As a form of politics it seeks to change market 
expectations regarding the effectiveness and credibility of policy-making in addition to 
shielding the government from the consequences of unpopular policies. Moreover, it is a 
process cloaked in the language of inclusiveness, democratization and empowerment” 
(Burnham, 2001: 128-129).  
 
Flinders and Buller (2006) provide an extensive review of the literature on 
depoliticization to claim that this concept has found usage in a range of disciplines but „in 
definitional terms the wider literature is largely barren‟. Authors who have worked with 
this concept- like Boggs (2000), Douglas (1999), Petit (2004) clearly denote some kind of 
shared understanding of values and processes, yet never seek to explicate the core 
essence of the term.  
The literature review allows us to harvest a number of shared values and processes, and 
through these processes produce a set of six common themes (Flinders, 2007: 238):  
1. the role and power of a dominant rationality; 
2. shifts in political reasoning and conceptions of legitimacy; 
3. the process of placing at one-remove the political character of decision-making; 
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4. the reallocation of functions and responsibilities to independent bodies or panels 
of experts; 
5. the exclusion of politics through the adoption of „rational‟ practices; and  
6. Political exhaustion, which feeds loss of confidence and a resignation to fate.  
Synthesizing these core themes, leads us to define depoliticization as „the range of tools, 
mechanisms and institutions through which politicians can attempt to move to an indirect 
governing relationship and/or seek to persuade the demos that they can no longer be 
reasonably held responsible for a certain issue, policy field, or specific decision‟ (Flinders 
and Buller, 2006: 3-4).  
It is important to note that the concept of depoliticization is not intended to suggest that a 
given issue, people, institution or process is any less political but it is merely highlighting 
a change in relation to the „arena‟ or processes through which decisions are either taken 
or avoided. Although the form of politics changes as the (water) issue is subject to an 
altered governance structure through the application of depoliticization tactics, the issue 
becomes no less political in its impact on the society. Processes and procedures that are 
commonly referred to under the rubric of depoliticization might therefore be more 
accurately described as „arena shifting‟ (Flinders, 2007: 238). This means that the issues, 
people and decisions are not really devoid of politics as the syntactic meaning of the word 
„de-politicization‟ seems to suggest, but are shifted to another arena- this one being a 
non-elected political arena. 
3.2 Tactics of Depoliticization  
This section describes the tactics of depoliticization (institutional and preference shaping) 
employed by the strategic groups and examines how these are instrumentalized in a 
mutually supportive manner to place at one remove the political character of decision 
making. Depoliticization has formed a, if not the, central element within the global 
politics in recent years to justify the formation of technical committees and delegation of 
responsibilities to a number of arm‟s-length bodies across a number of policy areas. 
Evidence of rising levels of public disenchantment and distrust in relation to politicians, 
political processes and political institutions has led to the promotion of depoliticization as 
a way of circumventing conventional politics.  
98 
 
Buller and Flinders (2005) point out that the wider literature on depoliticization has 
largely failed to pinpoint and distinguish between different types of depoliticization 
tactics. Nor has it sought to explore the inter-play between depoliticization and 
established frameworks of representative democracy. This study undertakes both these 
tasks within the given scope of case studies.When faced with the case studies, it becomes 
necessary to dissect and unravel the various components of depoliticization and their 
dynamic interaction with each other in order to understand the adoption of specific tactics 
and tools by the politicians, donor agencies and other strategic groups. 
Flinders (2007) describe depoliticization as having three distinct elements- 
“First, at the core of any depoliticization tactic is an acceptance that the principle (macro-
political level) of depoliticization is an appropriate one for governments to pursue 
through the policy making process. Second, the principle of depoliticization should be 
distinguished from the tactic (meso-political level) used to realize this goal at any one 
moment…there are different tactics for implementing the objective of depoliticization 
and these can vary across time and space, even when the acceptance of the principle 
remains constant. The principle and tactics of depoliticization will be supported by a 
particular tool or form (micro-political level)”.  
 
Table 7. Elements of Depoliticization at different political levels 
31
Principled commitment to Depoliticization
No Yes
Tactical Choice
Institutional Rule based Preference shaping
Non-departmental External Internal New public 
management
public policy Exchange rate Golden rule Neoliberalism
Non-ministerial department Globalization
Independent statutory body
Macro-political level
Meso-political 
level
Micro-
politic
al 
level
 
Source: Flinders (2007: 235).  
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In his view, the micro-level policy supports are the most transient part of a 
depoliticization tactic, „pulled in‟ to operationalize a particular technique and then 
discontinued in the event of implementation failure.  
The decision to make a commitment in principle to depoliticization might be taken on 
public policy or political grounds (or a mixture of the two). Once the principal of 
depoliticization has been adopted in a particular policy area, a choice has to be made 
concerning the most appropriate tactic, or mixture of tactics, to employ. The next section 
describes two among the many tactics employed in development governance, namely, 
preference-shaping depoliticization and institutional depoliticization.  
3.2.1 Preference-Shaping Depoliticization 
 
It involves the invocation of preference-shaping through recourse to ideological or 
rhetorical claims in order to justify a political position that a certain issue or function 
does, or should, lie beyond the scope of politics or the capacity for state control. In 
practice, preference-shaping depoliticization tactics involve the construction of a new 
„reality‟ in which the role of national politicians is presented as having been, to some 
extent, eviscerated by external forces or broad societal factors. These forces limit the 
flexibility of national politicians and reduce their role in managing and enforcing rule-
based tactics or policy stances which are designed to alleviate the negative consequences 
of trends for which national politicians cannot reasonably be held responsible (Flinders, 
2007). However, a government may seek to avoid or deflect responsibility for an issue it 
is possible that the public may still blame the government for non-intervention or the 
adoption of an inappropriate tactic. The significant aspect of this tactic is that it relies on 
normative beliefs that may be extremely powerful even though the empirical evidence on 
which they are based is debated. Governments may seek to espouse or over-emphasise a 
distinct aspect or interpretation of an ideology in order to increase the potency of the line 
of reasoning being presented. The preference-shaping tactic is potentially far-reaching in 
that it attempts to refine and change public expectations about both the capacity of the 
state and the responsibilities of politicians (Buller and Flinders, 2006).  
An example of this preference-shaping tactic is the development ensemble‟s recourse to 
arguments concerning globalisation in order to justify certain decisions or non-decisions. 
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In essence, the rhetoric of globalisation has been employed as a tactic or tool through 
which the potentially negative political consequences of policy choices can be neutralised 
through the creation of an ideological context in which issues are depicted as being 
beyond the political control framework of national politics. For example, a government 
can convince the public that it can no longer control the economy due to wider global 
trends despite the fact that in reality is still has a number of significant control 
mechanisms at its disposal. If one emphasises the importance of rhetorical or ideological 
strategies then this situation may well be defined as one of depoliticization due to the fact 
that the public believes that depoliticization has occurred because of globalization and 
other such constraints (Burnham, 2001).  
3.2.2 Institutional Depoliticization 
 
Institutions have always been at the heart of political science and political analysis. They 
consist of formal and informal rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and 
systems of meaning that define the context within which individuals, corporations, labor 
unions, nation-states, and other organizations operate and interact with each other 
(Campbell, 2004: 1; see also Leftwich, 2007, Hodgson, 2001: 294).  
Following North (1990), this thesis defines „organizations‟ as “groups of individuals, 
bounded by a common purpose, involving a defined set of authority relations and 
dedicated to achieving objectives.” Organizations differ from „institutions‟, which are 
defined as rules of the game and include “codes of conduct, norms of behaviour and 
conventions” (North 1990; Uphoff 1986). Institutions are both embedded in and surround 
organizations (Alsop and Kurey, 2005). Then, as noted by Haggard, we have to dig 
beneath institutional arrangements to reveal the political relationships that create and 
support them (Haggard, 2004: 74).  It is now acknowledged in the literature on water 
management that if institutions matter, then understanding the political processes that 
establish, maintain and change institutions matters even more. Political institutions 
determine the distribution of political power which includes the ability to shape economic 
institutions and the distribution of resources. As economists are conventionally concerned 
to explore the importance of structure of incentives which institutions establish, this study 
lays emphasis on the structures of power which not only underpin the formation of 
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institutions, but are also embedded within them. This section argues that it is important to 
recognize the preferred political goals that the institutions are designed to serve. The 
analysis should not stop at assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of an institution but 
should also extend to questioning for what is it effective? An institution that is effective 
for generating economic growth, for example, would have different indicators of 
„effectiveness‟ than an institution which is effective for democratic participation.   
Institutional depoliticization focuses on structures. Although the purest form of 
depoliticization is privatization, where the state absolves itself completely of 
responsibility for a specific policy field or sector, its most common variant involves the 
creation of a quasi-autonomous body to insulate decision-making from political influence 
(Flinders, 2007: 251). Depoliticization of social organizations and institutions is a 
mechanism by which the state comes into the public view or presents itself in a technical 
role, as a rational actor with a narrow focus on how to improve economic effectiveness 
and efficiency. Little attention is paid to the non-economic factors and the complex 
political, social and cultural landscape in which the state operates, is grossly 
oversimplified (Bryld, 2000: 703).  
Institutional depoliticization is possibly the most frequently employed tactic. A 
formalised principal-agent relationship is established in which the former (minister) sets 
broad policy parameters while the latter (chief executive) enjoys day-to-day managerial 
and specialist freedom within the broad framework set by ministers. Institutional 
depoliticization is designed to release the agent (and its sphere of responsibility) to some 
extent from short-term political considerations - vote seeking, populist, short-term 
pressures to which elected politicians are subject (Buller and Flinders, 2005). Ministers 
do, however, enjoy substantial powers in relation to nationalised industries over such 
issues as appointments, policy frameworks and investment. Thus, a distinction needs to 
be made between an organisation‟s theoretical autonomy and the autonomy it enjoys in 
practice. Depoliticization should not therefore be seen as necessarily part of the 
„hollowing out‟ or evisceration of the state but may be more accurately be interpreted as 
an aspect of the transformation of the state. Moreover, the degree of true 
„depoliticization‟ is questionable when the independent body operates within a frequently 
narrow and prescriptive policy framework set by ministers. 
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The delegation of functions along a „spectrum of autonomy‟ with ministerial departments 
at one end and purely private bodies at the other, and executive agencies, non-ministerial 
departments, non-departmental public bodies, strategic health authorities, a vast range of 
statutory, non-statutory and „unrecognised‟ bodies, and increasingly complex forms of 
public-private partnerships in between these two poles - clearly raises a number of 
conceptual and empirical issues. At which point along the spectrum does an issue actually 
become depoliticised? 
Clearly the explication of such tactics risks over-simplifying the complexity of modern 
governance. Within any sector at any time it may be possible to identify a mixture or 
amalgam of tactics. The examples outlined above may not be exhaustive as a list of 
depoliticization tactics. Nor should they be viewed as mutually exclusive. A government 
may pursue a number of different depoliticization tactics at any one time; with the 
preference-shaping tactic providing a macro-political context or rationale; the rule-based 
tactic operating at the meso-political level and within a certain policy area; and, the 
institutional tool operating at the meso as well as micro-political level and in response to 
specific incidents or demands. 
In a nutshell, an extremely depoliticized outlook would hold that legal and political 
decisions are complicated matters which should be left to experts where as the extremely 
politicized outlook would argue that everyone affected by legal and political decisions 
should discuss them till there is a complete agreement about them. While the second 
outlook is unacceptable on practical grounds, the first is on principle unacceptable. The 
challenge is to find a synthetic amalgamation of the two views for a more desirable form 
of development.  
 
3.3 Depoliticization in Development Studies  
 
Probably the most influential book that deals directly with the depoliticization effects in 
bilateral development projects is The Anti-Politics Machine written by Ferguson in 1990. 
Using Foucault‟s notion of dispositif, or apparatus, Ferguson considers the development 
projects, particularly in Lesotho, as emerging from and operating as a complex 
heterogeneous ensemble of institutions, discourses, resource flows, programs and 
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practices. He regularly refers to it as a „conceptual apparatus‟. The heterogeneous nature 
of the apparatus, and the idea that effects are not necessarily predictable, means that a 
wide range of both positive and negative outcomes can be generated through 
development without attributing these to a metasubject or force, or requiring that we 
solely see imposition or interdiction at play (Brigg, 2002). At the same time, such 
ensembles operate to achieve overall effects, thereby serving a dominant strategic 
function (Gordon, 1980: 195).  
The main thrust of his study is „not to show that the development problematic is wrong 
but to show that the institutionalized production of certain ideas (about Lesotho) has 
important effects, and that the production of such ideas plays an important role in the 
production of certain sorts of structural change‟ that he explicates as a mechanism of 
depoliticization. 
In recent years, Ferguson has been criticized for overstating the case for the „anonymous 
automaticity of the anti-politics machine‟ (Chhotray, 2007). His approach diverts 
attention from the complexity of policy as institutional practice and the diversity of 
interests behind policy models and the perspectives of actors themselves (Mosse, 2004: 
644). Corbridge and Kumar (2002: 95) criticize his argument that „failed development 
projects are repeated because they produce the unintended effect of entrenching 
bureaucratic state power‟. In their view, such hypothesis may not work in countries like 
India where the state has more direct ways of establishing its power than by designing 
new generations of „failed projects‟.   
Harriss (2001) addresses the same problematic to suggest that the developmental 
enterprise in the third world is based on a discourse propounded by international 
development agencies like World Bank, that relocates political issues of poverty and 
water scarcity in the list of technical problems to bypass the issues of contestation in 
democratic politics. He argues that governments and other actors have an interest in 
„depoliticizing‟ debates on development because exclusion of politics based on 
instrumental reasoning assists in reproducing state power and its legitimacy, as well as 
the reproduction of development projects. In his view, the idea of „social capital‟ as 
propounded by the World Bank forms part of what became known as the „anti-politics 
machine‟ to diffuse potential political conflicts in situations of underdevelopment. Harriss 
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adds participation, empowerment, civil society and decentralization to the list of concepts 
to depoliticize development because they are „so deceptively attractive‟. 
The fuzzy concept of social capital has come under severe criticism fro its irrelevance in 
terms of practical development policy and the near impossibility to measure it because it 
seems to harbor many different things. In addition, Marxist political economists argued 
that understanding situations of underdevelopment was being replaced by a notion that 
was neither political nor economic, and which did not address situations of power 
asymmetries (Fine, 1999). Harriss agrees with Fine that social capital is anything but a 
Trojan horse within the neoliberal economic bulwark of the World Bank forming an 
important part of the neoliberal agenda to roll back the state and to legitimize large cuts 
in public expenditure by focusing on civil society.  
Following Ferguson, Chhotray (2007) studied two villages in south India to explore the 
relevance of the concept of depoliticization within the governance strategies of watershed 
development projects. In her view, one needs to specify exactly what kind of politics 
(party politics, elite politics, low-caste politics, pro-poor progressive politics among 
others) is disregarded in a depoliticized from of development in the Indian context. She 
traces the approach followed by the Indian planners since independence for their 
apolitical content and the ways in which it has influenced development.  
Although the planning exercise after independence was depoliticized in intent and sought 
to operate outside the domain of „politics‟ the ruling Congress government engaged in a 
type of „accommodative politics‟ that sided with the rich landlords to maintain its 
position of political power (Bardhan, 1984; Rudolph and Rudolph, 1987; Kaviraj, 1988; 
Kohli, 1988). In their efforts to win elections, Congress Party appeased the rich landlords 
and erstwhile kings by providing them with political power in lieu of electoral 
mobilization, which steadily eroded state resources and turned planning into a profligate 
process (Chhotray, 2007: 1039). Democratic system as it evolved in India had less to do 
with mobilization based on a critical reasoning of practical issues in the public sphere. 
Instead, political mobilizatsion was pursued along the lines of caste, religion and 
linguistic adherence in the years after independence (Varshney, 2007). Given the socio-
cultural diversity of India and practices of caste based social organization, the political 
interest groups sought to mobilize people on similar lines that became, and remains, an 
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integral part of the Indian democratic system. The politicization of social relations was 
reflected in the developmental planning from the very beginning, producing elite driven 
and accommodative development strategies, argues Chhotray.  
To the extent that we accept her definition of „politicization‟ leading to elite driven 
accommodative politics, certainly Ferguson is of little direct relevance. However, if 
depoliticization is assigned a wider definition of a transformation of the public sphere 
from being a critical sphere of deliberation to a sphere where dominant groups push or 
persuade the public towards certain predetermined conclusions, as proposed by 
Habermas, then watershed development in India serves as a good example of 
depoliticization of development.  
3.4 Operationalizing Depoliticization for the Case Studies 
In the last section it was shown how different authors in the field of development have 
studied the processes and mechanisms of depoliticization. This section describes how this 
thesis would undertake the analysis of the two cases with the help of three different 
models of depoliticization by Blühdorn (2007), Hay (2007), and Flinders (2007) as 
outlined earlier in the chapter.  
 
 Tactics of of 
Depoliticization  
Location of 
Depoliticization  
Analytical framework to study  
depoliticization 
1. Preference-
shaping 
depoliticization  
Depoliticization of 
issues, people and 
institutions 
Discursive construction of  
debate, actors and institutions; 
2. Institutional 
depoliticization  
Depoliticization of 
actors and institutions 
 Delegation and reorganization of 
developmental apparatus, shifting 
from political to apolitical arena;  
Where:  
Depoliticization 1: demotion from governmental to the public sphere.  
Depoliticization 2: demotion from the public to the private sphere 
Depoliticization 3: demotion from the private sphere to the realm of necessity.  
Table 8.  Analytical Framework to study Depoliticization 
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Location of depoliticization in the above table is based on the work of Blühdorn while the 
tactics of depoliticization derive from the work of Flinders and Burnham (2006). 
Mechanisms of locating depoliticization derive largely from the work of Hay (2007) 
which forms the basis of the analytical part of this thesis.  
Preference-shaping depoliticization in watershed development can be located by 
subjecting the issues, institutions and actors involved in the project to a three step 
analysis as described in the Hay‟s model. This amounts to analyzing if there exists a 
preference for specific issues and institutions in the discursive construction of the debates 
in watershed governance that correspond to their shifting from the elected political realm 
to the non-elected apolitical realm.  
A discourse represents a configuration of ideas that provides the threads from which 
ideologies are woven. Numerous discourses can be identified, for example the „scientific 
discourse‟, which sees development as a rational, technical and scientific process. The 
dominat discourse revealed in the analysis in these selected cases would be indicative of a 
(de)politicized form of development. Discourse analysis attempts to make explicit the 
implicit values and ideologies in discourses. „Discourse‟ can also refer to dialogue, 
language, and conversation. If defined in this way, discourse analysis relates to the 
analysis of language used in policy-making and information sharing. This method can be 
usefully employed to study the preferences of policy makers and strategic groups that 
could then be evaluated to observe if they provide evidence for (de)politicization of type-
1, 2, or 3 based on Hay‟s model.   
Depoliticization of institutions looks at the delegation and reorganization of the 
governance apparatus in watershed development. Depoliticization of social organizations 
and institutions is a mechanism by which the state comes into the public view or presents 
itself in a technical role, as a rational actor with a narrow focus on how to improve 
economic effectiveness and efficiency. Institutional depoliticization focuses on structures. 
Although the purest form of institutional depoliticization is privatization, where the state 
absolves itself completely of responsibility for a specific policy field or sector, its most 
common variant involves the creation of a quasi-autonomous body to insulate decision-
making from political influence (Flinders, 2007: 251). How far does a watershed project 
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subscribe to this tactic of governance? The institutional apparatus of the case studies are 
analyzed to observe if they could be seen as tools to delegate responsibility away from 
the political sphere of deliberation and contestation to a technical apolitical sphere. How 
far are the institutions in the apolitical sphere, created for implementing watershed 
development projects, „inclusive‟ and how is this „inclusion‟ mobilized? 
In natural resource governance, inclusion and exclusion are not simply bipolar concepts. 
The concept of inclusion in the democratic process in itself presents problems of co-
option and control and does not imply that people are not excluded. The act of inclusion 
begs the question of what the included have become included in, on whose terms, and 
what new exclusions the act of inclusion presents for them. How do projects ensure the 
participation of the community as valued, appreciated equals within the project, given the 
stratified nature of the society in India. Does the project have a transformative approach, 
by design or by default, as regards the social relations (of power), underlying the 
developmental issues/objectives, it seeks to address? If it does not, or only to some 
extent, what are the implications of this?  
 
Summary of the Chapter 
 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework for this study that was used in the 
anaylsis of the data collected from two watershed development projects in India. It first 
outlines the concept of politics in its ideal usage as a sphere of public deliberation and 
collective decision making for common good contrasted with the narrow, negative 
connotation assigned to the term in current usage. This chapter argues that a discursive 
construction of „politics‟ and „political‟ as undesirable derives from the public choice 
theory and its formulation in terms of rational choice that understands the behaviour of 
politicians and government officials as self-interested agents who appropriate scare 
public resources for private motives. This leads to a search for alternative routes and 
strategies for governing development projects that could circumvent the governmental 
and political route. In this scenario, depoliticization emerges as a viable strategy.  
In the next section, this chapter describes the models that have been employed to analyze 
this governance strategy. The first model by Hay (2007) describes the spectrum of 
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political and apolitical sphere and discriminates between the two based on a three-step 
model, where the type-1 depoliticization corresponds to the shifting of an issue or 
institution from the elected governmental sphere to the semi-governmental sphere of 
delegated agencies and type-3 depoliticization involves the shift from private sphere to 
the sphere of fate and necessity.  This section also provides the important sites to locate 
the mechanisms of depoliticization in the form of issues, people and institutions, based on 
the work of Blühdorn (2007).  
The next section outlines the tactics of depoliticization in terms of preference-shaping for 
depoliticization and institutional depoliticization deriving from the work of Flinders 
(2007). This is followed a brief review of the available literature that uses a similar 
theoretical framework to study the governance aspects in different contexts and 
situations.  
The last section constructs an analytical model to study the watershed development 
projects and operationalizes depoliticization by synthesizing the available theories into a 
conceptual apparatus.  
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4 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the scientific model selected for the study, the research method, 
and the techniques that were followed in the field for collection of data. The main goal of 
this chapter is to raise to the level of explicit consciousness all those means which have 
demonstrated their value in answering the main research question.  
This research adopted the „extended case study method‟ of Burawoy (1998) as used in 
social/ cultural anthropology, to study the political processes and governance strategies of 
IGWDP in Maharashtra and Hills-II watershed development project in Uttarakhand. By 
focusing on the issues and institutions of governance in watershed projects, I collected 
data with the help of interviews, participant observation, focus-group discussions and 
archival sources.  
4.1 Selecting the Scientific Model 
Methodology of a study informs us about the way we view and chose to investigate the 
social world we live in. It implicitly expresses our own position in the academic world 
and what we consider as „valid‟ knowledge. In this view, our choice of methodology is 
also a political action that shapes the research process (including the questions asked and 
answers received), and privileges specific ways of knowing and discards others.  
The fundamental idea behind any research is to represent the reality out there to its 
highest possible degree of accuracy, given the complexity and heterogeneous nature of 
any human activity, including water governance and watershed development. Before a 
study would begin to analyze the social situation, it is necessary to consider the 
fundamental basis on which such knowledge could be approximated with the reality and 
applied accordingly within the limitations of the selected case studies.  
Positivism claims that experience is the foundation of knowledge. We record what we 
experience, and the quality of recording then becomes the key to knowledge. It would 
mean, as put by the Vienna Circle of logical positivists, „if one could not verify 
something, one must question its existence‟. The positivist approach to the study of social 
phenomena, exemplified by „survey research‟ attempts to suspend our participation in the 
world we study. We insulate ourselves from the subjects of study by adhering to a set of 
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standardized data collecting procedures that assures our distance. We try to avoid 
affecting the situation we study, bracket external conditions, standardize data collection, 
and make sure our sample is representative. Positive science works on the principle of 
separation between the scientists and the subjects they examine. It proscribes reactivity, 
but upholds reliability, replicability, and representativeness in social research.  
Structured interviews that form the basis of survey research have their importance in such 
studies that seek to estimate the watershed project impact in terms of economic indicators 
and numbers of people affected by the project. At the same time, its use is limited in such 
studies where the governance aspects or the quality of economic distribution is posed as a 
problem. It must be added that the studies on watershed development following positive 
methods are numerous and it is the dominant framework for most of the studies. It was 
noted that the results presented by the survey research conducted by various professional 
consultants hired by the implementing agenices hardly matched the reality as observed in 
the individual villages. The case of Uttarakhand can be enumerated here where the local 
villagers were aware of the limitations of the survey research conducted earlier and felt it 
did not provide the actual reality about the watershed projects. It was seen as an 
ambiguous method that helped to hide the actual processes and inequalities of distribution 
behind generalized reports seeking safety in numbers
98
. 
With humanism, man became the measure of all things and the relativity of truth gained 
ground. As Schiller argued, that since the method and contents of science are the products 
of human thought, reality and truth could not be „out there‟ to be found, as positivists 
assume, but must be made up by human beings (Schiller 1969). The disagreement with 
positivism was also expressed by Dilthey (1833-1911) who argued that the methods of 
physical sciences, while undeniably effective for the study of inanimate objects were 
inappropriate for the study of human societies. There were, he insisted, two distinct kinds 
of sciences: the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften. Human beings live 
in a web of meanings that they themselves spin. To understand humans, he argued, we 
need to understand those meanings.  
                                                 
98
 Field Notes, 20 February 2007; Interview of the ex-sarpanch in the Talla Banas village of Garhwal. 
Available at  (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wogn_DhbuAk) 
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My own allegiance in this study is based on the philosophy of human knowledge that 
emphasizes a reflexive participant observation of the socio-political phenomenon. Unlike 
the positivistic approach, the idea is to sense reality and to describe it in its meaningful 
context rather than only in numbers; words that reflect consciousness and perception 
compared to a juxtaposition and generalization of economic indicators as indicators of 
development. This humanistic tradition has been named phenomenology, where the acts 
(of consciousness) are the objects of systematic analysis to reveal the structures (of 
consciousness) and phenomenon that gives rise to these acts. The researcher tries to see 
reality through another person‟s acts (villagers, NGO/State, Donors) to understand the 
meanings that people give to the reality while at the same time reflecting on the meanings 
that he/ she would give to the same reality.  
Rather than bracketing our participation in the world we study, a reflexive model of 
science takes these effects into consideration and uses theory to guide its way in the 
dialogue with participants. The central role of theory in this model is to provide the 
cognitive map through which the reality is apprehended. This „dwelling in‟ theory is at 
the basis of reflexive model of science. This method embraces not detachment but 
engagement as the road to knowledge. Premised upon our own participation in the world 
we study, reflexive science deploys multiple dialogues to reach explanation of empirical 
phenomenon (Burawoy, 1998). The dialogues are embedded within a second dialogue 
between local processes and extra-local forces and between different theoretical positions 
that seek to explain these social processes. It is a generic strategy that focuses on 
differences between similar cases and the significance of a case relates to what it tells us 
about the world in which is embedded (Burawoy, 2005).  
This research thus traverses the academic realm that begins towards the end of positivism 
and ends in the beginnings of post-modern thought. In this sense, it seeks to overcome the 
limits of positive science and embraces the importance of a critical view, but not by 
debunking this labyrinthine arrangement of development enterprise as a narrative only. In 
this sense the developmental apparatus does something concrete that cannot be located by 
positive methods alone. A theory centric method of enquiry was needed.  
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4.2 Critical ‘Political Sociology’ of Water Resource Management  
 
To advance the social sciences we must not dissolve them, but create alliances both 
among them and the public, around shared projects- stitched together from below rather 
than imposed programmatically from above (Burawoy, 2007).  
 
A critical „politico-public‟ sociology of water resource management is an amalgamation 
of three related research fields: 1) critical sociology based on critical realism of Roy 
Bhaskar and critical theory of Frankfurt School, and their intersection with sociology; 2) 
political sociology refers to the contested nature of water resource management 
(Mollinga, 2008) and deriving from the works of Weber and Dahl; 3) public sociology 
based on the work of Burawoy (2005a) that he later rephrased as „critical public 
sociology‟ (Burawoy, 2007).  
Each of the three fields outlined above is a discipline in itself that prevents an elaborate 
review of their knowledge base. However, their main ideas that have relevance for the 
study of depoliticization in watershed governance have been outlined in the next section.  
Critical realism is a methodological philosophy of the social sciences based on the 
ontological claim that social reality is constituted by real underlying social structures and 
causal mechanisms which we can identify and explain through scientific investigation 
(Bhaskar, 1998: 21). For critical realists, an observed event is presumed to have been 
produced/ generated by underlying social relations. The process of scientific discovery is 
therefore to identify, conceptualize, and improve upon existing conceptions of generative 
social relations, and the process through which these relations generate observed events 
(Archer, 2003). This is a post positivist philosophy which regards both causal explanation 
and interpretive understanding as necessary for social science. Unlike positivism, it is 
anti-reductionist, arguing that the world is stratified and characterized by emergence. 
Thus, the meaningful character of discourse or communicative interaction is emergent 
from rather than reducible to physical or economic behaviour, and hence must be 
understood in conjugation with Verstehen/ interpretative methods (Sayer, 2005).  
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The mainstream water management research based on instrumental knowledge and 
problem solving managerial approach exists with a fast emerging field of alternative 
approaches based on the contested nature of water resource, its context and its history 
(Mollinga, 2008; Franks and Cleaver, 2008; Molle, 2008). The authors build up a case for 
explicitly addressing the social relations of power that are part of water management 
structures and practices for a comprehensive analysis.  
 
Burawoy provides a useful tool to deal with the diversity of research knowledge as 
practiced in the sociological research by posing the targeted readership and different 
target groups as the driving force behind the mainstream research. This can be usefully 
employed to map the governance of watershed development. He suggests that four types 
of knowledge define a scientific field that can be represented in the form of a matrix as 
given below:  
 
 Academic audience  Extra-academic audience 
Instrumental knowledge Professional Policy 
Reflexive knowledge Critical  Public 
Table 9. Knowledge types and knowledge audience 
 
“Policy knowledge is knowledge in the service of problems defined by clients. This is 
first and foremost an instrumental relation in which expertise is rendered in exchange for 
material or symbolic rewards. It depends upon preexisting scientific knowledge. This 
professional knowledge involves the expansion of research programs that are based on 
certain assumptions, questions, methodologies and theories that advance through solving 
external anomalies or resolving internal contradictions. It is instrumental knowledge 
because puzzle solving takes for granted the defining parameters of the research program. 
Critical knowledge is precisely the examination of the assumptions, often the value 
assumptions, of research programs, opening them up for discussion and debate within the 
community of scholars. This is reflexive knowledge in that it involves dialogue about the 
value relevance of the scientific projects we pursue. Finally, public knowledge is also 
reflexive- dialogue between the scientist or scholar and publics beyond the academy, 
dialogues around questions of societal goals but also, as a subsidiary moment, the means 
of achieving those goals” (Burawoy, 2007: 139).  
 
Mollinga (2008) asserts that water research and studies driven by practical concerns, 
which support the mainstream water resources discourse, mostly fall into Burawoy‟s 
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category of professional and policy sociology. The current dominant discourse follows 
the approach of „instrumental knowledge‟ based on certain assumptions and 
methodologies that are shaped by power relations and normative values. Franks and 
Cleaver (2008) critique instrumental approaches to the generation of knowledge and 
policy based on the amalgamation of perceived 'success stories' and 'good practice' of 
governance. They favor instead approaches that attempt to understand water governance 
arrangements and outcomes for the poor within wider frameworks of negotiations over 
the allocation of societal resources. This implies the need to build reflexive knowledge 
generation into the research policy interface.  
Need for reflexive knowledge in the field of water resource research has been felt by 
Mollinga (2008) who expands on Burawoy‟s critical public sociology to encumber water 
resources management. It would in a way „level the discursive playing field in which the 
future of water resources management and the resolution of the impending global water 
crisis is analytically and ideologically negotiated‟, he argues. Reflexive knowledge must 
supplement the near monopoly of instrumental knowledge in the mainstream water 
resource management discourse.  
 
Critical theory and Frankfurt School 
 
The distinctive Frankfurt School perspective is essentially that of Adorno, Horkheimer 
and Marcuse developed in response to three major challenges: those of fascism, Stalinism 
and managerial capitalism (Outhwaite, 1996: 6). In their important work called the 
Dialectics of Enlightenment, authors argue that the Enlightenment critique of myth and 
domination and the pursuit of rational mastery over nature, themselves contribute to new 
forms of domination. Habermas shared their substantive preoccupation with the way in 
which enlightenment, in the form of instrumental means-end rationality, turns from a 
means of liberation into a new source of enslavement (ibid: 7). This instrumental 
rationality is the basis of the dominant discourse in watershed development studies that 
has been described here under the concept of depoliticization.  
In works of Habermas there was a distinct concern with rational political discussion or 
practical reason (in modern technocratic democracy) which he believed was turning into 
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an object of technical manipulation. He explicates a tendency of the modern democracies 
to treat political decisions as a whole as a technical matter to be decided on expert advice, 
that he argued was a new source of enslavement.  
Critical theory and questioning the presence of an 'objective' truth or the economic 
logic/indicators as the true representation of development finds its origin in Nietzsche's 
rejection of the Platonic idea of truth. Foucault takes it a step further, proposing what 
Deleuze (1984: 49) calls 'counter-philosophy', that ' traces the lowly origins of truth in 
struggle and conflict, in arbitrariness and contingency, in a will to truth that is essentially 
indicated with desire and power‟.   
Water resource management is deeply embedded in the human society and is an arena 
where structure and agency meet to reproduce and transform society (Mollinga, 2008). 
This implies that the social events that occur around this resource are of great importance. 
These events are generated by real underlying social structures and causal mechanisms 
which we can identify and explain through scientific investigation. Defining watershed 
projects here as events embedded in the social fabric, we seek to explore the mechanisms 
that contributed to this event and the mechanisms that helped to form the structures that 
facilitated the event. Is the „good governance‟ rhetoric in watershed development subject 
to the same „lowly origin in struggle and conflict, in a will to truth that is essentially 
indicated with desire and power‟? 
 
4.3 Extended Case Study Method 
Burawoy (1998) proposes a parallel model to positive science in extended case method 
(ECM), based on reflexive science that overcomes the limitations faced by positive 
methods, specially the „context effects‟ but has its own limitations in accounting for the 
„power effects‟. The origin of this method could be traced to social anthropology. Instead 
of collecting data from the informants about what the „natives‟ ought to do, the 
Manchester School of social anthropologists began to record accounts of what „natives‟ 
actually were doing, with accounts of real events, struggles, and dramas that took place 
over space and time. They brought out discrepancies between normative prescriptions 
and everyday practices (Burawoy, 1998: 5).  
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The extended case method emerges to overcome the limitations of other methods that 
also use participant observation. There exist two common criticisms of participant 
observation: 1) that it is incapable of generalization and therefore not a true science; 2) it 
is inherently „micro‟ and ahistorical and therefore not true sociology (Burawoy, 1991). 
Based on the positions taken on the two criticisms, Burawoy presents four comparable 
methodologies from the four answers on the critique of participant observation as shown 
in the following table:  
 
Level of Analysis Particular  General 
Micro Ethnomethodology (micro 
only) 
Grounded theory (micro to 
macro) 
Macro Extended case method 
(macro to micro) 
Interpretative case method 
(macro only) 
Table 10. Level of Analysis 
Ethnomethodology works without generalizing and only on the microlevel, because each 
situation is perceived as context specific and unique. „In the view of ethnomethodology 
the micro world is not a real world but a construction of participants enabling them to 
negotiate and uphold face-to-face interaction. The task of ethnomethodology is to 
elaborate the cognitive accomplishments that make social interaction possible (ibid: 272).  
Interpretative case method also problematizes the premises of the criticism. Here the 
„micro is viewed as an expression of the macro, the particular an expression of the 
general. It is as if the whole lodges itself in each part in the form of a genetic code, which 
has to be uncovered through a process of hermeneutic interpretation‟ (Ibid: 273).  
Both these positions are reproached by Burawoy as reductionist compared to the other 
two, „both of which accept that micro and macro are discrete and causally related levels 
of reality and that generalizations can be derived from the comparison of particular social 
situations‟ (ibid: 273). Grounded theory has its scientific appeal as the theory here is 
induced from the data and its ardent pursuit of generalizations, induced from comparisons 
across social situations. But in making those comparisons grounded theory represses the 
specificity of each situation, leads to generic explanations, which take the form of 
invariant laws (Burawoy, 1991: 280).  
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The „extended case method‟ applies reflexive science to ethnography and participant 
observation. It extends out from the „micro‟ to the „macro‟ or individual to the general, 
best exemplified by the „extended‟ feminist slogan of „personal is political‟. Extended 
case study raises this implicit „extending out‟ from the micro to the macro reality, to the 
level of explicit consciousness as a reflective method of studying social sciences 
(Burawoy, 1998: 6). It looks for specific macro determination in the micro world and 
seeks generalization through reconstructing existing generalizations, i.e. reconstruction of 
existing theory (Burawoy, 1991: 279).  
It adopts a situational analysis but avoids the pitfalls of relativism and universalism by 
seeing the situation as shaped from above rather than constructed from below. In 
constituting a social situation as unique, the extended case method pays attention to its 
complexity, its depth, its thickness. Causality then becomes multiplex, involving an 
„individual‟ (indivisible) connectedness of elements, tying the social situation to its 
context of determination (Burawoy, 1991: 280).  
Both grounded theory and extended case method use participant observation and appear 
to have similar roots however differences do exist as outlined in the table below.  
 
 Extended case method Grounded theory 
Mode of generalization Reconstruction of existing 
theory 
Discovering new theory 
Explanation Genetic (particular 
outcomes) 
Generic (inductive strategy) 
Comparison Similar phenomena with a 
view to explaining 
differences 
Unlike phenomena with a 
view to discovering 
similarities 
The meaning of 
significance 
Societal Statistical 
Object of analysis Social situation Variables across situations 
Causality Multiplex, indivisible 
connectedness of elements 
Linear form: x causes y 
Social situation  Thickness Simplification 
Micro-macro Macro foundations of a 
microsociology 
Micro foundations of 
macrosociology 
Social change Social movements Social engineering 
Table 11. Grounded Theory Vs. Extended Case Method 
 
118 
 
ECM deploys a reflexive understanding of participant observation to locate and study 
social phenomenon. A reflexive understanding takes into account the context effects and 
engages consciously with the object of study, recognizing the inter-subjectivity of the 
scientist and subject of study. It takes the social situation as the point of empirical 
examination and works with given general concepts and laws about states, economies, 
legal orders, and the like to understand how those micro situations are shaped by its wider 
structures. Once we highlight the systemic forces and the way they create and sustain 
patterns of domination in the micro situation, the application of social theory turns to 
building social movements (ibid: 282-3). According to Burawoy, extended case method is 
the most appropriate way of using participant observation to (re) construct theories of 
advanced capitalism.  
In making problematic the exceptional or deviant cases, a space for further exploration is 
opened up that moves beyond the field situation to the broader socio-political forces 
impinging on the field. Seeing through the lens of governance and depoliticization, the 
cases become a completely different object, one treaded by patterns of power in which 
watershed management becomes a terrain of struggle and politics.  
4.4 Discursive Analysis 
Discourse analysis proceeds by ascertaining the source of data, identifying the speaker 
and the audience and the possible consequences of the text/ utterance. Discourse used in a 
semi-technical sense refers to the systematic examination of problematized validity-
claims
99
 which are raised or presupposed in speech. These can then be redeemed by a 
discursive anaylsis.  
Many commentators, especially those who locate themselves within the field of critical 
discourse analysis (e.g. van Dijk, 1985, 1993), pay attention to the role played by 
discourse in sustaining systems of inequality or oppressive power. Schiffrin (1994) 
identifies six different approaches to discourse analysis that find relevance in different 
disciplines. In my study, following methods are being used for the analysis of the project 
documents to understand the preference shaping for a depoliticized form of governance in 
the linguistic construction of these documents:  
                                                 
99
 See Outhwaite, 1996.  
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1. Speech-Act Theory: It was developed by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) to 
argue that language is used not just to describe the world but to perform a range of 
other actions that can be indicated in the performance of the utterance itself. For 
e.g. if we say grass is green, it also performs the function of assertion. Speech Act 
approach to discourse basically focuses on knowledge of underlying conditions 
for production and interpretation of acts through words. To mean, words may 
perform more than one action at a time and that contexts/ background knowledge 
of the situation may help to separate multiple functions of utterance from one 
another. It also provides a means by which to segment texts and thus a framework 
for defining units that could then be combined into larger structures for 
meaningful analysis.  
 
2. Interactional Sociolinguistics: Some Interactional approaches focuses on how 
people from different classes/ castes/ cultures may share the grammatical 
knowledge of a language but differently contextualize what is said, such that very 
different messages are produced (Gumperz, 1982). Other Interactional 
sociolinguists (Goffman, 1981) focus on „how language is situated in particular 
circumstances of social life and how it adds/ reflects different types of meaning 
(e.g. expressive, instrumental) and structure (e.g. interactional, institutional) to 
those circumstances‟. Interpretation of the speaker‟s intent are related to different 
linguistic qualities of the utterance (phonetic, lexicon) as well as the way 
utterance is actually embedded. The same plantations when described by a 
government staff produces a very different data set compared to that described by 
a local farmer. In this method, the context of interchange (e.g. the physical setting, 
social roles, relationship of speech to other activities, physical stance of the 
interactants) is important and relies upon a precise transcription of linguistic, 
including prosodic detail of the utterances in social contexts. It also considers how 
interpretations of the speaker‟s intent are related to different linguistic qualities of 
the utterance (e.g. phonological and lexical variants) as well as the way the 
utterance is contextually embedded (e.g. activities it follows, to whom it is 
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directed). The focus of analysis is how interpretation and interaction are based 
upon the interrelationship of social and linguistic meanings (Schiffrin, 1994: 8).   
  
Both cases consisted of data in the form of interviews, documents, field notes and 
transcription of group discussions that were analyzed using the above approaches to 
discourse analysis.  
4.5 Research Technique 
Limitations of the positive research and survey methods were overcome to some extent 
by following the ethnographic method of living with the community for a sufficient 
period of time and „writing about the world from the standpoint of participant 
observation‟ (Burawoy, 1998: 6).  
Participant observation and interviews were the main techniques that helped in collecting 
the major part of the data. Once in the field, I recorded all information that related to the 
watershed development project and its governance. In the case of IGWDP, I lived in the 
area very close to the office of the implementing NGO in Ahmednagar. From this place, I 
made daily visits to nearby project villages and finally settled down in a village called 
Kelwandi in the same district. Most of the staff from the NGO lived in the same locality 
and were a constant source of information and company. This was helpful in many ways 
as it allowed access to the NGO library and an observation of its day to day activities.  
In participant observation the observer breaks out of the shelter and joins the participants 
in their everyday lives. This can lead to a different picture of social research. Problems 
that are otherwise repressed or bracketed now become central. The researcher always 
interacts and changes the researched by his presence in their time and space.  
Slowly as I grew to be a part of the community, certain roles were implicitly expected 
from me. Once the villagers in Kimsar knew that I was a researcher studying the 
watershed project, I had the unsaid assignment of clarifying and sharing information from 
the government and their officials with the village people. At the same time, the local 
MLA expected me to give a true picture of the reality in the village and asked me to show 
her the photos and other documents related to the IWDP Hills-II, specifically those 
related to the drinking water supply scheme. I was intervening and participating in the 
village life, as far as water supply was concerned. I was in a way expected to bring to the 
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notice of „honest officers‟ about the rampant practice of corruption in the project, as 
villagers kept repeating.  
The point is, far from distantiating myself from the object of study, I was intervening in 
the watershed community and their lives when it came to the water issues. The field notes 
were thus not only an account of how the projects were managed and run in the villages 
but also about my reflective engagement with it.   
The three considerations outlined above can be usefully summarized in the form as 
shown in the table:  
 
Table 12. Models of Methodological Research 
 
4.5.1 Selection of the Cases:  
In this section, I present a brief argument to say that the selected cases would provide 
good opportunity /situation to investigate the mechanisms of depoliticization under the 
sub-categories as operationalized in the last chapter.  
My study of governance strategy in watershed development projects is an approach to the 
subject of research in such a way that in order to get a better understanding of what is 
good/bad governance begins by asking how these divisions (good/bad governance) are 
operated in the two cases in an environment of simultaneous existence of multiple 
discourses. 
To maximize the number of possible actors and hence discursive regimes in a project, I 
selected two cases that were funded by donor agencies and were implemented both by 
state and by non-state organizations. A selection of the second case was with a view to 
compare the practices in project management between the government and NGOs. 
Both projects undertake watershed development within the community governance 
framework, form consensually nominated working committees for project management 
and address the women's development by forming micro-credit societies.  
Scientific Model Research Method  Techniques of Empirical 
Investigation 
Positive model Survey research Interviews, surveys 
Reflexive model Extended case method Participant observation 
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Both projects are funded by international donor agencies. As elaborated in the second 
chapter, IGWDP is funded by BMZ (via KfW and GTZ) while the Hills II project is 
supported by the World Bank. IGWDP was implemented by the NGO called WOTR and 
the Watershed Management Directorate, a nodal agency set up by the Government of 
India, funded by the European Economic Commission (EEC) in 1982, undertook Hills II. 
This selection of cases further helped to maximize the number of actors and discursive 
practices for a comprehensive view of Watershed governance in India.  
4.5.2 Sampling  
Extended case study does not take an entire community or culture as its object of study 
but relies on smaller social activities for analysis.  
My study was conducted on the basis of one project and data from five villages in case of 
IGWDP in Ahmednagar and a detailed study of a single project village in Garhwal in the 
second case. Yet it was a constant concern for me to ensure a representative sample. This 
was attempted to be achieved by selecting and visitng many more villages in the same 
watershed (in both cases) that provided the complementing evidence and opportunities 
for cross checking the data from the thickly studied villages. The effort was more on 
maintaining a sociologically representative sample even if at times the statistical 
represetativeness suffered (Hamel, 1993).  
Sociological representativeness relies more on seeing the sample village or community as 
a microcosm of the greater culture, the intent being to expand and generalize theories on 
the basis of the case study (ibid: 489). Thus sociological representativeness is determined 
more by the rigour of the study in question and in the quality of theory generated, than it 
is by the strict statistical representativeness of the sample. So whilst a small village 
sample may be of dubious statistical representativeness, if the ethnographer is sufficiently 
reflexive and uses theory to inform their work, it may well be capable of extension to the 
wider community (Wall, 2006).  
4.5.2.1 IGWDP – Maharashtra 
In 1990, a project proposal was submitted to the BMZ (Bacher, et. al. 1990) requesting a 
loan to start watershed development projects in Maharashtra with an explicit choice for 
NGOs as governance agencies. This later became formalized as the IGWDP in 1992 and 
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continued until December 2009. The project created its first institution in the form of an 
NGO called Watershed Organization Trust (WOTR) that was entrusted with the 
responsibility of 'capacity building' of the villagers to form local level ' civil society/ 
community based organizations' for project planning and implementation. Such capacity 
building NGOs are referred to as „mother NGO‟ in the Indian watershed development 
jargon. 'Capacity Building' translates into the project areas in the form of new institutions 
created out of the village society as explained in the second chapter. To study the 
Watershed development project (implemented by the NGOs) and their discursive 
practices, WOTR provides a good case due to its long term involvement in the project 
area (around 20 years) and its well-documented project details. My preliminary 
acquaintance with this area and availability of data from the donor country (here 
Germany) were other reasons that helped and guided the selection of this project in 
Ahmednagar. 
Once the project to be studied was selected, the specific villages to be chosen remained 
undecided until the field work actually began.  
4.5.2.2 IWDP Hills-II, Uttarakhand 
The Hills-II project is supported by the World Bank, one of the most important financial 
institutions for development in the southern countries. The policies and documents that 
the World Bank produces act as the largest source of development data referred to, 
anywhere in the world. It is not surprising therefore, that the projects of World Bank have 
been a source of constant observation and criticism.  
Ferguson‟s analysis of World Bank-CIDA funded development project in Lesotho has 
immensely influenced the analysis of state power and development interventions, 
particularly from the perspective of depoliticization. Such financial institutions have been 
accused of an 'invention of the economy as a domain independent of politics, morality 
and culture‟ (Escobar 1999). Storey( 2004) observes the way in which the World Bank 
discursively constructs debate, how it determines what policies are acceptable, how it 
seeks to present development as a neutral technical exercise, particularly in relation to 
economic development and by doing so it creates 'choice-less democracies'. 
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No study on depoliticization could claim completion unless the World Bank's perspective 
is taken into account, or so it appeared to me when I reviewed the literature available on 
depoliticization. This led me to tentatively select a World Bank funded watershed project, 
preferably in an area where the Bank has been involved for a considerable period of time 
to reveal the patterns ( if there exist any) of governance from the perspective of 
depoliticization. 
The project Hills II is located in the Garhwal district of Uttarakhand in north India. The 
World Bank has been engaged in this region since 1983, signifying an extended period of 
stay in the area, enough to give rise to the 'micro-politics' (Sardan, 2005) of development 
projects. 
This project presents a different situation compared to the IGWDP, Maharashtra in the 
form of implementing agency also. A quasi-governmental nodal agency played the role of 
'mother NGO' here. It was complementary to the first case in explicating the discursive 
practices in NGOs as different from those in the government organizations, the 
dominance of technocratic governance in the two situations, inclusively of the 
marginalized into the watershed governance in two cases, and the state society as well as 
the State- NGO-Society interactions.  
 
4.6 Working in the Field- Trust Building and ‘Extending out’ 
Case I:  
In the first phase of my study of IGWDP Maharashtra, I interviewed the representatives 
of the donor agencies in the Germany. Later, I had the opportunity to accompany them on 
an exposure program to the field villages in India. After the exposure program when the 
participants from the donor country returned back, I stayed in those villages in an effort 
to triangulate my data from other sources of information. In the project villages, I met the 
important functionaries of the program and lived there in an effort to gain familiarity with 
the day-to-day living of the people when not observed by outside groups. The strategy of 
participant observation is to reduce the strangeness of one‟s presence in the space and 
time of the village  
A reflexive participant observation requires that we build a relationship of trust with the 
community by empathizing with their cause and understanding their situation as they see 
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it. With an „extended approach‟ of study, the reworking of theoretical explanations for the 
observed reality guided me in finding my way through the complex reality of watershed 
governance and politics that surrounds it. Besides empathy, the other technique for trust 
building that I follwed could be referred to as „risky sharing‟. This technique has its roots 
in clinical social work where the interviewer not only extracts information from the 
respondent but also shares his/her personal concerns. The researcher goes the furthest in 
„nativity‟ when he/she is able to share his/ her own location in space and time and its 
relation to their space and time. The honesty of the relationship between these two spaces 
determines the trust that local people display in the research team. In my case study, I 
took the risk of telling the truth (and not what people would like to hear) as I stayed for 
longer periods of time and slowly drilled into the community that my interest was for the 
villagers though any direct action in terms of financial help for the pending work or new 
project was beyond my capacity. In personal interviews, „risky sharing‟ helped to 
establish a rapport in the limited period of conversation.  
I did not try to go „native‟ in the sense that I perceived myself as a donor agent when 
participating in an exposure program organized especially for the donor groups, but 
remained in a cohesive relationship with both the donors and the Indian villagers. I was in 
a way representing both depending on the relative arrangement of the situation.  
Case II:  
Unlike the case study of IGWDP where I studied the „top down‟ view on watershed 
development policy and practices, I applied the „bottom up‟ view in the case of Garhwal. 
This means that I directly settled in the project village and began my data collection with 
the villagers‟ perspective on the watershed project. Following the ethnographic method 
and reflexive participant observation, I located the important activities, issues, people and 
institutions around the watershed development program.  
As this area of Garhwal is surrounded by the Rajaji national park, the movement into and 
out of the village is not possible after sunset. This is because the roads are poor, 
unmetalled and wild elephants are a constant threat due to the surrounding park area. This 
provides the village with relative isolation in some respects.  
Once we reached the village, there was an initial euphoria about the project when 
everyone wanted us to record their opinion. It slowly faded as we completely became a 
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part of the everyday vision of the village community. As the strangeness dissolved into 
mutual cognition, the important issues, people and institutions in the watershed program 
began to surface. I was in no hurry to extract the information from the villagers but 
focused on understanding the socio-political condition of the village and power dynamics 
around the watershed issues, till the villagers trusted me enough and were curios to share 
their opinion. From the many issues that came to light, the drinking water supply system 
and approach roads appeared to be a high priority and cause of much concern. In my 
position as an activist researcher, I explored the possibilities of bringing the water supply 
in a functional condition by extending out from the village into the governmental quarters 
of WMD and political institutions of the village panchayat and the local MLA. A certain 
degree of activism was necessary to build trust among the villagers as it showed them that 
my concern was not only to use this water system as a guinea pig for my research but a 
genuine concern about village water supply. A non-activist mode in this type of a setting 
is limiting by its own nature as it cannot experience the real problems that makes the 
water supply system dysfunctional.  
A thick case study of the water supply scheme in Kimsar village served as the basis of 
analyzing the governance mechanisms that surround watershed development projects in 
Uttarakhand. I positioned myself on the side of the villagers in this case, and debated the 
revival of the pumping scheme from their perspective when faced with the government 
and implementing agencies, at the same time remained in a reflexive relationship with the 
opinion and perspectives from both parties as well as my own.  
Participatory observation gave way at times to participant activism where I used the 
resources at my disposal towards a revival of the water system in the village.  
4.7 Data collection and analysis  
In the first stage of this study, a prelimnary review of the literature in this area was done 
to understand the existing theories in the light of the project processes. My aim was to 
develop an analytical framework whose categories could be used to explain the empirical 
data on issues, actors and institutions of watershed development projects in India.  
Two main types of data were collected:  
1) Policy papers and documents on the implementation of watershed projects from 
the implementing agenices;  
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2) Participant observations and field notes, interviews, ideas and local opinions;  
 
Data Collection 
I was mainly collecting qualitative data through semi-structured guided interviews as my 
main aim was to analyze the processes of governance and the actors‟ perspectives on 
them. Nevertheless, wherever possible quantitative data was also used to verify and 
enrich the qualitative data. In the case of quantitative data, the research depended partly 
on already existing data and partly collected in the field in interviews with households 
and families. Semi structured guided interviews with the expert groups, field staff and 
households were gathered over a period of one year divided between the two cases.  
Expert interviews are based on the presumption that not the interviewed person is the 
object of analysis but his or her organizational context. The statements of the experts are 
considered in relation to their position in the interviewed organization. This helps in 
generating the research object specific assertions (Meuser and Nagel, 1991: 466). This 
type of interview is especially suited for collecting factual data and to gain information 
about the specific perceptions of different types of actors involved in watershed 
development. Expert interviews were conducted with the government officials, 
international experts, NGO representatives, individual experts and development agencies.  
 
Household interviews:  
To address the main research question, household interviews were found useful in getting 
the „bottom up‟ perspective on watershed development programs. It was also useful in 
serving as a control sample to validate the data collected from the expert interviews and 
other documentary sources.  
During the research period, it was my intention to talk to as many people as possible 
during my stay in the villages to get an impression of the living conditions and world 
view of the people. Though every such talk did not materialize into specific data, it 
certainly helped a great deal in enriching the study by providing a wider base to the 
socio-political observations in the specific watershed programs.   
A normal interview proceeded in the follwong order of questions:  
1) Introductory questions to start the conversation, uncontroversial and general issues; 
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2) Guiding questions that appear as substantial for the research question; 
3) Additional questions that the specific position of the interviewed brings into 
discussion.  
Data collected from the interviews and reflexive participant observation was organized 
and filtered for its relevant contents. Main issues and concerns of each interview were 
summarized to locate the important findings. The next step involved filtering the 
information gathered within the analytical categories of governance issues, people and 
institutions. Each analytical category was assigned further codes and memos based on the 
preexisitng theories. The process of coding and comparison of the two cases was 
facilitated by the research software called Atlas.ti-5.  
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5 PREFERENCE SHAPING FOR DEPOLITICIZED 
WATERSHED GOVERNANCE 
 
The objective of this chapter is to analyze the shaping process of donor‟s preferences in 
the governance of Indo-German Watershed Development Project (IGWDP) in India. 
Based on a discursive analysis of the „Exposure and Dialogue Program‟ (EDP- as 
elaborated in the second Chapter) this chapter demonstrates the preference shaping of, 
and by, the EDP-delegation towards a depoliticization of watershed governance.  
The chapter begins by analyzing the preference shaping of the EDP- delegation before the 
exposure program in Germany and then in India (section-7.1). The next section explores 
the „display‟ of preferences by the EDP-delegation after their field visits in the project 
villages (section- 7.2) in a reflection session with other delegates and the implementing 
NGO. The next section analyzes how the donors in turn shape the preferences of the 
Indian policymakers in their dialogue session in Poona (section 7.3). The next section 
analyzes the preferences of the Indian delegation in their dialogue with the donors 
(section 7.4) followed by a brief summary of the main findings (section 7.5).  
5.1 Preference-shaping of the donors 
This section describes the process of preference shaping of the EDP-delegation, first in 
Germany and then in India, before their actual exposure to the project villages in 
Maharashtra. This will be achieved through a close textual analysis of the minutes of the 
EDP. Here I will examine in detail the peculiar emphases, interpretations and preferences 
of the delegation that combine to produce a unique perspective on watershed governance, 
a perspective that indicates a political position that watershed governance is a technical 
intervention to address the ecological problem of land degradation that should lie beyond 
the scope of politics.  
5.1.1  Preference-shaping in the Pre-Exposure meeting, Berlin  
 
This section discusses how the development agencies in the donor country, like the 
international NGOs and bilateral donor agencies like the BMZ shape the preferences for 
the choice of governance institutions and development interventions in the developing 
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countries. It explicates the choices that are dominant in the donor country and the 
discourses that find articulation in their policy documents and speeches to show a 
preference for treating watershed development as a technical intervention and placing it 
beyond the capacity for state control in the realm of apolitical implementing agencies like 
the expert NGOs and non-elected, nominated community based organizations.  
The development policy of Germany is formulated by the BMZ and carried out with the 
help of its implementing agencies. The project under consideration (IGWDP) was 
sanctioned by the BMZ in 1992 and supported by the GTZ and KfW. The GTZ 
component is the initial „capacity building phase‟ (CBP) of 12 -18 months. The funds are 
routed through the NGO called WOTR and then other phases follow with the help of 
grants from KfW.  
Two months before the actual visit to India, a pre-EDP meeting was organized by the 
NGO called EDP e.V. in Berlin to explain this program to the potential participants. As 
its partner agency, BMZ was invited to introduce and provide details of the ongoing 
project, its origin, evolution and achievements in the last 17 years of association with the 
partner agencies in India.  
 
The presentation made by the BMZ official in the orientation meeting at Berlin
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reasoned that watershed management in India was a necessary development intervention 
because:  
“Über die Hälfte der Landfläche Indiens (175 Million. ha) ist von Landdegradierung 
betroffen…noch lebt die Mehrheit (c.a.70%) der indischen Bevölkerung auf dem Land 
von Subsistenzlandwirtschaft. Eine wichtige Strategie zur Armutsbekämpfung der 
Indischen Regierung ist die Entwicklung von Wassereinzugsgebieten…“ 
 
The above statement not only describes the problem of land degradation as a cause of 
vulnerability of the 70% of the Indian population but also presents watershed 
development as the befitting solution to this problem. The Indian government also 
recognized the importance of watershed development as an appropriate response to 
poverty alleviation. The above statement also introduced the state as an important actor in 
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 Hahn, A., (2006): Watershed Development im Kontext der bilateralen deutsch-indischen 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Ref-203, BMZ;  Presentation to the EDP delegation on 7th September 2006, 
Berlin.  In the rest of this chapter, this presentation is referred to as (Hahn, 2006).  
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watershed development, and that watershed development has been an important strategy 
of the Indian government to fight poverty. However, the state agencies had failed to 
implement the projects successfully till the 1990s due to their “rein technische 
ausgerichtete Ansätze, ohne Managementrolle der betroffenen Bevölkerung zu 
berücksichtigen” (Hahn, 2006).  
The performance of government implemented projects had not improved considerably 
even after the coming into being of a national guidelines for watershed development and 
formation of watershed development fund in 1999.  
There are two points to be noted in the above statements. First, that watershed 
development was the unanimous choice of the BMZ and Indian government for 
addressing the problems of rural poverty, and secondly that the state was unable to 
implement the watershed programs effectively due to their „purely technical approach‟ 
and lack of participation from the local population. The selection of a watershed by the 
BMZ and the Indian government as the smallest unit of development is a decision based 
on technical rationality. I argue here that the dominance of the technical discourse 
safeguards the selection of watershed as a rational unit of rural development and puts it 
beyond the realm of critical examination. Compared to the village, states, provinces, 
countries, the only 'natural' project area is a watershed and that is beyond reproach 
because it is technically the most appropriate unit for circumscribing a geographical area. 
It is 'natural' because it allows planners to focus on all the effects of a downhill run-off in 
a given area and to plan accordingly to control or contain it (Tideman, 1996: 7).  
Using the speech-act theory, to separate the multiple functions of an utterance from one 
another, the above statement not only discredited the government for its „purely 
technical‟ approach that did not take the affected people into account but also prepared 
the stage for the logical introduction of other non-governmental agencies that were 
comparatively more efficient. By outlining the weaknesses of the government, it 
indirectly introduced the strengths of the non-governmental agencies and the reasons why 
the donor agencies preferred to work with the NGOs and self-help organizations in the 
implementation of IGWDP:  
“Staatliche und nicht-staatliche Durchführungorganisationen sowie Selbsthilfegruppen 
setzen Kernelemente einer eigenverantwortlichen und nachhaltigen Bewirtschaftung von 
Wassereinzugsgebieten um“(Hahn, 2006).  
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The sustainable management of watershed development projects required that non-
governmental agencies and self-help groups must also participate in the implementation 
of the projects. Partnership with the NGOs, civil society and the private sector to carry 
out the development projects began in 1990s as an outcome of the „good governance‟ 
discourse that became popular in the international water management, including German 
development cooperation, and promised „sowohl soziale als auch ökologische 
Verbesserungen
101
.  
This is not surprising in the light of the fact that the German development cooperation in 
the water sector has gradually shifted to partnerships with private agencies that are 
considered more efficient compared to the governmental agencies: 
„Es zeigt sich, dass den Wasserverbrauchern, auch und gerade den Armen, (...) mit 
einem privaten Modell langfristig besser gedient ist als mit den überkommenen 
staatswirtschaftlichen Lösungen. Auch für die Umwelt ist ein professioneller privater 
Betreiber, der adäquat beaufsichtigt wird, günstiger als ein schlampiger Staatsbetrieb“. 
(BMZ 1999, 118)  
 
Hoering (2003: 4) argues that the preference for „public-private partnerships‟ in the 
German development policy can be located in the middle part of 1990s when the goal of 
increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of development aid acquired focus:  
“Das Konzept der Beteiligung privater Unternehmen an der deutschen 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (Private Sector Participation, PSP, oder auch „Öffentlich- 
Private-Partnerschaften“, Public-Private-Partnerships, PPP) datiert auf die Mitte der 
neunziger Jahre. Zum einen hoffte die Entwicklungspolitik damit, die Stagnation bei der 
öffentlicher Entwicklungshilfe zu kompensieren…Zum anderen setzt sie darauf, dass 
privatwirtschaftliches Engagement und Gewinnstreben größere Effizienz und 
Nachhaltigkeit entwicklungspolitischer Projekte bringen werden. Nachdem die 
ursprünglich bilaterale Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zwischen Regierungen 
beziehungsweise staatlichen Institutionen bereits um eine verstärkte Kooperation mit 
Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NRO) erweitert worden war, wird nun versucht, durch 
einen weiteren Partner die Wirksamkeit der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu 
verbessern“. 
 
Once the NGO was presented as an implementing agency that was more efficient than the 
government, the presentation by the BMZ official highlighted the important role played 
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 See Hoering (2003) for a detailed discussion on the changing orientation of development policy of 
Germany in the water sector.  
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by the implementing partner for IGWDP, an NGO called WOTR with its headquarters in 
Ahmednagar, Maharashtra. It described WOTR as a multifaceted NGO that acted as the 
„mother‟ NGO (an NGO that initiates the formation of community-based organizations in 
the project villages). WOTR also provided:  
“Unterstützung der Aktivitäten auf Dorfebene , Training, Beratung, Capacity Building 
für lokale NRO und CBO, Dorfentwicklung, Land- und Bodenmanagement, 
Pflanzenbaumaßnahmen, Mikrofinanzierung, Weidewirtschaft, ländliche 
Energieversorgung, Einkommensschaffende Maßnahmen, Gender Mainstreaming, 
Aufforstung, Human Resource Development, EDP, Ünterstützung von Schulen, 
Dorferneuerung…aber WOTR ist mehr....“  (Hahn, 2006)   
 
The above sentence describes WOTR as an agency that has undertaken all possible 
activities within and without the scope of watershed development. A distinct preference 
shaping for the NGO could be observed in the above statement that presented WOTR as 
an organization that cannot be adequately described inspite of the long list of activities 
that it supposedly undertakes. In the model provided by Hay (2007), this preference for 
delegation of function from the state to the non-state public sphere is designated as type-1 
depoliticization. 
From the presentation at the orientation meeting, an attempt to shape the preference of the 
participants can be noted in the three main areas:  
i) That watershed development was the expert agreed rational solution to poverty 
alleviation in degraded areas of India, agreed by the experts in both BMZ and 
India.  
ii) That government had failed to implement the projects properly due to their purely 
technical approach and lack of local participation. 
iii) NGOs like WOTR are better suited to implement watershed development projects 
that also perform a range of other activities that are too many to list, hence 
should be supported by the donor agencies.  
 
Once the experts have agreed that watershed development is in fact the right answer, now 
it is for the NGO to convince the village people of its usefulness and secure their 
participation. Similarly, the implementing agencies seek to convince the politicians in the 
donor countries about the undisputed acceptance of watershed development as the 
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solution to poverty-affected regions in the degraded ecosystems of India. This is an 
example of how dominant groups push or persuade policy makers of the merits of a more 
or less agreed (amongst the 'experts') position regarding certain interventions. From the 
perspective of depoliticization, I argue that watershed development and its universal 
acceptance as an answer to the problem of poverty alleviation simultaneously rules out 
any other approach or solution to the problem. The problems of connecting roads, 
education, structural imbalances of power or provision of markets and fair prices remain 
outside the sphere of discussion around watershed development. Depoliticization here 
works through the denial that there is even a political choice to be made, by insistence on 
the existence of one, single technically correct solution to the given problem of poverty in 
the form of watershed development.  
In the same light, shaping a preference for the reduction of the role of the state and 
routing of development through the agency of NGOs that have no democratic mandate is 
a strategy of depoliticizing watershed development that shifts the implementation and 
decision-making for the project to non-elected and consensually nominated committees.  
5.1.2 Preference-shaping in the pre-exposure meeting in Darewadi, India 
 
This section describes how the participants from the donor countries were exposed to the 
competing discourses of watershed governance from the state and non-state agencies on 
their arrival in the IGWDP village of Darewadi and later in Poona. First part of this 
section presents the discursive construction of WOTR of itself and the achievements of 
the IGWDP. This is followed by an expression of the donor‟s preferences in their 
meeting, first with the implementing NGO and then with the Indian governmental 
delegation. The next part describes the governmental discourse on watershed 
development that the EDP delegation encounters. This section shows that while the 
discursive construction of WOTR of itself as a „success story‟ is an important part of its 
presentation to the donors, the government agencies also express their preference to work 
with non-governmental agencies outside the state. It is also shown how the governmental 
agencies express their helplessness in the light of wider issues of international prices of 
agricultural products as having an impact on watershed development in Ahmednagar 
villages. This is an example of type-3 depoliticization in Hay‟s model, where the 
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watershed development is resigned to the realm of fate and dictates of international 
circumstances, taken away from the governmental and public sphere.  
The presentation of WOTR as multifaceted and successful agency by the BMZ (…aber 
WOTR ist mehr...) in Berlin was reiterated in Darewadi by the officials from WOTR. 
Father Hermann Bacher who founded the IGWDP in 1988-89 welcomed the EDP 
delegation. He outlined the problem of water scarcity and soil erosion in Ahmednagar 
district since he came to this place in 1966. In his view, IGWDP was a success story 
because it addressed this problem of water scarcity and brought people together:  
“We have a success story only when we have a problem. Unless there is a problem, there 
is no struggle and cooperation or any innovations. The IGWDP was an answer to the soil 
erosion and water scarcity in the drought prone areas of rural Ahmednagar, now extended 
to two other states for its exemplary execution through people‟s involvement and 
participation in all phases of project execution.”102  
 
He emphasized the point that watershed development was an effective solution to the 
problem of water scarcity and that IGWDP was a „success story‟ because it addressed this 
problem with people‟s participation „in all phases of project execution‟. The point here is 
not to go into a debate about how this success is measured and by whom, or the meaning 
of „people‟s participation‟ but to point out the discursive construction of WOTR as a 
successful agency in developing watersheds with people‟s involvement, and watershed 
development as the right solution for water scarcity and soil erosion in drought prone 
areas. Using the speech-act theory, to separate the multiple functions of an utterance from 
one another, the above statement foreclosed the debate on the other possible remedies to 
this situation in favor of watershed development implemented by the NGOs that could 
generate „people‟s involvement‟.   
Father Bacher explained why he selected watershed development and the transformation 
that was made possible with the example of Darewadi village:    
“When I was here before the year 1995, for half a year I was going all over the places 
with my jeep up there on the pathar (plateau) seeing where I find the worst watershed 
possible, absolute desert! But it should have at least 500 to 1000 hectares of land area. So 
after half a year traveling on the pathar of the whole of Maharashtra, I looked down upon 
this watershed- beautiful! Perfect desert!! No water, not a tree, not even a grass. I said- 
                                                 
102
 Field Notes, 28-10-2006: Speech by Father Bacher from WOTR to the EDP delegation in Darewadi, 
Ahmednagar.  
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This is the place (Darewadi) where we can do something. Darewadi was an awful 
business; for 5 months of the year, the village did not have even drinking water. They had 
to leave the village and go for sugarcane cutting, go for brick-kiln work….anything!! But 
there was nobody here. And they were sheep-holders. For half a year they were not even 
here, with their sheep and goats and whatever they have, moving to the east coast of India 
and then came back again.”103 
 
Darewadi village agreed to join the watershed development project in 1996 and today this 
village has been able to restore its environment. This village also houses the residential 
training center of WOTR where courses in watershed management are conducted all the 
year round, attended by national and international participants. Darewadi village is a 
good example of a heavily supervised watershed that acts as the showcase village for 
IGWDP and shapes the preference of the visitors to consider all other villages under this 
project to have an equally transformative effect on the physical environment of the area. 
An example of the preference shaped based on Darewadi village was later expressed in 
the dialogue session with the Indian decision makers by the MdB, Bernward Müller (see 
section 5.4.1).     
After the meeting with Father Bacher, the EDP delegation was given a tour to the 
Darewadi Training Center (DTC). The Center also had photographs of the Darewadi 
watershed before, during, and after the watershed program. The photos taken before the 
project showed a dry area, photos taken during the project period showed a perceptible 
green patch with plantations while the photo taken after the project shows a denser patch 
of trees with a pond developing in the valley of the watershed. This was followed by a 
tour to the actual watershed site in Darewadi village to observe it in its present condition. 
With this visit, WOTR was able to convince the donor agencies that it was successful in 
regenerating the physical environment in Darewadi, and hence of every village under 
IGWDP.  
While NGOs like WOTR focus primarily on watershed development to address water 
scarcity and irrigation in the rainfed areas, the government departments remain convinced 
of their „hydraulic mission‟ that construction of large, small and medium dams on the 
seven rivers (Pravara, Adhula, Mula, Dhora, Bhima, Sina, Mahalungi) of the district 
could be a possible solution. The retired secretary of the water resources department, 
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 Interview with Fr. Bacher in a documentary film made by WOTR called „The Silent Revolution‟, WOTR 
(n.d.)Ahmednagar.  
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government of Maharashtra, Suresh Sirke noted in his speech in a public ceremony in 
Ahmednagar
104
 that:  
 
“It is baseless to blame the large dams like Koyna in Ahmednagar for the problem of 
silting or heavy investment. In fact, they are cheaper. Without large dams like 
Bhandardhara and Mula, with a storage capacity of 11 and 26 TMC respectively, the 
progress of Ahmednagar district cannot be imagined. Now the government must think of 
medium sized dams also that have a command area of 2000- 10,000 hectares. Nilwande 
dam with a height of 74 meters, which is still under construction in the district, would be 
able to store 8.5 TMC of water and irrigate 64500 hectares area in 5 blocks of the 
district”.  
 
 The point here is not to delve into the question whether watershed development has 
transformed the local landscape or dam-based water provision is the solution for 
Ahmednagar district, but to show that there exist different discourses that approach the 
problem of water scarcity in the district in different ways. Interactional sociolinguistics 
argues that the social context of an utterance also determines to a large extent what is 
said. Both discourses become comprehensible and even necessary when we consider the 
context of interaction, target audience and the institutional conditions in which WOTR or 
the governmental department defines its preference. The difference between the two 
types of discourse is, as Ferguson notes, due to two different sets of rules of formation for 
discourse, or two different problematics, and not due to any necessary difference in 
intellectual quality or individual abilities of the speaker (Ferguson, 1990: 28). In this 
light, it is not surprising that the discourse on watershed development preferred by the 
NGO- WOTR maintains its own distinctive qualities (in being „participatory‟ or having a 
„capacity building phase‟), its closure because it has its own institutional, financial and 
ideological constraints
105
 that structure the formation of participatory watershed 
development as its main discourse. Burawoy (2005) argues that the production and 
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 Jal Pujan  (Water worshipping) of seven rivers in the district organized by The Institution of Engineers 
(India) Ahmednagar local centre in association with Sinchayan Sahyog (irrigation support department) and 
other government organizations to celebrate the World Water Day on 22
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 March, 2009 at Sahakar 
Sabhagruha, Ahmednagar. Available at (http://www.worldwaterday.org/page/2495) 
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 The institutional constrains result from its lack of public mandate for the NGO that necessitate „people‟s 
participation‟ as the only source of its legitimacy to work in the villages. Financial constraints derive from 
the fact that the donor policies are willing to support only such efforts that provide development through 
„self-help‟ and popular participation, and ideological constraints prevent this NGO from responding only to 
the work of Jesuit missions but also involve common people in its developmental work. In this way, 
participatory discourse becomes comprehensible in the light of above mentioned constraints.  
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dissemination of knowledge also depends on the target audience. For WOTR the target 
audience is the EDP delegation/ donors while for the state agencies, it is the masses, who 
display more faith in dams and „big schemes‟ than in watershed development106.   
The EDP delegation was informed about the „success story‟ of WOTR in the brochures 
and CDs presented to each participant on his/her arrival. It also contained a concise report 
(henceforth village report) on the village to be visited during the exposure phase, the 
details of the work done, project governance institutions and „tangible impacts of the 
initative‟.  
I was placed in the Pimpri village with an official from the BMZ. The village report given 
to us described the project in Pimpri as a „WOTR-Wasundhara Watershed Development 
Project‟ started in 2005. It was an ongoing project that had completed its „capacity 
building phase‟ (CBP) and was would soon be taken up for the „full implementation 
phase‟ (FIP). The village report identified the project governance institution and its 
composition at the local level:  
“At the village level, the project is managed by the Village Development Committee 
(VDC), called Kaloba VDC, with the help of WOTR‟s team working in Akole cluster. 
The members of the VDC are consensually nominated by the village gramsabha.  The 
VDC has 9 members including 4 women. They regularly meet to plan, implement and 
monitor the project”.  
 
Kaloba VDC that managed the watershed project in Pimpri was „consensually nominated‟ 
by the gramsabha. As noted earlier, the Common Guidelines issued by the government in 
1994 recommends the formation of community based organizations for the governance of 
watershed projects. This body, called the village watershed committee (VWC) has no 
legal status in the panchayati raj institutions due to its „consensually nominated‟ status. 
This amounts to saying that the VWC is not a registered body (in most cases) and thus 
cannot receive funds from a public sector institution like NABARD. Lobo (2003) from 
WOTR contends that:  
“VWC could be seen as a „formal body‟ according to the Bombay Village Panchayat Act 
of 1958. This Act holds that „when the majority of adult voting members in a village held 
a gram sabha in accordance with the provisions of the Act and passed a resolution, that 
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 For an example of the common people‟s preference for „big schemes‟ compared to watershed 
development, see the interview of an „educated‟ villager in Kimsar under Hills-II project, conducted on 24th 
February 2007 in Kimsar. Available at (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OVeaS5fZS6U) 
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resolution was a formal act, having a legal basis, was binding and enforceable. Thus the 
VWC that is established in such a manner becomes a formal body, eligible to receive 
funds and be held accountable for them” (Lobo, 2003: 6).  
 
This Act provided the legal basis for the banks to open accounts in the name of VWC and 
NABARD disbursed funds directly to these accounts. 
The literature distributed to the delegation did not mention why the elected gram 
panchayats were not chosen as the implementing agency or the logic of creating an 
institution parallel to the democratically elected body for carrying out developmental 
work in the village that is constitutionally a responsibility of the gram panchayat
107
. Of 
course, one explanation for changes in institutions comes from considering the incentives 
of those in power (Olson, 2000). WOTR chose to work with „consensually nominated 
committees‟ compared to the gram panchayat as noted in the village report.  
The village report also presented the “8 most tangible impacts from the watershed 
development project in Pimpri” as follows:  
1. “The agricultural wage rate has increased from Rs. 30 to Rs. 60. 
2. The drinking water problem has been solved through the activities undertaken by 
the women‟s group. Now the village has enough drinking water. 
3. Significant increase in the ground water table, seasonal irrigation and cropped 
area as well as cropping pattern developed. 
4. Significant change in the socio-economic status and the standard of living.  
5. Women‟s involvement in developmental activities and decision making. 
6. Increased social unity and confidence in the people regarding implementation of 
various developmental activities in their village.  
7. Increased agricultural production in the field since the farmers can cultivate 
vegetables like chilly, potato, beans and pulses. 
8. Farmers take repeat crops soon after Kharif crops (June to September).”  
 
After reading the village report and before our exposure to the Pimpri village, my opinion 
was formed that if a watershed project can achieve these „8 most tangible impacts‟ among 
other intangible impacts in one year of CBP, it is a „success story‟. 
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 The Constitution (Seventy-Third Amendment) Act, 1992-93. See 11
th
 Schedule (Article 243G). 
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Women‟s empowerment through micro-credit groups 
As mentioned in the Berlin meeting, the NGO works not only in the field of watershed 
development but also for women‟s empowerment, among other things. This was further 
emphasized in the presentation made by Marcella D‟Souza, the present head of WOTR, 
in the introductory meeting with the EDP delegation, on the micro-credit societies in the 
project villages through the „sister concern‟ of WOTR called „Sampada Trust‟.  
“Sampada Trust establishes micro-credit societies for women‟s empowerment and works 
as the „company partner agency‟ to network with private banks and provides 
opportunities to the women to get loans. Sampada Trust has calculated the cost of 
watershed treatment, women‟s development and the cost of drinking water per hamlet. 
That comes to around 45€ / person / year…This new NGO is also looking for the scope 
of renewable energy in the project villages”.108 
 
In her presentation, D‟Souza linked women‟s empowerment in the project villages with 
the establishment of SHGs implying that if a village woman was part of the micro-credit 
group formed during the project period, she could be considered as empowered.  
It is important to note that the EDP delegation on a visit to watershed projects under 
IGWDP implemented by WOTR was presented with the information about a new NGO 
formed out of WOTR that works in the area of establishing micro-credit groups in the 
village.  
It not only points to the project based lifeline of the NGOs in developing countries that 
are under a constant pressure to reinvent themselves as per the changing requirements and 
policy focus in the donor countries but also shows that the NGO was aware of its 
audience and accordingly presented its facts to inform the donors about its new ventures 
for possible funding in the future. WOTR that was formed out of the earlier NGO called 
„Social Center‟ after BMZ sanctioned the IGWDP in 1992 was indicating its closure 
when the project was to expire in 2008 with the coming into being of a new NGO carved 
out of WOTR called „Sampada Trust‟. The demand for funding of this new NGO was 
partially revealed in its presentation of the cost of „women‟s development, watershed 
treatment and drinking water‟ as 45 € while the rest of the presentation calculated other 
values in Indian Rupees. It would probably appear to be a small amount to pay for one 
year of water supply, watershed treatment, and „women‟s development‟. It would be 
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interesting to find out about the actual activities that the new NGO plans to undertake in 
its three-way developmental plan to be accomplished in 45€ per person and how these 
costs are calculated. From the micro-credit based approach of this NGO, it can be safely 
concluded that to „develop a woman‟ would eventually boil down to inducting her in one 
of the village self-help groups as it is practiced in the IGWDP.   
This partial approach to women‟s issues projects a woman‟s developmental need as 
confined to the possibility of her eligibility to secure a credit at lesser interest rate. From 
the perspective of depoliticization, reducing women‟s development issue to the formation 
of micro-credit societies in the village also denies them any other avenues of 
development except that they become micro-entrepreneurs with the help of a small loan, 
without addressing any other infrastructural or socio-cultural issues that directly have a 
bearing on the sustainability of a their enterprise.  
The point is not to argue whether the formation of the SHG is an effective tool to address 
the development of women in a village but to show that by reducing their options of 
empowerment to the provision of a loan at a lower interest (that was anyway available at 
a higher interest rate from the moneylenders, with SHG formation the most fundamental 
change then, has been the lowering of the interest rate by 3-5% on small loans), the NGO 
simultaneously limits the critical discussion on the options to bring about empowerment 
of the women to a logistic problem of how to form more SHGs. It shapes the donor‟s 
preference that a woman in the SHG is empowered and hence developed. Little more 
needs to be done in a village for women‟s empowerment except forming a SHG.  
The inherent contradiction and narrow definition of women‟s empowerment by self-help 
group formation was revealed clearly in the visited village. In the Pimpri village, Sunita 
has been a part of the SHG since the project started in 2005. Sunita has finished her high 
school and wanted to be a nurse but in the present discourse that clubs women‟s 
empowerment with the SHG formation, there is no space to address the idea that a village 
woman may have other needs and aspirations than becoming a village-level entrepreneur 
all the time. The job of the NGO however, is to convince the village women that SHG is 
their only recourse to development and to convince the donors of its developmental 
impact. Part of the strategy of depoliticization is to reduce the people to the status of 
consumers that need to be convinced about the usefulness of a particular intervention 
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rather than generate a critical public sphere to discuss the nature of intervention required. 
In this sense, convincing the donors of the usefulness of SHGs in women‟s empowerment 
also limits the donors from debating the nature of intervention that could be required to 
accommodate the concerns of women like Sunita in the face of available options.  
The formation of this new NGO called „Sampada Trust‟ that shifts from watershed 
development work into micro-finance (headed by the program coordinator of IGWDP, 
Crispin Lobo) shows how development projects are informed by a strong economic 
orientation centered on economic relations that are presented as true indicators of 
empowerment. This orientation derives from the understanding of economics as neutral, 
empirically verifiable, and technically correct discipline, a science of neutral and 
politically incontestable concepts. As Abrahamsen argues, this technical presentation of 
development is a part of generalized depoliticization of development, 'the myth of 
development as an apolitical, technical process':  
“'To a significant extent, this claim to neutrality relies on the commonplace perception of 
economics as a value-free science. Economics is perceived as a "realist", empirical 
discipline that can provide a neutral and true representation of the world. In this way 
correct economic policy becomes a question of objective facts and data, devoid of 
political and cultural preferences” (Abrahamsen, 2000: 12).  
 
This neutrality is then extended also to conceptualizations of the NGO as an agent of 
development that is apolitical, and acts ideally in the interest of all in order to provide the 
best economic support to the villagers with the help of micro-credit. With this 
presentation, the NGO shaped the preference of the donors to understand women‟s 
empowerment by counting the number of SHGs formed in the village. This later became 
an important, if not the only, scale for the donors to measure the success of the program.  
 
In brief, this section has shown how the implementing agencies like BMZ and WOTR 
shaped donor‟s preferences before their actual exposure to the project villages:   
 For treating watershed development as a rational, scientific intervention to fight 
land degradation vis-à-vis poverty. 
 That the project villages were developed and poverty significantly reduced. 
 That government was inefficient in implementing watershed projects compared to 
the NGO. 
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 That WOTR was a „success story‟ in implementing watershed development 
projects.  
 That inclusion of women in VDCs and self-help groups is a characteristic 
component of IGWDP that has empowered the village women.  
 WOTR is an apolitical organization that works with nominated (hence apolitical) 
committees at the village level since watershed development does not involve 
making any political choices but is merely the implementation of technically 
correct policies.  
 The local level politics and contestations in the project are passed over in silence 
although their existence was noted by the EDP delegation after their exposure to 
the project villages, as shown in the next section.   
5.2  Donors expressing their preference 
After a three-day exposure and living in the project villages, the EDP delegation had an 
informed opinion, if not a fully shaped preference about the different aspects of 
watershed development, and interventions for poverty alleviation through self-help.  
This section describes the categories under which the EDP delegation organized their 
experiences in the exposure villages, the issues that came up for discussion, preferred 
mode of governing the watersheds and the shortcomings of the project. It shows that the 
donor‟s preferences for the watershed governance institutions and practices were subject 
to politicization and depoliticization depending upon the target audience, institutional 
affiliation and the social context of interaction. 
In this section, I argue that the efforts made by the implementing agencies in convincing 
the EDP delegation that watershed development was the only rational solution to 
eradicate rural poverty, fell short of its goal as explicated in the observations made by the 
EDP members after their exposure to the project villages. The EDP delegation felt that it 
was necessary but not a sufficient solution towards alleviating rural poverty. The 
women‟s empowerment in the project village was limited.  
Giesela Kallenbach, Member of the European Parliament (MdEP) observed in the 
reflection phase in Darewadi Training Center with the NGO staff and EDP delegation 
that:  
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“Watershed alone cannot be the answer to poverty alleviation. The issue of fair-trade and 
GMO are important matters that must be considered in relation to poverty alleviation 
besides the soil and water conservation issues raised by watershed development”. 109 
 
In a similar observation Bärbel Höhn, MdB and a member of the EDP delegation added 
in this meeting that:  
“Watershed development was just one component of the development process and other 
issues like livelihood opportunities for the landless, education, health, social security, 
women‟s development must also be addressed to fight poverty that looms large in the 
village-“ 
 
Matthias Adler from the KfW remarked that watershed development needs to be 
supplemented by addressing other issues also to bring about any effective change in the 
lives of the rural people:  
“Besides water, there is an equally important issue of connecting roads. The village that I 
went to was Shirasgaon and the roads leading to it are in a very bad shape which makes it 
difficult to access the village. I would put roads on an equally high priority.” 110 
 
Bernd Wirtzfeld from BMZ, placed with me in the Pimpri village observed that:  
 
The management of water in a village cannot stop at just harvesting it but the waste water 
management is also a very important part of it. If the waste water is allowed to flow free 
into the ground, it will soon contaminate the water table and thus make it unfit for usage. 
The management of waste water also requires that there is a proper sanitation system in 
place but none of the villagers have it. The practice of open air defecation is rampant in 
the village and thus a serious cleanliness problem. We must also look into the issue of 
sanitation as a part of the project policy.” 
 
It is visible in the above statements that the efforts by the implementing agency, WOTR 
to present watershed development as a sufficient and most appropriate intervention for 
rural development was contested by the EDP delegation in the light of other important 
issues that the project did not address. These issues, as shown above, ranged from fair-
trade, basic infrastructure, GMOs to sanitation that was observed to be relevant in 
connection with watershed development.  
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While WOTR seeks to depoliticize watershed development by presenting it as the only 
solution to rural poverty, the delegation politicized the issue by extending out to the 
structural causes of poverty and other equally basic problems. It extended the questioning 
space from „what should be done to implement watershed projects successfully‟ to „how 
far does watershed development address the problems of poverty and empowerment‟.  
The EDP delegation pointed out that “significant change in the socio-economic status and 
standard of living” as reported in the village report by the implementing NGO was not 
observed in the exposure villages. Adler from KfW recalled his experience in the project 
village of Shirasgaon with the Bhangare family, his host in the village during the 
exposure tour:  
“Die Familie Bhangare gilt al eine ärmeren Familien im Dorf: sie besitzt kein Land und 
muß daher bei Landbesitzern als Tagelöhner arbeiten, was  jedoch für den 
Lebensunterhalt nicht ausreicht. Das Familieneinkommen beträgt umgerechnet rd. 360 € 
im Jahr und somit gerade einmal einen € pro Tag.“ 
 
Bärbel Höhn, MdB, placed in the same village with Adler seconded his observations in 
the following words:  
“The villagers had no livelihood opportunities except working as daily wage laborers or 
depending on small assets like cattle. In my host family, a goat went missing on the day 
we were in the village and it was a great loss for the family. They had such fragile social 
security system that it could be disturbed by the loss of a goat.” 
 
She described her host family in an interview with Die Zeit (16
th
 November, 2006) and 
their standard of living in the following words:  
“Meine hatte vier Kinder, sie lebt von Tagelöhnerjobs und zwei kleinen Stückchen 
Pachtland, und dabei muß Sie die Hälfte ihrer Reisernte auch noch dem Landbesitzer 
abgeben. Die Familie Bhangare schläft in zwei winzigen Zimmern zu fünft auf dem 
Boden“.  
 
Kallenbach, MdEP noted the annual income of her host family Shelke:  
“Das Jahreseinkommen unserer Gastfamilie Shelke liegt bei etwa 200 €; davon sind 
neben den Eltern der ‚Kronprinz Machindra (13) und die Mädels Savita (17), Sarika (15) 
zu versorgen.“ 
 
Marcus Stewen from KfW, placed in the Wankute village with Kallenbach, observed the 
assets and the standard of living of his host family:  
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“Die vier Ziegen, der einzige größere Vermögensbesitz der Familie, findet nun 
Unterschlupf zwischen den noch stehen geblieben Mauern….Neben einigen 
Küchengeräten wie Pfannen und Töpfen dominieren die Dosen mit Gewürzen und 
Kräutern. Silberne Schalen auf denen das Essen serviert wird, gibt es nur fünf...“ 
 
Many such observations by the members of EDP delegation pointed to the fact that 
villages covered by IGWDP and the beneficiaries of the project were not enjoying a high 
standard of living nor was the poverty any lesser.  
The participants of the delegation observed the efforts made towards the empowerment of 
women and the actual impact that the SHGs were making in the life of the village 
women.  
Bärbel Kofler, MdB, was palced with Martin Rempis from the organization „Brot für die 
Welt‟ in the project village of Mhaswandi. Kofler observed the micro-credit societies and 
noted that:  
“SHGs were a very lively group that provides some space to the women for discussion 
but it had no impact on changing the traditional role structure for women in the village 
nor was it sustainable.” 
 
Stewen from KfW, observed that in his village Wankute that “the watershed committee 
was male dominated with very few old women as members.”  
Höhn observed in the meeting that the “institution of SHG was providing some relief in 
the emergency situations but it is limited in its impact and sustainability.” 
Adler from KfW, located in the same village as Höhn, expressed his evaluation of the 
SHGs based on his interview of the host family:  
“Die monatlichen Treffen und die Aussicht auf Mikrokredite verschaffen Linderung in der 
Not und beruhigen sehr im Alltag, aus der Armut führen diese Mikrokredite aber nicht”, 
erklärt Thakabai.  
 
Adler adds further that it made little sense to provide poor women with small loans and 
presume that they would become small entrepreneurs when all other socio-cultural and 
infrastructural problems are left unattended:  
“Derartige Investitionen würden auch wenig Sinn machen: es existiert in Sirasgaon kein 
Markt auf dem selbst produzierte Waren verkauft werden könnten, und der Verkauf dieser 
Waren auf weiter entfernten Märkten unten im Tal wird erheblich erschwert durch die 
schlechte Straße zu diesem entlegenen Dorf, die nicht mehr als ein Eselpfad ist.” 
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As already noted, Adler placed the connecting roads to the village on an equal priority 
with water.  
In his visit report submitted to EDP e.V. it was noticed by Wodarg (MdB) that the project 
had, at its best brought the villagers only a step away from the traps of poverty:  
“In zahlreichen Gesprächen sowohl mit dem örtlichen VDC (Village Development 
Committee), dem „Gemeinderat“, der Frauenversammlung und der Dorf versammlung 
wurde ausdrücklich die Bedeutung des Watershedprojekts für den Zussamenhalt des 
Dorfes betont und große Hoffnungen für die eigene Zukunft zum Ausdruck gebracht. 
Deutlich wurde aber auch, dass die meisten Menschen trotz der geschilderten positiven 
Entwicklung nur einen Schritt von einem erneuten Absturz in die Armutsverhältnisse vor 
Beginn des Projekts entfernt sind“.111  
 
It can be observed from the above statements that the EDP delegation began to differ 
from the official discourse of IGWDP as a „success story‟. The delegation had argued that 
measures more than watershed projects were required, that poverty was stagnant and 
visible among the project beneficiaries also, and the limited support provided by the 
SHGs in times of emergency.  
The point here is not so much to explicate the incompatibility between the discursive 
construction of IGWDP by WOTR and the observations made by the EDP delegation but 
to show the source of this incompatibility. In its discursive construction of the project, 
WOTR leaves out a very important aspect owing to its apolitical representation of itself, 
namely the political contestations and village level negotiations in forming the VDC and 
functioning of the project while the EDP delegation was exposed to the project work in 
all its reality of the everyday workings and automatically political negotiations emerged 
as an important variable in their observations. In their discussion with the NGO and other 
members of the delegation in Darewadi after the exposure to the project villages, the EDP 
delegation placed local politics and power relations in the project in its list of importance 
and began to differ discursively from the NGO.   
This abstinence from addressing the political aspects of the project also performs the 
action of its denial in the project activities. Bärbel Höhn, Member of the German 
Parliament (MdB) asked:  
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“Why were the projects not routed through the already existing elected village 
panchayats? Why were the people not given more power to manage their watersheds?” 
 
This question was seeking a clarification for the observation made that people had limited 
power to take decisions about their watersheds. Lobo from WOTR admitted that in the 
larger political considerations, decentralization of power in actual practice was not in the 
interest of dominant group:  
“Decision-making was still not decentralized in practice because of the political nature of 
the context, where it is in the interest of the government to keep people powerless and 
dependent on them, even underdeveloped. This gives them the space which they could 
promise to fulfill and continue to be in power based on those promises.” 112 
 
From his statement, it is clear that the practice of decentralization was different from the 
claims made in policy documents because of political reasons. Lobo argues that the 
government derives its power by keeping the village people powerless; hence, deep down 
the hidden political consensus of the government is to keep people underdeveloped. 
Speech-act theory allows us to observe that Lobo also conveyed that WOTR being a non-
governmental agency did not participate in this brand of politics, as it has no agenda of 
political power or reelection. To mean, WOTR was sincerely interested in empowering 
the villagers while the government was interested in keeping them „dependent, or even 
underdeveloped‟.  
His statement also emphasizes the need for an apolitical approach to watershed 
development that could only be implemented efficiently by such organizations that have 
no political goals, namely the NGOs. Here „political nature‟ refers to the electoral politics 
where reelection by the people is the only route to political power. In this sense, the NGO 
remains insulated from political considerations. This is an important argument from the 
NGO sector to claim its neutrality towards politics. It provides the NGO with the image 
of being a neutral, technical agency that is genuinely interested in the empowerment of 
village people (as their underdevelopment serves no purpose of the NGO, unlike the 
government where underdevelopment is preferred). However, it also raises the questions 
about their legitimacy to participate in a process as political as water distribution and 
management.  
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The absence of political ambitions in an NGO by design is an important component of the 
discursive construction of itself as an „apolitical‟ agency involved in an objective oriented 
technical intervention for soil and water conservation. But in practice, the NGO remains 
highly political in its negotiations with the village community, community based 
organizations, policy makers and donor agencies as observed by the EDP delegation. 
Local political configurations were visible in the unequal distribution of benefits, 
composition of the VDC, and inclusivity of women in the program.  
Adler from KfW observed after his village exposure that:  
“Recognition of the problems of different interest groups was important for an efficient 
planning of the watershed development projects…in my village landless and marginal 
landholders do not benefit much from the watershed development project and remain 
confined to wage labor.” 
 
Stewen from KfW also observed the skewed distribution of benefits: 
“In Wankute village, there were rich farmers who certainly benefitted differently 
compared to the poor farmers. The village watershed committee was also male dominated 
with very few old women as members.” 
 
His observation highlights that landowning farmers (rich) benefit more and on a long-
term basis (differently) while the marginal landholders and landless are confined to short 
term benefits (wage labor). As WOTR argues, „4 seats out of 9 are reserved for women in 
a VDC‟ conveys the message that women are included in the program and have a say in 
the decision making for watershed development. In his observation, Stewen highlights the 
male dominated composition of the VDC where women members have a weak presence.  
„Old women (were nominated) as members‟ also points to the fact that the project does 
not address the basic structural problem that places restrictions on the village women in 
the first place and bypasses the fundamental issue in favor of getting the required 
percentage of women in the VDC by nominating old women, who are already 
„empowered‟ (at least known and mostly respected due to their old age). It overcomes the 
problem of addressing the oppression faced by common village women that restricts their 
freedom of realizing their full potential by showing that women do have that freedom 
with the help of old women presented as members of the VDC.  
Blühdorn (2007) refers to „simulative democracy‟ as a characteristic of depoliticization. 
In theory, gender mainstreaming is achieved if there are „4 women out of 9 in a VDC‟ 
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while in practice the issue of representation is also vital. Do these „very few old women‟ 
adequately represent the village women? Whom and what do they represent? Do they act 
only as a tool for the NGO to claim gender mainstreaming, or do they represent village 
women as empowered citizens? A simulation of women‟s empowerment113 is achieved in 
discourse by the NGO that does not re-present the plight of common women in the 
villages but serves other political purposes of checking the right boxes in funding 
proposals.   
Martin Rempis from the organization „Brot für die Welt‟ was placed with Bärbel Kofler 
(MdB) in the village called Mhaswandi under the IGWDP. This village also had a 
government supported watershed development project under the „Employment Guarantee 
Scheme‟ of the government. He observed that:  
“The government-run program that was meant to provide employment to the poor and 
landless villagers was hijacked by the rich farmers. The BPL population did not benefit as 
much as the rich farmers did. In IGWDP, the VDC operated within a democratic 
framework but the caste issue was also very much present. The low caste people were 
unable to resist and overcome domination by the higher castes…the capacity building 
phase should focus more on the poorer sections that have low self-help capacity.”114 
 
Rempis observed the inequality of resource distribution and that the projects were 
missing their target population due to the dominance of powerful interests. His last 
statement indicates that the capacity building of the poorer sections is more important 
than the present degree of focus on it. It is also implicit in his statement that the capacity 
building was an exercise with the richer sections (landowners) probably because the 
required physical constructions would take place on lands owned by them. Therefore, 
accommodating their interests was important for the project to procced in the village. 
Socio-cultural factors like the caste status were also playing a role in determining the 
governance of watershed development in the village.  
In the exposure to the villages, the EDP delegation observed the presence of local 
contestations and politics shaping the watershed development programs. The nature of 
politics between the implementing NGO and the gram panchayat or the VDC, right from 
the selection process of the village to the completion of the project, was passed over in 
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silence. The acceptance of villages for the program by WOTR and the acceptance of 
WOTR by the villagers for the capacity building are also influenced by its Jesuit 
background as one of the EDP delegates, Vonalt from KfW, noticed:  
“I was shocked and it saddens me to hear a rumor that WOTR may be discriminated 
because they have a Christian background and I hope this is not true.”115 
  
The point here is not to prove or disprove if WOTR is discriminated, but to argue that an 
absence of certain issues (like local politics, socio-political context) in the presentation of 
watershed development projects of WOTR helps it in its construction of itself as an 
apolitical, non-religious organization formed with the objective of providing technical 
guidance to the community based organizations in implementing watershed development 
projects.   
An important tactic of depoliticization is to exclude certain issues of public importance 
from entering the critical public sphere and building consensus for the few selected issues 
that are allowed in the public sphere and „publicized‟ by the interested agency116. Its 
absence in the discourse simulates the absence of such issues in reality also. In this sense, 
the EDP delegation repoliticized the issues of distribution and contestations in watershed 
development project by bringing them out in the public sphere for discussion. In this light 
the work of WOTR in poverty eradication or gender mainstreaming was observed to be 
of limited impact. The quality of impact, so far shadowed by the absolute number and 
quantity (of for e.g. villages covered or the total number of SHGs formed), showed 
conflicting evidence in support of the „success story‟. The point here is not to argue if the 
project was successful but to show that with the inclusion of different interest groups 
(locating and opening the „black box‟) in their observation, the EDP delegation 
established that watershed development was in fact a politically contested site and as far 
as political empowerment of the people was concerned, the project had not made any 
significant change. This is precisely because the project addresses a different problem as 
shown in its choice of indicators to measure success that derive from a consumerist 
approach to development.  
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The only way for NGO to validate its „success story‟ discourse now was to make the 
delegation believe that its choice of indicators were representative of success because the 
structural causes of underdevelopment of the people has political reasons that are outside 
the purview of WOTR‟s work as it is an apolitical organization. Thus it cannot be held 
accountable for the problem that it does not address in the first place.  
5.3 Depoliticization by the NGO 
This section explores how the preferences of the donors were „re-depoliticized‟ by the 
NGO before their dialogue with the Indian delegation.  
If the villages were underdeveloped, as Lobo argued earlier, it is because the government 
and politicians want it to be so in the bigger political picture. This is one of the causes of 
discrepancy in what is said in policy and what actually happens in its implementation.  
 “There is a huge gap between policy and its implementation in India. The Indian officers 
are used to the charges of corruption, which has been a popular subject in the local press, 
but it puts the officers on defensive and thus no fruitful outcome of the dialogue is 
possible. We cannot afford to just locate the gaps between policy and implementation but 
should think in terms of solutions and suggestions for filling these gaps.”117 
 
After clarifying that the Indian delegation may get defensive if the gaps are located in the 
program, Lobo suggested that the delegation „should think in terms of solutions and 
suggestions for filling these gaps‟ in their dialogue with the Indian policy makers. A more 
„fruitful outcome of the dialogue‟ would be to tell the government that „they are on the 
right track if they push watershed development in the way shown by WOTR‟: 
“Indian politicians needed to know from a disinterested party about their watersheds. 
They need to know that they are on the right track if they push watershed development in 
the way shown by WOTR. The government projects do not focus on capacity building 
while WOTR spends one year, sometimes more in the capacity building. Human input in 
the government projects is low which gives rise to many problems including delayed 
money transfer, resulting in a delay of everything else.”118 
 
 Lobo further clarified the weaknesses of the government projects, which do not focus on 
capacity building, have low human input and delayed money transfer. Using speech-act 
theory of discourse analysis, this statement also outlines the comparative strengths that 
WOTR has as an NGO. It also articulated the arguments that EDP delegation could use in 
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their dialogue with the Indian policy makers in support of a NGO driven watershed 
development program. This could be a substantial outcome of the dialogue session. In 
Burawoy‟s terminology (see Chapter-3), the critical reflexive knowledge of the EDP 
delegation, in the opinion of WOTR, should now acquire instrumental-policy 
characteristics in terms of solutions and suggestions. Since WOTR was a part of the 
solution, the EDP could be helpful in helping people if they spoke on behalf of the 
„solution‟ in the way shown by WOTR.  
Höhn (MdB) argued that the EDP delegation had:  
“The possibility to tell the government whether a project was good or not…We can share 
our impression of the project with them, what was good about the work that WOTR has 
done in these villages and convince the politicians to back up such organizations”.119  
   
Other members of the EDP were not convinced that the dialogue session with the Indian 
delegation should focus largely on presenting „what was good about the work that WOTR 
has done‟ but should also focus on actual experiences in the village and weaknesses of 
the program. Vonalt from KfW suggested:  
“We could discuss tomorrow in the following manner: first, we can present what we have 
found out in the villages and then we can seek information about what is being done from 
the Indian side. We can then discuss the policy issues that could address this situation on 
behalf of the villagers. We should not only communicate that WOTR has done good work 
but also look for further opportunities for cooperation between the two countries, for e.g. 
in the field of bio-diesel and alternative energy options.”120 
 
Ackermann (MdB) agreed to the first part of Vonalt‟s proposition and added that:  
“There is no possibility for the villagers to communicate with Indian decision makers. 
Thus we can use EDP as an opportunity to communicate the issues that we have 
experienced to the Indian politicians.”121 
 
We find here that some members agreed that the dialogue could be used to „convince the 
politicians to back up such organizations‟ like WOTR, other participants argued that 
wider developmental cooperation between the two countries should also be discussed. 
The final preferences of the EDP delegation could only be revealed in their two day 
dialogue with the Indian delegation in Poona.  
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5.4 Shaping the preference of the state 
In this section, I will show that the presentations by the EDP delegation and their sharing 
of experiences in the dialogue with the Indian delegation in Poona underwent perceptible 
changes when compared to the sharing of experiences in the reflection phase with the 
NGO and other participants in Darewadi. Certainly the audience was thickened, joined 
now also by the state representatives including the Minister of Agriculture of 
Maharashtra among other participants. With a change in the listener group, the partially 
informal environment of the training center in Darewadi had also changed into a formal 
bilateral seminar on watershed development in Poona. But the most defining feature of 
the changed discourse of the EDP delegation came not from the changed „to whom it was 
addressed‟ but from the changed „on whose behalf was the address made‟. In this section, 
I argue that the EDP delegation shifted from speaking „on behalf of the village people‟ to 
speaking „on behalf of the NGO‟. The actors from the donor agencies in a strategic 
alliance with the NGO seek to shape the preference of the Indian delegation towards 
supporting an NGO-led watershed development program that works with consensually 
nominated community based organizations at the grassroots level. This indicates a 
preference shaping for a depoliticized governance of watershed development programs 
that bypasses the elected institutions of governance at the local and national levels.   
5.4.1 Watershed dialogue in Poona, Day-1 
 
Dialogue phase in Poona started with the sharing of village experiences by the German 
parliamentarians. Bernward Müller (MdB) shared his experiences in the village 
Sarvachol: 
“I was in the village Savarchol in the Sangamner block and had a close interaction with 
the village families. Seeing the plantations in Darewadi, the economic benefits which the 
people reported and number of self-help groups in the village, I am convinced that the 
NGO has been successful in bringing many opportunities to the remotest of villages in 
Maharashtra. But there still remains the issue of sanitation which we should take up 
together. The women in the village are very interested and very active in this debate. It 
would also be an opportunity to look into the debate of waste water management. I would 
like to end by saying that „people in the villages are very active in this project and WOTR 
has given many opportunities and possibilities to them in the form of a watershed project. 
155 
 
It is important to activate people for their own development by building their capacity for 
self-help.”122 
 
In his opinion, the NGO was „successful in bringing many opportunities to the remotest 
of villages in Maharashtra‟. He ascribed this success to the plantations and visible change 
in Darewadi (not so visible in Sarvachol), economic benefits which the people „reported‟ 
(as it was not so visible to the participants in their exposure villages), and the „number‟ of 
self-help groups formed in the village. The idea here is not to argue if these indicators 
represent the success of a project but to observe that the NGO was presented to be 
„successful in bringing many opportunities‟. He summed up his experience in the village 
by saying that „people in the villages are very active in this project and WOTR has given 
many opportunities and possibilities to them in the form of a watershed project‟. He 
expressed his preference for WOTR as the implementing agency for watershed 
development, and capacity building of the people. He was also convincing the state 
representatives to support WOTR because it had restored the ecosystem in villages like 
Darewadi, economic gains were reported by the people in project villages and formed 
many SHGs for women‟s empowerment. People „are very active in this project‟ refers to 
the participatory nature of project implementation. WOTR should also be supported 
because it was successful in generating popular participation due to its unique focus on 
capacity building phase. The absence of capacity building phase in the government 
projects automatically rules them out in his preference for watershed implementing 
agencies.  
His presentation was followed by a presentation by Bärbel Höhn (MdB) who shared her 
experience in the IGWDP village with the Indian delegation:  
“The programme addressed not only the water related problems of the villagers but also 
brought about a significant change in the women‟s condition. The formation of SHG has 
made the women economically stable and they feel more empowered. WOTR started 
with watershed development but did a lot more. IGWDP benefits the people who have 
land. But the family that I was staying with was a landless family with five members. The 
wife had joined the SMS and was more confident. From many different points of 
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reference, this is found to be a successful programme. There are three main reasons why 
this programme is successful: 
1) Empowering women is an important aspect of the programme. The women are now 
more active and confident, which is achieved by the SHG. The empowerment is also 
evident in that the women could get credit and help the family with money also, which 
was not the case earlier. This helps in times of illness or education or marriage in the 
family. SHG provides the platform for the women to talk about the different issues. 
2) The programme is successful also because of its transparency policy. The project was 
carried out through the NGO, which gave the money to VWC and thus they have no 
hidden political agenda. This was actualized and reported in the gram sabha meetings. 
The distribution of finances is displayed in a public place of the village so that there is 
less corruption. It makes a good example in the light of realization that in India, as 
everywhere else in the world, corruption is a major obstacle to development. Also, there 
is a lack of structures to make the programme successful. 
3) The project was not trusted to the gram panchayat as it may have political strings 
attached to the programme and it would not become a fully villager‟s program.” 123 
 
Höhn outlined the reasons that made the IGWDP a successful program. She ascribed this 
success to the empowering effect achieved by the SHGs, transparency in village level 
financial transactions, and formation of a new apolitical institution, called the VDC that 
was more efficient and less corrupt.  
Using the speech-act analysis, we observe that her statement also performs the function 
of outlining the strengths that WOTR had compared to the government institutions. It was 
an example of a transparent agency in the face of corrupt practices all around it, 
especially in the government supported projects. The point here is not to verify if the 
„formation of SHG has made the women economically stable and they feel more 
empowered‟ or if the watershed development became „a fully villager‟s program‟ because 
it was not entrusted to the political gram panchayat but was implemented by apolitical 
VDC, or if there is less corruption and more transparency in the workings of IGWDP. 
Our main concern is to note that her presentation expresses hers, and shapes the 
delegation‟s preference towards an apolitical treatment of watershed development. She 
argues that watershed development project could be successfully implemented only by 
those agencies that have „no hidden political agenda‟, i.e. the NGOs. At the village level, 
the project works efficiently through a consensually nominated committee compared to 
the gram panchayat that has „political strings attached to it‟.  
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The choice of VDC over the democratically elected gram panchayat is a mechanism to 
shift watershed development from the arena of elected political sphere of the panchayat 
to the non-elected political sphere of the consensually nominated VDC. Choice of the 
NGO as an implementing agency compared to the government reflects the same 
phenomenon of providing an apolitical face to watershed development, to be carried out 
by the apolitical NGOs and VDCs. In Hay‟s model, this shifting of responsibility from 
the elected political sphere to non-elected public sphere is shown to be Type-1 
depoliticization.  
The village experiences were also shared by Bärbel Kofler (MdB) who observed that 
there was a “need to devise methods to capitalize on the social capital of the villagers” 
and Wolfgang Wodarg (MdB) who noted the “importance of leadership provided by Fr. 
Bacher in making this „miracle‟ possible”.  
From this section, we can observe that the German parliamentarians praised and provided 
support to the work done by WOTR and expressed their preference for an NGO-driven 
governance of watershed projects. They also expressed their reservations in working with 
the elected gram panchayat that is presented as too political for watershed development 
and prone to corruption. The choice of non-elected and delegated implementing agencies 
is one of the many tactics of depoliticization. Here a preference is shaped for the choice 
of such agencies for watershed development.  
It is surprising to note that the issues brought up during the reflection phase of the EDP, 
like the insufficiency of watershed programs, persistent poverty among all groups, 
unequal distribution of benefits from the watershed program or the limited impact of the 
SHGs found no mention in the dialogue with the Indian delegation. In contrast, the 
delegation focused on proving how the project was „exemplary in its execution‟, how it 
made the women „economically stable and more confident‟, and how the implementation 
of the program was transparent and how the NGO was more efficient as it was without 
any hidden political agenda. Distribution of benefits or the dominant role played by the 
rich farmers or the token presence of women in the SHGs as enunciated in the reflection 
in the Darewadi Training Center was also passed over in silence.  
Interactional sociolinguistics provides a tool to partially account for this discrepancy in 
the two different representations of the same village experience. In this method, the 
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context of interchange (e.g. the physical setting, social roles, relationship of speech to 
other activities, and physical stance of the interactants) is important. It also considers how 
interpretations of the speaker‟s intent are related to the way the utterance is contextually 
embedded (e.g. activities it follows, to whom it is directed). From this perspective, I 
argue that the EDP delegation in the reflection phase at Darewadi was addressing a 
different audience than in the dialogue phase at Poona and this change of target audience 
changed the linguistic quality of their interaction. In Darewadi, discussions acquired a 
critical tone in which the participants narrated not only the good points about the work 
that WOTR had done but also reflected on the weaknesses of the project as enumerated in 
the earlier section.  
Burawoy argues that one way to classify the sociological research knowledge is by 
posing the targeted readership as the driving force that shapes this knowledge (see 
section- 4.2). In this method, the nature of the audience determines the nature of the 
utterance. Or in other words, what is said is also determined by „to whom‟ it is addressed. 
Discourse analysis recognizes the importance of other aspects of an utterance also, like 
„on whose behalf‟ is the speaker talking, or „who is the mouthpiece and for whom‟.  
In the reflection phase in Darewadi, the EDP delegation can be seen as speaking on 
„behalf of the people‟ that brought out the difference in policy and its actual realization in 
the field. They „politicized‟ the gaps that exist in the watershed development program by 
enumerating in the public sphere the insufficient nature of the intervention that had 
neither impacted poverty nor the women‟s empowerment in any significant way.  
In the dialogue phase with the Indian policy makers, the EDP delegation was observed to 
be speaking „on behalf of the NGO‟ that highlighted how the program was successful and 
sought to convince the state to support NGOs in watershed development projects. In this 
session, the EDP members depoliticized the watershed development program by 
suggesting that apolitical bodies likes NGOs should undertake watershed development. 
The experience sharing was reduced to an exercise that presented the strengths and 
advantages of working with non-governmental partners. None of the gaps in the program 
were mentioned by the partners, possibly to avoid making the Indian delegation 
defensive, but also to present an impeccable performance of the NGO in poverty 
alleviation and gender mainstreaming.  
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Deriving from the definition of depoliticization as removal of practical issues
124
 from the 
critical public sphere and building consensus for a pre-determined, expert agreed, rational 
solution, we can observe that a selective presentation of the project‟s achievements not 
only removed the gaps from the discussion in an open public sphere but also sought to 
build consensus for an NGO driven watershed development without deliberating upon 
their accountability, or legitimacy, or the long term impact of forming nominated 
organizations parallel to the constitutionally elected governance bodies,  on the 
democratic structure of the village.   
5.4.2 Preferences of the Indian delegation: Poona Day- 2 
 
This section presents data from the presentations made by the Indian policy makers in the 
field of watershed development to show that the government is gradually moving to 
„facilitating‟ role in rural development projects while the NGOs and delegated agencies 
are acquiring prominence. This preference of the state and donor agencies that watershed 
development should lay beyond the direct responsibility of the state, into the realm of 
non-elected public sphere is a strategy of depoliticization (Type-1) in Hay‟s framework.  
 
The theme of presentation for the Indian delegation (that included State government 
representatives, NGOs, quasi-state rural development banks, donor agencies, Minister of 
Agriculture among others) was announced as:  
„Engaging Complementarities: Effective public sector, private sector and civil society 
engagement for large scale poverty reduction‟ 
Within this broad theme, 5 case studies were presented by different actors:  
1. The experience of IGWDP and WOTR in Maharashtra by the managing director 
of National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) 
2. The experience of WOTR as the „mother NGO‟ in the government supported 
Drought Prone Areas Program (DPAP) by the director of soil conservation 
department, Government of Maharashtra (GoM).  
3. Empowering and catalyzing community based organizations and local bodies for 
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poverty reduction, development and change by the director of the NGO called 
WOTR.  
4. The experience of Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission in Madhya Pradesh by the 
joint development commissioner of Watershed Mission, Government of Madhya 
Pradesh.  
5. Institutional-partnership with WOTR by the team leader of Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC).  
 
Besides these 5 case studies, the joint delegation was also addressed by the Minister of 
Agriculture in Maharashtra, Balasaheb Thorat, narrating his experiences with watershed 
development in Ahmednagar in general, and specifically with respect to IGWDP.  
 
The theme of the discussion points to the need for inclusion of private sector and NGOs 
also in the field of poverty reduction, here, by focusing on watershed development. This 
in itself is a good thing as much more can be achieved if the public sector is supported by 
other agencies also. However, the discussion that followed shows that rather than a 
partnership approach between the government and the NGO, the discussion sought to 
establish NGOs as more efficient and a possible alternative to the state in implementing 
watershed development projects. It also shows the shifting of debates in the public sphere 
towards reduction of the state‟s role in watershed development and how it could be 
achieved effectively.  
An important aspect of discourse analysis is to observe „who is allowed to speak‟ and 
„who is the mouthpiece for whom‟. Of the five cases „allowed to speak‟ in the joint 
delegation meeting, four referred directly to the IGWDP and work done by WOTR. The 
case study of Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission highlighted how the government had 
successfully moved to a „facilitating role‟ while the NGOs functioning as Project 
Implementing Agency (PIA) had carried out the State-wide watershed development 
program. Effectively, the presentations made by the Indian delegation expressed a visible 
preference for depoliticization of watershed governance by reducing the role of the state 
to „facilitation‟ while the PIAs acquired prominence in project implementation.  
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Presentation by NABARD 
This presentation showed a preference for involving non-governmental agencies in 
watershed development by citing the partnership between WOTR and NABARD as an 
example that has created many „gardens of eden‟.  
NABARD is a partner agency in IGWDP. It is a semi-governmental rural development 
bank established by an Act of the Parliament called the „NABARD Act of 1981‟. This act 
was meant to:  
“Establish a development bank to be known as National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development for providing and regulating credit and other facilities for the promotion 
and development of agriculture, small scale industries, cottage and village industries, 
handicrafts and other rural crafts and other allied economic activities in rural areas with a 
view to promoting integrated rural development” (NABARD Act of 1981, GoI).  
 
As it is clear from the above citation that NABARD is a bank for „providing and 
regulating credit and other facilities‟ that does not specifically deal with grants. However 
the mode of funding for IGWDP was in the form of grants and hence needed to be 
disbursed as grant. This was overcome by invoking the provisions of NABARD Act
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that allows NABARD to accept and disburse grants for action research and innovative 
pilot projects.  
NABARD supports the full implementation phase of the Indo-German watershed 
development project. Its main function here is to disburse the grants made available by 
KfW directly to the VDCs after the NGO certifies that the capacity building of the village 
is complete and a consensually nominated VDC has been formed in the village.  
Director of NABARD agreed that watershed development was an appropriate 
intervention in the rainfed areas because:  
“80% of the land holdings in the rainfed areas do not produce any market surplus. These 
areas are basically poor regions with a cycle of poverty leading to low income. Watershed 
development projects are the way out.” 
 
He also emphasized the „success story‟ of their partnership with WOTR in the following 
words:  
“The villages covered under IGWDP have changed from water scarce deserts to the 
„gardens of Eden‟. So far 86 gardens of Eden have been created and 54 more are nearing 
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the completion phase. The program has helped to reduce migration, increase in the 
number of wells, better opportunities for village women to get together and shatter some 
of the boundaries that the traditional social system imposes.”  
 
The point here is not to verify if the NABARD-WOTR partnership created the „gardens 
of Eden‟ but to note that he emphasized the advantages of „engaging complementarities‟. 
The technical partnership between the two agencies was successful, also because it 
remained insulated from the political influences of the government and village 
panchayats.  
He shaped the preference for „watersheds as the way out‟ of rural poverty, engagement of 
the NGOs as partners and that women of the village were empowered to „shatter some of 
the boundaries that the traditional system imposes‟. He advocated a strong preference and 
conviction that watershed development projects routed through the NGOs and delegated 
banks like NABARD have the capacity to bring about radical transformation.  
From the perspective of depoliticization, a preference for non-elected and upwardly 
accountable organizations like the donor supported NGOs remove the practical issues 
around water, at least partially, from the critical public sphere and places it in the 
responsibility of non-elected public bodies like the NGO or the VDC. While NABARD is 
a product of the politics of delegation at the level of national politics, it further advocates 
depoliticization and delegation in the governance of watershed development projects at 
the local level. 
 
Presentation by Soil Conservation department, Government of Maharashtra   
 
The director of soil conservation and watershed development in Maharashtra presented 
the case of DPAP projects and the government‟s experience in implementing watershed 
development projects with the help of „mother NGOs‟:  
“It was useful for the government to involve NGOs in building the capacity of the people 
before the government could start its construction work in the village. The projects have 
never been a smooth sail and the government faced many challenges in the last 20 years 
of its involvement in watershed development. Some problems that still remain to be 
addressed are: 1) how to make watershed development bankable? 2) It has been found 
that many villagers are involved in the program with very short-term individual gain 
motives. They lack the commitment that could turn this program into a people‟s 
movement, so that the motives become long-term common expectations. In short, the 
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challenge is to make watershed „everyone‟s business‟ (popular participation). 3) Also, 
irregular supply of funds is a major obstacle.”     
 
The director noted the important role that NGOs could play in preparing the ground 
before the government could begin „its construction work‟. Capacity building phase is 
seen here as an exclusive domain of the „mother NGO‟ that trains the villagers in 
management of their watersheds, forms SHGs, and most importantly, creates VDCs 
during this phase. The VDC later receives funds directly from NABARD and implements 
the project. The logic of bypassing the gram panchayat is implicit in the formation of 
VDC. To mean, if the projects are routed through the gram panchayat, there would be no 
requirement of forming a separate VDC. This would reduce the capacity building phase 
drastically vis-à-vis the role of the NGO, if not remove it completely, by saving on the 
time and efforts made to create a new and parallel institution for watershed development  
in the village.   
Mahalle acknowledged the presence of different interest groups that are „involved in the 
program with very short-term individual gain motives‟ pointing to the contested nature of 
watershed projects and the political negotiations in their governance. His recognition of 
the motives that people have in participating in the project drew the EDP delegation‟s 
attention towards the political nature of watershed governance. For the government, it 
was a problem to generate popular participation. The „challenge was to make watershed 
everyone‟s business‟ along with the irregular supply of funds.   
His last statement informed the EDP delegation that if his department was falling short of 
its expected performance in watershed development, it was also because there were 
limited funds and a lack of commitment among the people. From the perspective of 
(de)politicization, it can be observed that he stressed the need for politicization of 
watershed development in the sense of it becoming „everyone‟s business‟ was a serious 
challenge. The director‟s remarks are not precisely in support of depoliticization- 
institutional or otherwise, but he identifies a lack of genuine politicization of watershed 
development projects as one of the obstacles that prevents it from becoming everyone‟s 
business.   
His statement on irregular supply of funds indicates a direct demand from the donor 
agencies to support the government agencies also along with supporting the NGOs. To 
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the extent that governmental implementation of watershed projects can be seen as an 
indication of politicization, the director shaped the donor preference towards support for 
the government in changing people‟s attitude from short term individual goals to long 
term common expectations. With a long term approach to watershed development, it 
would be useful to address the problem that so far it wasn‟t everyone‟s business and what 
should be done to achieve this. It also points to the dominant group capture of watershed 
development projects. In this sense, the project is political but not politicized. Here 
„political‟ refers to its being subject to appropriation by different interest groups, while 
„politicized‟ refers to its widespread dissemination and critical evaluation in the village 
public sphere comprised by all villagers so that it becomes „everyone‟s business‟. In the 
absence of a genuine politicization, the project remains unsustainable as people with 
similar interests come together with a motive of „short term individual gain‟ during the 
project period and disperse once the project is over. Mahalle pointed out that lack of 
politicization was making the project unsustainable and subject to capture by dominant 
groups.  
 
Presentation by the director of WOTR 
 
In her presentation on empowering the community based organizations with the example 
of IGWDP, the director presented WOTR as an efficient implementing agency because it 
worked with the participation of local community (achieved by following a self-selection 
process and the so called „empowerment pedagogy‟), included women and the 
marginalized groups in decision making, empowered women by forming SHGs and was 
transparent.  
“Engaging civil society would require a „self-selection process‟ in which the people 
themselves would decide if they want the watershed program. It complies with the idea of 
a „bottom to top‟ approach and the possibility of withdrawal of the NGO if the „civil 
society actors‟ (here referred exclusively to the village community) do not recognize their 
responsibilities and duties. The other component to engage the „civil society actors‟ is the 
so-called „Empowerment Pedagogy‟, which serves the necessity of involvement of a 
target group in every stage of a watershed development. It means that the villagers 
participate at every step, regardless whether it is planning, implementing, maintenance or 
monitoring.” 
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This statement shows that WOTR ensures that people participate by allowing the village 
community to decide if they want the watershed program. She calls it the „bottom to top‟ 
approach because the demand for the project comes from below. The implementing NGO 
maintains a „possibility of withdrawal‟ and is however not bound to support the program 
if the villagers fail to adhere to the conditions of the project or „their responsibilities and 
duties‟. WOTR follows the so called „empowerment pedagogy‟ where people participate 
in every stage of watershed development. It presented WOTR as an agency that worked 
in „self-selected‟ villages126 by following a participatory approach at all stages of the 
program.   
The director further added that WOTR was actively involved in the inclusion of the 
marginalized groups and women in the watershed development program:  
“The second issue deals with the question of ensuring equity and mainstreaming of 
marginalized groups. The solution to this problem is twofold: 1) Deliberate institutional 
arrangements, which allow women or marginalized groups to be present on decision-
making bodies;  2) Promotion of women‟s self-help groups and the apex body SMS, 
which enables women to strengthen their position within the village community and 
develop new sources of income through micro-credits.” 
 
The statement above shows that the project ensured gender mainstreaming by nominating 
women in the VDC. Their presence in the decision making bodies was the evidence of 
their empowerment. The NGO also promoted SHGs that provided village women with 
new sources of income vis-à-vis economic empowerment.  
She noted the need for sustainability in watershed development projects and argued that 
transparency and accountability were important in this regard:  
“The third issue deals with the importance of sustainability in watershed institutions and 
benefits. Transparency, ownership and accountability are amongst them as well as the 
installation of a maintenance fund.  
But most important would be a solution to energy needs. Unless the problem of energy is 
solved, the risk of new deforestation and degradation still exists. Hence there was a need 
to look into the possibilities of renewable energy sources for the village people.” 
 
This statement also conveyed that WOTR was transparent and accountable and showed 
its future concerns to be in the field of renewable energy.  
                                                 
126
 Refer to the case of Darewadi where the VDC president noted that Fr. Bacher campiagned actively in 
this village for one year to make the villagers realize the importance of adopting watershed development. 
This was elaborated in the speech given by the minister of agriculture in Maharashtra during the interaction 
session with the EDP delegates in Poona as described in the next section.  
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It is not my concern to show if the claimed procedure of „empowerment pedagogy‟ or 
self-selection was actually observed by the EDP delegation in their exposure visit but to 
show that the director shaped the preference of the joint delegation for working with 
NGOs because they followed an „empowerment pedagogy‟, included marginalized 
groups and women, and were transparent and accountable. From the perspective of 
depoliticization, a reduced role of the state in watershed development, replaced by an 
active role of the NGO that is more transparent and efficient, also shifts the main issue 
from the governmental realm to the non-governmental realm, an example of type-1 
depoliticization.   
 
Presentation by the representative of Rajiv Gandhi Watershed Mission 
 
The case study of Rajiv Gandhi Mission emphasized the success achieved by the NGO 
driven watershed development in Madhya Pradesh. In his presentation, the joint 
commissioner of the watershed mission stated that:  
“One of the main characteristics of this „bottom to top‟ approach, lies within the 
facilitating role of the government, providing expertise and financial resources only to a 
limited extent, while the rural communities are responsible for the selection of activities, 
the creation and implementation of action plans, monitoring, the maintenance of assets 
and the budgeting related. The process can be accompanied by the program implementing 
agencies (PIA) from the phase of community mobilization and capacity building in the 
beginning until the end of a project. RGM cooperates with many NGOs that would 
function as PIAs to the villages. The program is currently one of the largest in India, 
covering more than 240 000 square kilometers, spanning 9540 villages in 6745 micro-
watersheds. The program has led to a significant increase in irrigated area, in food and 
fodder production, to a significant decrease in ground water consumption and an 
improvement of ground water level in approximately 60% of the villages. The SHGs 
constituted and the efforts regarding microfinance and saving by rural communities also 
indicates a considerable improvement.” 
 
In this program, the government has reclined to a facilitative role „providing expertise 
and financial resources only to a limited extent‟ replaced by „many NGOs that function as 
PIAs‟ from the beginning to the end of the project. In Hay‟s framework, this reclining of 
the state to a facilitating role replaced by the NGO is an example of type-1 
depoliticization. He observed that it was a successful experiment as evident from the 
„significant increase in   irrigated area, food and fodder production and an improvement 
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of ground water level‟. This project had also brought about a considerable improvement 
in women‟s condition with the help of micro-finance. This presentation shaped the 
preference for an NGO-driven watershed development program with a decreased role of 
the government to be a successful strategy.  
 
Presentation by the team leader of SDC 
 
Since last five years WOTR has been working in partnership with SDC that started in 
2001. The SDC representative expressed his dissatisfaction with the „project based 
partnerships‟ as it ran the risk of instrumentalizing the partner for a brief period of time 
along with the „problem of unnecessary administrative burdens‟ on the NGO. He favored 
the „institutional partnership‟ instead and outlined the advantages of the same with an 
example of WOTR-SDC collaboration.  
“The crux of institutional partnership lies in providing support to the NGO per se and not 
to a single project or activity. This provides the NGO with considerable amount of 
flexibility and timely funds that ensures the efficient implementation of watershed 
programs.”127  
 
In his presentation, the SDC official emphasized the need to support the idea of 
watershed development that WOTR was following even if sometimes specific projects 
may not be available. In an institutional partnership, the donors can support the NGO first 
before the projects. 
The discussion above shows how a preference is shaped among, and by the government 
agencies, donors and NGOs for a transfer of power to national and local NGOs, 
nominated bodies and delegated agencies. In this discourse, the gram panchayat is 
presented as „too political‟ and hence corrupt and inefficient compared to the apolitical 
NGOs and VDCs. Ribot (2005) analyzes how decentralization reforms in the developing 
countries, rather than empowering the representative elected local government have often 
transferred power to „a wide array of other local institutions, including private bodies, 
customary authorities and non-governmental organizations‟. The presentations discussed 
above show a distinct preference for transferring power to NGOs and bypassing the 
                                                 
127
 Dialogue between the EDP delegation and the Indian government representatives from the watershed 
development departments in YASHADA, Poona; 2-11-2006 
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elected local governments. This is a governance strategy that is leading to the 
depoliticization of watershed development projects. 
Address by the minister of agriculture  
 
In his address to the EDP delegation in Poona, the minister recognized the local level 
contestations and negotiations involved in a watershed development program. He argued 
that normal „everyday politics‟ based on narrow and divisive party affiliations keeps the 
village people divided among different political camps that makes it difficult to bring 
them together for a common cause like watershed development.   
“It was a big challenge for us to organize the people as they came together for the 
program and as soon as the elections came around, they went back to their different 
political camps.”128 
 
He cited the example of Darewadi village to show how the negotiations among, and 
between the local influential leaders and the implementing NGO often caused unrest in 
the village power structure:    
“It was a mega challenge to bring people together. For e.g. in Darewadi, there was a very 
influential person called Khande Rao who opposed it. After some time, Fr. Bacher was 
able to convince him and he became the President of the VWC but there were many 
people who opposed the election of Khande Rao for president. As watershed 
development program involves ban on free grazing and alcohol, people who opposed 
Khande Rao made his son drunk and paraded him in the village. Then the President Mr. 
Khande Rao thrashed his son in public for breaking one of the rules of watershed 
development and handed him over to the police. After this incident, the village got on 
track and started working for the program.”129  
 
It can be seen from his example that local politics played an important role in the process 
of forming VDCs, where the official posts were contested among the village elite. There 
is always a mistrust and opposition from the villagers towards such programs. Thus 
begins the phase of negotiating and convincing the village people to not only join the 
program but also provide voluntary labour during the project. This involves more than the 
involvement of local politicians and the project staff. In the case of Darewadi, as it was 
recalled by Khande Rao, the influential person who opposed it, the fears that villagers 
harbour and what does it take to convice them:  
                                                 
128
 Address to the EDP delegation and the Indian delegation on 3-11-2006 at YASHADA, Poona.  
129
 Ibid.  
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“In 1995, Father Bacher visited us constantly for around 12 months and discussed his 
idea of the watershed development with us. But we were not willing to join the program 
because we had many fears. The basic fear was that if we join the program they (IGWDP) 
may grab our land. Then we got an opportunity to attend a felicitation ceremony attended 
by about 5 lakh people in Ahmednagar, in which Father Bacher was honoured by our 
local leader Balasaheb Thorat. In his speech, Balasaheb Thorat shared his experience and 
tried to convince us that if the farmers wanted any kind of development for their villages, 
then there was no alternative to Watershed Development. We decided to join the project 
in the year 1996.”130    
  
It can be noticed in the above statement by Khande Rao that the village was not willing to 
join the project but after constant efforts by Father Bacher and intervention of the 
minister resulted in an agreement between the two parties, WOTR and Khande Rao, in 
which Khande Rao was made the president of VDC and IGWDP was started in 
Darewadi. The constant campaigning in the village for 12 months also indicates that the 
„self-selection‟ process as outlined by the executive director of WOTR was not followed 
as a rule. If it were so, there would be no watershed development project in Darewadi. 
But in this village, the project had to be undertaken and negotiated with the villagers, 
even though they did not select themselves probably because WOTR had plans to 
construct its residential training centre in this village that came up in the years following 
the watershed development project and began working as a full fledged training centre in 
April, 2002. This points to the fact that political negotiations do exist within the project‟s 
everyday working though WOTR claims to be an apolitical organization without any 
„hidden political agenda‟.  
 
The role of the minister in convicing the village to join the program is also important for 
other reasons, as explained by the minister in his speech:  
 
“In order to spread Watershed development in my area through Indo-German Program, I 
have collaborated with both NGOs and state departments, as a representative of the 
people and directly appealed to the people for a separation of WDP from politics. I asked 
the people not to see me as a politician but as another farmer However, the same villages 
elected me with full votes in the next election. So, even if it was apolitical in the 
beginning, it became political in its outcome.” 
 
                                                 
130
 Interview with Khande Rao Avhad in the documentary film made by WOTR in 2003 called A silent 
Revolution, WOTR, Ahmednagar.  
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A politics of depoliticization can be observed in the minister‟s direct appeal to the people 
„for a separation of watershed development from local politics‟. However, here he is 
referring to „politics‟ in the sense of divisive vote bank politics practiced in the elections, 
where political parties align themselves with different sections of population based on 
caste, religion, language or region, among other things. Politicization on the other hand, 
has been defined for the purpose of this thesis as recognition of contingency in social 
practices and relations and the power of collective political agency.  
  In this sense, a „separation of watershed development from politics‟ was needed to bring 
people together for a common cause with their power of collective political agency. So he 
advocated watershed development to adopt a different kind of politics that was welfare 
oriented and issue (watershed development) based. The rhetoric of depoliticization 
facilitated the implementation of the project as per the NGO‟s framework and added to 
the political support for the minister. The shaping of regional politics by watershed 
development was exemplified in the reelection of the minister. So, even if it was 
apolitical in its appeal, it became political in its outcome, only exemplifies how 
depoliticization is used as a governance strategy for political outcomes. 
The minister expressed his preference for watershed development as a good program and 
sought support from the donor agencies in making it into a people‟s movement.  
In his address, the minister observed that women have an important role in watershed 
development: 
“It was very clear that women have to play an important part in this as women are not 
only interested in the development of the family but are also less political.” 
 
5.5 Interrogating the state  
 
The woman member of the European Parliament, Giesela Kallenbach, objected to the last 
statement by the minister on ascribing a „less political‟ status to women. She responded 
that:  
“It would be inappropriate to say that women are not interested in politics as they are also 
equal voters and citizens and what they do in the SHGs is also quite political.” 
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There are two messages conveyed by her statement. First, that the EDP delegation does 
recognize the presence of politics in the SHGs, and second was a demand to treat women 
as equals in the discursive construction of women by the state.  
The minister explained that here mentioning them as „less political‟ was more of a 
statement about politics than about women. Politics has a negative connotation in the 
Indian public sphere, associated with duplicity and corruption, whereas women are seen 
as more interested in their family than in political power. The government does recognize 
them as equals and made policies to bring them into mainstream politics:  
“After Rajiv Gandhi, there has been a reservation made for the women in the government 
and panchayat. Even in the parliament and the state Assembly, 33% seats are reserved for 
the women. We are trying to increase it to 50%. You must have seen women working 
very hard to secure water for the family. To solve this problem is their main attention and 
not the „politics‟. If she gets an opportunity to solve this problem, this would be her first 
preference rather than politics. In this case „politics‟ comes with a negative connotation.” 
 
In this perspective, if watershed development is treated in the normal political way, many 
benefits are siphoned off by politicians or go to dominant elite groups in the village. His 
statement on „separation of watershed development from politics‟ in a way assures the 
villagers that the benefits would not be siphoned off by the dominant groups and 
addresses the possible cynicism that villagers would have as regards such schemes.  
 
“Along with WOTR, there are other good NGOs that are also supported in this program 
but unless it becomes a movement of the people, it cannot be successful. It cannot be 
done on large scale either and it is our attempt and struggle to make this a people‟s 
movement. In any other way, it would take at-least 50 years to do any effective work or 
bring about visible change.” 
 
The minister left the joint delegation with the current challenge that WOTR and other 
government departments were facing in implementing watershed development projects.  
It was not acquiring the shape of a „people‟s movement‟ that hindered its successful 
implementation. From the perspective of depoliticization, „people‟s movement‟ refers to 
the highest degree of politicization possible in a society. Though it is realized by the 
Indian policy makers that unless a genuine politicization is achieved, where all citizens 
deliberate upon and concern themselves with watershed development as a long term 
practice rather than its current management through short term coalitions, the 
mechanisms employed to govern this program (through the agency of NGOs, bypassing 
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the elected local government) depoliticize watershed development in its planning and 
implementation.  
Obstacles in making this program into a people‟s movement was ascribed to the absence 
of capacity building phase in the government projects by Lobo from WOTR. In the 
projects undertaken by WOTR, there was a distinct phase of capacity building of 6-12 
months but this was insufficient as noted by the Indian delegation. The chairman of the 
technical committee, constituted by the Department of Land Resources under the ministry 
of rural development in February 2005 to reassess the watershed development programs 
in India that submitted its report to the government in 2006, was also present in the 
dialogue session. He argued that the report of the technical committee (From Hariyali to 
Neeranchal) does take the problem of capacity building into account and the lack of 
focus on this aspect. He clarified that this deletion of capacity building from watershed 
development projects implemented by the government served the political compulsion of 
limiting the development projects to the time of an election term:  
“In our report131 we have put the time for CBP as 2 years, because it is not only difficult 
to achieve but also depends upon the preparedness of the community, the receptivity of 
the villagers, their skepticism about the new program and planned intervention after 40 
years of non-planning in the Indian villages. People debate a lot of issues and we also add 
in the report that even if the community is not ready to undertake the program, there must 
be a way to write it off as a part of an evaluation mechanism. I advised the government to 
undertake this program, which would now last 7-8 years for completion. But the 
governments are typically in a hurry and do not want to invest in the programs that last 
more than 5 years, the time of an election term.”  
 
It is clear from his statement that the electoral priorities of the politicians have a negative 
impact on the planning and policy making of watershed development. For one, it forces 
the planners to limit their projects in time and design it as a tool to achieve political 
mileage. Considering the actual status of poverty „after 40 years of non-planning‟ in 
Indian villages, a planned intervention like watershed development requires a 
preparedness on the part of the villagers, which does not exist at present. Addressing this 
problem is difficult because of the „skepticism of the villagers about the new program and 
                                                 
131
 Parthasarathy refers to a report named “From Hariyali to Neeranchal- a report of the 
Technical Committee on Watershed Programmes in India.” This report was released in 
January of 2006 by the Ministry of Rural Development, GoI 
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planned intervention‟. He argues that one way to address this problem was to focus on the 
capacity building of the people for an extended period of two years time, more than the 
government or the NGOs were spending on this phase at present. But the political 
interference in the policy making confines it to confirm to the political requirements of 
the leaders. Watershed development is useful for the politicians if it could be 
accomplished within the time of an election term, but technically it needed 7-8 years, he 
argued. This proves to be a fatal compromise as the program begins with the final 
implementation phase without creating a mass base for the project. In the limited amount 
of capacity building, the implementing agency has the compulsion of forming new 
institutions that would be instrumental in carrying out the future work. As a deliberative 
democratic process for forming the institutions is longer and complicated, the 
implementing agency forms „nominated committees‟ in strategic alliance with the 
dominant groups. It was thus not surprising that it did not become a „people‟s movement‟ 
and could not be sustained beyond the project period.  
It is under such circumstances that depoliticization fares better than this quality of 
politicization (here politicization is understood in a narrow sense of being subject to the 
politicians‟ motives and personal goals). If the programs work independent of the 
electoral politics, with the help of apolitical agencies that are flexible and free of electoral 
demands, the programs could be implemented in the right way with a capacity building 
phase of two years: 
“NGOs have an advantage here as they do not have to work in this time limit nor worry 
about getting elected. I stood firm on the point that the CBP must be spread over a period 
of two years and not 6 months as at present. One has to be really flexible in carrying out 
such programs because the communities react differently to such programs and it may not 
help if we are not flexible.” 
 
From the perspective of depoliticization, it is clear that the chairman of the technical 
committee has a preference for the NGOs because they „do not have to work in this time 
limit nor worry about getting elected‟. An apolitical treatment of watershed development 
was felt necessary that could make it more flexible and free from being used as a political 
instrument. In this sense, „politicization‟ understood as an involvement of the politicians 
in watershed development was not desirable. However, „politicization‟ in terms of 
creating an informed community that critically debated the watershed development 
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project in its village public sphere was felt necessary as visible in the extended period of 
the capacity building phase. A flexibility in method and time was required to make 
watershed development everyone‟s business.  
Before any concrete capacity building of the people could begin, it was necessary that the 
politicians agreed to the plan proposed by the committee to extend the period of the 
project to 8 years. This required that the committee should make the watershed 
development program lucrative to the politicians without compromising on the capacity 
building phase. In this sense, the technical committee also has a political agenda to 
motivate the politicians and form a political will for the program. He argued that this is 
often achieved by employing „technical‟ and alarmist arguments in favor of the project. 
Such arguments are based on scientific facts and an apolitical understanding of the 
project but are used to achieve political ends, here a favorable action based on the 
findings of the technical committee:  
“In the report it has been said, we need 15 years to cover all the villages under the 
watershed program with some investment. Otherwise, in a normal process, it would take 
70 years to do it. But the governments do not wake up to the arguments like that. They 
only respond to looming crisis and we did state this problem as a looming crisis. When 
40% of the additional food production in the next 15 years is going to come from the 
rain-fed areas, there is a big food problem waiting for us if we do not respond to the 
situation in the rainfed areas.” 
 
The above statement shows us that a subtle politicization of watershed development 
project, in its presentation as an answer to a „looming crisis‟ was necessary to motivate 
the politicians. However, the basis of achieving this political end was in the technical fact 
that „40% of the additional food production in the next 15 years is going to come from the 
rainfed areas‟ and watershed development in these areas was the answer to curb this 
looming food crisis. Here depoliticization acts as an instrument in the hands of the 
„experts‟ and technical committees to motivate the politicians, and in this sense to 
„politicize‟ the issue. A political will was equally important (and difficult to achieve) in 
making watershed development a successful program when the funds were available.     
 
“Funds are not a problem right now, what we need here is a political will to undertake 
these programs. It is more important and more difficult to motivate the politicians than 
the village people.” 
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With this statement, the chairman attracted the attention of the joint delegation towards 
the need to create a political will along with motivating the village people. After his 
comments, the „appeal to separate watershed development from politics‟ by the minister 
of agriculture seemed to be unrealistic in the light of the above statements.  
Politics at local and national levels were equally important as evident in the statements by 
the chairman of the technical committee and the minister. Now the watershed 
development project had an added dimension of the role and participation of the 
politicians along with the role and participation of the people.  
A delegate from the Indian bench, chief general manager of NABARD- Pune, N. 
Srinivasan added another dimension of the role of international politics as critical in 
watershed development. He highlighted the issue of international trade agreements and 
prices of agricultural products in the international market, which had a direct bearing on 
the development of farmers in the project villages:  
“You have seen from the field that people are quite backward, for the kind of 
interventions that are being made possible by the joint cooperation of India and Germany, 
especially in this case of IGWDP and similar watershed interventions in other parts of 
India. While it has been quite helpful in increasing productivity and also improving 
quality of access, physical access now available to the people, one of the major issues 
they face is of the markets, its accessibility and the prices they get.  
Quite a few of you are in a position to influence the policies in your country. Can we 
have systems where people out here could get realistic prices through fairer trade 
mechanisms and more appropriate rates? Can you in some way convince your 
government to design your polices in favor of the poor, can we stop subsidizing sugar and 
cotton, can we stop subsidizing oilseeds, can we stop intervening in the domestic markets 
in the dairy sector? If we do, what we do by this intervention will be 100% more effective 
in combating poverty than many watershed programs.  
Through a more appropriate wage policy we can alleviate poverty more effectively than 
many other watershed programs. A small market surplus becomes a life-sustaining fund if 
the prices are standard, the farmers can sustain themselves without any other help. I 
would leave this part to you all; can you in some way influence the policies of your 
government a little bit more in favor of the poor?” 
 
Srinivasan pointed out that people in the project villages were quite backward inspite of 
the watershed development program because they lacked access to the markets and the 
low prices that they got for their labor and products. He observed that not only village 
people or national politicians but the international politicians also had an important role 
in influencing the policies in their home countries in favor of the poor. He emphasized 
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the limitation of the watershed development program in the absence of appropriate wage 
policy, and continued subsidy for the farmers in developed countries on cotton, sugar and 
oilseeds, which are also the main crops grown in Maharashtra. Srinivasan‟s statement 
combined three important issues in the global politics that was left untouched by the 
NGO or the EDP delegation: accessibility to the market, agricultural subsidies to farmers 
in developed countries, and an inappropriate international wage policy.  
If depoliticization is understood as disappearance of practical issues from the critical 
deliberation in the public sphere, it is clear that the issue of fairer prices or agricultural 
subsidy was not taken up for discussion as it was presumed to be unrelated to the 
discussion on watershed development. This isolated treatment and focus on watershed 
development was a mechanism of depoliticization that pushed other related and relevant 
issues beyond the scope of discussion and critical reflection. Srinivasan re-politicized the 
watershed development program by explicating its linkages in international politics and 
prices.  
The linkage of watershed development in Indian villages to the international agricultural 
policies was cited with the example of cotton prices in the in the international markets by 
the minister of agriculture in response to a question from Martin Rempis of the 
organization Brot für die Welt. Rempis referred to an article on farmer‟s suicides in 
Maharashtra published by the national magazine in India called „Frontline‟ (Volume-21, 
Issue-16, 2004, among others). In his response, the minister highlighted the plight of 
farmers in the cotton producing belts of Maharashtra:  
“The issue of suicide was highlighting only one aspect of the problem, one study says, it 
is due to globalization of cotton prices, WTO and subsidized market economy. 50% of 
the cultivable land in this area (Vidarbha) is under only one crop, which is cotton, and it 
has become a crisis crop for the last 10 years. WTO gave a verdict but nothing happened.  
The cotton price in 1994 was 81 US-cents per pound and now its 57 US-cents per pound 
in 2005. It appears that the increase in prices of the equipment to the seeds to fertilizers 
has had no effect or rather such an effect that the prices for the farmers are really suicidal. 
The farmers get less in their hands due to heavy subsidy offered by the developed 
countries to their farmers, so till situation improves in cotton market internationally, the 
prices cannot improve. And unless the price issue is addressed many developmental 
efforts would end up increasing the crop productivity but no markets to sell them. Thus 
the fair trade issues are also relevant in this case.” 
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The statements by Srinivasan and the minister traced the intricate political connections 
that affect the watershed development program and create obstacles in its success. This 
shaped the joint delegation‟s preference for a politicized treatment of watershed 
development rather than a „separation of watershed development from politics‟ as 
presented by the NGO. It also highlighted the need to politicize the practical issues 
around watershed development that were left unaddressed by treating watershed 
development as an isolated technical intervention for alleviating poverty by soil and 
water conservation. Bringing up these issues on the table for discussion was the first step 
in politicizing these excluded facets of watershed development. 
5.6 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter analyzes the shaping process of donor‟s preferences in the governance of 
Indo-German Watershed Development Project (IGWDP) in India based on an exposure 
and dialogue program of donor agencies in the project villages of Maharashtra. It shows 
the process of preference shaping of the donors by the implementing agencies for 
depoliticization of watershed governance by presenting watershed development as the 
expert agreed, only rational solution to rural poverty (and no other intervention), 
advocating the involvement of non-elected village committees and NGOs (and not the 
government or the village panchayat), and an absence of local politics in watershed 
development from the project discourse.  
After the village exposure, the EDP delegation re-politicized watershed development 
projects and their governance in the villages by pointing out its insufficiency in rural 
development and gender mainstreaming, role of the elected village panchayat and local 
level contestations for the resources among the project beneficiaries.  
The NGO re-depoliticized the project by presenting its advantages in economic terms and 
presenting the implementing agency of the NGO as less corrupt and more efficient than 
the government. At the village level, nominated committees performed better compared 
to the gram panchayat that was too political and inefficient.  
The EDP delegation presented its preference for the depoliticization of watershed 
development in its dialogue with the Indian delegation. It approved the agency of NGOs 
and nominated committees for the project implementation, and supported the bypassing 
of elected local government. The delegation supported the watershed development 
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program as bringing about the development of both men and women in the villages and 
the issues of local contestations and negotiations, which were discussed in the reflection 
phase, were passed over in silence (a denial of their presence).  
The final discussion re-politicized the watershed development program by pointing out its 
local, national and international political linkages. The issues left out of the discussion 
like the political motivation for watershed development or the international agricultural 
policies were also established as important issues in this regard.    
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6 INSTITUTIONAL DEPOLITICIZATION IN WATERSHED 
GOVERNANCE 
 
The objective of this chapter is to show that the implementation of watershed 
development projects through the NGOs and delegated governmental directorates is a 
strategy of governance that circumvents the elected local governments and transfers 
power of implementation and decision making to a wide range of nominated committees.  
This chapter uses the case study of Indo-German Watershed Development Project 
(IGWDP) and Hills-II project and their institutions of implementation to explicate that 
the routing of watershed development projects through the NGOs like WOTR or 
delegated agencies like Watershed Management Directorate (WMD) at the project level, 
and through VWC and GAREMA (Gram/Village Resource Management Association) at 
the village level removes the political character of decision making by reallocation of 
functions and responsibilities to independent bodies or panel of „experts‟. This choice of 
institutional ensemble for watershed development is underpinned by a discourse of 
depoliticization.  
This chapter concludes that the „apolitical‟ implementing agencies and nominated 
development committees created to circumvent the „political‟ panchayats remain highly 
political in operating as a subsystem of a larger political rationality. It shows how the 
attempt to create apolitical implementing agencies like the NGOs or delegated 
directorates removes the political character of decision making and at the same time 
reflects the accommodation and power of a dominant political rationality.  
 This chapter first explores the formation of WOTR and WMD to show that such 
delegated organizations act as tools of institutional depoliticization created by the alliance 
of the donor interests and „strategic groups‟ in the recipient country to insulate decision 
making from political influence (section 6.1). The next section explores the village level 
institutions for watershed development formed by the two projects (VDC, GAREMA) to 
contend that these nominated committees for watershed development become the 
instruments of bypassing the elected local government at the grassroots level (section 6.2) 
followed by an analysis of the proliferating local organizations and their relationship with 
one another in the governance of watersheds (section 6.3). The next section shows how a 
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simulation of transparency and empowerment is practiced by the implementing agencies 
in their efforts to fulfil the conditions of the funding agencies. This also frees the 
implementing agencies from their accountability to the local people, resulting in an 
alienation of the local people from the project activities (section 6.4). This is followed by 
a summary of the chapter and its main findings (section 6.5).  
6.1 Implementing Institutions as Tools of Depoliticization 
The development ensemble in watershed projects does not make its presence felt only 
through preferences in documents and reports as outlined in the last chapter, but also 
through concrete policies, programs and institutions that are entrusted with the task of 
implementing watershed development projects.  
This section of the chapter traces the coming into being of Watershed Organization Trust 
(WOTR) as an implementing agency and „mother NGO‟ for the IGWDP, and Watershed 
Management Directorate (WMD) as the implementing agency for the Hills-II project to 
argue that both agencies owe their origin to a politics of delegation that portrays them as 
apolitical, technocratic implementers of policy, with the local contestations and 
negotiations in the development of watersheds downplayed or ignored. Formation of such 
„mother NGOs‟ and directorates allows the government and the funding agencies to move 
to an indirect governing relationship where they can no longer be reasonably held 
responsible for the (mis) management of watershed development projects. This in turn 
insulates the decision making of the NGOs from (undue) political interference, provides 
the NGO with a direct access to funds and an increased independence from accountability 
to the local people as long as they remain upwardly accountable. Olson (2000: viii) 
observes that conditions necessary for (economic) success occur most reliably, and thus 
with greatest economic effect, in rights-respecting democracies where institutions are 
structured in ways that give authoritative decision making to encompassing rather than 
narrow, interests. Without the constraints provided by the political institutions of 
democracy (as is the case with depoliticization) it is more difficult to develop credible 
systems of property or contract enforcement.  
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6.1.1 Formation of WOTR and Depoliticization in Watershed Development 
 
This section of the chapter is concerned with the case of IGWDP and its primary 
implementing agency, an NGO called WOTR that was established in 1993 with the 
exclusive purpose of implementing the IGWDP. This section first provides a brief 
account of how the NGO was conceived, funded and organized, and what it was expected 
to do. It further explicates the institutional instruments activated and put to use by this 
NGO in the implementation process to show that these institutional choices are 
underpinned by a strategy of depoliticization.   
In this sense, this section also establishes a connection between the preference-shaping 
for depoliticization, as discussed in the last chapter and the institutions that are formed to 
implement watershed development projects. From a pragmatic point of view, it is 
understandable that the official discourse in which IGWDP/WOTR and Hills-II/WMD 
are meticulously presented as successful organizations working with people‟s 
participation and including women in the decision-making process, might operate only as 
a necessary tool used to obtain funds from the donor agencies or justify watershed 
development as the succinct answer to „fighting poverty with self-help‟ in the donor and 
governmental circles, but playing no significant role in the more concrete level of actual 
institutions, programs and day to day management of the projects. This section shows that 
this is not the case and that the preference-shaping for some institutions and not others 
does indeed define the institutional choices made to implement watershed development 
projects. These choices are only intelligible within a frame of reference which treats 
watershed development projects as apolitical, technical interventions to be carried out by 
apolitical, technical agencies. In this light, the implementing institutions appear not so far 
removed from the discursive preferences (as elaborated in the preceding chapter) but as 
sites where the preferences of the policy makers is first put into play, and has its most 
concrete and visible depoliticizing effects.   
 
This section describes how the IGWDP was inspired by the policies of the German 
government and shaped around it to explicate the accommodation of donor‟s priorities in 
the developmental interventions, best carried out by the non-governmental agencies. 
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WOTR came into being in December 1993, four years after the IGWDP was approved by 
the German government in 1989:  
“In June 1988, the Parliamentary Commission for Economic Cooperation (of Germany) 
following a public hearing, passed a resolution titled „fighting poverty through self-help‟ 
calling upon the German government to reorient its official development aid towards 
poverty alleviation in a way that placed poor at the centre of development intervention. 
Subsequently, the German parliament passed a resolution supported by all parties 
mandating the government to increase and reorient official development assistance 
(ODA) for poverty reduction through self-help efforts which if, henceforth, would be 
grant financed” (Lobo, 2003).  
 
It can noticed that the German policy orientation towards „fighting poverty through self-
help‟ had a role to play and shaped the conceptualization of the watershed development 
program that came to be known as IGWDP. Lobo from „Social Centre‟ notes the 
conditions under which Fr. Bacher proposed the project to the BMZ for funding:  
“Fr. Bacher, who has been involved in the development sector for over 50 years and who 
was involved in the entire Indo-German watershed development pilot project study, saw 
the opportunity that arose from the confluence of these various events and processes and 
conceived of a large-scale community driven program for poverty reduction centred on 
regenerating the environmental space of villagers along watershed lines. The people 
themselves would be responsible for the projects, with NGOs facilitating them and all 
other actors playing the role of enablers. Given Fr. Bacher‟s credibility and experience, 
he was successful in convincing both the Indian and German governments to accept, 
approve and fund the project. The first official agreement was signed in 1989.If success 
were to spread, „facilitating involvement‟ (as opposed to control) by framework actors, 
namely government and political institutions would have to be ensured at all stages of 
intervention” (ibid.).  
 
As it can be seen from the above statement, the project was to be a „large scale 
community driven program for poverty reduction‟. This convinced the donors that the 
project did fall within their policy focus and could be supported. Further, Fr. Bacher‟s 
experience in this area for more than 50 years and his credibility as a Jesuit priest from 
Switzerland was convincing to the donor agencies as well as the local population
132
. As it 
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 See the public address by Crispin Lobo in the „watershed fair‟ organized in Ahmednagar that brought all 
the VDC and some self-help group members to Ahmednagar. In this address, Lobo spoke about the 
conditions under which Father Bacher brought the funds for the project directly to the villagers and placed 
tremendous trust in the villagers and if they failed him now, he would be willing to go back to his home 
country: (Documentary made by WOTR on the VDC- WOTR, 2004).  
“My birth place is in Switzerland, but my work place is this land-India. I have been working with the 
farmers here since the last 35 years and I never had any bad experience, which would make me lose faith in 
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is clear from the above statement, the main objective of IGWDP was „regenerating the 
environment‟ to be carried out by the people with NGOs as facilitators while the 
government and political institutions were to have a lesser degree of control in the 
project. The reduction in the role of „political institutions‟ also creates the space which 
could then be occupied by the „apolitical institutions‟ like the NGO. The demand for the 
rolling back of the state also results from the fact that the government is seen as corrupt 
and inefficient, besides the neoliberal motives attached to it:  
“In Germany, during the 1990s, German development cooperation policy came under 
review as it was realized that with very few exceptions, official aid (channelled through 
the government) reached the poor largely by way of exception. It was decided to launch a 
worldwide study to assess and determine the conditions under which official aid could 
directly reach the poor in a manner that empowered them to free themselves from poverty 
(ibid.).” 
 
The donors search for an agency other than the government, which could bring the 
official aid to the poor „directly‟ crystallized around the non-governmental sector, 
technical agencies and delegated institutions like the national banks. The donor‟s choice 
of non-governmental institutions and their policy priorities were incorporated in a 
watershed development program and presented for funding as IGWDP:  
“The project proposed by Fr. Bacher (namely, the IGWDP) fitted in nicely with the new 
institutional and developmental thrust in Germany and offered an opportunity to realize 
these new orientations and perspectives on a large scale” (Lobo, 2003).  
 
While the „Social Centre‟ as an NGO met the criteria of institutional thrust on non-
governmental channels, the proposed project promised to fight poverty through self-help. 
Having incorporated the donor‟s agenda the project was approved for funding and began 
to work with „Social Centre‟ as the implementing agency in India. However, the local 
socio-political context and a disregard of the villagers‟ agendas soon became apparent 
after the first four years of the program that only funds were not enough to implement the 
program and something was missing from it, when the project was considered to be 
„floundering and not making much headway‟:  
“When the IGWDP began, there were only 7 NGOs involved, of whom only two had 
some experience in integrated watershed development. If the programs was to become a 
                                                                                                                                                 
them. So if you (the government) are willing to accept the fact that the money should be given directly to 
the villagers, I am ready to bring in the IGWDP.”  
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movement as envisaged, and go to scale rapidly, a lot many more NGOs would have to 
be involved, common standards and protocols developed and best practices put in place. 
This called for substantial expansion in existing capacities, identification of new NGO 
partners and the development of a pedagogy that systematically built up institutional, 
organizational and operational capacities of the NGOs as well as the VWCs and other 
community based organizations. Existing resource agencies were unable to meet this 
requirement and by 1993 the IGWDP was floundering and not making much headway” 
(ibid.).  
 
Lobo from „Social Centre‟ argued that this NGO was unable to meet the requirements of 
the project due to its lack of „common standards and protocols‟ that led to the poor 
performance of the project. There was a need to „put best practices in place‟ and expand 
the existing capacities of „Social Centre‟ to build the capacity of local NGOs and 
community based organizations. This gap was to be filled up by the formation of a new 
NGO, carved out of the „Social Centre‟. 
“It was decided by a group of prominent NGO leaders to set up a new organization to 
cater to the capacity building needs of the IGWDP as well as to provide an institutional 
base for the Program Coordinator. Thus WOTR was established in December 1993 as an 
NGO under the Bombay Public Trust Act 1950” (ibid).  
 
It can be observed in the above statements that WOTR was established to systematically 
build up the institutional capacities of the local organizations and provide an institutional 
base to the project coordinator. It would develop common standards and protocols and 
pedagogy of systematic capacity building. A more formal and rule-based managerial 
approach was needed for the program to make some headway.  
In this section I argue that WOTR came into existence as an organization that would not 
only fulfil the technical requirement of „capacity building‟ but perform a range of other 
functions that would provide it with an autonomy and independent access to funds by 
circumventing all political controls on its budget and decision-making.  
 
With the formation of WOTR, the IGWDP went into the exclusive custody of this NGO. 
It became the official partner of the project and defined for itself the task of training the 
villagers to undertake the watershed development program in the so called „capacity 
building phase‟. In the years from 1989-1993, when the IGWDP was implemented by the 
„Social Centre‟ it had no such „technical‟ capacity building phase and the grants for the 
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project was by the way of „financial cooperation‟ (for investment purposes only) routed 
through KfW. When IGWDP began its work in Ahmednagar, there was no distinct 
„Capacity Building Phase‟ and the funds were released by the way of Financial 
Cooperation of KfW. In these initial years, Social Centre acted as the facilitating NGO.  
Later, when capacity building was established as a distinct activity and part of watershed 
program, part of the funds for the program was routed by the way of Technical 
Cooperation (TZ: Technische Zusammenarbeit) through the GTZ directly to WOTR, the 
implementing NGO that came into being later. In the first 3-4 years, this project worked 
in coordination with Social Center and some other local NGOs without much experience 
in the field of watershed.  
Formation of WOTR as an NGO separate from Social Center was a further delegation of 
responsibility, this time for the sake of this new project called IGWDP. Here the issue of 
governance remains within the same sphere of non-governmental public sphere, i.e. 
neither promoted or demoted (refer Hay‟s model, 2007: 87) but this coming into 
existence of a new NGO totally dedicated to achieving the objectives of IGWDP serves a 
different purpose.  
The new NGO developed a „capacity building phase‟ (CBP) of 12-18 months as a pre-
condition to undertaking the full implementation of a watershed development project. 
The newly added CBP was considered as a „technical cooperation‟ that came under the 
purview of GTZ and funds were routed directly to WOTR via GTZ. The Indian 
government on its part exempted this official development assistance from the realm of 
Foreign Contributions Regulation (FCR) Act:   
“WOTR gained the status of an official partner and the funds were available for direct 
disbursement to NGOs (even those without FCR Act clearance) and village committees. 
A flexible financial instrument called the „disposition fund‟ was instituted and the office 
of the Program Coordinator was established” (ibid: 4).  
 
The newly formed WOTR now provided a direct access to the funds, was better 
positioned to work with added flexibility and assurance of timely money. It helped this 
NGO to focus only on IGWDP (unlike the Social Center that worked on other issues 
also), develop its own strategies of governance (like „participatory operational pedagogy‟, 
„net planning methodology‟, „participatory impact monitoring‟ among others) and much 
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needed autonomy. Last but not the least, it provided WOTR an identity of a 
„professional‟ organization independent of the Social Center and its missionary work.  
By establishing a requirement for the technical cooperation in watershed development, 
the NGO was able to justify its formation as a „technical agency‟ that could receive funds 
directly from the donors without going through the bilateral governmental route. 
Although this direct cooperation with an NGO in a developing country is not the common 
route by which German ODA is transferred, an exception was made in the case of 
WOTR:  
“Das Program läuft als eines der ersten Modellvorhaben dieser Art im Rahmen der so 
genannten Direktkooperation mit Süd-NRO. Während die Deutsche staatliche 
Entwicklungshilfe, soweit sie nicht mit deutschen NRO zusammenarbeitet, es in der Regel 
mit ebenfalls staatliche Partnern im Gastland zu tun hat, wurde hier ein anderer Weg der 
Kooperation beschritten. Zwar ist der indische Staat weiter offizieller 
Zuwendungsempfänger des deutschen Beitrags, und eine nationale Entwicklungsbank 
verwaltet das Geld, jedoch erfolgt die unmittelbare Durchführung allerMaßnahmen 
durch einheimische NRO“ (Bliss, 2001).  
 
This „direct cooperation‟ with a southern NGO was an exception also in the light of the 
fact that the project was not making much progress so far when implemented through the 
NGOs. In this situation, the „direct cooperation‟ in a way centralized the managerial 
powers in one NGO and removed the political control of the government in its direct 
funding of WOTR as a way of decentralizing decision-making. In effect, WOTR became 
a „technical agency‟ for the implementation of IGWDP directly funded by GTZ under its 
„technical cooperation‟ after 1993. This centralization of managerial powers and the 
decision of direct cooperation would appear unbalanced in the light of its basis of 
formation „by a group of prominent NGO leaders‟.  
As we see in the above discussion that IGWDP began in 1989 to regenerate the 
environment along watershed lines, implemented by „Social Centre‟ and was funded 
exclusively by KfW until 1992. In 1993, a new NGO was formed and a CBP funded 
directly by GTZ was added. It was necessary to recognize the NGO as a „technical 
agency‟ working for watershed development, not only to qualify for the funding under 
„technical cooperation‟ of GTZ but also to present its task as an apolitical intervention by 
the „civil society‟ actors towards environmental regeneration.  
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However, to work in the villages on the people‟s land and water, the NGO needed 
acceptance from the villagers and some form of legitimacy. This was to be achieved by 
building the capacity of the people to participate in the program and by building local 
organizations from among the villagers. The government also needed to be convinced to 
allow the NGO „a level playing field‟ to work in the villages and abstain from undue 
political interference. 
“In IGWDP since participatory development was its central tenet, it was necessary to 
bring about a level playing field (as all the major actors were governmental agencies), 
and ensure that concerns and perspectives of the field actors (villagers and NGO) were 
brought on board. This was achieved by three innovative institutional mechanisms: 1) the 
inclusion of an NGO, namely WOTR as an equal and „official partner‟ in the governance 
and management structure of the program; 2) the creation of a flexible financial 
instrument called the „disposition fund‟; 3) the establishment of the office of program 
coordinator (PCO)”.133  
 
It can be observed above that the „level playing field‟ was achieved with the status of an 
„equal and official partner‟ for the NGO so that it can work with the donor agencies 
independent of the governmental control and was actually a demand of delegation of 
watershed development to the NGO, and to remove political interference from its 
decision-making processes. Once the status of „official partner‟ was acquired, the NGO 
needed resources to carry out its work that was provided by the „disposition fund‟. It can 
be observed that the donor support was empowering institutions other than the elected 
local government to do the same work as the local government does. A level playing field 
was translated in the formation of WOTR as an organization equal to the governmental 
department that carried out watershed development, in possession of technical and 
financial resources but without a mandate from the people that it sought to develop. It is 
debatable if the NGO was able to acquire a level playing field and equal status in the eyes 
of the government from the above three measures, but the „official partner‟ status 
provided considerable freedom to the NGO from political influences in their decision 
making, especially during the CBP when it acquired funds directly from the donors and 
was accountable to them directly. The above measures certainly allowed the NGO to 
circumvent local politics and maintain its depiction as an apolitical actor while 
performing the political task of intervening in the issues of collective concern. It must be 
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 Lobo (2003).  
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noted that the concerns of the villagers finds no such institutional mechanism to bring it 
on the table for discussion. While the NGO presents its own concerns regarding lack of 
power in working parallel to the government and institutes new NGO and designations, 
no such measures are found necessary in the case of the villagers‟ concerns. In this sense, 
the demand for a level playing field is in fact a demand for empowerment and recognition 
of the NGO sector rather than the empowerment of common villagers. This demand to 
empower non-elected agencies as development agents of and for the people weakens the 
elected governments by the people, affecting the democratization process negatively.  
 
Program Coordinator 
 
This section shows that the „institution of the program coordinator‟ was a site of 
centralization of managerial powers in one office. It was presumed to represent the 
interests of the „civil society‟ while all mechanisms of control by the „civil society‟ were 
weakly formulated, if not non-existent. This office was to be acquired by nomination 
from the „Social Centre‟, the NGO that was the initial implementing agency. The 
program coordinator was now to be the chief functionary and authority for IGWDP. 
„Social Centre‟ nominated Fr. Crispino Lobo for this post. Lobo had worked with Fr. 
Bacher since the beginning of the project in 1989 and now was appointed as the project 
coordinator for IGWDP. He was also the founding member and the managing trustee of 
WOTR along with Fr. Bacher. Lobo describes the role and decision-making process of 
the program coordinator as follows:   
“Since the institution of the program coordinator was approved of in bilateral agreements, 
it had official sanction and therefore could represent the program at all levels. Since the 
program coordinator was historically from, and nominated by the NGO sector, he 
represented the interests of civil society. It was an officially sanctioned post and so the 
program coordinator had official access to the government. Since WOTR provided the 
institutional and organizational base for the program coordinator, the latter had at his 
disposal the resources and goodwill of the organization and its network. This unique 
combination enabled real time flow of information as well as provided the flexibility and 
resources to undertake creative and innovative experiments at the project as well as 
institutional levels” (ibid: 5).  
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The program coordinator presents it as implicit that this office represents the interests of 
the „civil society‟ because of his being historically from (Social Centre), and nominated 
by the NGO sector (Social Centre). It also presumes that the NGO sector represents the 
interests of the „civil society‟. The point is not to argue if the NGO does or does not 
represent the „civil society‟ but to show that the politics behind appointment to this 
powerful post is legitimized by claiming a membership to the NGO sector and 
nomination by it. In its portrayal of the NGO as representing the interests of the „civil 
society‟ as a whole, the analysis of the NGO as representing certain sectional interests is 
downplayed or ignored.In the absence of any other direct local democratic control on this 
office, the program coordinator represented the interests of the donor community as much 
as it represented the „civil society‟ because the only accountability that existed was to the 
funding agencies. In this scenario, the decentralized planning and emergence of the local 
perspectives at the project and institutional levels was confined to the managerial 
intervention by this office to „undertake creative and innovative experiments at the 
project as well as institutional levels‟ and the decentralization of decision-making stopped 
at the empowerment of the program coordinator with flexibility and funds.  
“Unencumbered by bureaucracy or protocol, the program coordinator was able to easily 
move across all levels of influence, from the village to the decision-makers, across the 
boundaries of the civil and public sectors as well as between the official and the non-
official worlds. In fact, the directives of the Government of Maharashtra granting 
permission to treat forest lands as well as extension of facilities and benefits of the 
„capacity building phase‟ to the „full implementation phase‟ were in response to the 
initiatives and consistent follow up done by the program coordinator. Furthermore, in 
being able to approach the political and administrative establishments on both the Indian 
and German side at various levels, the program coordinator was able to facilitate 
continued support and an enabling policy environment for the IGWDP” (ibid: 6).  
 
The above statement shows that the program coordinator worked independent of any 
undue interference from the governmental bureaucracy and created enabling 
circumstances for the project in the form of securing permission from the government to 
work on the land owned by the forest department and securing continued funding from 
the donor agencies. The lack of bureaucratic protocol for the program coordinator also 
signifies an absence of accountability to the institutions of governance in the recipient 
country, replaced by an accountability mechanism to the donor agency. A concentration 
of managerial powers in the office of the program coordinator is useful in continuation of 
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the project. In this capacity, the program coordinator utilized his flexibility and resources 
provided by the NGO for efficiency gains and political support for the program. The 
continuation of the project became an end in itself that replaced its role as a means 
towards alleviating poverty. This changed managerial approach also signified a 
replacement of NGOs as public bodies that could have been the seedbed of radical 
alternatives and structural change to expert bodies that could be utilized for efficiency 
gains in implementing watershed development projects.  
The absolute power of the program coordinator over the project could not be achieved 
without the continuous supply of the „disposition fund‟ from the donor agencies. This 
was achieved by the inclusion of another delegated agency in the form of a national bank 
called the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD).  
6.1.2  NABARD as an Instrument of Depoliticization 
 
This section of the chapter argues that NABARD as a national bank uses its quasi-state 
organizational status with the donors to act as the credible recipient of funds for IGWDP 
and with the government to secure administrative and political approval for the project. A 
strategic group formation between the NGO and the Bank helped in routing the grants 
from Germany not through the State or Central government treasuries but through a semi-
governmental organization, an example of Type-1 depoliticization in Hay‟s model. This 
also exempted the donor funds from attracting the provisions of Foreign Contributions 
Regulation (FCR) Act, the only other legal mechanism of state control on donor 
contributions. This section shows how depoliticization by delegation of responsibility to 
the banks became instrumental in removing the political character of bilateral funds, 
reduced to a technical accountability exercise to be dealt interdepartmentally between the 
National Bank and the Ministry of Finance. Routing of funds through NABARD provides 
the NGO greater flexibility by removing the grants provided by the donors from the 
governmental treasuries as well as from the FCR Act.  
 
NABARD‟s Role in Securing Governmental Approval for IGWDP  
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This section shows how NABARD‟s status as a quasi-state organization becomes useful 
in securing the governmental approval for the project while the NGO remains in the 
background and its role in the project is downplayed. 
The deputy manager of NABARD, Bombay made the first application to the GoM for the 
„political and administrative approval‟ of the IGWDP134 on 19th December, 1991. This 
was followed up by him in another letter addressed to the government on 31
st
 July, 
1992
135
. The Government of Maharashtra responded to his request on 27
th
 of August, 
1992 with a „government resolution‟ approving the demand for the project:  
“Having regard to the NGO activity in the field of watershed development in 
Maharashtra, negotiations on bilateral assistance between the Government of Germany 
and the Government of India (GoI) were under process in the past. Now the German 
government has agreed to provide through KfW financial assistance of DM 12 million 
(i.e. Rs. 174.09 million; E.R: DM 1= Rs. 14.5) for the development of watershed projects 
by the NGOs in Maharashtra. NABARD in consultation with GoI has agreed to help in 
the preparation of project proposals and implementation of the projects. German 
assistance may be in the form of grant for the program. The fund will flow from the KfW 
directly to the National Bank i.e. NABARD, as per arrangements laid down by the 
Ministry of Finance, GoI. The National Bank shall institute similar measures for 
financing individual projects. On the basis of projects sanctioned, the phasing indicated in 
the project document and satisfactory work completion, NABARD will release the funds 
for direct project implementation (labor and material costs) through the local bank to a 
joint account of the VWC and the NGO concerned. Overhead costs of the NGO will be 
paid directly to the NGO.” 136 
 
The „preamble‟ of this governmental resolution as cited above, shows the important role 
ascribed to NABARD in the funding process as a direct recipient of the grant from KfW. 
A preliminary reading of the „preamble‟ of this resolution gives the impression of a 
contract between KfW and NABARD concerning a grant of DM 12 million for the 
purpose of implementing watershed development projects through NGOs in Maharashtra. 
In this sense, NABARD acted also on the NGO‟s behalf by offering its services and 
seeking approval from the government.  
In the normal course of action, ODA is routed through the ministries, but in this case it 
was delegated to a national bank. With this move, the Ministry of Finance moved into an 
indirect control of the grant. This responsibility was delegated to NABARD, an example 
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 Letter No. NB.OPD. FS/2949/RF.KFW/1991-92; Government of Maharashtra  
135
 Letter No. NB.DPD. FS/1403/RF.KFW/1992-93; Government of Maharashtra  
136
 Resolution No. IGP-1091/43015/CR-36/ JAL-7; Government of Maharashtra 
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of Type-1 depoliticization in Hay‟s model where the accountability of the funds is 
removed from the central ministry to the arena of a „professional bank‟. NABARD also 
agreed to help in the preparation of project proposals and project implementation. It was 
responsible for meeting the labor and material costs to be transferred directly to the joint 
account of the NGO and the VWC. The NGO was authorized to receive only the 
overhead costs directly from the donor agencies.  
The governmental resolution further elaborates that:  
“National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development has sought government‟s 
approval for implementation of this program and necessary support and guidance from 
the concerned department of the Government. Since the entire funding in the program is 
being provided for under German assistance, no financial support is required from the 
Government. However, for successful implementation of this project, Government‟s 
approval and support are essential. In view of this, Government is now pleased to accord 
approval for implementation of IGWDP through NGOs in Maharashtra with active 
involvement of NABARD.” 
 
The GoM granted its approval because NABARD had an active role in the project and 
would act as the governmental arm to ascertain accountability in the project. The point 
here is to note that NABARD shielded the NGO from coming in direct contact with the 
state and used its quasi-governmental status to convince the state and the donors of its 
authenticity and reliability. At the same time, NABARD removed the IGWDP from the 
public sphere and direct political concern into the realm of a technical transaction 
between two national banks, KfW and NABARD.  
Notably, the government resolution makes no mention of the technical cooperation that 
was routed through the agency of GTZ that became an integral component of the 
program. One reason for this could be that the CBP was added to the program after the 
formation of the new NGO called WOTR in 1993 while the governmental approval was 
grant a year before in 1992. After the government approved the project, it underwent an 
institutional transformation with the formation of WOTR and the addition of a new CBP. 
This also included the displacement of NABARD as the funding agency for this phase of 
12-18 months where the grants were given by GTZ directly to the NGO. In Hay‟s model, 
this further delegation of responsibility to the non-governmental sector, removed first 
from the ministerial sphere, then from the semi-state sphere of the National Bank to the 
private sphere of the NGO, is an example of Type-2 depoliticization. With this addition 
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to the program, the grants were also removed from the local public sphere and scrutiny to 
a confinement into an organizational issue between the GTZ and WOTR.  
 
NABARD‟s Role in Securing funds from KfW 
 
As noted earlier, that bilateral funds from the German government are routed only 
through the state agencies in the recipient country, however an exception was made in the 
case in which the funds were provided directly to the NGO with a national bank as the 
mediating agency (Bliss, 2001). The program coordinator of IGWDP, Lobo explains why 
this was a good choice from the NGO‟s point of view:  
“These being bilateral funds, they normally have to be routed through either the Central 
or State government treasuries. However, the procedural complexities involved in 
accessing budgetary resources and the need to have funds allocated in a flexible manner 
and available on a timely basis, made the NGOs (as well as the villagers) uncomfortable 
with this route” (Lobo,2003).    
 
Lobo from WOTR rejects the budgetary option because it involved „procedural 
complexities‟. The lack of flexibility and delay in fund transfer also made the government 
route „uncomfortable‟. NGOs can also be supported by the donor agencies in India 
without going through the budgetary route, within the framework of FCR Act. Lobo 
argues that this option was also not available for the IGWDP:  
“If the funds were routed outside the budgetary channel, they would attract the provisions 
of FCR Act. Since the goal of IGWDP was to create a large scale movement involving 
„civil society‟, most of the NGOs (especially the small ones) and all the community based 
organizations would have been excluded from directly receiving these funds. Moreover, 
whatever channel was used, since these funds were ODA and fairly substantial, both the 
German and the Indian governments would have to be assured of its deployment and 
proper utilization. Since Fr. Bacher personally knew its top management, he decided to 
explore NABARD as the routing agency for the German funds from KfW” (ibid: 4).  
 
As shown before, NABARD sought the permission and political approval from the 
Government of Maharashtra for the project and volunteered to act as the recipient agency 
on behalf of the ministry of finance and „Social Centre‟.  
“NABARD, being a Govt. institution, would meet the requirement of governmental 
oversight, (both from the German and Indian sides), could accept the funds directly (do 
away with the budgetary route) and would not attract the provisions of the FCRA. Being 
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a public sector financial institution dealing with large amounts of money and having 
experience in dealing with bilateral and multi-lateral funding institutions, it would also 
provide a credible counterpart to the official German Funding Agencies” (ibid: 5).   
 
It can be observed in the above statement of the program coordinator how the 
involvement of NABARD did away with the budgetary route and shielded the grants 
from attracting the provisions of FCR Act. Delegation was used as a strategy of 
depoliticization that not only removed the direct political control on the fund but also 
shifted them out of the public sphere by circumventing the legal machinery present to 
oversee such transactions. The status of NABARD as a quasi-governmental bank was 
beneficial for the NGO in availing the funds without delay and outside the purview of 
FCR Act. At the same time, its status as a bank presented problems in dealing with 
„grants‟ as it was a credit-disbursing bank. Lobo from WOTR noted this problem and 
how it was resolved in favor of the NGO:  
“However, NABARD, being a credit disbursing agency, faced an initial difficulty in 
administrating these funds since they were grants and had to be disbursed as grants. 
However, there is a provision in the NABARD Act, which allowed for NABARD to 
accept and disburse grants for action research purposes and innovative pilot projects 
especially those which would test out approaches and mechanisms that enhance credit 
absorption and utilization. Since NABARD largely re-finances agricultural operations, a 
good amount of which is rain dependent, promoting watershed development as a means 
of stabilizing and productivising rural agricultural credit was viewed as innovative, in line 
with its mandate, and therefore qualified to be taken up on a pilot basis” (ibid: 5).  
 
Brought into being by an Act of the Parliament in 1981, NABARD is a credit disbursing 
agency that does not deal with grants. However the mode of funding for IGWDP was in 
the form of grants and hence needed to be disbursed as grant. This was overcome by 
invoking the provisions of NABARD Act
137
 that allows NABARD to accept and disburse 
grants for action research and innovative pilot projects. Article 38, section (iii) notes that 
NABARD: 
“…may provide facilities for training, for dissemination of information and the 
promotion of research including the undertaking of studies, researches, techno-economic 
and other surveys in the field of rural banking, agriculture and rural development and it 
may for the said purposes make loans (or advances or grants
138
) including grants by way 
of provision for fellowships and chairs to any institution.” 
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This article solved the issue in favor of the implementing NGO. As NABARD was a 
governmental institution that could accept the funds directly from KfW, could now also 
disburse it as grant. It resolved two problems for the implementing NGO: 1) it 
circumvented the lengthy budgetary route and 2) it saved the community based 
organizations from the provisions of FCR Act.  
A favorable interpretation of its provisions allowed NABARD to fit this project in its 
mandate as an action research that would enhance credit absorption and utilization. In this 
effort, it can be seen that watershed development undergoes contextual presentation and 
interpretation based on the target audience. For the BMZ, it was presented as a project to 
„alleviate poverty through self-help‟ to fit their policy focus, for the government as an 
„integrated and comprehensive soil and water conservation treatment program within the 
micro-watershed‟139, and for NABARD as an „innovative way of stabilizing and 
productivising rural agricultural credit‟. Watershed development was seen as an 
innovative approach towards stabilizing agriculture in rainfed areas, hence „qualified to 
be taken up on a pilot basis‟ with grant disbursement. It can be seen that the strategic 
group formed by the apolitical, technical agencies suitably interpreted the provisions of 
the NABARD Act to make the project „qualify‟ and fit the Bank‟s purview of operation.  
Under the authorization from NABARD the funds from KfW were received in trusted 
hands in India. Now the problem that remained was in bringing the funds directly to the 
village people. Who in the village would receive the funds? Who would be held 
accountable in case of mismanagement? 
The program coordinator of IGWDP noted this problem and its resolution in the 
following words:  
“A difficulty arose in routing these funds to the villagers directly. Since, at the village 
level, the legal project holder was the Village Watershed Committee (VWC) 
consensually nominated by the Gram Sabha and since this was not a registered body, the 
question of whether they could receive funds from a public sector institution and be held 
accountable for the same arose. Local Banks refused to open accounts in the name of the 
VWC. The Bombay Village Panchayat Act of 1958 provided a legal solution. It held that 
when the majority of adult voting members in a village held a Gram Sabha in accordance 
with the provisions of the Act and passed a Resolution, that Resolution was a formal act, 
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having a legal basis, was binding and enforceable. Thus the VWC that is established in 
such a manner becomes a formal body, a person in law and therefore, eligible to receive 
funds and be held accountable for them. When this was brought to their attention, local 
banks began to open accounts in the name of the VWCs and funds were disbursed 
directly to these accounts” (ibid: 6).  
 
Refusal of the local banks to open accounts in the name of VWC also points to the weak 
recognition that the committee had in the village public sphere. This body, called the 
village watershed committee (VWC) has no legal status in the panchayati raj institutions 
and was „consensually nominated‟ by the gram sabha. This amounts to saying that the 
VWC is not a registered body (in most cases) and thus cannot receive funds from a public 
sector institution like NABARD. It has no verifiable identity proof (other than the 
minutes of the village meeting on the day that gram sabha consensually nominated the 
VWC) required to open bank accounts in the name of the VWC.  
This was overcome by providing a weak legal basis to this committee in the Bombay 
Village Panchayat Act of 1958. It is interesting to note that this Act was brought into 
effect to strengthen the village democracy and Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI) was 
used to form and legitimize a parallel non-elected committee. From the perspective of 
depoliticization, it can be observed how sometimes the democratic instruments in the 
public sphere could also be used to depoliticize local institutions.  
The example of routing funds and the complexities involved in the process could be 
inferred from the above description. It was quite rational for the implementing NGO to 
explore alternate routes of channeling funds for the project as bilateral governmental 
routes are tedious and unpredictable, it would make the efficient implementation of the 
program difficult in the absence of timely availability of funds. Similarly, FCR Act would 
prevent the community based organizations to secure funds from Germany. Both parties 
resolved the issue by delegating the responsibility of grant disbursement to autonomous 
Banks, working largely independent of the government at the Center or State. In Hay‟s 
model, this could be described as demotion of the responsibility from the government 
sphere to the non-governmental public sphere, with an arm‟s-length control over the 
delegated body, an example of Type 1 Depoliticization. The implementing agency was 
able to reduce direct governmental influence from the day-to-day activities of the project 
by delegating the responsibilities to non-political authorities, expert groups, technical 
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agencies and „professionals‟. The implementing NGO represents itself as a „technical 
organization‟ that specializes in watershed development. It conducts training sessions 
throughout the year in its residential training center at Darewadi village in Ahmednagar. 
The training sessions are attended by the government staff of different watershed 
departments, NGOs working in different parts of India, researchers and international 
delegates. This helps in constructing an „apolitical‟ image of the NGO, perceived as a 
„goal oriented and objective based organization‟. This does not imply that the work of the 
NGO does not involve political negotiations and contestations, especially when the NGO 
begins with the formation of institutions like the VWC and micro-credit societies. Also, 
the delegated agencies engage in extra-parliamentary politics to either avoid a legal act or 
interpret it favorably as per the context. Delegation further centralizes managerial powers 
in the hands of apolitical agencies that promise efficiency by circumventing politics and 
following a formal rule-based managerial approach to watershed development. It focuses 
on output legitimacy and economic efficiency by reducing the complexities involved in 
deliberative democracy and governmental procedures.  
As discussed in this section, the way it was imperative for the NGO to avoid bilateral 
channel in the favor of efficiency and reduction of complexity, it was also imperative to 
avoid the panchayati raj institutions at the village level for similar reasons. It was too 
politicized to be efficient.  
6.1.3 Watershed Management Directorate as a Tool of Depoliticization  
 
This section explores the institutional mechanisms of depoliticization in the case of Hills-
II project. It traces the coming into being of watershed projects in Uttarakhand and the 
nature of institutions that have been formed to govern these. On the basis of this case 
study, I argue that the institutions governing the watershed project are increasingly placed 
outside the direct purview of political influence by delegating the governance to 
specialized agencies formed for this purpose. In Hills-II project, Watershed Management 
Directorate (WMD) was the implementing agency working under the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MoA). I argue that WMD is a product of the „politics of delegation‟ that 
refers to the analysis of the secondary consequences of locating responsibilities and 
powers beyond the direct control of elected politicians. Hay‟s model that maps the 
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gradations of autonomy also allows us to accommodate the existence of different control 
and accountability frameworks. Russian Doll Model of Flinders (2007: 109) maps seven 
stages of delegation of authority in the governance strategies excluding the core executive 
and ministerial departments, as explained in the third chapter.  
Following Hay and Flinders, I argue that WMD is an example of delegating watershed 
program from the political realm to an apolitical body, delegation to the Layer 2, i.e. an 
„executive agency‟.  
Executive agencies remain a part of their parent departments, like WMD is a part of the 
MoA, but enjoy a significant degree of operational autonomy. The ministers do not 
concern themselves with the day-to-day running of the agency. The agency is funded by 
the parent department but may also generate their own revenue streams. Appointments 
are made by the Principal secretary of the State government in consultation with the 
Secretary Agriculture and Secretary of the Ministry of Finance.  
Agency chief executives are responsible to the ministers and have no direct line of 
accountability to parliament. Ministers remain accountable to parliament for their 
department‟s agencies.  
In this section we would examine the coming into being of one such agency called 
Watershed Management Directorate (WMD) that acts as the implementing agency for 
watershed projects in Uttarakhand and explicate its principal-agent role in relation to the 
MoA as emerging from the logic of delegation and a tactic of institutional 
depoliticization.  
Monsoon rains of 1978 flooded the entire northern India and left at least two million 
people homeless. The destruction of crops and property was immense in what was 
described by BBC as „the worst floods in the living memory of northern India‟140. Two 
most important rivers of north India, Ganga and Yamuna, both originating in Uttrakhand 
had risen way beyond the official safety level ruining crops and life. The Indian 
government responded by setting up a high-level working group for flood control in 
Ganga-Yamuna basin to study its causes and suggest remedial measures for its control. 
The Working Group suggested a treatment of the area on watershed lines.  
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“Accordingly in November 1981, the forest department of the erstwhile Uttar Pradesh 
formulated an overall development plan for treating the said region. In March 1982, 
keeping in view the “Overall Development Plan” of forest department of Uttar Pradesh, 
Watershed Management Directorate (WMD) was established by the Government of Uttar 
Pradesh to carry out the work performed by various departments on the basis of 
watershed region in an integrated manner by means of a „Multi- disciplinary force‟ under 
an administrative authority to check the obscure problems like those of soil erosion in the 
hilly areas and environmental degradation”.141  
 
This directorate had a well defined role and function. Its presentation of itself was defined 
by the functions that it promised to perform: 
“Through this Directorate, it was proposed to, gradually, treat the entire mountain region 
on the basis of mini watershed regions under which state, district and regional offices/ 
units were approved to manage the work related to environmental preservation and 
activities pertaining to curbing soil erosion, afforestation, social forestry, setting up of 
parts, grazing land development, increase in the high breeds of animals for high 
productivity of milk distribution of fertilizer and high yielding seed for agricultural land, 
minor irrigation schemes, minor Engineering etc. in a successful, effective and integrated 
manner” (WMD 2006). 
 
After its formation in 1982, WMD acted as the administrative authority that worked to 
address the problems of soil erosion and environmental degradation in the hilly areas. It 
was a purely technical endeavor that had nothing to do with the community that inhabited 
these ecosystems till 1993 when the EEC came to Uttarakhand with the „Doon Valley 
Watershed Management Project‟ when community based institutions were to be formed 
for its management. From 1982 to 2005, WMD worked as a statutory body implementing 
projects with the help of line departments. It was granted a permanent status in 2005 as a 
nodal agency for all watershed projects in the State. The executing agency from 1982 to 
1993 was mainly the line departments or the project administration „under the unified 
command‟. Doon Valley Project (DVP) financed by EEC for the first time brought self-
help groups into the management matrix though it received secondary importance in this 
project. The execution here was still „by the project administration under the unified 
command‟ but community based organizations did make an appearance in the 
management discourse. The 1999 project of Hills-II totally did away with the line 
departments and strengthened the discourse on community participation. This did not 
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imply that the line departments had a diminished role but the technical requirements of 
Common Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Rural Development in 1994 and 73rd 
Constitutional amendment necessitated this reluctant inclusion of the community in the 
affairs of WMD.  
The main point that I wish to highlight here is that WMD began as a delegated agency to 
undertake the watershed work on technical lines and continues to work on the same 
paradigm till 1999 when the global focus on community based organizations and 
„people‟s participation in their own development‟ acquired popular legitimacy. It would 
be naive to presume that WMD would make a paradigm shift overnight to community-
based governance. As the evidence from the case study shows, WMD still operates with 
the high-handedness that is characteristic of the public-sector agencies in India. Further, it 
simulates the presence of a local participation by citing in its official records the presence 
of new village-level institutions (called Gram/ Village Resource Management 
Association- GAREMA) and self-help groups for women.  
In the next section, I would explore these local governance institutions to show that the so 
called GAREMA and self-help groups are a way of further delegating the responsibility 
of watershed work to such institutions that have no power or presence in the local project 
implementation. It certainly facilitates the shifting of responsibility of work done/not 
done from WMD to amorphous local bodies, that are made „amorphous‟ by selective 
inclusion of the local people in project governance among other strategies, by the very 
agency that has the task of forming such village-based institutions.  I would look closely 
at the case of Kimsar village in Uttarakhand and the GAREMA formed there to govern 
the Hills-II project. It also looks at other villages in the same micro-watershed to show 
that local participation in the project management is deliberately kept to a select group of 
villagers from the elite groups and big landholders.    
6.2 Village Watershed Committee as a Tool of Institutional Depoliticization  
This section introduces the village level institutions that were formed and put to use by 
the Hills-II project in Uttarakhand. By exploring how these village level institutions were 
conceived, funded and organized, what they were expected to do and what they ended up 
doing, this section argues that the village level institutions became the sites where the 
depoliticized strategies of governance are first put into play and have their most concrete 
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and visible effects of institutional depoliticization. At this level, depoliticization occurs 
by transfer of power to a wide range of non-elected, „consensually nominated‟ local 
committees that encloses and diminishes the watershed project from the public sphere to 
a select group of interest-based coalitions while the elected local governments languish 
on the sidelines.  
6.2.1 Formation, Functions and Fading-Away of VDC in Hills-II Project  
 
In this section, I show how the formation of the watershed development committee in 
Kimsar village, Uttarakhand under the Hills-II project reallocated the responsibility of 
village development under the project to a „consensually nominated‟ body formed by an 
alliance between the government staff from the implementing agency of WMD and the 
village contractors/ politically influential people. The main idea behind empowering 
committees other than the elected local government was to circumvent any political 
interference in the program. Political interference in this sense associated with duplicity, 
corruption and undue delay in the decision-making processes, that was meant to be 
avoided by the formation of new committees, not only eroded the public scrutiny of the 
project implementation but also became as corrupt and duplicate as the political 
panchayats they sought to bypass.  
 
Formation of GAREMA 
 
Watershed development was not a new idea for the residents of Kimsar village in 
Uttarakhand when the Shiwalik Hills-II project came to this village in 2002. It was 
already a part of watershed development under the state-sponsored Drought Prone Areas 
Program (DPAP) from 1994-1998. This project was implemented by forming nominated 
watershed committees, a separate body from the elected local government. Needless to 
say that the project did not bring about any significant change in the environment or the 
life of the people during DPAP and hence was selected one more time to be covered 
under Hills-II project.  
Kimsar village was first visited by the WMD officials in December 2002. The first 
meeting of the village gram sabha records the events of the day of watershed committee 
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formation on 17
th
 December 2002. A consensually nominated committee of 11 people 
was formed to govern the Hills-II project. It included a president, vice-president, 
secretary, treasurer and 7 members. In practice, only two people from the committee, 
namely the president and the secretary were trusted with some functional powers like 
withdrawal of funds from the local bank. This committee was called Gaon /Village 
Resource Management Committee (GAREMA)
142
. This has been referred to as the VDC 
in the following pages.  
This meeting was conducted in the presence of Kesar Singh Aire (Unit Officer for Hills-
II project, Kimsar village) from WMD and three women „motivators‟ who would help to 
form the self-help groups for women. In theory, the functional powers were devolved to 
the „community based‟ institutions.  
“Today on 17th December, 2002, a general body meeting of the Kimsar panchayat was 
held to inform the villagers about the Hills-II project. As some villagers know from their 
„exposure tour‟ and the training session in Rishikesh about the program, same rules and 
regulations of the project were repeated for others. After this, the apex body for the 
implementation of this project, to be called GAREMA, was proposed to be formed. It was 
agreed that the gram pradhan would be the ex-officio patron of the project.” 
 
This meeting also defined the power distribution between the newly formed committee 
and the elected local government. The executive power in the project was to be retained 
by the VDC while the elected local government was reduced to the role of a consenting 
bystander. By assigning no active role to the gram panchayat, the VDC also removed the 
scrutiny and control of its activities from the village public sphere. The VDC was to 
address the collective problem of water but the decision-making was to not to be 
collective but confined to the nominated committee that did not derive its power from the 
collective mandate nor could be removed from office by democratic means. Following 
resolutions were passed in this first meeting:  
“Resolution-1: GAREMA was proposed to be formed of the following office bearers and 
members:  
 
Post Name  Proposed By  Seconded By 
President  Rajpal Singh Bist Ummed Singh 
 
Anusuya Prasad 
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Vice President  Khushhal Singh 
Azad 
Viren Singh Bhopal Singh 
Secretary Vinod Kandwal MadanMohan 
 
Darshanlal Kandwal 
Treasurer Smt.Chandrakala 
Devi 
SS Negi Bhubneshwar 
Kandwal 
Member Jaswant Singh Prema Singh Negi  Om Prakash 
Kandwal 
Member Chait Singh Bist Balam Singh Ved Prakash 
Kandwal 
Member Bansi dhar Kandwal Satya Prasad 
 
Vishambhar Dutt 
Member Sachidanand 
Kandwal 
Purushottam 
Kandwal 
Rajendra Prasad 
Kandwal 
Member Smt.Guddi Devi Narendra Singh 
 
Smt.Urmila Devi 
Member Smt. Sangeeta Devi Smt Pushpa Devi 
 
Smt.Seema Devi 
Member Smt. Krishna Devi Smt.Prema Devi  Smt. Vijaya 
Kandwal 
Table 13. Village Watershed Committee in Kimsar 
Resolution- 2:  
A resolution was passed that the amount of money received for the project would be 
saved in a national or grameen bank, with the signatures of the President and the 
Secretary. The funds would be withdrawn and managed by the joint signatures of the 
President and the secretary.”  
 
A closer look at the above table reveals that the formation of VDC in the village also 
represented the power distribution among the strategic groups in the village. The 
nominated president for the VDC, Bist, was also the president for government sponsored 
project of DPAP and the secretary nominated was the son of the earlier secretary. All 
other office bearers had no active role in the project as specified in the second resolution, 
but served the purpose of a simulated democratic decision-making and inclusivity in the 
project. This point would become more obvious when we observe the inclusion of 
women into the committee. The above table indicates that after the powerful posts were 
distributed among the village contractors
143
, a woman candidate was nominated for the 
post of treasurer. The inclusion of women members in the committee and their order of 
appearance in the table indicate the importance assigned to them. Selecting three women 
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members in a row towards the end of the meeting also indicates the priority given to them 
and served the purpose of fulfilling the requirements of gender balance as required by the 
World Bank.  
Blühdorn (2007) argues that the simulation of democratic representation (inclusion of 
women in the decision-making body) is a strategy of depoliticization that shapes the 
public opinion about the democratic nature of an organization when in reality the 
democratization of decision-making has not been achieved. It also limits the public 
deliberation and solutions for the issues that are simulated to be resolved, like inclusivity, 
while they still exist. The implementing agencies emphasize persuasion to convince the 
donor agencies towards believing that women have been empowered by inclusion into the 
decision-making committee, whereas in reality the inclusion is highly selective and into 
non-power positions.  
The second resolution as cited above, further concentrates the power of watershed project 
management into the hands of president and the secretary. If they are authorized to 
withdraw and spend the funds, they are responsible for the project also. The second 
resolution also excluded the gram panchayat from any control or monitoring of the funds. 
In this arrangement, removal of the gram panchayat also circumvented any (undue) 
political interference and public scrutiny, where the funds would be released by the 
WMD in the account of the VDC that would then undertake watershed development 
activities in the village and be accountable to the WMD.  
It must however be noted that no mention was made of registering this committee under 
the Societies Registration Act of 1860 as outlined by the World Bank. It is evident that 
there was no intention of „devolution of power‟ to the VDC as it was left almost as an 
informal body in the absence of any legal status. This was a common pattern of work in 
the Hills-II project as identified by the World Bank Aide-Memoire, mid-term review. The 
WMD responded by „promising to register all VDCs under the Societies Act by 
September 30, 2002‟144. As the project in Kimsar began in 2002 and ended without a 
registration of the VDC in 2005, certainly the WMD did not fulfill its promise of 
registering all VDCs by September 2002 nor did it follow this guideline in the villages 
that were taken up after this date, for e.g. Kimsar.  
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Functions of VDC: 
This section shows that the VDC was authorized to undertake village development work 
and issues of collective concern that is constitutionally the responsibility of the elected 
local government. If so, what was its source of legitimacy and authorization to do 
undertake such work? Here I argue that the creation of apolitical bodies parallel to the 
elected village government that is authorized to perform the same task is a strategy of 
depoliticization that seeks to provide village development without the involvement of 
local democratic politics.  
After the formation of the VDC in the first meeting of the Hills-II project, the next 
meeting held a week later on 24
th
 December, 2002 outlined the activities to be undertaken 
by the VDC:  
“An unopposed resolution was passed to select two areas- Salami Tok and Nighra Tok 
within the Kimsar gram sabha for forestation (vanikaran). The VDC was given the 
authorization to conduct the survey and begin work in these areas. Since these areas are 
privately owned, the landowners are allowed to use their choice of private plants along 
with those given by the implementing agencies” 
 
It can be observed from the above resolution that forestation of the private land was the 
priority for the implementing agencies. For this action, cooperation from the villagers 
was required (as the land was privately owned). As the VDC was formed from among the 
villagers, it would be easier for the government to work through this committee rather 
than directly employ its line departments. This was also a reason that VDCs were formed 
but only to be instrumentalized by the WMD to facilitate rent-seeking and to act as its 
local agent. The nominated status of the VDC made it easier to manipulate than the gram 
panchayat that has the popular mandate and could be scrutinized by the public and 
removed from office if found to be involved in unfair practices. The process of VDC 
formation made it immune from such scrutiny and control.  
The VDC gradually added more issues of collective concern in its list of activities in the 
next meeting held in February 2003:  
“An unopposed resolution was passed that a pumping system should be installed in the 
village water source of Jugyapani to supply drinking water to the households. A request 
for this project should be sent to the WMD, Dehradun.” 
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The next meeting held in June 2003 reconfirmed the above resolution and outlined other 
areas in which VDC would be authorized to work:  
“The pumping scheme to bring water from the Jugyapani source to the village households 
was passed unopposed. It was decided that collective forestation (samuhik udyanikaran) 
and private forestation (nizi udyanikaran) can only be successful if there was wire-
fencing (taar baad) to protect them. In the village, around 2 hectares of land would be 
undertaken for collective forestation and wire-fencing. VDC would also construct 
cemented walking tracks of about 3 km in the village. As a part of minor-irrigation 
support, 366 meters of Gul and 500 meters of pipeline would be laid in the Juwahad Tok. 
Stone check-dams would be made in the Dehran Tok, Dadi Tok and Viradi Tok. The unit 
officer from WMD also explained about the construction of water tanks and fodder tanks 
in the village. 25 water tanks and 50 fodder tanks would be made in the village.” 
 
It can be observed from the above meeting record that the VDC would not only undertake 
forestation and water supply in the village, but also be responsible for wire-fencing, street 
construction, minor-irrigation, construction of check dams and water tanks among other 
things. These developmental issues that would normally come under the jurisdiction of 
the elected gram panchayat were shifted to non-elected, nominated committee. This 
committee was recognized and funded by the WMD. Meanwhile, the elected local 
government received neither support from the government to undertake similar activities, 
nor any power to influence the decision-making of the VDC. It left the elected local 
government powerless and weak while the nominated committee formed by the alliance 
of strategic groups was recognized and empowered by the WMD.  
This meeting also discussed the formation of a „revolving fund‟ for the maintenance and 
upkeep of the project activities:  
“An unopposed resolution was passed that each villager would contribute a sum of Rs. 10 
as directed by WMD. This amount would form the basis of establishing a revolving fund 
for the project.” 
 
Along with the funds issued by WMD, the revolving fund was also to be deposited in the 
village bank account, jointly operated by the president and the secretary of the VDC. 
Under the directions from WMD, the VDC would not only undertake activities as 
enumerated above but would also be the custodian of public funds. However, the agency 
authorized to undertake these activities in the village had no legal status or democratic 
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mandate from the people. The question of its legitimacy in the village public sphere was 
also raised in this village meeting.  
 
Legitimacy of VDC and the Issue of its Registration  
 
This section shows that the VDC continued to work in the village without any formal 
status. The only evidence that such a committee existed was in the minutes of the village 
meeting, which cannot be considered a legally binding evidence as it was an informal 
document maintained by the president of the VDC. In the absence of any other 
constitutional provision for the formation of such a committee, the villagers demanded in 
this meeting that the VDC must be registered as a non-profit organization under the 
Societies Registration Act of 1860:  
“An unopposed resolution was passed to register the VDC as a non-profit organization 
and the president of the VDC was authorized to undertake the formalities of 
registration.”145 
 
This resolution by the gram sabha clearly indicates an interest of the village community 
in the registration of VDC. The president of VDC certainly did not „look into the matter‟ 
or was prevented by the WMD staff to push for registration is not clear. For the next one 
year, this issue remained unattended. It reappeared as a point of debate in the meeting of 
4
th
 November 2004. The resolution passed earlier was repeated again in the following 
words:  
“The registration of GAREMA was felt necessary by the house and the President was 
given the responsibility of getting the formalities completed. It was agreed by all that the 
amount of 3000 INR required for the registration of GAREMA could be withdrawn from 
the „Revolving Fund‟ account number 207146.  
 
Two months later, the project came to an end in Kimsar without any registration of the 
VDC. The last meeting of the committee was held on 27
th
 January, 2005 after which no 
records exist about the project work. In fact, no records other than the minutes of village 
meeting exist for this project at the village level. In my search for the records, WMD 
office in Dehradun directed me to the village committee and the village committee 
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directed me the president of the VDC. The president in turn confessed that he did not 
receive any documents, plans, expenditure details or log-books from the WMD office. 
WMD certainly had mid-term reviews, status reports and a combined data on the entire 
State but individual details of the work done at the village level were unavailable or not 
made available. Since VDC had no legitimate status, there was no legal mechanism 
available to them to „demand‟ the relevant information from WMD nor could the research 
team ask VDC for any information due to the same reason. In practice, the VDC was 
reduced to a one-man committee, run by the president.  
To explore why the VDC was not given a formal status, it is important to explore who it 
would benefit and how. In theory, the governmental agency „empowers‟ the villagers to 
form such institutions that would govern their watershed projects, in practice, the 
governmental agency retains an arm‟s-length control over the community-based 
organizations. In this case, the VDC in Kimsar is nominated to perform the act of 
decentralization but actual power of funds and planning is retained by the WMD. No 
public dissemination of information is practiced that could facilitate a democratic 
decision-making in the village but information is shared on a „need to know‟ basis and 
never in writing between the WMD and VWC. The VDC works independently of the 
panchayati raj institutions, sometimes in competition with it as was the case in Kimsar. 
The VDC president could be the next sarpanch if he worked well in watershed project. 
This separation from the panchayat keeps the VDC out of the political sphere in the 
village as they are not elected democratically (but nominated) and hence not subject to 
the removal from office by popular mandate. In the absence of any formal registration, 
the VDC automatically dispersed once the project team left the village. The 
„multidisciplinary teams‟ formed by WMD shifted to new areas once the project was over 
in Kimsar. These teams were reformed and deputed to new areas now under the new 
project sanctioned by the World Bank called „Uttaranchal Decentralized Watershed 
Development Project‟ (UDWDP- Gramya). The delegation of responsibility to technical 
committees formed and reformed makes it difficult to establish the accountability in the 
project both at the village and implementing agency level. The non-formal status of the 
VDC further facilitates inappropriate rent seeking outside the public sphere, both by the 
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government and village committee members. Hence, it makes sense to implement the 
project through the VDC and not through the village panchayat.  
The village sarpanch Negi argues that VDC was not a part of the gram sabha and 
although he was the patron of the project in theory, no decisions were made with his 
consultation. To „politicize‟ this issue, so that gram sabha would become the responsible 
body for the project management, the sarpanch demanded an official „hand-over‟ from 
the VDC with all the right papers. As shown above, no such documents were ever shared 
with the VDC by the implementing agency of WMD.  
The „Status Report IWDP (Hills-II)‟ published by the WMD in March 2005 provided the 
status of action taken on the observations made in the Aide Memoire of the World Bank 
supervision mission in 2002. On the issue of registration of institutions formed, the status 
report presents the data on the total number of VDCs formed in each division and those 
that were registered under the Society Act 1860. In the Rishikesh division, 121 VDCs 
were formed out of which 83 were registered
147
. This report cites the reason given by 
WMD for non-registration as follows: „many VDCs are unwilling to do registration under 
Societies Act inspite of persuasion of project staff‟148. However, the minutes of village 
meetings in Kimsar do not record any mention of registration from the project staff, 
certainly no persuasion. In fact, the villagers pressed for registration and sanctioned funds 
for it as noted above, but to no avail. But the absence of registration or a legal basis did 
not prevent the VDC from working on the watershed development project, an important 
component of which was the pumping system to supply drinking water to the households.  
 
Drinking Water Scheme in Kimsar 
 
This section explores the pumping scheme and its management by the VDC in Kimsar 
village to argue that the scheme ran into trouble and still lies dysfunctional precisely due 
to the strategies of depoliticization followed during the planning and implementation 
phase, which not only removed it from the village public sphere but also kept the elected 
local government from taking any responsibility for its repair and revival.  
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The demand for a pumping system to supply drinking water was raised in the village 
meeting in February, 2003:  
“An unopposed resolution was passed that a pumping system should be installed in the 
village water source at Jugyapani to supply drinking water to the village residents.” 
As mentioned in the meeting records, the need for proper drinking water facility in the 
villages was felt and a proposal was passed for requesting the Hills-II project officers to 
provide resources for installing a diesel run motor to pump water from the source in the 
valley to the village surface level and subsequently to the houses and would be run by the 
VDC. This body would be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the water 
supply system.  
After the meeting in April 2003, which again emphasized the need for the pumping 
scheme, it did not find any mention in the two meeting that were held in the next 18 
months. The issue made its reappearance in the records of the last meeting held on 27
th
 
January 2005. The minutes of this meeting in January 2005 read as follows:  
“A meeting of the gram sabha was organized today in the Baraat Ghar to discuss the 
issue of drinking water problem and the pumping scheme. The issue of laying the 
pipelines was also discussed in the meeting. Following important points were raised: It 
has been decided by the house that only those villagers who have paid the security money 
for water supply will be provided with a connection nearest possible to their house. 
However, the beneficiary has to make his/ her own arrangements to take it inside his 
house.  
All interested villagers must deposit the security amount of 150INR with the president 
today so that their connections could be planned accordingly.  
It has been decided by the house that Mr. SuryaMohan Singh, son of Pushkar Singh Negi 
has been appointed to operate the pump. He would be paid a sum of 500 INR per month 
for this job.  
No fiddling with the pipelines would be tolerated once the system has been laid out. Any 
kind of misuse of the pipelines would be seen as a punishable offence.”  
 
It appears that in the meantime, when no mention of the pumps, pipes or the layout plan 
finds entry in the meeting records, it can be inferred from the above resolutions of this 
meeting, that a pump was installed, storage and supply tanks were constructed, but the 
meetings of VDC do not have any mention or recording of the discussions on these 
issues. It did not bring up these matters for the public discussion and now the issues 
related to its management were being discussed. The minutes cited above clearly shows 
that this village meeting was not a forum to discuss the water supply system where the 
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villagers could voice their opinions and ideas about the project but the villagers were 
approached as „consumers‟ to be informed about a new scheme that they could avail if a 
monthly bill of Rs. 150 was paid to the VDC. Using water without paying for it would be 
considered a punishable offence.  
It can be noted here that the substantial discussion about the cost or quality of the pump, 
layout of the pipes, number of required connections among other things were not brought 
out in the village public sphere. The villagers were approached only after the committee 
had decided the „practical issues of concern‟ away from the public sphere and needed to 
convince the potential users to pay the security deposit and inform about the rules to be 
observed and not to deliberate upon, for example, what rules should be put in place. 
Irrespective of any possibility for a greater democratic influence on the rules, pump 
specifications or the other decision-making of the VDC, the villagers needed to know 
what the VDC was doing or failing to do and to influence it as far as they could, to 
accommodate the collective problems. The issue of the pumping system in Kimsar shows 
how the scheme was shifted from „publicity‟ in the sense of openness in the public sphere 
to the modern usage of the term in journalism or politics whereby the interest groups seek 
to convince the mass of consumers whose receptiveness is public but uncritical. It 
appears that the information was kept from to the people to avoid the critical public 
scrutiny from the villagers.  
The consensually nominated VDC became the main agency through which water supply 
was to be provided in the village. The role of the gram panchayat was already minimized 
in the formation of the VDC and now the gram pradhan was just another customer in the 
village who did not receive any water in his house but could take no action as VDC was 
neither elected nor registered. Complaints, if any, could only be made against the 
individuals who were the office bearers and that is not preferred in a close knit village 
society, also because it was common knowledge in the village public sphere that WMD 
had reduced the committee to a puppetry role.  
This was the last record that existed in the village on the pumping scheme or any other 
aspect of the project. The president of GAREMA was of the opinion that since villagers 
did not take any active interest in the project work, he stopped calling any more meetings.  
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After the last meeting in January 2005, security money was collected, a pump-operator 
was employed and the stage seemed set for the water supply to begin. It never did.  
 
The next section explores the reasons why the pumping system failed to provide any 
water in the village taps after all the arrangements were made for it. It argues that the 
marginalization of the local state and empowerment of a nominated VDC for the short 
period of project duration created conditions in which the VDC felt responsible for the 
pumping scheme only during the project duration and the local state did not feel 
responsible for the pumping scheme after the project duration as it was still not 
completed by the VDC when the project left the village. In the end, the pumping project 
remained abandoned and dysfunctional by all the involved actors including the VDC, 
WMD and the gram panchayat. 
6.2.2  Seeing like the local state:  village headman’s view on pumping system 
 
This section presents the views of the elected gram pradhan to show that the temporary 
status of the VWC tied to the project duration and its lack of formal status in the village 
allowed it to disperse after this duration although the activities started during the project 
were still incomplete. Circumventing the local panchayat that allowed WMD to 
manoeuvre the VDC, also absolved the VDC from any accountability to the local people 
and it faded away from the village public sphere after securing the „revolving fund‟ and 
without fulfilling the requirements of drinking water supply. The gram panchayat took no 
responsibility for its revival because the project was not yet complete and none of the 
documents related to the project could be provided by the VDC.  The present status of 
VDC in the village was now a matter of personal opinion. The gram pradhan was equally 
at a loss whether to place the VDC in relation with the project duration or with the 
activities that it undertook during the project period:  
“VDC has left the drinking water project incomplete and now there is no one to take 
responsibility for it. They say that the water supply scheme in the village is complete 
because they showed once in the trial run that water could be supplied to the houses but 
in my opinion, the project is still incomplete. One thinks that I say this because of 
political reasons and differences that one may perceive between us due to our different 
political affiliations, but the things that are incomplete with respect to the project are right 
there in front of our eyes. The first thing is that the pipelines running across the village 
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have not yet been buried under the ground. Not only is this a technical requirement but 
also because someone might trip and fall while walking in the village. I would have 
ignored the technical aspect that the pipes have not been buried as per technical 
requirements as long as it was not creating problems for the villagers. There have been 
cases when some people tripped due to the pipes on the way, fell and hurt themselves 
badly”149 
 
In this statement, the gram pradhan noted that the most visible sign of the incomplete 
work was the pipes running across the village above the ground. It did not help the 
villagers in any way as the water supply did not begin but created additional trouble in 
everyday life. On enquiring about the present status of VDC in the village, the gram 
pradhan observed that:  
“Since the Hills-II project is now over and WMD has left the village, but the water supply 
work is still incomplete, I would presume that the committee that was formed during the 
project is still valid and it is their responsibility to finish the remaining work. Or, if we 
presume that VDC has also become invalid after the project was over, and it was in office 
only for the project duration, then it should hand-over the charge to gram panchayat. In 
this case, the VDC should handover the revolving fund that was collected from the 
people. This fund can be utilized by the gram panchayat to finish the remaining work”.150 
 
In his statement above, the gram pradhan clarified that the elected village government 
had no role to play in the water supply scheme till VDC finished the work for which it 
has already received funds from the government and then hand it over to the gram 
panchayat. The gram pradhan also demanded the „revolving fund‟ that was collected by 
the VDC during the project. In fact, revolving fund was not the only thing that kept the 
gram panchayat from taking charge of the water supply system. He also complained that 
there were no records of the money spent, plan of the pipe layout, specifications of the 
pump among other things that he required for a systematic handover:  
“If the government says that the VDC ended when the project was over and the new 
caretaker of the scheme would now be the village panchayat. I have no problems with 
that. But before I undertake to maintain the scheme, I am supposed to know what is it that 
I have to maintain. What is the scheme? If I am a responsible village head, I should know 
about all the programs in my village. I want to give you an example. Suppose we have a 
visit from the District Collector (DC) office and the Collector asks me to explain about 
the projects in my village. I see it as my responsibility as the village head to know about 
the projects in my village. There may be technical nuisances that I may not be aware 
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about but I should certainly know about the non-technical aspects of the project. If the 
DC asks me „Tell me about the amount spent on this particular scheme‟, I should know 
that. And how can I know that without the right papers? I am arguing that if there is a 
problem with the pipelines somewhere and it begins to leak in the future, how will I 
locate the problem if I have no sketch or any diagram of the line distribution? I should 
know how the pipelines run, where the joints are before one can repair it.” 151 
 
In his statement, the gram pradhan confessed that so far he had no concrete information 
about the project as the communication between the VDC and WMD was always verbally 
transmitted and never in written or made public. If the elected village head as a patron of 
the project had no concrete information, it was obvious that the common villagers knew 
even lesser about the activities of the project. It points to the fact that VDC worked in 
isolation from the villagers as well as the patron of the program. The villagers or the 
gram panchayat had no formal mechanism to demand information from the VDC and 
VDC in turn was not responsible to the villagers in any direct way. This made it even 
more difficult to persuade or even force the VDC to finish the water supply scheme or 
provide the documents related to its planning and construction.  
It was VDC‟s responsibility to demand the documents related to the project from the 
WMD staff and they were at fault for not doing this. They did not demand the documents 
because that would put the WMD staff on defensive and they would withdraw the project 
from the village. As VDC did not want to lose the benefits that the project could bring, it 
acted as directed by the WMD and hence did not represent the village public opinion in 
the governmental sphere or it would have demanded the documents related to the village 
development program as the gram pradhan demanded. The VDC was only simulating to 
represent the villagers, deriving its weak legitimacy from the „consensual nomination‟ by 
the village gram sabha. In practice, it was a body of politically influential village 
contractors that was brought together in a committee, effectively reduced to one 
contractor, the president, who acted not as a representative of the village but a stooge of 
the WMD staff. A strategy of depoliticization was to put such a committee in the first 
place that would not demand transparency from the WMD and act according to its 
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interests. Depoliticization replaced the villager‟s interests with the interests of the 
implementing agency called WMD by nominating a VDC that would not, and could not 
demand documental evidence of its practices as no one would, or could demand any 
documents from the VDC as it was not accountable to the people or to be elected by 
them. This was the situation that prevented the gram pradhan from asking for project 
related documents and VDC‟s evasion to comply with this request. VDC argued that it 
did not receive any documents from WMD and this demand should therefore be placed 
before them and not to the VDC. As WMD worked with officials from different line 
departments, it was not possible to find the team that was responsible for the project in 
Kimsar as they are now deputed to new projects in different configurations:  
“The Kimsar unit of WMD that formed the VDC has also disappeared. Once the project 
was over in this village, their deputation was also over and now new teams have been 
formed for the new World Bank project. The Hills-II project had its unit office in Muni-
ki-Reti, Rishikesh that has now been shifted to Uttarkashi for this new project”.152 
 
It can be observed that circumventing the elected and political panchayat the WMD was 
able to shift the blame on a committee in the village that existed only for the project 
duration and even the highest authority in the village government, namely, the gram 
pradhan had no possibility of securing any details about the water supply scheme that lies 
dysfunctional in the village.   
6.2.3 Seeing like the VDC- President’s view of the Water Supply Scheme  
 
This section enumerates the official position of the VDC to show that the above shown 
observations of the gram pradhan were contested by the VDC and contrary to his view 
the VDC held that the project was complete and water was supplied to the village. It was 
stopped only because the villagers did not pay the monthly charges due to which the 
diesel for the pump could not be procured and the water supply stopped. It can be 
observed in this section that the gram pradhan blamed the VDC while the VDC blamed 
the „people‟ for the failure of the scheme. The president of VDC explained that he was 
not provided with any documents about the project from WMD and hence he could give 
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the gram pradhan the papers he wanted for the handover of the water supply scheme to 
the gram panchayat. It can be observed in this section that depoliticization of VDC was 
used to facilitate corruption and rent-seeking that was observed in the governance 
practices.  
The VDC president agreed that the watershed development project in the village did not 
achieve its goal of drinking water supply or forestation in the depleted areas because the 
„people‟ were engaged in the project with very short-term motives:  
“The people did not deposit the „revolving fund‟ in time and were confined just to the 
labour work on daily wages. The participation of the villagers could not be achieved as it 
should have been. And the different works done under the IWDP were not guarded or 
taken good care of by the people.  
For example, the plantations which were done could not flourish as the watchmen did not 
pay any attention to it and it was destroyed. Still some plantations which were given to 
the private lands are secure as they were protected from the animals and care was taken. 
There were professional motivators for each village but they did not do their job at all as 
they were salaried employees. (So, even if they don‟t do the job, they were assured of 
their income on a monthly basis.) I don‟t know if they motivated the people or they 
didn‟t, but we could not manage the participation of the people”.153 
 
 The president argued that the water supply scheme was complete and could start working 
if the cost of the diesel could be met:  
“We have a water problem in this village as the water source is far below the village plain 
level. So, we demanded a pumping set for the village and finally we were able to get it 
and have installed the pump. While we were putting the pumping project, the villagers 
were very excited that they would be able to get the water in their houses. But this pump 
is a diesel run machine and now people do not pay the money for it. There are two 
problems, one is that we need someone to operate the machine everyday and second is 
the cost of the diesel. Then this operator could start the machine and pump the water to 
the tanks and then it could be supplied to the houses.  But the villagers are unable to bear 
the costs. So, inspite of everything being in place, the project has remained 
dysfunctional”154  
 
I reminded the president about the „revolving fund‟ that was collected by the VDC for 
this purpose and that the gram pradhan referred to in his list of requirements for 
accepting the water pump under the gram sabha:  
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“Initially it was decided that the revolving fund would only be kept as a security, to be 
used if something went wrong with the pumping system or some repairs were needed. So 
we did not touch that fund then.  Later after 3 months when I tried to start the pump one 
day, it did not work. I tried to call the mechanic here but the dealer told us to bring the 
pump to Dehradun. We carried the pump again all the way to Dehradun and got it 
repaired and brought it back to Jugyapaani. Again the gurkha laborers did this for us. 
Since that day, the motor lies idle for the want of diesel.” 
 
It remains open to discussion as to what could have been the problem in the pump that a 
mechanic cannot fix it there but requires the tedious process of carrying this 200kg pump 
on jeep tracks to Dehradun. The point is, this repair tour to the city and back was an 
expensive business as the president told me, they had to use the „revolving fund‟ and now 
there was no money for diesel or staff to run the motor. Besides the repairing cost for the 
motor, the president argued that he supplied water to the village for one month that used 
up the remaining money from the revolving fund:  
“Initially, we took 150 INR advance from the villagers, saying that only those who pay 
this amount would be provided with the pipelines till their house. Accordingly we laid out 
the pipelines and then people demanded that we should run the motor with this money 
that they paid. So we ran the machine for about one month and then the money was 
over”155  
 
This claim by the president of the VDC was contested by the villagers, including the 
gram pradhan who was also a „customer‟ of the water supply scheme: 
“This statement is totally incorrect. It never worked for more than 2 days. I am also a 
consumer and I am just talking about myself here. I did not get any water at all and I 
cannot agree that it was run for 4 weeks. I did not get a drop of water in my tap. If you 
have any doubts, you can ask the president to open the supply channels and see in my 
house if there is any water reaching. I am the pradhan and even I don‟t get water in my 
house. I could agree that the water is reaching the supply tank but it is not getting 
distributed in the households and that is a bigger problem. The layout of the pipes is just 
random. It has been turned and twisted at wrong places just to provide some small benefit 
to even smaller number of people. Obviously, the water does not reach all the 
households”.156 
 
It can be observed in the above statement that the claims made by the VDC were 
contested by the gram pradhan and vice-versa. This made it difficult to ascertain the 
number of days for which the water supply system worked and the nature of repairs that 
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the pump underwent to understand if that could have used up the entire „revolving fund‟. 
But in its present state the water supply scheme was dysfunctional which also pointed to 
the fact that the sustainability of the scheme was not a priority for the VDC or the WMD. 
The goal was, as the gram pradhan noticed, to show once in the trial run that water could 
be supplied to the households. It did not reach his house even during the trial run due to 
inappropriate bending of pipes to provide the involved groups with water inside their 
house. The president of the VDC argued that this was not the case. It there were any 
shortcomings in the project, it was due to the reduced amount of funds that was made 
available to them from the WMD. They had to work in lesser than the required amount 
due to the rent-seeking practices by the implementing agencies. A non-compliance with 
their request would result in the withdrawal of the project from the village as explained in 
this interview:  
“Q: How long did the project last in this village?  
A: For about two years, from the day of the first meeting of the IWDP in our village.  
 
Q: Was there any problems that you faced dealing with the government staff?  
A: We had to pay a commission of 30% to the project staff from the funds meant for the 
project. It was done through cheques. If they sent one lakh rupees, it was deposited in our 
account and when we withdrew the money, out of the total amount we were forced to pay 
30% to them on the spot.  
 
Q:  Once you withdrew the money, you would carry 30,000 to their office? 
A: They would follow us to the bank and wouldn‟t leave us till we paid the money. They 
would be hanging around the bank till we paid.  
 
Q: They already knew when the money was deposited in your account?  
A: Of course they knew about it. They knew about every penny that came to our account. 
It was them who sent the money to the bank, so there was no question of them not 
knowing. Measurements were taken by them and then the money was sent accordingly. 
They would say that if you don‟t pay us the said amount, we will reduce your 
measurement (of the work done), we will send a „recovery‟ team to your village, and your 
project would be failed, you won‟t get any further budget. We were willing to pay as the 
villagers then wanted to get as much work as possible for the village. They threatened 
that they would stop the work if we don‟t pay the appropriate commission.  
It has happened in many villages in this area. Wherever the villagers refused to pay their 
commission, the work was stopped and at the same time where the payments were made 
well, as in one village, the work amount has crossed even one crore rupees”157 
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The point here is not to show that rent-seeking was a popular practice in the watershed 
development project but to argue that no agency in the village was willing to take 
responsibility for the revival of the drinking water supply scheme. The gram pradhan 
held VDC responsible; VDC held the „people‟ and WMD responsible while WMD in turn 
held the VDC responsible as the entire funds for the project were directly disbursed into 
their account. The depoliticized status of the VDC allowed it to be used as a tool for the 
implementing agencies. In theory, the project was an example of decentralized watershed 
governance where „people‟ were responsible for managing their own watersheds with the 
funds supplied directly to their accounts, while in reality it was a toothless tiger, an 
informal, non-registered, nominated committee controlled by the implementing agency 
called WMD that retained the control of VDC from an arm‟s length. In this way, the 
responsibility of any mismanagement could easily be shifted to the „people‟ as the project 
was „self-governed‟ and WMD could stay clear from any responsibility or legal action. 
The statement cited above explains the power relation between the WMD and VDC also. 
WMD exercised its discretion of village selection for the projects to manufacture consent 
from the VDC to comply with its „fixed rate of 30%‟ commission from the total amount. 
The apolitical and nominated status of the VDC was an essential component of creating 
such a body in the first place that would work hands-in-glove with WMD because it 
would not be dependent on the villager‟s opinion for its reelection and would only be 
answerable to the WMD. In other words, if the villagers would not agree to the „fixed rate 
of 30%‟ there would be no VDC formed at all, simply because the village would then be 
deselected for the project implementation. A VDC emerging from such subordinated 
status was in no position to refuse their demands and was easily manipulated.  
The president explained in the interview that the funds reduced by 30% after paying the 
commission left him in a difficult situation where he had to compromise on the quality of 
the work and often report false expenses to compensate for it:   
“Q: How you manage to do the work in an amount reduced by 30%? 
A: We have to adjust the working days of the laborers. We show the same number of 
laborers who work. For example, if 10 people work for 4 days, we show 10 people 
working for 8 days on the bill. This is how we cover that 30% paid in the commission. 
Otherwise we would be in trouble and so would they be. This is the actual practice.  
There are certain rates which are fixed. The rates of the labor or of the stones or the 
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transportation charges in these areas are fixed. There may be cases where we may not pay 
the transportation but we have to show it to cover the commission.  
 
Q: Can you give me an example from the project where you managed the funds in this 
way?  
 
A: Say for example, they give us the rate of 50 INR per meter. We go to the labor and get 
him to agree that he would do the job at 25-30 INR per meter. If he is ready the work gets 
done.  
A2: We actually sub-contract the work. We make contractors and give them the work. 
For example, we tell the contractors, that you have to make this wall that costs 100 INR; 
will you do it in 40 INR? He would say, yes I will make it. Even when we pay him 40 
INR he would make good daily wage at the end of the day.  
 
A1: Suppose we have made the boundary walls for the forestation. Let‟s say that the wall 
costs us 30 Rs per meter. We sub-contract it to the labor at 20 Rs per meter. At the rate of 
20 Rs/ meter also, he is making 150-200 Rs every day. And if we keep him on the daily 
wage, he would charge 80 Rs and do the work only worth 50 Rs. But if we give the work 
to him on contract basis, instead of 80 Rs, he would try to make 150 Rs for himself in the 
day. He would then work more and do more than on a daily wage basis.  
 
For example, in the forestation there is a need for digging pits to plant trees. If we get 2 
Rs per pit from the WMD, we tell the laborers that they have to dig the pits at Rs 1 per 
pit. Then the laborer tries to dig 100s of pits. And if we put him on the fixed wage of 80 
Rs./ day, he wouldn‟t dig more than 50 pits.  
This is the fact, somewhere something is wrong. The system is wrong somewhere or the 
other.  
 
Q: And the other thing that you do is maintain the register for 8 days when the work is 
done for 4?  
 
A: We are forced to do it otherwise how can we cover up for the commission paid which 
has no record. Where shall we show it? We have to do it. Whatever amount we have paid 
in „black‟ that we have to make into „white‟/ legal  
And if we don‟t pay; the village doesn‟t get any work at all. Then the villagers shout at us 
that the neighboring village has got so much work through projects and why is our village 
not getting any.  There are many types of problems that we face.  
And the other thing that was the main money spinning enterprise was the „Exposure 
tours‟. The department made enormous amounts of money through these tours. Someday 
they are going to Pantnagar, next day to somewhere else, third day to Jaipur and so on. 
This was the most corrupt practice in this entire project. No doubt some people went to 
these places but it was totally illogical and out of place”158 
 
This excerpt from the interview shows us that corruption in the project activities is not an 
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exceptional phenomenon but an accepted form of behavioral practice. If WMD seeks 
rent, the VDC compensates for it in the records and incomplete work. The point here is 
not to show that there is corruption at the local level but to show how and why it exists 
and sustains itself as a common practice. It can also be observed that the institutions 
formed for carrying out the watershed development, at the project level as well as the 
village level, play an important role in continuing this practice. This could also be 
attributed to their lack of direct accountability to the local people and also to their 
upwardly accountable structure. The apolitical process of their formation either by 
„consensual nomination‟ or „decided by a group of prominent NGO leaders‟ remains only 
a simulation of their democratic nature while in actual practice the consensus is in most 
cases manufactured. An apolitical institution makes it possible to manufacture consent 
easily compared to the deliberative democratic processes of the political institutions. In 
this sense, depoliticization emerges as a favorable governance strategy that reduces 
complexity and promises to increase efficiency. The outcome is a proliferation of 
puppetry institutions working according to the needs of funding agencies in the name of 
decentralized institutions that are empowered for the development of self-governed 
watersheds.  
The direct involvement of VDC in the governance of natural resources of the village 
brings it in direct competition with the elected village government that is authorized to 
work on the same issues. As observed in the village, the relations between the gram 
pradhan and the VDC were not always cordial. The gram pradhan described the VDC as 
inefficient and corrupt while the VDC blames him for not motivating the villagers to 
participate in the project. This led to a situation of conflict between the two in which the 
issue of water supply suffered and remained abandoned. The next section describes the 
(non) acceptance of VDC in the village public sphere as a legitimate authority to 
undertake watershed development work. 
6.2.4 Elected State and the ‘nominated’ VDC in the village public sphere 
 
This section shows that the relationship between the gram panchayat and the VDC 
remained uneasy due to their contestation of the power over natural resource management 
in the village. While the WMD empowered the VDC to implement the Hills-II project 
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that undertook natural resource management in the village, the elected status of the gram 
panchayat provided it with the people‟s mandate for village development activities. The 
gram panchayat demanded documentary evidences of the water supply scheme and 
forestation work done in the village, which was indirectly a demand from the VDC to 
prove its legitimacy to the gram sabha and make its dealings with the WMD transparent 
in the village public sphere. This section concludes that the empowerment of the local 
bodies other than elected village panchayats is a strategy of depoliticization that results in 
a proliferation of agencies at the local level with poorly defined job-profiles and 
jurisdiction. It effectively strengthens the village elite as parallel force to bypass and 
compete with the panchayati raj institutions and makes the project susceptible to capture 
by the strategic groups instead of a decentralization of political power to the grassroots.  
 
In his interview, the gram pradhan asserted that gram panchayat was the only legitimate 
agency in the village and no other agency could take its place. It demanded that the 
watershed development project should be officially handed over the gram sabha as VDC 
cannot be considered as a permanent agency responsible for it:  
“If they are incapable of finishing the water supply scheme, the gram panchayat, which is 
a legitimate body in itself and the works with various government departments to 
undertake developmental activities in the village, should be given the charge/ handed 
over to complete the project. This is also a rule that irrespective of the developmental 
agency (Zila Panchayat, Kshetra Panchayat) involved in the work duration of the 
project, finally the responsibility is transferred to the village panchayat for its further 
maintenance and upkeep as it is the only permanent elected body in the village and no 
organization can afford to stay in the village forever. So, in any case the project should be 
handed over to the gram panchayat.” 
 
His above statement points to the fact that the VDC is not recognized in the village public 
sphere because it was a temporary body only valid for the duration of the project. The 
choice of VDC as the implementing institution over the gram panchayat is a form of 
recognition provided by the WMD through the transfer of resources, partnering in the 
project and engagement through contract with the VDC
159
. Recognition strengthens the 
chosen institution for the project duration and lays the foundation of its automatic 
disappearance by curtailing the resource flow and contractual engagement with the VDC 
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once the project ends. The gram pradhan observed, as shown above, that the gram 
panchayat was the only legitimate body as it was constitutionally recognized and hence, 
like all the development projects of the village, water supply scheme should be „handed 
over‟ to it.  
On enquiring about the handover process by which the gram panchayat could take the 
responsibility of the project, the gram pradhan outlined the following requirements:  
“I would need the signatures of the President and the Secretary of VDC saying that the 
project has been transferred to the gram sabha for further upkeep and maintenance along 
with the relevant important papers. I certainly need the right papers for the „handover‟. 
Then I can try to finish the project and make sure the supply of water is regular. I know 
everyone may not be satisfied, as was the case with the work done by GAREMA. But as 
a man on a responsible position, I am aware „how much should one eat and how much 
should be left for developmental work‟. But the papers are needed anyway, you see. I am 
the gram pradhan and I know that if I undertake a developmental project in the village 
worth 50,000 INR, I would also like to keep whatever is left over from the project. Even I 
will not provide my time and labor without a price
160
. They must have charged for their 
time too. But we cannot move away from the technical requirements of the project (to 
save money) and leave it incomplete. 
 
It was implicit in his statement that the lack of right papers with the village committee 
was a clear indication of a high level of corruption and that the ones who did the water 
supply work do not know 'how much one should eat' and they have 'overeaten' in this 
case due to which the drinking water scheme remains dysfunctional. The demand for 
„right papers‟ could not be fulfilled by the VDC. It remained firm on the point that WMD 
did not share any papers with them that they could handover. In the absence of these, the 
gram pradhan was unwilling to recognize any work done by them in the village.  
VDC and its lack of recognition in the formal governance structure of the village was also 
responsible for the corruption in the project and it had provided the president avenues to 
monopolize the benefits to the extent that even the secretary of the VDC was unaware of 
the actual expenses and profits that the president was making: 
“In this village, the president and secretary were responsible for doing the project work. 
But the secretary could not get his hands on any cash or maybe he was never consulted or 
asked about the length of the pipes, motor system or layout of the supply lines is a matter 
of his personal relationship with the president. But if it comes to legal situations, he 
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cannot plead innocent on the account of lack of awareness about the project details 
simply because he is the secretary and he has to know it. Since it is a village based 
society and everyone knows everyone else, we rather maintain good social relations and 
avoid situations of argumentation or confrontation, regardless of the information that we 
have about the corrupt practices and misconduct. After all, we have to live here 
together.”161  
 
It was implied here that the secretary is comparatively innocent compared to the president 
who had made lots of money from the project. The secretary got more than the other 
villagers but not as much as the president, argued the pradhan. If there is a legal situation 
or official inquiry, he cannot say that he was unaware of the facts or has no papers to 
prove his honest conduct. The secretary must own responsibility for the failed water 
supply due to his official position in the project, even if the personal relations deterred 
him from acting effectively or demanding transparency from the president.  
From the perspective of depoliticization, it can be observed that the status of VDC in the 
eyes of the local governmental discourse is that of a one-man enterprise simulating a 
decentralization of political power in watershed governance. Besides the institutional 
competition between the gram panchayat and the VDC, the heads of these institutions 
also compete with each other on the political front. The president of the VDC has worked 
as a contractor in the village before and presently has the contract for the ongoing work 
on village hospital. He is an influential man in the village who acquires the role of the 
president in all watershed development projects. He was also the president for DPAP 
project and now re-nominated for the Hills-II watershed project. As already noted, the 
gram pradhan is a BJP sympathizer while the VDC president is affiliated to the 
Congress, both powerful political parties in India. His nomination for the president one 
more time also reflects the influence of State politics in Kimsar. At that time, 
Uttarakhand was ruled by the Congress government while the Yamkeshwar block had 
elected a BJP candidate. Hence the projects coming from the State agencies in Dehradun 
could have been influenced by the Congress government that led to the nomination of the 
present president. Incidentally, the nominated president is known to share a good 
relationship and his surname with the local Congress leader, Ms. Renu Bist. The village 
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headman elaborated his experiences in the earlier work that he did together with Rajpal, 
the president, and his role in the water supply scheme: 
“If I didn‟t intervene in this project, there would be no construction of the storage tank or 
anything at all. I told them very clearly that we don‟t want any compromise on the 
drinking water scheme. You have to do good work at least in this regard and after that if 
there is any work which is not done or is incomplete, even if there is an enquiry there 
would be no one to report. Even if someone does report, I would use my official position 
to save you all, as far as I can. But I am not going to go easy on two issues- drinking 
water and the revolving fund. I told them beforehand. But Rajpal didn‟t understand the 
responsibility of his post although he worked also as the president in DPAP. He 
disregarded the importance of the issue of drinking water. That was his biggest mistake. 
If only he had realized the importance of drinking water for the people, this problem 
wouldn‟t have come at all”.162 
 
The gram pradhan was willing to use his official position to save the VDC from any 
enquiry if they could only install the drinking water supply scheme even if the villagers 
made a complain about it to the higher authorities. But the president of the VDC had 
disregarded its importance and was flaunting his personal benefits in the open village 
public sphere that had caused resentment among the villagers:  
“I would give you the same example of the boundary wall for the village school or issue 
of pipe distribution in Hills-II. The people, who couldn‟t afford to buy pipes for taking 
the water close to their houses from the main line, gave me in written that they needed 
pipes. Now that I got a written request, I had to do justice as the village head no matter 
who is on the line of fire, be it Rajpal or my own brother. When I get the role of a judge, I 
always do my best to be true to god and myself and avoid all conscious partiality. There 
can be no „bhaibandi‟ in that. Of course, if unknowingly I make a wrong decision that is 
a different issue, but consciously I can never do partiality in decision-making.  
I told Rajpal, if you take 7 pipes, how will the poor get anything, even if they may need 
just 2 pipes? So I said, those who are poor and need pipes, it should be given to them 
first. Now Rajpal has fenced his balcony with these pipes, put his TV antenna on supply 
pipe while others didn‟t have enough to take the connection from the main pipe anywhere 
close to their house. Problem of the diesel engine is quite different. Whether it is new or 
old, is a different issue and that will go on for a long time. Even if it is discovered after 
10 years that the supplier has given a wrong/ old machine, they have to pay for it. 
Otherwise, the other day it was decided that the fire-valves to control the water flow have 
been brought and everything is now there then why are they not trying to run the 
engine?” 
 
The gram pradhan observed that even the engine bought for the pump was a cause of 
concern and he did express his opinion when the pump was being bought in Dehradun. 
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He recalled that when the machine was being bought, he noticed that the machine looked 
used and not brand new. There were patches of oil and seemed that he motor has been 
used before.  
 “I asked the manager of the shop that the motor looks like it has been used before and it 
is not new. The manager told me that I was both right and wrong. He said, just like your 
village, there was another village in the hills which wanted to install the pumping system 
and they ordered this pump and we made a trial run for them. In this sense you are right 
that the motor is old. But their scheme did not work out finally, so they never bought the 
motor and it remained in our shop. Hence it is new and you are wrong”. 163 
 
There were other discrepancies in the project besides the dysfunctional status of drinking 
water supply scheme and that the pipelines were not buried inside the ground:  
“That is one of the observable problems but not the only one. The problem is more 
serious than that. The problem here is of the measurements and payments made for those 
measurements. As the payments for burying the pipes has already been made, there must 
be some records of the date and amount and of the measurement. Someone must have 
done these measurements either the JE or the AE or the EE
164
 because that‟s the only way 
money could have been released. Payments have been made, IWDP has already finished 
its tenure in this village and everything in that respect is now closed. I want to ask the 
person who made its (MB, how did he do it when the project is not finished on the ground 
and extract the money for something that was never done.  
The labor charges for burying the pipes have already been made. And if it is so, why are 
the pipes still lying on the surface. If the money was never paid to VDC for this purpose, 
I would have requested the people to provide voluntary labor to do this. But it makes no 
sense to ask people to do something for free when the government has already paid for 
the work and in official documents it is a completed project.  
See, one thing leads to the other. When I press for an enquiry of the water supply system, 
I would also ask for the details of forestation. It was reported by VDC that it caught fire. I 
agree there are forest fires sometimes; there could be some situation in which the 
plantations caught fire. I want to ask the VDC who they reported to about this fire. There 
should be a report if the plantations caught fire. There may have been an enquiry about 
the causes that led to this fire or if someone deliberately burnt them down. There can‟t be 
a fire out of nowhere. Something must be behind it.”165  
 
From the above discussion it is clear that the relationship between the VDC and gram 
panchayat was competitive and unpleasant. WMD‟s choice of working with a nominated 
                                                 
163
 Interview with SS Negi, Field Notes, Dated: 4
th
 March 2007.  
164
 JE- Junior Engineer, AE- Assistant Engineer, EE- Executive Engineer 
165
 Hamare gaon me bhi Jalgam ke samay forestation ka kaam hua tha. Bus forestation 
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committee left the gram panchayat deprived of the resources that were being diverted to 
the village. VDC‟s control of decisions on the public issues and service delivery was the 
only form of legitimacy that it had. Its formation had sought to shift the conception of 
legitimacy to other than democratically elected bodies that were authorized to work on 
collective issues
166
, without a collective mandate. The reallocation of water supply to an 
independent body removed the political character of decision-making by circumventing 
the local elected government that led to the non-cooperative relationship between the two. 
Partially transferring the executive powers to the VDC without any formal registration 
allowed the implementing agencies to retain control over them. Conyers (2002) argues 
that when transfers of power are conditional or insecure (in this case, the condition of 
30% commission from the funds or the insecurity of village selection for the project), 
recipients are forced to respond to the needs of those institutions making the transfer so as 
to retain their privileges. Transfers made as privileges can be taken back, thus the threat 
of withholding power makes the local institutions upwardly accountable. However, it 
cannot be withheld if the transfers of power are made as secure rights where it can be 
exercised with discretion in response to local needs. Hence the institution to which the 
power is transferred is also indicative of the preference of the governing strategy. 
Transfer of power to hurriedly nominated, apolitical VDC is a strategy of depoliticization 
that takes away decision-making powers of the democratic local governments.   
To „politicize‟ this issue, so that gram sabha would become the responsible body for the 
project management, the sarpanch demanded an official „hand-over‟ from the VDC with 
all the right papers. In their absence, the project remains incomplete, outside the „critical 
public sphere‟ without any agency or institution that could take up and complete the 
drinking water supply system in Kimsar. 
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6.3 Simulation as a Technique of Depoliticization 
This section of the chapter attracts our attention to a practice of simulation in the 
watershed development projects that continue to maintain a coherent representation of the 
project in the policy documents independent of the actual realities on the ground. 
In the twin villages of Bhoyare Khurd and Pathar in Ahmednagar, a big signboard about 
the watershed work greeted us at the village main road.   
 
 
Photograph 3. Signboard about the Indo-German Program, Bhoyre 
Pathar village, Ahmednagar, Maharashtra State 
 
Overlooking the dilapidated condition of the sign that occupies a prominent place in the 
village „public space‟, the contents on it are more relevant for the discussion here. This 
signboard is placed on the main (and only) village road that connects Pimpalgaon Wagha 
to the twin villages of Bhoyre Khurd and Pathar. It reads that an „Indo-German 
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Watershed Development Program‟ funded by the „Federal Republic of Germany‟ is under 
progress „in the Bhoyre Khurd village‟. It is a „cooperative effort of the people of Bhoyre 
Khurd and Pathar‟ under the umbrella organization of „Vithal Gram Vikas and Panlot 
Kshetra Vikas Sanstha of Pimpalgaon Wagha‟. NABARD, KfW, WOTR and GTZ are 
other actors in the program. „GoM and GoI are also in the picture.  
This signboard has two sides, just like the watershed program. As we see on this side, the 
project has been announced in English that is of no use to the common villagers who 
speak and read only Marathi, the local language. But this does not mean it has no use at 
all. It shows the presence of the project to an international audience and the elite national 
audience in India that prefers information in English compared to regional languages. It 
certainly does not address the local population although it is located in the public sphere 
of the village. The other side of the signboard repeats the same information in Devnagari 
script (see Photograph 4) but retains the formulation, semantically and syntactically, as in 
the English language, hence of no use to the village people one more time. One can 
conclude that the writings in English have a stronger scientific appeal and technical 
legitimacy in the eye of the villagers as it is the language of the educated class in India.  
Points of contact between the villagers and NGOs such as these remain biased in favor of 
the NGO. Here the implementing NGO had the opportunity and authority to „set the 
discourse‟ as it were, and it chose to practice linguistic exclusion of the villagers in both 
roman and devanagari scripts. The main point to be extracted from this argument is that 
the democratic ideal of bringing awareness to the local people exists but not 
accomplished on the field. The village public space is usefully employed by the NGO to 
show to the outside world, mainly the funding agencies, that the program has reached the 
remote areas such as these. In practice, this board serves the NGO even from the village 
public sphere. This process of creating an illusionary democracy has been seen as a 
strategy of depoliticization, especially by Blühdorn (2007), who calls it „simulative 
democracy‟- a distinctive feature of the late-modern democracy. In his words:  
“The distinctive feature of late-modern democracy is, strictly speaking, not really the 
simultaneity of the participatory revolution and the post-democratic revolution, i.e., the 
simultaneity of politicization and depoliticization, but the performance or the simulation 
of this simultaneity. ..Historical evolution of democracy can now be conceptualized as the 
transformation from direct democracy via representative democracy to simulative 
democracy” (Blühdorn, 2007: 321).  
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In theory, this signboard would signify a local dissemination of information about the 
project but in practice, it delivers no concrete information to the villager. A simulation of 
transparency is at work here.  
Photograph 4: Signboard announcing the Indo-German Project in Devnagari script; 
Ahmednagar, Maharashtra  
 
Photograph 4. Signboard about the Indo-German Program, Bhoyre 
Pathar village, Ahmednagar, Maharashtra State in Devanagari 
script 
 
The village of Bhoyre Pathar was an exemplary evidence of the success of watershed 
development program as documented by the implementing NGO. A short documentary 
film made by WOTR and funded by GTZ called „Enkindled hope, resurgent spirits‟ 
(WOTR, 2006) describes the process of watershed development in the Bhoyre Pathar 
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village. This film begins with an interview of a village woman called Shobha 
Suryavanshi who talked about the “proud moment when the challenging task of 
developing a watershed of 250 hectares in this village was given exclusively to women” 
(WOTR, 2006). The film further shows village women participating in the activities of 
watershed development like taking measurements, digging and moving soil. The main 
message of this documentary was that the IGWDP has been able to empower women to 
undertake the development of their watersheds and it was great leap forward in a society, 
which is otherwise patriarchal.  
The research team visited this village and met Shobha Suryavanshi to understand her 
views on the watershed development program that was undertaken „exclusively‟ by the 
village women. Ms. Suryavanshi is the Aanganwadi worker
167
 and lives with her old 
father and a physically challenged husband. On asking about the watershed development 
program of this village, she explained that WOTR had made such a proposal and a 
women‟s committee was also formed for this purpose but the work cannot be completed 
due to „political interferences‟168. On enquiring about the exact nature of these 
interferences, she explained that:  
“Some of the interested parties in the village tried to pay 50,000 INR to the president and 
secretary of the women‟s watershed development committee asking them to refuse to 
work on the project. The village level politicians had also made a document of refusal 
and wanted these members to sign on it, and the money was offered for this signature. 
The village sarpanch and his son the up-sarpanch offered us the money to refuse to work 
on the project. When we continued to work on the watershed development, they used 
force to stop us from working. I was prepared to complain to the police but thinking 
about my children and family, I avoided involving the police into the matter. Today also, 
when I was coming here to meet you people, he called me from the Aanganwadi window 
and asked me to tell you that all the six SHGs are functional and regular. However, the 
only reason why the SHGs stopped working was political interference. I worked hard for 
the project but only faced resentment from the people. ”169 
 
From her statement, it was clear that the documentary made by WOTR is only a 
simulation of the women‟s empowerment and self-reliance while the actual events from 
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the village show us that the women of the village had very little control on the activities 
of the project that was subject to negotiation by the different political groups in the 
village. Simulation in this sense serves the purpose of presenting an empowered women‟s 
community to the funding agencies that does not exist in the actual village society but 
maintains a discursive unity between the proclaimed policies of the NGO and village-
level practices.  
We had already met the Sarpanch of the village asking about his opinion about the WDP. 
After the interview, his son, the Up-sarpanch, accompanied us to the different project 
sites and showed the work done in the watershed programs. During this visit to the fields, 
the up-sarpanch approached a farmer working in the field and asked him to pose as the 
president of the VWC (which was revealed when we questioned this farmer about the 
details of the VWC- to which he did not respond at all and looked blankly at the Up-
sarpanch asking him to answer the questions). When we expressed our desire to meet the 
Aanganwadi worker, he quickly left the scene on a motorbike and disappeared. It was 
later revealed by Suryavanshi that he came to tell her that she should say to us that all of 
the six SHGs are working and in good condition.     
One can look deeper into the issue of corruption in this project, if the time given is more 
and an elaborate study is undertaken. However, a simulation of gender-sensitive and 
participatory watershed development could not escape the eye.  
Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter has shown us how the implementation of watershed development projects 
through the NGOs and delegated governmental directorates is a strategy of governance 
that circumvents the elected local governments and transfers power of implementation 
and decision making to a wide range of nominated committees.  
It uses the example of WOTR, NABARD and WMD to show that such institutions play 
an important role in depoliticization of watershed governance at the project level. The 
next section uses the example of the village level institutions to show how the governance 
strategy that empowers institutions other than the elected local government depoliticizes 
watershed development and facilitates rent seeking. It also leads to a proliferation of local 
institutions that compete with each other for control of the watershed development 
project, ultimately neglecting the developmental goals. A simulation of decentralized 
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development is then presented in the official discourse that serves the pragmatic purpose 
of securing funds from the donor agencies. Depoliticization also means that the local 
issues and problems are displaced from the public sphere, substituted by the concerns of 
policy makers and the donor agencies. The implementing institutions convince people 
that it is also the cause of their underdevelopment and peddle the project for securing 
participation of the people that remains its only source of legitimacy owing to its 
apolitical character and method of formation.  
 The final politics in the watershed governance thus oscillates between depoliticization 
and repoliticizaiton (not confinable to a binary relation between the two) and emerges as 
an outcome of the dynamic interaction between the two. A discourse of democratic 
participation interacts with the power sharing issues of everyday politics and both 
determine and reconstitute each other in the actual governance practices in the two cases. 
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7 FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This thesis on „democratization and depoliticization of watershed governance‟ has 
explored the politicial dimensions of watershed development to make politics a legitimate 
area of enquiry in watershed development and governance discourse. It addresses an 
important aspect of development aid that is routed through the non-governmental 
agencies and delegated institutions, and has so far remained under-researched. To study 
the political dimensions of watershed development, I have synthesized the existing 
theories in political science and development studies with the aim of developing a 
conceptual framework under the umbrella concept of depoliticization within which such 
studies could be undertaken. This conceptual framework was then operationalized as an 
analytical tool that was applied in the two selected cases of IGWDP, Maharashtra and 
Hills-II project, Uttarakhand to understand the changing governance strategies in 
watershed development.   
Depoliticization provides us with a working hypothesis that the under-researched aspects 
and a lack of critical reflection on some areas in watershed development politics could be 
a part of the governing strategy that depoliticizes development by keeping certain issues 
out of the public sphere of deliberation. It is not so much by chance as by a deliberate 
effort on the part of interested parties to obscure the political negotiations that are taking 
place on a daily basis in the context of development projects. It was my attempt to 
explore these negotiations and identify entry points for making research possible in these 
areas.  
The focus of this concluding chapter is – therefore- on the theoretical and analytical 
strengths of depoliticization in terms of the researchable space that it secures and carves 
out for itself (from the competing hegemonic discourses) in analyzing the politics of 
watershed management.  
In section 7.1, I describe the conceptual apparatus that was developed under the umbrella 
concept of depoliticization and how it can be usefully applied in practical research 
situations by studying the preference-shaping and institutional aspects of depoliticization.  
In section 7.2, I revisit the two case studies and briefly describe the political dimensions 
and governance strategies that are revealed by using the lens of depoliticization. I 
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conclude this section by returning to the main concerns as outlined in the first chapter and 
explain how this thesis helps us to answer these questions in the light of the research 
findings. These two sections together provide a summary answer to the central research 
question of this thesis.  
In section 7.3, I discuss two specific research themes that emerge out of this study that 
could form the basis of future research in this area.  
In the last section, 7.4, my attempt is to link these strategies of governance in watershed 
development projects to the wider phenomenon of a perceived change in the 
understanding and practices of democracy in the modern world.  
 
7.1 Depoliticization in Practical Research 
 
This study subdivides depoliticization into two components for it to be usefully employed 
for studying practical situations in watershed governance. Preference-shaping 
depoliticization investigates the broader discursive frameworks that construct watershed 
development as a „technical‟ intervention and on this basis justify the involvement of 
technical and „apolitical‟ institutions like the NGOs as implementing agencies. This 
section shows how the political dimensions of watershed development can be usefully 
problematized by invoking the concept of preference shaping for a particular type of 
conceptual apparatus.   
7.1.1 Preference Shaping for Depoliticization  
 
 
This thesis has shown how prefernces of the implementing agencies and strategic groups 
formed during the project could be an important site of investigation for studying 
depoliticization. It has shown that the discursive construction of the debates has concrete 
and visible effects in the different phases of the watershed development project in terms 
of the goals and objectives that the different participating agencies set for themselves and 
the institutional appratus that result from it.  
The preference shaping for depoliticization is also a process of rhetorically building up an 
argument that conceals actual practices on the field. This helps in persuading the local 
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people about the usefulness of a particular program and convinces them to participate in 
it. Participation of the local people in their own development does not mean that the local 
people have decided their programs of development, but that they are gradually 
convinced to adopt a particular program that comes in the village with the help of some 
external agency, either the NGO or the govenement.  
Once the preference is shaped for a particular program, here watershed development, the 
mobilization of the village is undertaken in the form of a capacity-building program. As 
already mentioned the capacity building then remains an exercise to form a strategic 
group in the village that could convince the implementers of its capacity to perform the 
required tasks, both physical and institutional, that together make up the watershed 
program. Depoliticization of people is carried out largely by the juxtaposition of interest 
groups both from above (in the implementation circle as in IGWDP) and from below (in 
the village circle as shown in the Hills-II project).  
In the depoliticization from above situation, experts in the form of NGOs are activated to 
perfom the developmental tasks. In the IGWDP case, the NGO formed its strategic 
partnership with „capacity building‟ as its domain of expertise, the knowledge that was, 
and still is, absent from the government implemented programs.  
In the depoliticization from below, the local village group that is comprised of contractors 
and local influential people stands to gain from every project. This strategic group of 
„professional beneficiaries‟ was found to be securing the key positions and benefits from 
the project in all rural development programs. 
7.1.2 Institutions of Depoliticization  
 
This study has shown how the institutions formed for implementing the watershed 
development projects have a depoliticizing intent and effect on the project governance.  
The rationale behind forming „village watershed development committees‟, when the 73rd 
Constitutional Amendment in 1993 already empowers the village panchayat to undertake 
village development work (on 29 subjects listed in the XIth Schedule including watershed 
development) has been frequently questioned.  
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This „administrative devolution‟ of power to the VDC is underpinned by a 
depoliticization discourse in development that see it primarily as an economic activity of 
self-employment and development of cottage industries.  
On the other hand, „politicization‟ of panchayats, and the fact that panchayats do not 
constitute „ecological units‟ (with the result that boundaries of a watershed unit may not 
correspond to the village boundary included in a particular panchayat) but political units 
in a small „city- state‟, render them unfit for undertaking a watershed project that has a 
pronounced technical content.  
The relationship between VWCs and panchayats varies from one case to the other. In 
IGWDP, village panchayats were consulted but had little role to play in the workings of 
watershed program. It was mainly undertaken by the village NGO under the guidance of 
WOTR, the mother NGO. Watershed project was announced (by the NGO) in the village 
as a technical, apolitical activity and hence actively pursued a disassociation from the 
village politics or any political ideology. In case of Hiwre Bazar, and Ralegan Siddhi the 
project was undertaken by the village panchayat in a „politicized‟ manner. The 
development here could be inferred as more sustainable than in many IGWDP villages 
because of the constitutional recognition of institutions. The approach followed by 
IGWDP also has its successful examples in Darewadi, Mendhwan and many others but 
the sustainability of the institutions and maintenance of plantations, physical structures 
and sustainability of the self-help groups has been a constant problem in most of the 
visited villages in Ahmednagar.  
In Hills-II, WMD plays the role of facilitator and is a technical agency for implementing 
watershed projects in Uttarakhand. However, in its nomination of the VDC the project 
went through a pattern of formation of similar „strategic groups‟ in all villages that 
comprised of the village shopkeeper, contractors and the junior engineers. A type of 
politics that revolves around appropriation of public funds and presents it like genuine 
disbursement among the needy by keeping the paperwork right is the main problem of 
this project. The role played by Panchayat in Kimsar was almost negligible. Although the 
minutes of the meeting record that the gram pradhan would be the ex-officio patron of 
the program, the actual relationship between the VDC and gram pradhan was of mutual 
mistrust. The pradhan felt that watershed work has been left incomplete due to corruption 
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by the VDC members and the President of VDC argued that if there was any corruption 
he is not the one responsible because the demands for 30% fixed bribe came from the 
WMD staff and they had to work in limited budget of 70%. He cited the lack of funds due 
to corruption as the cause of failure of the drinking water scheme. He blamed the people 
for not paying the monthly bill for diesel and plumber while the gram pradhan contested 
that he was also a customer of the water supply scheme and paid the initial amount but 
there was no water for a single day that he should have paid for in the next month. The 
relations between the VDC and panchayat could be observed as being that of competitors 
in the process of nominating a VDC exclusively for watershed development.  
 
7.2 Main Concerns in Retrospect 
 
The first, theoretical, and specific concern of this thesis was to study the political 
dimensions of watershed development using the concept of depoliticization. The second 
concern was to operationalize this concept for undertaking research on governance 
practices and apply them in the selected case studies.  
On applying the theoretical framework to the cases, we can observe that watershed 
development projects are the sites of contestation and negotiation for the resource 
distribution. This area has not been researched extensively for the lack of a solid 
conceptual apparatus as well as the complexity involved in undertaking such research.  
The case of IGWDP in Maharashtra shows how the delegation of project funds to a 
national bank was effective in circumventing the elected ministries. The national bank 
was also able to accept the ODA funds as „grants‟ and disburse them as such so that the 
legal control of the FCR Act was bypassed.  
The formation of a new NGO as the implementing agency for IGWDP and providing it 
with the status of an „official partner also gave it the complete control over public funds 
and resources without any accountability to the local people or the national government. 
At the village level, the formation of a consensually nominated committee for 
implementing watershed development projects circumvented the elected local 
government and and provided the VDC with powers to undertake the functions that the 
elected local government is mandated to perform.  
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This thesis shows how the partnership between the donor agencies and the implementing 
NGO results in the formation of a strategic group for securing the funds for an extended 
period. BMZ has been funding this project since last 20 years. This becomes possible 
because of a discursive and institutional apparatus formed in the process that presents the 
project as a „successful intervention‟ based on the indicators of development selected by 
the NGO. These indicators remain biased in favor of the NGO and present one-sided 
view of the project based on economic and biophysical measures.  In this sense, it is 
important to ascertain „who counts development‟ and what qualifies to be counted as an 
indicator of development as most of the impact studies on the project was conducted by 
WOTR, the implementing NGO itself.  
Due to the dominance of economic model of development, efficiency and transparency in 
the working of IGWDP are seen as evidences of „good governance‟ and a measure of 
success. This project does address the economic aspects of the village life but steers clear 
of the societal power relations that cocoon the causes of poverty, of which economic 
poverty is just one among the many. It achieves economic gains for a short period of time 
in the village. As the project comes to an end, gradually the village seeps back into its 
traditional roles and social position as defined by the local community. The groups 
formed during the project disappear into oblivion as the time passes. In this way, the 
work done by IGWDP is partial in its approach as the societal component of the program 
needs a wider acknowledgement, understanding and recognition of the political nature of 
the project governance, especially at the capillary level of implementation.  
The discourse maintains the project as a „success story‟ of a participatory watershed 
development program and shapes the preferences of the donors and national governments 
towards a long term support of the project that is presented as an apolitical technical 
intervention to be carried out by apolitical NGOs that have no hidden political agenda 
(see Chapter 5). This discursive construction of watershed development projects is 
manifested in the institutional apparatus that is entrusted with the task of carrying out the 
development project. At the level of the project, NGOs substitute the state agencies and 
political ministries and at the village level, nominated committees substitute the elected 
local government. Both institutions effectively circumvent the political governments that 
are perceived to be „too political‟ and hence unworthy of trust. A comprehensive view of 
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the „hidden politcs‟ of this conceptual and institutional apparatus promoted by the 
strategic groups reveals that the watershed development project comes to be controlled by 
a small group of national and local elites for an extended period of time who appropriate 
the available resources for their individual gains in the absence of any control or 
accountability to the „demos‟. Depoliticization in this way claims democracy as its first 
and the final victim.  
The case of Hills-II project presents a similar strategy where the role of the „mother 
NGO‟ is delegated to a semi-governmental department called the Watershed 
Management Directorate (WMD). As shown in the preceeding chapters, this agency came 
into being in 1982 with funds from EEC. So far this Directorate has „completed‟ seven 
watershed development projects with funds either from the World Bank or the EEC (see 
table in Appendix-A). The establishment of WMD as a nodal agency for project 
implementation removes the watershed development programs from the direct political 
control of the government and ministries (vis-à-vis the demos) into the hands of a 
technical agency that is outside the purview of electoral control.  
Following the guidelines issued by the World Bank, WMD formed consensually 
nominated VDCs in the village for implementing the Hills-II project. This committee 
came into being as an institution that could effectively circumvent the elected local 
government that is already established, well structured and constitutionally recognized. 
As shown in chapter 6, the elected local government is rendered powerless and reduced to 
the role of a bystander without any involvement in the village watershed development 
that becomes an exclusive domain of the VDC formed by a small group of influential 
villagers. Similar to the IGWDP, the VDC in Hills-II project works without the popular 
mandate or direct accountability to the „demos‟. In this sense, depoliticization is 
simultaneously a strategy that claims democratization of development as its victim.   
 
7.3 Future Research  
 
Two possible research questions follow from the above study. In the case of donor-
recipient interaction in Maharashtra, the donors focused on those aspects in a watershed 
program that could enhance its present state, replicate the successful cases in other areas 
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by improving the project governance and using watershed projects as a platform to 
empower the local people. The Indian state represented by the Ministry of Agriculture 
saw watershed development as a small intervention with limited scope because of the 
structural problems of the world economic system. They cited the example of cotton 
farmers committing suicide in Maharashtra as a global issue that also derives from the 
international cotton prices as much as from the lack of water in the area.  
In my view, there is a need to create an ideal-speech situation between the two parties and 
explore the prerequisites of that. The politics of language in development governance is 
another area of study that remains under-researched. Habermas and his theory of 
communicative action and universal pragmatics could provide the theoretical framework 
for the study and data could be collected on the basis of international development 
projects that interact with at least two socio-political discourses, cultural values and ethics 
among others, and hence the need for an „ideal speech‟ situation that could enhance the 
project planning process.  
The other case of water supply system in Kimsar requires further research that explores 
the governance strategies for the revival of the water supply, if at all it could be revived. 
In my view, a fully politicized approach to the formation of a new committee and 
distribution of responsibilities in a democratic fashion could lead to the efficient working 
of the water system. This forms the basis of the second research project. It would be 
worthwhile to study the governance of a water system when the planning and 
implementation is fully and consciously politicized, the watershed committee is elected 
by a popular mandate using secret ballot, where the villagers conduct their own elections. 
At this stage, the pumping system could be handed over to the new committee from the 
old one. The present state of the pump and many of its pipelines would require repairs in 
a big way. Given the time of 1 year and a planned budget, a type of experimental action 
research could be designed that works towards the completion of the water supply in this 
village, observes the democratic processes that could be most sustainable and concludes 
with the establishment of a profit-making water supply system generating more money 
from revenue than its cost of operation, more water for the crops, faster construction of 
the hospital building, relief to women and children from the arduous task of water 
procurement along with a clean and sanitized Kimsar, if the experiment is successful. In 
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case of its failure, we would be in a position to understand and document the processes of 
politicized development and the obstacles that hinder its path that could be addressed in 
future development projects. The problems of water scarcity can be then resolved by 
identifying, isolating and then relocating the centrality of politics in watershed 
development. 
The mistake that present frameworks make both in a politicized and a depoliticized 
governance strategy is that they start with the community and seek to address the 
problems faced by poor and marginalized individuals. It follows from the idea of a 
„trickle down‟ effect where an empowered community will have empowered individuals 
by default. These result in real problems because not only the concept of a community 
remains contested but also because the group of village population presented as the 
„community‟ is often a juxtaposition of powerful interest groups. This prevents the 
project from trickling any further to the poor groups, minorities and women. In this sense, 
the projects never make to the target population subsumed by the vaguely understood and 
formed community-based organizations.  
In my opinion, this approach needs to be turned upside down in its method by starting 
with the individual villagers and seek to address the problems of the community. This 
does not imply an adherence to the philosophy of „individualism‟ but a focus on 
individual citizens is the stepping-stone towards building an empowered community. By 
identifying the problems faced by individual farmers, we already identify the issues that 
the community as a whole is subjected to. A „door to door‟ campaign would yield much 
better results than a loosely announced public meeting that is sparsely attended or 
attended only by the informed potential beneficiaries. Such „capacity building‟ method, if 
followed consistently for two years as claimed by the implementing agencies may be in a 
position to form an empowered community. At the same time, it would produce 
important demographic data identifying each household‟s water needs, its members, age, 
income, and education among others that could be useful for future developmental 
interventions.    
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7.4 Final Remarks: Democracy and the ‘Brave New World’ 
 
I finally contend that the concept of depoliticization could be consolidated with the help 
of other disciplines as an important tool for analyzing development projects, in particular 
with moral and ethical philosophy. Depoliticization in this view could also be usefully 
problematized as a crisis of morality in development studies.   
In this strategy of governance, development remains invisible behind a series of expert 
bodies and scientific „facts‟ that guide the developmental enterprise and the actions taken 
by it are sanctioned by techno-economic laws devoid of all subjectivity or politics. 
Development thus comes forth not as a shared global moral engagement but as an 
essential and indispensable cog in the wheel of globalizing neo-liberal market economy.  
This thesis has argued that the developmental enterprise in the third world countries are 
depoliticizing development by their different governance mechanisms, as shown in the 
two selected cases. This depoliticization of development is independent of the 
implementing agency, be it the NGO or the GO. The study has focused on the processes 
that lead to the marginalization of individuals and groups from the issues and policies that 
affect them. This has been done by analyzing the narrative and rhetoric of the projects, 
focusing on the processes of debate and decision making which often marzinalize 
individuals and groups because the norms of political discussion are biased against some 
form of expression as explicated in the two cases. The need for democratic 
communication, a positive engagement of the civil society and revitalization of the public 
sphere as a space to entertain such plural forms of communication cannot be 
overemphasized. This thesis demonstrates that both watershed management and rural 
development are interrelated and inherently political.  
Development must remain politicized because without the intervention of the state 
machinery substituted by the NGO, and open public reasoning there can be no 
improvement in the living conditions of the poor people at the scale required in India. 
And without the people and their deliberative approach to social problems all solutions 
would only be a stop-gap arrangement. Only limited success could be achieved in the 
long term without a proper role of the elected government, and there could be no 
democratically elected government without the people and their active participation in the 
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political process of development. Democracy is based on the proposition that power is 
dangerous and it is extremely important not to let any one small group have too much 
power for too long a time. The constitution is a device to limit power but it could be 
rendered useless by employing such strategies that take the developmental process 
beyond the constitutional provisions. This translates in the field by disregarding the 
amendment that recognizes the local elected government and empowering parallel 
institutions instead, or bypassing the provisions of legal acts that are designed to hold the 
development agencies accountable to the state. With depoliticization as a governance 
strategy, circumvention of democratic processes and constitutional provisions is an 
inevitable outcome. 
This study does not argue that there is something principally wrong with depoliticization 
but a general acceptance of the logic of delegation to reduce complexity and increase 
economic efficiency without any detailed or principled consideration of the 
administrative or future democratic consequences of this process is a step in the dark.  
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APPENDIX- A: Watershed Projects Implemented by Watershed 
Management Directorate, Dehradun 
 
Year Evolution of watershed work in Uttarakhand 
1978  After the dreadful floods in August 1978, the concept of 
watershed development surfaces; 
 Constitution of a high-level working group set up by the 
Governemnt of India for flood control in Ganga-Yamuna 
basin. 
1979  Submission of the recommendation report by the Central 
Working Group 
1981  Presentation of „Overall Development Plan‟ by the forest 
department of erstwhile Uttar Pradesh; 
 Decision of the forest department of the Uttar Pradesh 
government to work on the basis of watershed units through a 
„multi-disciplinary force‟ under an administrative authority in 
an integrated manner in the mountain areas based on an 
overall plan; 
 Establishment of „Watershed Management Directorate‟ 
(WMD) as a state-level administrative agency; 
 Decision to treat the entire mountain region on a micro-
watershed basis.  
1982  South Bhagirathi Phase-I Project: 
Duration 1982-1988 
Area 172 square kilometers 
District Tehri Garhwal 
Expenditure 6.46 Crorres INR 
Execution Through Line departments 
Funded by European Economic 
Commission (EEC) 
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1983  Himalayan Integrated Watershed Management Project:  
Duration 1983-1992 
Area 2867 square kilometers 
District Pauri Garhwal and Almora 
Expenditure 80.49 Crores INR 
Execution Through Line departments upto 
1988; then by project 
administration under the 
„Unified Command‟  
Funded by World Bank 
 
1988  Mid-term review of the Himalayan Integrated Watershed  
Project;  
 Shift of project executive agency from the line department to 
the project administration under the „Unified Command‟;  
 South Bhagirathi Phase-II Project:  
Duration 1988-1996 
Area 356 square kilometers 
District Tehri Garhwal 
Expenditure 19.56 Crores INR 
Execution By the project administration 
under the Unified Command 
Funded by EEC 
 
1991  
 Bhimtal Project:  
Duration 1991-1998 
Area 216 square kilometers 
District Nainital 
Expenditure 12.68 Crores INR 
Execution By the project administration 
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under the Unified Command 
Funded by EEC 
 
1993  
 Doon Valley Watershed Management Project:  
Duration 1993-2001 
Area 2408 square kilometers 
District Dehradun, Tehri and Nainital 
Expenditure 102.12 Crores INR 
Execution By the project administration 
under the Unified Command 
Funded by EEC 
 
 It involved construction, implementation and evaluation of 
rural schemes at village level; 
 Implemetation of the project on the basis of community 
participation; 
 Constitution of „Gram/Village Resource Management 
Association‟ (GAREMA) for implementing watershed 
projects; 
 Formation of self-help groups; 
 Village resource management plan for the maintainence and 
sustainability of created resources and assets.  
1999  
 Intergrated Watershed Development Program (Hills-II) 
Shiwalik Project:  
Duration 1999-2005 
Area 1573 square kilometers 
District Pauri, Udhamsingh Nagar, 
Nainital 
Expenditure 189 Crores INR 
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Execution „Based on community 
participation‟ 
Funded by World Bank 
Number of micro-watersheds  24 
 
 Planning, implementation and evaluation of the projects at the 
village level; 
 Implementation of the project on the basis of community 
participation; 
 Formation of „Gram/Village Resource Management 
Association‟ (GAREMA) for implementing watershed 
projects; 
 
2004  
 Uttarakhand Decentralized Watershed Development Project 
(UDWDP): funded by the World Bank.  
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APPENDIX-B: List of Participants in the Exposure and Dialogue 
Programme 
 
1. Ackermann, 
Jens 
 
Member of German 
Parliament,  
Petitions Committee 
 
Deutscher Bundestag 
Platz der Republik 1 
11011 Berlin 
2.  Adler, Matthias KFW Development Bank 
Country Team SSA 
 
KfW Bankengruppe 
Palmengartenstraße 5-9 
60325 Frankfurt am Main 
 
3.  Deshpande, C.B Joint Development 
Commissioner, Rajiv 
Gandhi Mission for 
Wathershed Management 
Rajiv Gandhi Mission for 
Wathershed Management 
IInd Floor, Vindhychal Bhavan 
Bhopal – 462 004 
Madhya Pradesh 
4.  D‟Souza, Dr. 
Marcella 
Executive Director 
Watershed Organisation 
Trust (WOTR) 
Watershed Organisation Trust 
(WOTR) 
"Paryavaran", Behind Market 
Yard, Ahmednagar - 414 001 
Maharashtra, India 
5.  Gaikwad, Dr. 
Ratnakar 
Member Board of Governors 
& Director 
General 
YASHADA 
Yashwantrao Chavan Academy 
of Development Administration 
(YASHADA) 
Rajbhavan Complex 
Baner Road 
Pune – 411 007/ India 
6.  Glück, 
Michael 
Programme Co-ordinatior 
Natural Resource 
Management Programme 
/German Development 
Cooperation (GTZ) 
German Development 
Cooperation 
(GTZ) Natural Resource 
Management Programme; D-
108., Anand Niketan, 
New Delhi 110 021 
7.  Höhn, Bärbel Member of German 
Parliament Committee on 
Consumer Protection, Food 
and Agriculture 
Deutscher Bundestag 
Platz der Republik 1 
11011 Berlin 
8.  Junger- 
Sharma, 
Heike 
Economist, Translator C408, Defence Colony 
New Delhi 110024, India 
9.  Kallenbach, 
Gisela 
Member of European 
Parliament Committee on 
Regional Development;  
 
Hohe Straße 58 
04107 Leipzig 
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10.  Karmakar, K 
G. 
Managing Director, 
NABARD 
National Bank for Agriculture 
and Rural Development 
(NABARD)  
Bandra-Kurla Complex, Plot No. 
C-24, A Wing, Bandra (E) 
Mumbai – 400 051 
11.  Kofler, Dr. 
Bärbel 
Member of German 
Parliament Committee on 
Economic Cooperation 
and Development 
Deutscher Bundestag 
Platz der Republik 1 
11011 Berlin 
12.  Lavekar, Dr. K Commissioner 
Agriculture Government of 
Maharashtra 
Government of Maharashtra, 
Pune 
13.  Lobo, Crispino Managing Trustee 
Watershed Organisation 
Trust (WOTR) 
Watershed Organisation Trust 
(WOTR) 
"Paryavaran", Behind Market 
Yard, Ahmednagar - 414 001 
Maharashtra, India 
14.  Mahalle, J. P Director, 
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